#tercios

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden(1611-1632) by Jacob Hoefnagel. Housed in the Royal Armoury (Livrustkammaren) in Stockholm, Sweden.

Gustavus Adolphus and the Road to Breitenfeld

The Thirty Years War was, to put it mildly, a bit of a clusterfuck. As was the Holy-Roman Empire. A clusterfuck of an empire in the midst of a clusterfuck of a war. As the name suggests, it was a war that went on for the better part of thirty years. Traditionally the war is widely accepted to have started in 1618 and didn't come to a conclusive end until around 1648. By the war's end anywhere from four to eight million people died. Almost every kingdom, duchy, barony, and empire in mainland Europe was involved in the war. It was truly an Early-Modern equivalent to the World Wars.

Boiled down onto paper the Thirty Years War is regarded as a war of Catholicism versus Protestantism. While religion did play a role in the conflict, with Holy-Roman emperor Ferdinand II wanting to impose Catholicism onto his rebellious Protestant nobility, in truth the war was about one thing. Power. Nobility and royalty throughout the Empire wanted power and influence. Religion was the greatest excuse to seek out this power.

This political spider's-web went on chaotically from 1618 to 1632 with no end in sight for those involved. The forests and villages of Germany became a near constant warzone. With no clear sense of unity to bring the motley mix of German nobility together, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden finally chose to step in.

Gustavus is one of those military leaders in history who often get overlooked. A legend in his own time who has become more obscure as time goes on. Outside of Sweden and Europe he is not very widely known. He was a military powerhouse who helped to turn Sweden into a political juggernaut and united countless disparate German nobles under his banner in the Thirty Years War. An impressive feat considering how uniting that many semi-independent nobles must have felt like herding cats, all while leading Sweden into military modernity.

The Vasa line came into power in Sweden rather hectically. In the early 1520s one Gustav Vasa led a liberation war against King Christian II of Denmark. Succeeding in the war, lord Gustav Vasa became King Gustav of Sweden in 1523, thus setting the stage for the Vasa line to become world powers.

Gustav Vasa by Jacob Binck. 1542. Uppsala University's art collection

Fast forward some generations to Gustavus Adolphus, the grandson of Gustav Vasa. Gustav did not inherit the throne easily. His father, along with many Lutheran rebels, had to overthrow the Catholic Sigismund from the throne. Upon his ascension to the throne Charles IX sucked the country into war with Poland and had to violently put down competitors for the dynasty. A legacy of violence was left behind Charles as well as many pissed off locals in Sweden. It was this bitter environment that Charles's young son Gustavus found himself in when he inherited the throne. He was sixteen going on seventeen when he came to power in Sweden.

A bitter peace treaty with the Danish in 1613 set the stage for Gustavus in the beginning of his reign. It made Denmark a rival for the Swedes and put a bad taste in his mouth toward nobility. While his military endeavors against the Danish was lackluster he had better luck against the Russians. While still a young man he gained critical military experience in his efforts to crush Russian presence in the Baltic. He almost single handedly postponed Russia's attempts to become a major European power, and in the process enabled Sweden to become the greatest power in the Baltic.

Perhaps the wisest decision Gustavus made was befriending Axel Oxenstierna. Axel was made chancellor of Sweden in 1612 and became a close friend and advisor to Gustavus. The two became a bit of a power friendship throughout the middle of the Thirty Years War.

Portrait of the Swedish minister and commander of Axel Oxenstierna Södermöre by Michiel Jansz. van Mierevelt. Photo credit to the Hampel Fine Art Auctions, Munich.

Gustavus's wars against Russia and the Polish paved the way for him to become a warrior-king. It's no surprise then that when he finally personally got involved in the Thirty Years War he did so with a bang. His motives for personally joining the conflict are hotly debated but are likely the result of a combination of factors. One rationale is the crippling debt that was accrued from his wars in Russia and from the peace treaty signed with Denmark. Another is the idea that Gustavus wanted Swedish political supremacy in Northern Europe. Then there's the religious rationale, that he simply wanted Lutheran/Protestant hegemony in Europe. The truth is probably a combination of all three.

In a journal written by John Roger Paas in 1996 titled The Changing Image of Gustavus Adolphus on German Broadsheets, 1630-3, in the Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. 59 (1996), pp. 205-244 published by the Warburg Institute, Paas writes "Even before Gustavus Adolphus had concluded the truce with Poland in 1629, he was deliberating with the Swedish estates on how best to counteract the danger posed by the growing presence of Catholic forces on the Baltic. There were two options under consideration, and whereas the king's closest advisor, Oxenstierna, and the majority of the Swedish estates favoured offensive operations in Prussia and a defensive stance in Germany, the king was of a different mind and vigorously advocated offensive military action on German soil. The Lutheran religion and Swedish national interests were inseparable, and a threat to one was perceived to be a dangerous threat to the other." pages 208-209.

It's also worth pointing out that there was relatively little organization on the Protestant side of the war at the time. Gustavus, a military veteran of multiple wars at the time, was possibly frustrated with the perceived lack of German/Protestant unity in the war effort. His landing in Germany might have been simple confidence in his own military expertise and a lack of confidence in his Protestant allies.

The Swedish had already gotten a foot in the door upon the Siege of Stralsund in 1628. Stralsund was the northernmost city in Germany and later worked as a bit of a stepping stone for the Swedes to use in their part in the war. After the Swedes finished wiping up their conflict with the Russians and the Polish, they now had the time on their hands to deal with the Catholics in Germany. With Stralsund having already been captured by them, Gustavus was able to enter the heartland of Germany with little issue. The greatest military mind of the war had now entered the fray, the "Lion of the North".

The army that he brought with him was considered unorthodox at the time. Knowing that his Swedish cavalry was comparatively inferior to the Spanish, with Swedish horses being much smaller, he chose to focus less on horses and more on guns. That sounds like common sense nowadays but at the time it was a bold risk. Keep in mind that "guns" at the time were not the rapid fire weapons of death that we have now. They were slow to use, slow to reload, sluggish to handle, and easy to break. A single cannon that was misused could explode onto the very men using it, causing metal and shrapnel to damage the army that owned it. Guns were fickle if improperly maintained. "Aiming" meant little more than simply firing enough cannons in one direction to finally hit something.

Image from "Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, from the German" by Loui Lalk Weinstein. 1906.

With a Swedish cavalry that was lackluster in quality Adolphus controversially chose to focus on guns and cannons. He also kept a small but exceptionally trained infantry on hand. He also brought with him military standards and codes of conduct that were comparatively new to the region. While not as humanitarian as modern military standards, many of the policies put into place by Adolphus were downright revolutionary for the time. In an article written by Kenneth Ögren in 1996, titled Humanitarian law in the Articles of War decreed in 1621 by King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden in the International Review of the Red Cross, 36, pp 438-442, Ögren writes the following rules applied by Adolphus.

"Article 91 No Soldiour shall set fire upon any Towne or Village in the enemies land; without he be commanded by his Captaine. Neither shall any Captaine give any such command, unlesse hee hath first received it from Us, or our Generall: who so does the contrary, he shall answer it in the Generals counsayle of Warre, according to the importance of the matter. And if it be proved to be prejudiciall unto us, and advantageous for the enemie; he shall suffer death for it." Page 441.

Regardless of his strength, family prestige, religious authority and manpower Gustavus had very few friends upon landing in Germany, save for his trustworthy Axel. A running theme throughout the war for him was the lack of support that he received from the local Germans, Protestant or not. Despite the religious comradery native German noblemen sometimes viewed Gustavus as an invader rather than a savior. It was under these conditions, with lackluster support from local lords, that Gustavus was forced to deal with his greatest rival, the Catholic leader Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly. Sometimes simply referred to as "Tilly".

Portrait of Johan 't Serclaes, Count of Tilly by Lucas Vorsterman the Elder. 1620s-1670s. Rijksmuseum.

Tilly was a count on the Catholic side of the war. Born in the Spanish Netherlands, he was no stranger to the feuding between Protestant and Catholic. Not only was he a man of reputation and military prestige but he also commanded a sizable Spanish cavalry. He and his Spanish horsemen and tercios ran through Germany with little to no important pushback. It wasn't until Gustavus that he would finally meet his match.

In September, in a village in Saxony called Breitenfeld, the forces of Gustavus were destined to meet with the forces of Tilly. On Gustavus's side were a combined force of Swedes and Saxons. Some 40,000 odd men gather under the Protestant/Lutheran side. They had anywhere from 50 to 60 guns of varying types. On Tilly's side were little more than 31,000 men but among those men were some of the best cavalry in the entire war's history. They only had 20 to 30 guns but Tilly was confident that his horses and tercios would see to a Catholic victory.

Gustavus Adolphus at Breitenfeld at the Battle of Breitenfeld by Jean Jacques Walter, Strasbourg Museum of Decorative Arts.

The Saxons were stationed to the Swede's flank. The Swedes themselves were standing in an open field in order to maximize the effectiveness of their cannons. While their cavalry were not as large as the Spanish their effectiveness when combined with musketmen proved itself in the ensuing fight. As the Catholic forces charged into the Swedes the Swedes alternated between the guns and the horses, confusing the enemy who had not seen such tactics at that time and therefore had no frame of reference.

Europe after the Thirty Years' War, 1648 From the Encyclopedia Britannica.

Tilly's forces had better luck against Gustavus's Saxon allies. The Spanish hit the Saxons with such ferocity that the Saxons fled the battlefield, a third of the troops leaving the Swedish-Saxon army and thus removing their numerical advantage. While successfully removing the Saxons from the fight for a moment the Catholics got cocky from this and perhaps underestimated their enemy from this point forward.

Despite the momentary advantage the sheer size of the Spanish tercios and the overzealousness of their charge caused great difficulty in their maneuverability. The time it took the tercios to simply turn around and charge at the Swedes after chasing away the Saxons gave the Swedes time to replan. The Swedes sent reinforcements from the main group to hold off the Spanish flank. Their movements were fast and backed up with relatively fast gunfire from the muskets. This speedy reaction was not anticipated by the Spanish.

The Swedes managed to hold off the brutal Spanish attacks, and the reinforcements managed to crowd them together to the point that the former numerical advantage of the tercios became a disadvantage. They were packed together like canned meat. The Swedish guns, while not impressive by modern standards, managed to fire at a comparatively rapid rate for the era. The troops were also far quicker at regrouping compared to Tilly's men. They reversed their situation and pinned down the very tercios that had tried to flank them. The rather malleable Swedish method of fighting which alternated between musket fire, cannon fire, cavalry charge and infantry charge and back and forth again, confused and vexed the tercios to the point of negating their reputable advantages.

While the battle was hard fought, the technology, fresh techniques, and sheer bravery of the men enabled Gustavus to pull out an unlikely victory against a far more reputable foe. The numerical advantage that Gustavus had in the beginning faltered when his Saxon allies fled, but no matter. Even with the drop in their numbers the Swedes were able to win simply because Gustavus had drilled into his men an instinct to adapt to changes on the battlefield. Tilly himself was wounded at the battle and died days later.

You might be thinking that this battle won the war. But keep in mind that this was 1631. The war went on until 1648. Gustavus himself died not long after the battle in 1632, at a battle that was also won by the Swedes at the cost of his life. Gustavus was brave in battle but perhaps a little too brave, never shying away from charging into battle himself on horseback. This bravery had cost him his life in the end.

So if this battle was in the middle of the war, a long seventeen years before the war would even end, then why is it remembered at all? Why is Gustavus talked about by those who study the Thirty Years War? One reason is that while the Battle of Breitenfeld did not win the war it did breath life into the Protestant side of the conflict. Until Gustavus the Protestants had not had that many impressive victories nor did they have a sense of unity. Gustavus breathed some juice into the veins of the war and inspired them to keep fighting.

He also created new fighting techniques that was studies for centuries afterwards. Swedish and German military strategy alike was changed from the battle. Gustavus was in many ways one of the earliest modern military minds. His style of improvisation helped to pave the way for more modern ways of fighting. He also cut through a lot of noble red tape in order to get things done when nobody else could. He did not win the war. He didn't even live long enough to benefit from it. But Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, created a military stratagem that would be studied centuries longer than he had lived.

I hope you guys enjoyed the article (-:

Keep in mind German and Swedish history is not exactly my forte lol. I hope I got everything right but if I didn't feel free to correct me! Any flaws are my own fault and not the fault of the sources.

Speaking of which, below are links for further reading.

1525 Pavía - Ferrer Dalmau

ESPAÑOL- Una de las habitaciones que mas me a gustado hacer en mi versión de El Alcázar de los Austrias en el que estoy trabajando, “El Salón de Reinos”. 

Aunque este salón no estaba en el Alcázar sino en el Palacio del Buen Retiro, del que solo queda este salón, que ahora formara parte de el Museo del Prado de Madrid, he decidido ponerlo. 

El Salón esta decorado con lienzos que representan las victorias de los Ejércitos de los Tercios Españoles al principio del reinado de Felipe IV de España, tales como “La recuperación de Bahía de Todos los Santos” de Juan Bautista Maíno, “ La  Defensa de Cádiz contra los ingleses “ de Francisco de Zurbarán o “La rendición de Breda” o “Las lanzas” de el GRAN  Diego Velázquez.

Sobre las ventanas y las puertas de los muros largos están los Trabajos de Hércules pintados por  Francisco de Zurbarán. Y en los muros cortos los Retratos de Felipe III a Caballo,  La reina Margarita de Austria a caballo, Felipe IV a Caballo,  La reina Isabel de Francia a caballo y El Príncipe Baltasar Carlos a Caballo, todos de Diego Velázquez. 

Faltaría la característica que daba nombre al salón, los 24 escudos de los territorios de la Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos de Felipe IV, buscare algo que me sirva para poder crearlo. 

He de dar las Gracias a TheJim07 que me ha dado permiso para usar sus cuadros para la creación de mis cuadros. 

Por cierto, todos estos cuadros se conservan en el Museos del Prado de Madrid. 

Espero que os guste.

ENGLISH- One of the rooms that I liked the most in my version of El Alcázar de los Austrias in which I am working, “El Salón de Reinos”.

Although this room was not in the Alcázar but in the Buen Retiro Palace, of which only this room remains, which is now part of the Prado Museum in Madrid, I have decided to put it.

The Hall is decorated with canvases that represent the victories of the Armies of the Spanish Tercios at the beginning of the reign of Felipe IV of Spain, such as "The recovery of Bahía de Todos los Santos" by Juan Bautista Maíno, "The Defense of Cádiz against the English "by Francisco de Zurbarán or" The surrender of Breda "or" The spears "by the GREAT Diego Velázquez.

Above the windows and doors of the long walls are the Works of Hercules painted by Francisco de Zurbarán. And on the short walls are the Portraits of Felipe III on Horseback, Queen Margarita of Austria on Horseback, Felipe IV on Horseback, Queen Isabel of France on Horseback and Prince Baltasar Carlos on Horseback, all by Diego Velázquez.

The characteristic that gave the room its name would be missing, the 24 shields of the territories of the Hispanic Monarchy in the times of Felipe IV, I will look for something that will help me create it.

I have to thank TheJim07 who has given me permission to use his paintings for the creation of my paintings.

By the way, all these paintings are kept in the Prado Museum in Madrid.