#philosophyoflanguage

Wpadłam na cudzą myśl, w której badanie języka jest porównane do tworzenia asymetrycznego diagramu między systemem analogowym a cyfrowym. Podaruję sobie może wątki o pasmach słyszalnych dla ludzkiego ucha, systemie zapisu (binarny vs analogowy),konwersji, próbkowaniu, bo próbowałam to tu rozpisywać i jednak wyszedł za duży inside jak na fejsa. Ale ogólnie mówiąc, język jest ograniczony przez problem jeszcze sformułowany przez strukturalistów - czasu zapisu i odtwarzania, co uniemożliwia mu dostęp do abstrakcji.

Ta przedziwna filozofia deleuze'oguattariańska wyprowadziła metaforykę geodezyjną by pokazać, że materia języka nie jest ustrukturyzowana tak jakbyśmy sobie tego życzyli. Jest pofałdowana, nierówno wyżłobiona, niekiedy cykliczna, czasami linearna, zrasta się sobą.

Przełóżmy to na system analogowy , który jest słyszalny dla ludzkiego ucha, lecz jest bardziej zbliżony do abstrakcji i niezautomatyzowany.

The philosophy of concepts is a branch of philosophy that investigates the nature, structure, and function of concepts in our thinking and communication. Concepts are the mental representations or units of thought that enable us to categorize and make sense of the world. Here are some key areas explored within the philosophy of concepts:

1. Nature of Concepts

Mental Representations: Concepts are often understood as mental representations that play a fundamental role in our cognitive processes. They are the building blocks of thoughts and allow us to understand and interact with the world.

Abstract Entities: Some philosophers view concepts as abstract entities that exist independently of individual minds, akin to Platonic forms or universals.

2. Acquisition of Concepts

Innateness vs. Learning: There is a debate over whether concepts are innate (inborn) or acquired through experience and learning. Nativists argue that certain fundamental concepts are hardwired into our brains, while empiricists believe that all concepts are learned through sensory experience.

Developmental Psychology: This area studies how children acquire and develop concepts as they grow, shedding light on the cognitive processes involved in concept formation.

3. Structure of Concepts

Classical Theory: The classical theory posits that concepts have a definitional structure, with necessary and sufficient conditions for membership (e.g., a triangle is defined as a three-sided polygon).

Prototype Theory: This theory suggests that concepts are organized around typical examples or prototypes, rather than strict definitions. For instance, the concept of "bird" might be centered around a prototypical bird like a robin.

Theory-Theory: According to this view, concepts are like theoretical constructs that are part of our mental theories about the world. They are embedded in a network of beliefs and assumptions.

4. Function of Concepts

Categorization: Concepts allow us to categorize objects, events, and ideas, making it easier to navigate and understand the world.

Communication: Concepts enable effective communication by providing a shared framework for discussing and understanding ideas.

Inference and Reasoning: Concepts facilitate inference and reasoning by allowing us to draw connections between different pieces of information.

5. Conceptual Change

Scientific Revolutions: The philosophy of science explores how concepts change in response to new discoveries and paradigm shifts, as seen in scientific revolutions.

Conceptual Change in Individuals: This area examines how individuals revise their concepts over time in response to new experiences and information.

6. Philosophical Implications

Epistemology: Concepts are central to epistemology, the study of knowledge. Understanding how concepts are formed and justified is crucial for understanding how we know what we know.

Metaphysics: The nature of concepts raises questions about the nature of reality and the relationship between our mental representations and the external world.

Philosophy of Language: Concepts are closely related to language, and the philosophy of language investigates how words and sentences express concepts.

Conclusion

One of many everyday, concrete counterexamples to the claim that the demonstrative determiners ‘this’ and ‘that’ make the same contributions to reference conditions (try to contain your excitement).

I have a 7" (record) that tells you which track is on which side of the record just by way of an engraving on one of the sides. It reads ‘On this side, blah blah. On that side, blah blah.’ For my money, it’s enough to show that ‘this’ and ‘that’ makes different contributions to how reference is determined that the engraving succeeds in conveying what is intended. 'This side’ certainly refers to the side on which it is itself engraved. And 'that side’ refers to the most salient side of the record (i.e., the only side) which is not (and could not have been) this side.

I mention this example because I happened to see it today. But it’s easy to see that the contrast generalises. And it seems to generalise in a way that supports the idea that 'this’-terms genuinely refer more easily than 'that’-terms. Presumably this is because, in lieu of any other indicators of the intended referent, a 'this’-term makes a candidate referent that is uniquely closest to its token preeminently salient (if there is such a candidate). In contrast, in lieu of any other indicators of the intended referent, a 'that’-term makes preeminently salient the most salient candidate among those that are (roughly) more distant than the best referential candidates would be if 'that’ were replaced with 'this’. (It seems to me that the reference of a 'that’-term really is parasitic on the referential possibilities for the corresponding 'this’-term in more or less this way.)

Clearly there is going to be a uniquely closest candidate referent for an expression token far more often than there will be a most salient candidate referent more distant than the best candidate 'this’-term referents would have been.

Thus if I write:

(1) this sentence starts with the letter ’t’

then 'this sentence’ successfully refers to the whole sentence (1), and contributes to the fact that (1) is true. Whereas if I write:

(2) that sentence starts with the letter ’t’

then 'that sentence’ fails to refer to anything, because there is not a clearly most salient sentence from among those that are more distant than the candidates for 'this sentence’ would have been. We know that if 'that sentence’ had been replaced with 'this sentence’ in (2), then the referent would have been the entire sentence (2), in parity with the case of (1). So in order for 'that sentence’ to refer in (2), there must be a most salient sentence that is more distant from it than (2) itself is. But there is no such uniquely salient sentence. So 'that sentence’ fails to refer, and (2) is neither true nor false.