I think people delude themselves about how effective intellectual property is. In the pure world of intellectual property you can patent a discovery and sell it for all the value it adds, or use it to make that much profit, but in reality the value of intellectual property corresponds very loosely to how much value it adds.
It's relatively easy to read a few books and write a pop history book about a topic which makes ten times as much money as what the academic history books made, even though those books may each have taken 10 times as long by more skilled workers, and amount to the vast majority of the work that went into your book. The incentive structure is clearly wrong if you want books like your pop history book to be made about more topics.
If you do basic research that leads to an important new drug being developed 20 years down the line, you will get nothing- the organisation that actually gets the patent is the one that does the last step. And many kinds of valuable research don't lead in any immediate way to a marketable product in the first place.
The reason the neoliberal argument fails here is because people are getting patents intellectual property that doesn't just capture the value they added, but all the work others put into the idea before them, which no intellectual property was awarded for. So there is a huge incentivise to focus on the last mile, the marketable part, to the neglect of everything else, even though that's most likely to be the part that anyone could have done.
The neoliberal might reply that this is actually a problem of incomplete property rights- the neoliberal's model works if the basic research was patentable too, so that the person who brings it to market pays for the basic research, gets paid the value of the market product, and pockets the difference- the value they added. But the reason that isn't done is that a world like that would be unlivable. It would be impossible to get any research done because the web of how ideas feed into each other isn't simple, and the negotiation of how much to pay for each idea would be arduous. This is why patents cannot work in the 'ideal' way they do in economic models, and why they will inevitably have this serious flaw in the real world.
The neoliberal might argue that this is a problem solved by universities- universities can do the basic research, which becomes commons, and the researchers are paid salaries because paying them based on their value added would be impossible, and the applied research is done by businesses, who are paid their value added, because it's close enough to the market that that is possible. Aside from neoliberals cutting universities, the problem with this is that it allows private companies to capture the value of research done by universities if there are only a few ways to apply that research effectively. If a company uses X basic research to make Y product, and there are no profitable alternative ways to apply X to make a competitor product, the company hasn't just been given a monopoly on Y, they've been given a monopoly on X- they have captured a piece of the commons, created by a university researcher for the good of everyone, and they're extracting rent from it. This also creates a strong incentive for reinventing the wheel, because if you can turn X into Y in a way different enough to fall outside of that patent, you get half of that economic rent.
Additionally there is no clear delineation between basic and applied research, so there is a balance that must be struck between not letting things too basic be patented, as that would be devastating to all the research that might build on it, while allowing applied research to be patented. But it is difficult to tell early on how far an idea could be taken, and patent assessors are generally not well placed to do that, so it is easy for them to hamstring any attempts to build upon a crucial idea for the duration of the patent- 20 years in the UK. Potentially this creates an incentive to veer away from more basic lines of inquiry.
And there is no such thing as a terminal creation, that there is no point in trying to improve, so counting research as applied and giving a patent is still cutting off the possibility of future improvements being made for 20 years, except by people at that company. This is particularly devastating with arts and writing, where works want to iterate on each other rapidly. Maybe someone made some important discovery, but they're a bad writer, so you want to rewrite their article so that people will actually read it, but you can't do so because that would undermine the incentive to read the original article, the copyright of which is owned by the publisher, so it's illegal- and has to be for the intellectual property regime to function, stifling the spread of ideas.
This capturing of value added by others isn't the only problem. Monopolies are an inefficient way for industries to be organised, leading to higher prices, so less sales, meaning less people are able to actually make use of the innovations, both applied and basic. The number of people who can access a drug is slashed to make sure the value from those who do access the drug can be captured by the market. But even when there are several variations of a product, patented by different companies, this creates the same problem, because of fixed costs- the companies have to charge above the marginal cost to make back their investment, reducing the number of people who can access the product. And this is a drastic effect when the marginal cost is often near zero.
This of course exacerbates inequality, and means that there is a strong incentive to create innovations that are aimed at the affluent, not the poor. Invent Ozempic, not a cure for malaria.
And finally there's the problem of the institutional structure actual people are innovating under. In theory everyone is a lone inventor-entrepreneur who chooses what they research and gets paid by their results, and aims to maximise profit. But really people are employed by a corporation, and when they discover something the shareholders capture most of the value, not them, so after this elaborate, expensive, destructive system to create a financial incentive for innovation, a tiny fraction of it gets passed on to the actual innovators, in the form of increased chance of a promotion or pay rise. And yet the innovations still get made, so clearly this is enough, or people are motivated by the desire to make the world a better place, not just money. Either way the patent system we have is patently excessive.
And if you aren't a researcher at an existing company and you want to get any money at all for your discovery, you're going to have to found a company yourself to extract the surplus- an arduous task, and one that you might not be any good at, and that in any case will take you away from making further discoveries. To be rewarded as an engineer you must remake yourself as an entrepreneur, or accept that someone else is going to take most of your reward. And it may be half your lifetime before you get that reward.
There are additional problems with access to educational resources, incentives for black/grey markets, deadweight loss from litigation, etc. but this is more than enough to show intellectual property is very inefficient at incentivising innovation. So when alternative models are also criticised for being flawed, economically inefficient that shouldn't kill those alternatives- because it would take a lot for them to be as flawed as the existing system.
A panel of experts awarding a payment for a discovery might get its value drastically wrong- but so might investors buying a start up, so might an unwilling, untalented entrepreneur failing to price their product correctly and losing money from their creation. And at least they can go on inventing/writing/innovating instead of changing careers, and the valuation will be based on opinions of people who know what they're talking about, and based on the value of their innovation to everyone, not just the wealthy. There might be political pressure to reduce the value of payments, but there's also political pressure to cut university funding- at least it would mean there is some connection between output and compensation for university researchers, and there isn't an incentive gradient driving people out of basic research and into applied research, and at least all of the value of the payment would be going to the actual innovator.
