#hempel

This post was written by Simone Mohite, a recipient of an Archival Scholar Research Award for the 2021 Spring Semester.

2020 has proved to be anything but ordinary. With the sudden onset of the coronavirus, millions of people comprising a non-scientific jury tried to determine the rules of survival. To wear a mask or not to wear a mask? Are vaccines safe or is the data weird? Is this science, or is it pseudo-science?  

Although dismissive statements about science and questionable “scientific” claims in the public sphere are routine, the coronavirus epidemic has shown us that it is even more difficult to know who and what to trust when the doctors and scientists offer conflicting guidance. We all want to know the truth that science can tell us—in this case, to keep us safe—but what classifies something as science in the first place? To answer this question, I turned to philosopher Carl Gustav Hempel’s work on logical empiricism. I examined a manuscript from 1981 in which to understand how Hempel developed his ideas before they were ‘fixed’ into print and disseminated.  

The manuscript I chose was titled “Logical empiricism: Its problems and changes.” It is the revised text of a lecture delivered by Hempel in China in 1981. On the very first page, there is a note that says, “Revised and Submitted to Hung.” I was curious to know why Hempel was in China giving this lecture on the recent history of Western philosophy. As it was towards the end of his career, I wanted to know if Hempel had taken an interest in Chinese Philosophy, or if philosophers in China had taken an interest in him.

(Above) Title with inscription “Revised, Submitted to Hung, 6/9/81,” Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.

Before assessing the content, I began by examining the document itself. The first half of the manuscript is mainly typewritten. In the second half of this document are what appear to be Hempel’s notes for the lecture, mainly made using a black ink pen; however, visible changes and edits were made with a pencil. It looks as if the document were written in a journal notebook, from both the size of the writing and comparing it to the typewritten pages. His handwriting on these notes is significantly more legible than other notes available at the archive under Hempel’s name, which made me think someone else was probably supposed to read this – possibly for more edits.

(Above) Page 1, typed, Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.

(Above) Page 2, notes. Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.

Another thing I found interesting was Hempel’s remarks on the second page in the handwritten journal. They stated, “I remember my teachers with great respect and gratitude, but in the course of time, I have found certain difficulties in their ideas” (Hempel, 1981). Hempel then omits this from the revised text. I plan to delve deeper into Hempel’s correspondence to see which teachers he may be referring to and how he came to disagree with their ideas. I noticed other omissions between the two versions of the text, but they seem generic, as if he was refining his language for publishing this text.  

(Above) Page 22, notes. Examples of generic corrections in the lecture. Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.

I then turned my attention to the content of these versions of Hempel’s texts. My brief analysis helped me develop two insights, and additional research helped me begin to answer my questions about Hempel’s relation to China and Chinese philosophy. First, this manuscript helped me figure out what the Logical Empiricists and members of the Vienna Circle characterized ‘pseudoscience’. To my surprise, figuring out what separated scientific truth from metaphysics was an issue that logical empiricists, like Hempel, were thinking about back in the 1930s! They were concerned with verifications and considered any metaphysical statement meaningless.  

Second, this manuscript provides evidence of who had influenced Hempel’s philosophy and who he may have had corresponded with. In Hempel’s lecture he mentioned a few recurring references to philosophers in Berlin and the Vienna Circle, such as Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolph Carnap. However, the one that particularly interested me was “Professor Hung” – likely the same Hung from the first page!  

As it turns out, I soon discovered that ‘Professor Hung’ was Tscha Hung, a Chinese Philosopher who was curious about logical empiricism and the foundations of truth (Cohen, 1996). This evidence provided an answer to my initial question: it seems Hempel was invited to China because Hung had an interest in Logical Empiricism and Western philosophy. Cohen (1996) mentions that he had heard of Hung while having a conversation with Marie Neurath Reading Hempel’s notes in the second half of this manuscript, I found Hempel’s account of meeting Professor Hung in Vienna.  Apparently, Hung also attended the Vienna Circle meetings or one of the classes taught by either Moritz Schlick or Carnap. Hempel also mentions that the next encounter he had with Professor Hung was when he was giving a lecture in China 50 years later! Comparing the handwritten lecture and the revised version, I saw that Hempel had omitted this story about meeting Hung, which was surprising to me, considering that he was delivering this lecture in person, with Professor Hung in attendance. However, the final typewritten version might be an article he wrote, based on said lecture, so that may have led him to cut out all the informal sentences spoken at this lecture.  

Works Cited  

Cohen, R. S., Risto. Hilpinen, and Renzong. Qiu. “Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science : Beijing International Conference, 1992 ” Dordrecht ;: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.

A Very Short Fact: On this day in 1905, German philosopher of science, C.G. Hempel was born in Oranienburg, Germany. He is famous for his contributions to the philosophy of science and explanation. He is known best for the “raven paradox,” which challenges our intuitions about what constitutes evidence for our beliefs.

“Hempel noted that scientific explanations are usually given in response to what he called ‘explanation-seeking why-questions’. These are questions such as ‘why is the earth not perfectly spherical?’ or ‘why do women live longer than men?’—they are demands for explanation. To give a scientific explanation is thus to provide a satisfactory answer to an explanation-seeking why-question. If we could determine the essential features that such an answer must have, we would know what scientific explanation is.

Hempel suggested that scientific explanations typically have the logical structure of an argument, i.e. a set of premises followed by a conclusion. The conclusion states that the phenomenon which needs explaining occurs, and the premises tell us why the conclusion is true. Thus suppose someone asks why sugar dissolves in water. This is an explanation-seeking why-question. To answer it, says Hempel, we must construct an argument whose conclusion is ‘sugar dissolves in water’ and whose premises tell us why this conclusion is true. The task of providing an account of scientific explanation then becomes the task of characterizing precisely the relation that must hold between a set of premises and a conclusion, in order for the former to count as an explanation of the latter. That was the problem Hempel set himself.” — From ‘Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (2nd edition)’ by Samir Okasha

[Pg. 37 — From ‘Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (2nd edition)’ by Samir Okasha.]

The teacher had been doing some simple errands along with walking Benvolio and Hempel when he came across the other, immediately becoming concerned as he saw how injured his double was. Goodness... He did not know what had occurred but it was best to treat the wound before his condition worsened.

He carefully ventured close to the other and searched his pockets until he found some bandages, gesturing towards him as Benvolio whined and nuzzled against the other and Hempel squawked and leaned over to play with his double’s jacket.

Hey! I’ve got two answers for you.

The first answer, and the main one, is no, there’s nothing inherently wrong with “cold” writing in the first person. It’s absolutely a style. Ernest Hemingway is known for his lack of adjectival writing, and many love and praise him for it.

But I think there’s more to be said here.

Here’s a piece of advice from the creative nonfiction world that ended up helping me out in all genres: when the action is hot, write cold. When the action is cold, write hot. Allow me to provide an example from Stephen King’s “Carrie”.

Miss Desjardin, their slim, nonbreasted gym teacher, stepped in, craned her neck around briefly,and slapped her hands together once, smartly. “What are you waiting for, Carrie? Doom? Bell infive minutes.” Her shorts were blinding white, her legs not too curved but striking in theirunobtrusive muscularity. A silver whistle, won in college archery competition, hung around herneck. 

The girls giggled and Carrie looked up, her eyes slow and dazed from the heat and the steady,pounding roar of the water. “Ohuh?” 

It was a strangely froggy sound, grotesquely apt, and the girls giggled again. Sue Snell hadwhipped a towel from her hair with the speed of a magician embarking on a wondrous feat andbegan to comb rapidly. Miss Desjardin made an irritated cranking gesture at Carrie and steppedout. 

Carrie turned off the shower. It died in a drip and a gurgle. 

It wasn’t until she stepped out that they all saw the blood running down her leg.

[I have to disclaim here that I find this passage problematic and male-gazey in terms of content, but it does illustrate the idea pretty well.] King spends a lot of prose on the set up here, in particular on the inconsequential details of Miss Desjardin’s appearance. The lengthy prose is musical and full of adjectives and pulls you close into the scene, drawing your gaze from the coach to Carrie’s eyes to Sue’s towel, lingering on the noises, all to evoke a feel for the room.

But when the real action happens, all that disappears. He drops the ‘hot’ evocative language, loses all the adjectives, and takes you right to the moment. The lack of couching language gives the image a shock value, clearing away all imagery of the room so that Carrie herself stands out a stark and lonesome figure. The reader is placed right in with the other locker room girls, seeing exactly what they see how they see it. Our eye is forced to concentrate on the blood. The action becomes what evokes the emotion, instead of the prose.Each author is going to have a different balance between stark language and rich prose. Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s work is full of imagery and adjectival prose. Amy Hempel is famous for the extreme experimental starkness of her stories, in which she leaves out every detail she possibly can while still maintaining a story. You are going to have your own unique balance.

That said, here’s a second answer. I do think it’s am important and useful exercise to write outside your strengths and tendencies, and to concentrate on one particular skill and experiment with it and exercise it. You may find it useful to take a scene you are having a hard time with, and trying to write it with the purplest prose you possibly can. The expectation here is not that the purple prose version will be great. In fact, a lot of it is liable to be pretty awful. But the experiment will exercise the muscle. Then you can set the purple scene aside and write it with your starkest prose possible. Probably this scene also won’t be exactly what you want either. Set it aside again. Hide them both and don’t look at them. Write the scene again, the best you can. I suspect you’ll find you naturally incorporate some of the best from both the other versions.

For still more practice, you could go back into each version of your scene and revise it as if it were the writing you planned to stick into your story. Revision is such an underrated skill, and practicing it will yet again get you to pay attention to when you use ‘cold’ writing and when you use ‘hot’ writing and why you’re making the choice to use it when.

Frieda Hempel (1884-1955) was a German soprano and became the favorite singer of Emperor Wilhelm II.

In New York she has performed over 200 times at The Metropolitan Opera. Here is an original program announcement for a concert at Carnegie Hall on March 25, 1925.