Hi, diagnosed traumagenic DID system here. (Not endogenic)
If you tell people to fuck off and to not interact, they can't exactly provide you with the evidence you're asking for without breaking your DNI, which is why we're reblogging. As well as, DNIs go both ways - if you don't want them to interact with you, then please don't post about them.
Medical & Non-Medical (Endogenic) System Sources By Guardians System, a diagnosed traumagenic DID system with PTSD and CPTSD Youâre welcome
What's important to understand is that, when endogenic systems are talking about their experiences, they're not talking about having a complex dissociative disorder without trauma. Plurality/systemhood and having a CDD are two different things, as has been acknowledged many times in medical literature. You can find a list of references on 'system' here,
đŹ 0  đ 4  â€ïž 12 · â So then, what is a system? â · In the context of CDDs, multiplicity, and plurality, a "system" is a collection of parts,
They aren't claiming to have a CDD without trauma. They're not glorifying a disorder they don't say they have. They're well aware a CDD isn't having friends in your head - they're not talking about having a CDD. They're not saying multiplicity can't come from trauma. They are saying they experience plurality without it being a disorder, and without it being caused by trauma. Some have trauma, some have a CDD because of their trauma, but trauma didn't cause their system.
Their experiences are in line with the definition of mental disorders, and how they work.
The question of âwhat is a mental disorder?â is central to the philosophy of psychiatry, and has crucial practical implications for psychiat
- "A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or development processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above."
- âThe DSM-5 wording indicates that mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or impairment. The word âusuallyâ may be technically accurate, in that on rare occasions, a mental disorder is listed in DSM-5, and there is no âclinical criterionâ. However, given that psychiatric symptoms are often on a continuum with normality, the clinical criterion is one key way of providing a relatively valid and reliable marker of underlying dysfunction, so lessening the risk of false positives and over-medicalization.â
The insistence of staying Plural even as at the end of therapy is something I've encountered throughout my career. More conservative leaders in my field insist that there's only one cure to DID and that's complete fusion and integration. The fact of the matter is that it's up to the client to decide how they want to be and how they define themselves. From my perspective, and that is in line with the DSM principles, one can have all the phenomenological manifestations of the DID, but if thereâs a sense of well-being, internal communication, cooperation, awareness, exchange of information, and external functioning is intact, then it's just a different way of being. It's not a disorder.
It's when they are unable to meet their obligations in real life and are unable to advance their goals in life, when they are experiencing internal strife and conflict and are paralyzed and unable to conduct their lives effectively [that itâs a disorder]. That's in the functioning domain. That's one criteria, a very important criteria. Scholastic, academic, work, family relations, functioning and all that, if it's not impaired, then there's no problem. That's the objective criteria. And then the subjective criteria is distress. So if you're not bothered by multiplicity in the sense that you don't feel that you're being taken over against your will, if you're not losing time, if there's no depression and anxiety associated with this disorder, if some parts are sort of leaking distress to other parts. That subjective criteria is another important indication that one needs help. But in other situations where these two criteria are not met, a person can be completely dissociative in the sense that they are functioning as a system and still not meet even the DSM criteria. Because in the DSM, for almost each and every diagnostic entity there is a condition that it must impair functioning or create distress. And unless this condition is met, then there is no diagnosis.
There's a great need out there to identify those who have multiple worlds and identities to identify the other forms of multiplicity and dissociation out there, and to label and understand better the variance ranging from normal and adaptive to excessive and abnormal and distress producing, and develop ways to help those who need help and want help. That's where we're at now.
It was apparent from visual inspection of the data that most of the MPD cases in the general population were radically different from clinical MPD patients. These people often did not report abuse histories and often reported experiencing little psychopathology. They had low DES scores (only one scored above 20). By reviewing the DDIS profile of each person positive for MPD I identified six individuals who appeared to have pathologic posttraumatic MPD, which was 1.3% of the entire sample.
These six individuals had abuse histories and substantial amounts of symptomatology. For instance, two met criteria for BPD and four had had a major depressive episode. Although they were clearly more symptomatic than the eight individuals positive for MPD who did not report childhood abuse, they were not as disturbed as clinically diagnosed MPD patients. Eight cases (1.8% of the entire sample) were possible false-positive diagnoses of MPD in individuals who did not report childhood trauma or extensive symptomatology.
Although the study yielded only a small sample of 14 individuals positive for MPD, the findings raise a number of issues. How should we think about the eight individuals who felt they had distinct personality states, but who did not appear to have clinical MPD? The first possibility is that the DDIS is not valid in nonclinical populations: These eight individuals may have DDNOS or no DD. In the absence of blind validation studies, all conclusions must be tentative.
The second possibility is that there is no problem with the DDIS, but instead with the DSM-III-R criteria: Perhaps the DDIS reflects the true prevalence of DSM-III-R MPD in the general population, but the DSM-III-R criteria yield false positives. Third, several of the eight apparently atraumatic individuals may be amnesic for abuse they experienced and unaware of their amnesia. Some of these individuals may be in a period of quiescence or remission, may have had more florid MPD in the past, or may develop overt MPD in the future if subjected to enough stress.
Another possibility is that multiplicity exists in a nonpathologic endogenous form in the general population. About 2% of people may be natural multiples who do not have dysfunctional posttraumatic MPD, They may simply have a highly dissociative psychic organization. If subjected to child abuse, these individuals would have developed clinical MPD with all its symptoms, self-destructiveness, and dysfunctional amnesia. The threshold for development of pathologic MPD in response to trauma is presumably low in such individuals, if they exist.
DSM-III-R criteria function well in clinical populations to differentiate MPD from other diagnostic groups, however it appears that more complex criteria are required to differentiate pathologic MPD with numerous personality states, complicated amnesia barriers, and severe trauma histories from individuals with nonpathologic atraumatic multiplicity.
The existence of mild, nonpathologic variants of MPD in the general population is consistent with the findings for all other forms of mental disorder. Simply having distinct personality states that feel subjectively like separate people may not in itself be a mental illness. This may be true even if the personality states have separate names and converse out loud with each other inside the personâs head. The DSM-II-R criteria for MPD do not make this distinction between psychiatric disorder and normal psychic organization. It is likely that the 14 individuals positive for MPD in the study have provided preliminary information about a heterogeneous group of people, some with disorders of varying etiology, and some with no psychiatric disorder.
âIt can be boiled down to several categories. 1. DID and OSDD as defined by DSM-5 - which require distress and dysfunction. Neither of these require trauma by DSM-5 rules but there virtually always is trauma. 2. Other DSM-5 dissociative disorders. 3. People with parts and trauma but no distress or dysfunction. 4. People with parts but no trauma, and no distress or dysfunction. - Like everything in DSM-5 there are mild versions that don't meet full criteria and don't have distress or dysfunction. One of the problems in the discussion is that people often have fixed ideas and rules about 'how it has to be' - unfortunately for them, the real world doesn't always follow those rules.â
Dissociation and multiplicity have existed outside of pathological experiences for a very, very, very long time. It's been noted in scientific research, discussed by medical professionals, and acknowledged by DID experts, in a variety of different contexts, including the authors of The Haunted Self, and including brain scans.
"Our definition of dissociation pertains to a division of the personality in the context of trauma. We are aware that this division may also occur in hypnosis and mediumship, that several other definitions of dissociation also address these other contexts, and that there are some indications that dissociation in these other contexts is also best understood as a division of personality."
âIn Canada, for example, where possession and trance experiences are not broadly accepted cultural or religious practices, 32% of individuals from a large sample reported having experienced them at least once, and 19% reported having experienced them between 10 and 50 times in their lives. Other research from general and clinical (DID) populations, conducted in the United States and Turkey suggests that possession is not a culture-bound phenomenon. Thus, cases such as Dona Saraâs are likely to occur elsewhere. Future revisions of the DSMâ5 need to include a more sophisticated framework that portrays these experiences as universal rather than culture or religious bound. This would be substantiated by what is known about variations of these experiences at not only the cultural level but the level of individual differences, including gender and personality trait.â
(^we have many more examples, but will keep this bit short unless otherwise wanted)
âThe fMRI showed a significant decrease of connectivity in the Default Mode Network (DMN) especially between the posterior cingulate cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex. Our results and their contrast with the available data on fMRI in DIDs allows to draw the hypothesis of a continuum between healthy mind - where multiple identities may coexist at unconscious level and may sometimes emerge to the consciousness - and DIDs, where multiple personalities emerge as dissociated, ostensibly autonomous components yielding impaired functioning, subject's loss of control and suffering. If this is the case, it seems more reasonable to refrain from seeking for a clear-cut limit between normality (anyway a conventional, statistical concept) and pathology, and accept a grey area in between, where ostensibly odd but non-pathological experiences may occur (including so-called non-ordinary mental expressions) without calling for treatment but, rather, for being properly understood.â
"Our strongest finding, and the one we had predicted before we started, was that tulpa possession reduced activity in a brain area--the pre-supplementary motor area--that is very important to planning actions and having a feeling of agency over your actions. This shows that tulpa systems really are shifting the basic building blocks of the sense of agency in the brain, which is pretty cool. We also found another brain change during tulpa possession, in a specific cluster in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. This cluster is interesting too because other studies have shown that it's specifically involved in what's been called "self-other merging". So basically when tulpas are possessing the body, our results suggest that the brain is shifting the way it's processing who is in control--reducing the sense of the self's agency (presumably the host) and merging between the sense of self and the other (presumably the tulpa)."
"They donât show signs of psychosis or anything like dissociative identity disorder, although there are phenomenological similarities. In terms of switching between identities, you donât often see amnesia between identities, and the symptoms very rarely cause distress or dysfunction. Most of the Tulpamancers find this practice to be very life affirming, and helping them to feel a sense of connection, a sense of support - help them develop pro-social qualities. This is also a culturally sanctioned practice, itâs deliberately cultivated. Itâs important to distinguish this from pathological things like dissociative identity disorder, or psychosis."
(^the brain scans on Tulpamancy apply to endogenic systems)
"There are similarities between these advanced tulpamancy techniques and the experiences of DID diagnosed folk, namely having multiple identities and dissociating from the bodyâs actions. However, the absence of amnesia, depersonalization, and other traumagenic symptoms in most tulpamancers make these techniques a reportedly positive and mutually enjoyable experience."
"Because non-traumagenic plural experiences rarely affect functioning, they have fallen very much under the radar of researchers, academics, and mental health professionals. The existing body of research on non-DID plurality is limited to online surveys and theory, and this must change. The lack of social, scientific, and medical awareness and understanding of plurality causes stigmatization, misdiagnoses, and mistreatment. Further research is a necessity to counter this."
"Plural experiences are not limited to tulpas and dissociative disorders. In fact, when the diversity of plural experience is considered, multiplicity may seem to be less of an extraordinary achievement and more of a fundamentally human experience. Many fiction writers, for example, report that the characters of their design seem to come to life in their heads, behaving autonomously and being perceived as full-fledged consciousnesses. Religious individuals of faiths where the God, Gods, or spirits they believe in can interact with them to a degree report similar phenomena, regardless of their specific religion or culture. There are also online communities tangential to tulpas where members report being plural as long as they can remember, but do not experience uncontrolled dissociation. And, of course, there is also tulpamancy. Tulpamancy is one way to willfully create new identities. It is a means to become plural."
"Both the congregants of the Vineyard church who are featured in Luhrmannâs book and the tulpamancers of the r/Tulpas subreddit seek to build a relationship with a being whom they understand as separate from themselves, yet able to communicate with them through their own interior experiences. This being is imagined in the sense that it takes shape and is communicated with through the matrix of the imagination. It is important to note that I do not use the term âimaginedâ to mean something that is wholly imaginary and thus unreal. The presence of an imagined being within the mind does not proscribe the existence of the being outside the mind, just as imagining a loved one in a daydream does not invalidate their reality outside of the daydream. Rather, the imagined being exists in the mind and gains reality in that form specifically.â
"Both Luhrmann and Taves offer theories for why certain people are better able to craft believable mental narratives than others. Luhrmann speaks on absorption, the trait of being able to lose yourself in something and have the world around you seem different as a result. It is âthe mental capacity common to trance, hypnosis, dissociation, and to most imaginative experiences in which the individual becomes caught up in ideas or images or fascinations.â It is related to hypnotizability because both involve subsuming yourself into an experience wholly and intensely. Luhrmannâs theory of attentional learning and Tavesâ conceptualization of high hypnotizability as traits which foster vivid internal imagery bear parallels to research done on authors of adult fiction about the illusion of independent agency: that is, whenâa fictional character is experienced by the person who created it as having independent thoughts, words, and/or actions.âOne study found that ninety-two percent of adult writers of fiction experienced the illusion of independent agency, noting that those who had been writing for longer were better able to experience their characters as independent people, indicating that bringing characters to life in oneâs mind is a skill that improves with practice. Characters can become autonomous to the point of rebellion, leading authors to bribe the characters to commit the actions in the storyline that the writer desires.â
"Psychologist Jim Davies argues that imagined characters, including imagined companions, hallucinations, and fictional characters in narratives, are by default non-autonomous but can gain autonomy if their personalities are âwell-practiced.â Practicing the characterâs personality allows the mind to autonomize their thinking so that it becomes effortless and essentially hidden from the imaginerâs mind.â
(^and before Tulpamancy/"the chronically online people")
"Results showed that slightly more than half of all subjects tested produced scores in the multiplicity range, strongly supporting the hypothesis that personality multiplicities frequently occur in the normal population."
"The term personality multiplicities refers to an individual's possession of at least two distinct personal identities or self-concepts, each of which is complete in itself and capable of standing alone as an independent, coherent personality. Several writers have referred to such multiplicities as multiple identities or multiple selves. Others have referred to these as subpersonalities. [] Personality multiplicities differ from role playing in that the former are states intrinsic to the individual. They literally are the person. However, it has been noted that role play can begin as a pretend situation for an individual and then develop into a genuine reflection of their alternative selves or identities.â
"Another source of information dealing with personality multiplicities comes from clinical psychology. Since Prince described a patient who came to him in 1898 with Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have collected a great deal of information about the condition. At present, there is little doubt among clinicians that personality multiplicities exist, at least within clients exhibiting MPD, and increasingly multiplicities are being recognised in other contexts as well. Although the present study centers on the existence of multiplicities within the normal population rather than those exhibiting pathology, there is obviously a certain degree of overlap between the two, and the clinical area provides information relevant to the evaluation of personality multiplicities in general.â
"The idea that each of us is made up of often conflicting multiple personalities was stated most clearly, perhaps, by the Italian psychologist Roberto Assagioli, who founded a form of therapy called Psychosynthesis. "We are not unified," he wrote. "We often feel we are because we do not have many bodies and many limbs, and because one hand doesn't usually hit the other. But, metaphorically, that is exactly what does happen within us. Several subpersonalities are continually scuffling: impulses, desires, principles, aspirations are engaged in an unceasing struggle."
"The Watkinses recognized that ego-states were similar in content to Hilgard's hidden observers and also to the alters found in their MPD patients. In one study, wrote Helen: "when Hilgard's 'hidden observers' were activated in normal college students as hypnotic subjects, further inquiry into their nature and content elicited organized ego-states. We... consider that hidden observers and ego-states are the same class of phenomena. They represent cognitive structural systems that are covert, but are organized segments of personality, often similar in content to true, overt multiple personalities. The Watkinses, however, noted a clear distinction between the ego- states found in normal people and the alters in their MPD patients. Ego-states did not "take over" their hosts entirely because, as the Watkinses put it, the boundaries between them were permeable. Instead of being entirely cut off from each other, they shared memories and acknowledged each other's existence.â
"This book is not for or about people with MPD-it is about the normal multiplicity common to us all. But understanding a little about that extreme form of multiplicity may help us to understand our own selves, because although the behavior of people with this condition seems bizarre, they are probably not as different from the rest of us as we like to believe.â
"The topic of this study was the self-perceived experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state. The research sought to affirm and expand the construct of inner selves as proposed by early theorists such as Assagioli (1965), Binet (1890/1977, 1896/1977), Federn (1955), James (1890), Janet (1907), and Jung (1916/1969). This study utilized transpersonal methods to investigate the transformative qualities of working with inner selves and their relationships with each other, the exterior world, and the sacred. The above theorists all proposed that the existence of inner personalities could be an ordinary occurrence for the normal person. [] Jung's comments on multiplicity draw attention to the fact that it need not be considered a psychopathology and can be an ordinary experience of those who are psychologically healthy. He advocates that inner multiplicity be viewed as entirely within the framework of ordinary or normal.â
"The phrase "self-perceived experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state" refers to the multiplicity (or inner selves) described by Beahrs as co-consciousness: The existence within a single human organism of more than one consciously experiencing psychological entity, each with some sense of its own identity or selfhood, relatively separate and discrete from other similar entities, and with separate conscious experiences occurring simultaneously with one another within this human organism. The multiplicity explored in this study is that which I believe occurs naturally and is experienced by the ordinary, everyday, common person, as opposed to the more publicized multiplicity experienced by persons with multiple personality disorder. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, multiple personality disorder was renamed Dissociative Identity Disorder. Since the word normal is used in statistical research to indicate the middle of the bell curve, I have chosen to use the statement "self-perceivedâ experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state to contrast with the pathological state of disordered multiplicity.â
"My curiosities led me to extensive reading on multiplicity, much of which is in the literature review section of this study. I found the prime opinion to be an association of ordinary inner multiplicity with dissociation. Following this logic, multiplicity is considered to be created by an experience so distressful that a new self is created to handle it. This process is called dissociation in psychology; however, dissociation itself is not considered a psychological disorder until it reaches severe stages demonstrating irrational behavior and emotional pain. There appears to be a multiplicity continuum that ranges from a person's being totally unaware of these interior selves, on through awareness and usefulness, all the way to dysfunctional. Dissociation itself does not indicate a disorder, but the degree of dissociation may fall into that category.â
"Adults might interpret reports of autonomy in a pretend friend as evidence that the child is confused about the friend's fantasy status or even as suggesting a dissociative disorder. Actually, we might have similar suspicions about an adult who described imagined characters as having minds of their own-until the adult is identified as a novelist. In the positively-regarded context of creative writing, we are willing to accept the possibility of phenomenological peculiarities; we do not question the adult's mental health. Writers certainly become immersed in the fantasy worlds they create and, as they work, may lose track of their real-world surroundings, but we doubt that novelists are seriously confused about the fantasy/ reality distinction. In the case of children, it is also possible that their grasp of the fantasy-reality distinction is independent of their perception of imaginary friends as autonomous. Yet, on the occasions that an imagined character is experienced as thinking and acting independently, he or she must seem eerily real.â
âThe theory of self-plurality can be found across a range of therapy modalities and includes such concepts as, âinner family systemsâ, âsubpersonalitiesâ, âparts of selfâ, âinner childâ, âconfigurations of selfâ, and âplural identityâ. Some writers have explicitly distanced this theory from the more controversial and stigmatised diagnosis of âmultiple personalityâ or âdissociative identity disorderâ, but it is now more commonly accepted that the existence of separate parts or aspects of self is a universal experience, and not a pathological state as such. In childhood, our fluid sense of self shifts and morphs depending on context (school, play, home) and arises from our ability to role play and enter imaginary worlds, experimenting with different personality traits and characters.â
âIn contrast, recognizing that multiple self-schemas operate at different times, in different contexts, or even simultaneously requires greater cognitive effort. For example, Hermans and Kempen argue that accessing the multiplicity of the self often involves active engagement in internal dialogues, which is less automatic than maintaining a unitary perspective. Similarly, the motivation to confirm a unified and consistent self-concept may limit individuals' awareness of their inner diversity. Therefore, the multiple self-mode is likely to be less accessible than the unitary self-due to the psychological effort required and the inherent preference for self-coherence.â
(and more recent research)
"As for those who may identify as Plural but report no trauma history, there is valid concern on several counts. One, is that reports of Plurality without traumagenic origin could undermine the most recent research that defends DID as a trauma-based disorder against those who have dismissed it for far too long, despite so much research and evidence already. However, even within the Plural community, Plurality is a broader concept than DID, and that is understood by Plurals who claim no trauma history. Furthermore, the research confirming DID as a trauma-based disorder is doing just that: confirming traumagenic DID, the disorder, not Plurality, the identity.â
âMany multiples with DID therefore are not plurals. Conversely, there are plurals who do not have DID. Of those plurals who donât have DID, many once met diagnostic criteria but no longer do, while remaining multiple. They may cease to meet criteria because they no longer meet the distress/impairment criterion; on cliniciansâ parts, the judgment as to whether or not a multiple merits the diagnosis of DID will probably especially often concern whether the clientâs multiplicity per se is impairing them. But plurals may also not meet diagnostic criteria because they no longer meet the amnesia criterion as the latter is framed, since multiple headmates may share their knowledge and experiences with each other. Some plurals identify with the diagnosis to the extent that they believe that their system was produced by traumaâa major factor in the etiology of DIDâbut claim that they never strictly met diagnostic criteria.â
"Importantly, there are also systems that donât have their origin in trauma to begin with. Some systems are intentionally created through soâcalled tulpamancy. Tulpamancy is a practice or set of practices undertaken with the intention of creating an autonomous sentient being âinsideâ, and of course using, oneâs brain; beings created in this way are called tulpas, and the people who created them are called tulpamancers. Tulpamancy has received a little popular media attention, but not much academic attention, although VessiĂšre and Laursen are important exceptions. People engage in this practice for a diversity of reasons, ranging from simple curiosity to loneliness and the perceived desirability of creating a companion that one can carry around inside oneself, in a sense.â
âThen there are ânaturalâ or âendogenicâ systems. Some claim that they were just always multiple people, without ever having experienced childhood trauma of the sort that is generally believed to be the precipitating factor for DID and without having intentionally and effortfully created headmates in the way that tulpamancers do; other natural systems say that while they have experienced such traumaâjust as have many singletsâthey were already multiple by that time. Natural systemsâ causal origins could perhaps just be some kind of neurobiological difference (or abnormality); alternatively, several systems I spoke to expressed the belief that authors may sometimes inadvertently create headmates in the process of vividly imagining fictional characters. Note that this could be viewed either as inadvertent tulpamancy orâfrom the standpoint of a narrative account of the selfâas just the same sort of process by which a singlet brain âcreatesâ one person.â
âPlurality and dissociative identity disorder are not exactly the same. Being plural, or having two or more people existing in one body or space, is just one part of the diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder. Many people who are plural do not experience distress from the existence of others within themselves although dissociative identity disorder and plurality are frequently associated with trauma, there are those who are plural and report no history of trauma. The case presentation in this chapter describes someone with severe trauma, but this is not a definitive or universal reason for the existence of plurality.â
âMultiplicity experiences âjust happening to developâ was a common narrative, often noted by participants as being âendogenic multiplicityâ, as opposed to âtraumagenic multiplicityâ which the community often refer to those whose experiences have a traumatic origin. Endogenic in this context describes peopleâs experiences which do not have a basis in trauma. This is often used as a catch-all term to describe the various other specific reasons which are not focused on trauma. Often within online discussions, this terminology is used to assign people to groups â either a traumagenic or endogenic system. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this interpersonal grouping and ensuing gatekeeping of experiences can be damaging for some systems, particularly people who are just starting to understand their experiences. The overwhelming narrative presented regarding frameworks was that regardless of reasons behind the emergence, or theories that people can map their experiences onto, the experiences exist now and would not be changed by respondents. Rather than spending time trying to understand why they exist, instead people focused on how they could work together, and develop positive internal relationships.â
"The understanding presented within this research relates to the notion of âendogenicâ multiplicity; people who do not have trauma histories that are of relevance. Participants noted that for some, there was a history of trauma, but they did not feel that their trauma was the origin of their multiplicity, and instead felt that they would be a multiple system regardless of their background. Christensen (2022) indicated that endogenic forms of multiplicity are distinct experiences, which concurs with the present project. [] Overall, while there is awareness of commonalities across different mental health experiences, the present research has identified and explored key characteristics which do not require specific clinical support, diagnoses, or clinical treatment pathways. Multiples can live well as a multiple self. As discussed in Chapter 2, this research supports the consideration of a continuum on which multiplicity is one experience. While this notion was developed by Janet in the 1920âs, it still remains understood that not all experiences fall neatly into specific categories, and as such a broader understanding of a range of behaviours and experiences is needed within healthcare and within the general public understanding. Further, for people who discussed having a traumatic basis, some believed that other situations and events occurred for specific headmates to develop, outside of the traumatic experience. As each self internally is a separate identity with their own origin, thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, their development is also understandably individual.â
âCultural manifestations of dissociative-spectrum and psychosis-spectrum experiences have been discussed in numerous ways, and as such cultural understandings remain lacking and unclear. However, it is important for individuals, and by association, professionals who work with those experiencing DID or other disorders to explore and understand the varying nature of identity across cultures. As discussed in Chapter 2.4.3, understandings of culture and its impact on identity can be linked to the notion of âdouble consciousnessâ whereby there is a difference between how others see you versus how you see yourself. The two understandings get internalised into two co-existing views of the self. Double consciousness has been explored in relation to trauma and dissociation, with Ćar developing a theory of functional dissociation whereby the âsociological selfâ is differentiated from the âpsychological selfâ. While this model argues for inclusion of the âtrauma selfâ within the âpsychological selfâ, within the current research it could be argued to not be required. By viewing the experience within such a framework, multiplicity experiences can be argued to be ânormalâ manifestations of multiple selves.â
"Dissociative identity disorder and depersonalizationâderealization have attracted research and clinical interest, facilitating greater understanding. However, little is known about the experience of multiplicity of self outside of traumagenic or illness constructs. Consequently, this systematic review explored how people identifying as having multiple selves conceptualize their experiences and identity. [] Multiplicity can encompass various presentations as described in this review. Continuum within this context can be defined as a range of experiences that involve similar characteristics from âsubclinicalâ expressions to clinically significant symptoms, which are typically observed in individuals diagnosed with disorders such as DID. The experiences of those who identify as multiple vary widely from distressing and life threatening when identities lack communication and engage in harmful behaviours, to life saving or enhancing through internal support and positive relationships."
"Individuals discussed the link between their experiences and past traumatic events, which they often felt was part of the development of multiplicity; however, the conceptualizations of their trauma varied. While some discussed multiplicity in terms of protective factors against trauma, others felt experiences were separate from prior trauma. Often not captured within research that solely focuses on clinical aspects of multiplicity, not all experiences were discussed as being a result of trauma, which added to the complexity in understanding. The lack of standardized language was a barrier to understanding. Overall, a variety of unique terminology was reported, including âmultiplesâ, âresidentsâ and âplural identityâ. As a result, participants felt misaligned with current discussions around multiplicity, which is often more complex than current criteria and language elucidates.â
âThe findings of this review support the notion that multiplicity experiences are complex and varied, existing across a continuum inclusive of multiplicity, DID and derealizationâdepersonalization. Findings also recognized that individuals with lived experiences can struggle to articulate their experiences, perhaps due to a limited framework of available language, representative of our developing understanding and the nuances surrounding multiplicity. Consequently, as with other mental health experiences, multiplicity is often oversimplified and depersonalized, leading people to question their identity, exacerbating one of the central tenants of depersonalization, rather than supporting self-acceptance. As detailed in Table 2, there are unique features associated with multiplicity, DID and depersonalizationâderealization disorder, which warrant individual exploration, terminology and support.â
"While aligning with a pathological framework, the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation also recognizes that a significant population of those with DID are unable or unwilling to unify into a singular self, instead working towards better communication and coordination among the various identities within the system. This outcome is fairly common, as Christensen found that 78% of 863 individuals that self-reported a diagnosis of DID (or otherwise identified as âmultipleâ or âpluralâ) preferred to maintain a functional state of multiplicity.â
"A subset of scientific literature recognizes that experiences of multiplicity manifest in non-pathological presentations, and has found value in a holistic or non-pathological approach to dissociation. A recent literature review by Eve, Heyes, & Parry conceptualized a continuum of multiplicity experiences ranging from nonpathological multiplicity to clinical DID. They noted that professional ignorance of nonpathological or subclinical multiplicity resulted in the over-medicalization of participantsâ experiences.â
"The present study uses the term âplurality,â which emerged from the advocacy community of multiples, and recently has been incorporated into the scientific literature. This newer, more inclusive term describes a broad range of pathological and non-pathological multiplicity, denoting those who have more than one person or entity sharing one body as a âplural system.â. While the term âpluralâ includes those in clinical distress and diagnosed with a dissociative disorder (DID or OSDD), authors have noted that many identifying with plurality found ways to live well with dissociation or did not experience distress from plural experiences.â
"We shall define multiplicity as the phenomenon of multiple persons, personae, or selves manifesting or being perceived to exist within a single embodiment. This definition follows existing use of the term, excepting that it inclusively recognizes the autonomy and personhood of these âselvesâ in their own right, rather than treating them as mere manifestations, perceptions, or âstatesâ of a singular person. This preference reflects the prevailing (though not exclusive) understanding of selfhood by those who experience plurality, as well as the constraints imposed by a sympathetic understanding of other forms of multiplicity, some of which will be discussed forthwith. Multiplicity exists on a continuum, and it may not be possibleâlet alone desirableâto differentiate, categorize, and label every possible experience thereof. As such, the survey that follows is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the historical, social, and clinical background that informs contemporary understandings of the phenomenon. Three prominent explanations for or forms of multiplicity will be treated: spirit possession, dissociation (especially as realized in the form of dissociative identity disorder), and finally plurality, which will serve as our focus for the remainder of the article.â
- "The connection between plurality and pathological dissociation, however, remains a point of significant contention. Communities which would eventually coalesce under the banner of plurality began to emerge in the aftermath of the DSM-IIIâs diagnostic formalization of âmultiple personality,â which notably lacked the requirement of distress or impairment present in more recent revisions of the DSM. This subsequent narrowing of diagnostic scope has resulted in many experiences that may previously have been considered pathological no longer meeting the criteria necessary for clinical diagnosis. Although this in turn precipitated a shift toward non-pathological understandings of plurality among those who experience the phenomenon, some in the plural community remain committed to the basic clinical framework as articulated by the DSM, andâechoing etiological debates regarding dissociative identity disorderâexpress skepticism toward non-traumagenic experiences of plurality. This commitment can result in frustration for patients unable to find validation of their experiences through clinical diagnosis, as well as for clinicians who must contend with what they perceive as factitious diagnosis-seeking.â
- "Countering the clinical view, others have decried what they allege are attempts at the medicalization of plurality. This position is well represented within the plural community, where many âendogenicâ systems refute clinical expectations of underlying trauma. Further, even among trauma-based systems, many experience no distress or impairment on account of their plurality, and thus neither consider themselves to be disordered, nor see integration as a therapeutic goal. While such understandings undoubtedly originate within the plural community itself, they can also increasingly be found in academic literature; recent treatments of plurality have viewed it as non-pathological and phenomenologically-distinct from dissociative identity disorder. Despite this, existing research on multiplicity-spectrum experiences is often undermined by imprecise definitions and mistaken understandings that conflate non-pathological manifestations of plurality with those properly described by dissociative disorders, obscuring the scope and applicability of such research, and of its findings. In consideration whereof, further reference to âpluralityâ in this article shall consider only holistic, non-pathological manifestations of the phenomenon.â
We'd also personally like to say, as a DID system, that origin syscourse doesn't need to be in the Actually DID tag
