What distinction are you using between Ideas and Concepts? i felt like i ALMOST understood that post but I'm not sure where to find context and I'm real curious now!
Re: this post. "Concepts" and "Ideas" are terms of art in late 18th and 19th Century philosophy. "Concepts" for both Kant and Schopenhauer are the contents of ordinary propositional knowledge. In both cases they think that concepts are not the object of aesthetic judgment or experience (respectively). Aesthetic judgment for Kant involves confrontation with an object we cannot readily assimilate to a concept provided by the understanding. Aesthetic experience for Schopenhauer involves overcoming the habitual, concept-laden mode of seeing things. They each use "Ideas" differently, but I think they actually are trying to get at the same explanandum and in both cases they're supposed to be special. I'll give on popular way to read what Schopenhauer means by ideas (which is slightly different from what I understand him to be saying, but close enough for tumblr work): when you perceive an Idea you perceiving its non-spatial, non-temporal essence. You are basically bracketing the thing and only observing its essential features (for more on this reading, I think there are parts of it in Shapshay, Janaway, and Young). One way of misunderstanding: "so you're just finding out the last of properties that it has that make it what it is?" No. Essences for Schopenhauer are not lists of properties but involve grasping something about the object that cannot be exhaustively translated into propositional terms, so listing off "red, such and such a beak shape, feathered, etc." for, let's say, "cardinal" isn't going to cut it. For Kant Ideas are equally weird: Ideas are products of the faculty of Reason that are produced as a result of Reason's "vocation" producing certain kinds of transcendental illusions that we mistakenly think we have a priori knowledge of, but which (nevertheless) are useful in providing regulative principles for our thoughts and actions. Things like the soul, God, etc. Kant thinks that beautiful things (really poetry specifically) can give sensible presentation to these things. These are Kant's aesthetic Ideas.
"What does this mean for real people?" Well, I think there are some thoughts that are really kind of dead from over-articulation, from having their entire existence in the propositional form. Running through the Romantics is this thread in which big parts of language are dead and the task of the poet is to make them Adamic and living again. This finds later articulation in the Russian symbolists, Russian formalists, early Anglophone modernists. I think the Romantic version of this in which thought needs to be reconnected with feeling isn't quite right: we can be triggered in a way to have certain emotions as a result of propositions (though perhaps they would discount this kind of unity). But there is something off about something that has its finality in speech. And I think it makes too salient the picture in which I compare the propositions in my head to the propositions on the page and assessment is simply a matter of matching. But corniness it seems to me is liking the ability for something to be plainly expressed and to find comfort in it. There is something corny in the sensibility of someone who likes an anti-war movie first and foremost because he can put to himself, in so terse a statement, "This movie is against war and I am also against war. This is my sentiment exactly."
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