He who kills for his personal motives, privately and on his own accord, is a murderer. He who kills wit higher authorization and 'in the interest of society' is not a murderer. If the perpetrator of the act is an instrument of his own intention or of his passion, he commits a crime. If he is a mere instrument, it need not be a crime. If I were to kill a man in and of myself, I might get scared of my own action, back away, and not carry out my intention: there is nothing cowardly and dishonorable in refraining from this action. But were I to kill with 'higher authorization,' by order of the Nation, Church, or Historical Necessity, I could not refrain from 'my' action, lest I be branded a coward. My act is not murder but revenge, trial, execution of justice, civic duty, an heroic deed. But the 'truth' of history, i.e. its concreteness, multidimensionality and reality, is such that a particular act can be at once murderous and heroic, that murder can be elevated to heroism and heroism degraded to murder, that particular interests can be declared general interests, and real general interests debased as individual intentions.
Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World, 143
