From Walter Kaufmann's prologue to Martin Buber's I and Thou.

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From Walter Kaufmann's prologue to Martin Buber's I and Thou.

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Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life by Theodor W. Adorno My rating: 5 of 5 stars It helps to know that this 1951 book, an unclassi
Let us look at the grammar of ethical terms, and such terms as "God", "soul", "mind", "concrete" , "abstract". One of the chief troubles is that we take a substantive to correspond to a thing. Ordinary grammar does not forbid our using a substantive as though it stood for a physical body. The words "soul" and "mind" have been used as though they stood for a thing, a gaseous thing. "What is the soul?" is a misleading question, as are questions about the words "concrete" and "abstract", which suggest an analogy with solid and gaseous instead of with a chair and the permission to sit on a chair.
Another muddle consists in using the phrase "another kind" after the analogy of "a different kind of chair", e.g., that transfinite numbers are another kind of number than rationals, or unconscious thoughts a different kind of thought from conscious ones. The difference in the case of the latter pair is not analogous to that between a chair we see and a chair we don't see. The word "thought" is used differently when prefaced by these adjectives. What happens with the words "God" and "soul" is what happens with the word "number". Even though we give up explaining these words ostensively, by pointing, we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms. The reason people say that a number is a scratch on the blackboard is the desire to point to something. No sort of process of pointing is connected with explaining "number", any more than it is with explaining "permission to sit in a seat at the theatre".
Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word 'God". I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one. For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God. This would throw light on the use of the word. What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word.
Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935, edited by Alice Ambrose
Love is a form of sincerity, in which the amorous agent expends energy in taking some object — of greater or lesser merit —seriously, and devoting itself to this object. On this basis we can assume that Dante would not have been fond of an especially modern group that is never found in his Hell: critics. With this term I mean those modern thinkers who hold that the purpose of the intellect is to diminish the amount of naiveté in the world, debunking and eliminating the vast majority of objects in the cosmos, replacing them with nothing but tiny particles, socially constructed language games, or an outright nihilism that takes the goal of the mind to be the final scientific elimination of all entities whatsoever. This sort of critic differs from another, more benevolent type: the food critic, wine critic, art critic, or theater critic. The goal of this second kind is not to eliminate the objects they confront, but to "critique" in the sense of assessing or detecting the various subtleties of their objects. If the nihilist would destroy wine by reducing it to quarks and electrons, or by observing ghoulishly that wine will no longer exist following the eventual death of the universe, the wine critic is so passionately attached to this object as to devote his or her professional life to an ever-deeper assessment of the virtues of various sorts of this beverage. The connoisseur is a lover: an amateur in the original sense of this word, which has wrongly become tarred with a pejorative meaning. Dante's theory of love is a theory of connoisseurship, or of amateurism, with the connoisseur of God ranking highest of them all.
Graham Harman, Dante's Broken Hammer

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kennzeichnen is a really good word for it. marking something is "acquainting-drawing"
[Hacker] claims that to explicate our concepts, we must look at word usage, since concepts, he holds, are abstractions from the uses of words. He is at pains to emphasise, however, that this interest in words and concepts is no less an interest in the natures of things. Philosophical investigation ‘elucidates a given concept by describing the use of the word that expresses that concept’. Moreover, ‘The nature of something consists in those features without which it would not be the thing it is, and without which it would not fall under the concept that it does. Hence, to clarify a concept is to clarify the nature of what falls under it’. Hacker explains (as Carnap did, though awkwardly) that philosophical discussion can be carried out in different modes, though we often flit between them: the linguistic, conceptual, or the material/necessitarian mode.
To illustrate with a simple example, we may ask ‘What does “bachelor” mean?’, ‘What’s the concept of a bachelor?’, or ‘What’s a bachelor?’ But despite appearances, these questions are not about different things as such (word, concept, and thing respectively), since the answer to one gives the answer to the others. For if ‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’, then the concept of a bachelor is the concept of an unmarried man, and furthermore, a bachelor is an unmarried man. And why should we privilege one mode over the others? The Linguistic Turn did not herald a change in subject-matter for philosophy, but only a clearer recognition that answering traditional philosophical questions articulated in the material mode requires paying attention to language.
Kevin Lynch, Review of The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker
But how are we to know what an expression’s proper use is? Hacker rejects two answers which have been offered in recent philosophy: that we should conduct surveys to find out what people say, and that we may rely on our own ‘intuitions’: ‘A competent speaker of the language is by definition someone who knows how to use a wide range of the common non-technical words of the language … he no more needs to consult others than a competent chess-player needs to ask others how to move the chess-pieces … he does not need to consult “intuitions” either’. Or as he said in volume 1, we ‘at most need to be reminded of the familiar’.
The analogy between the rules of language and of chess has its limits. Chess rules are learned explicitly and give clear guidance for all the (formally limited) states of affairs which can arise in chess. The situation with the ‘rules’ of language is more complex. Consider the method – of no small importance in philosophy – of using thought-experiments to investigate concepts by considering what we would say in some scenario, and note that the scenarios are often highly unusual or even physically/technically impossible.
Consider a down-to-earth example: a Gettier case. Smith looks at his previously-reliable watch and comes to believe, at 2pm, that it’s 2pm. Little does he know that his watch stopped at 2am last night. Does Smith know that it’s 2pm? Here we can’t simply recall what is generally said in these and similar situations, because we may never have encountered them, and they are curiously different from what we are familiar with.
We are left to judge for ourselves whether knowledge extends to this case. Given its novelty, we can’t simply recall what we actually say in such situations (‘marshal what one already knows’), but must judge what we would or should say (the question of what determines these judgments is an important one). These judgments are then called ‘linguistic intuitions’. Is this so inappropriate?
Nevertheless, Hacker’s conception of philosophy as a sui generis, a priori exercise in conceptual clarification restores to philosophy a dignity that has often seemed under threat from recent conceptions of it which blur the line between philosophy and science. But it also seems overly narrow. It is unclear, for instance, whether conceptual clarification is the panacea for all the problems and concerns which arise across sub-disciplines such as logic (formal and informal), philosophy of religion, science, and history, let alone ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of education, and Eastern philosophy, where thinkers are often concerned with normative and practical questions of what it’s right to do, how we should arrange society, how we should live, and what is of value.
Kevin Lynch, Review of The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker
http://philpapers.org/rec/LYNTIP-2
 In Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic, John Protevi purports to bring together politically activist philosophy w
Statistically, we can say that most people did not harm others. Most people helped one another. Mathematically, we can provide equations that describe the movements of those people as they faced or fled the disaster. But none of this tells us how it is possible for us to tell their stories. None of this tells us about how our own sensibilities can be open to the sensibilities of others when they decide to commit horrible acts or acts of love. Perhaps this is still what we need to know.

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Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophy
[Wittgenstein] said that the Solipsist's statement "Only my experience is real" is absurd "as a statement of fact", but that the Solipsist sees that a person who says "No: my experience is real too" has not really refuted him, just as Dr. Johnson did not refute Berkeley by kicking a stone. Much later he said that Solipsism is right if it merely says that "I have toothache" and "He has toothache" are "on quite a different level", but that "if the Solipsist says that he has something which another hasn't, he is absurd and is making the very mistake of putting the two statements on the same level".
In this connexion he said that he thought that both the Realist and the Idealist were "talking non-sense" in the particular sense in which "nonsense is produced by trying to express by the use of language what ought to be embodied in the grammar", and he illustrated this sense by saying that "I can't feel his toothache" means "'I feel his toothache' has no sense" and therefore does not "express a fact" as "I can't play chess" may do.
G. E. Moore's notes on "Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-1933" from Philosophical Occasions
「ウィトゲンシュタイン 『哲学探究』という戦い」 野矢茂樹 岩波書店 読了。
“Marge everything is corrupted by capital. Have you ever sat down and read this thing? Technically the way we close a car door is fascist.”
I think people maybe don’t understand that this isn’t an exaggeration – it is literally something Adorno says in this book.
“RETVRN TO TRADITION. Things were so much better in the olden days. I am very antifascist.”
I know people are going to make fun, and this deserves it, but when you carry your groceries home walking on the shoulder of a road with a 40 mph speed limit, occasionally cutting into a muddy ditch because that part of the road has no shoulder, that stuff about the car causing people to subordinate themselves to the logic of machines in ways which encourage sudden, violent action and discourage slowness or contemplation…
I dunno, after the third time someone almost hits you in a parking lot because they were looking for other cars instead of literally directly in front of where they were going, well, you might think there’s maybe something to all this.
Also I was talking to a friend who had lived without a car for years and was now getting back into driving more often, and he said something like,
“The hardest thing is re-learning to make split decisions again, like when you’re driving you can’t just stop and think, it’s much better and safer to just make the wrong decision quickly then it is to slow down and not be able to decide, and it’s taking a while to relearn that mindset”
So like…
PS - Fascism uses the idea of the past for propaganda purposes but is a generally modern doctrine and in practice is often incredibly frustrated by and violently hostile to the messiness of the past.
I mean, I genuinely don’t know, are there a lot of right-wing fascists in Italy who think the unification was a mistake and want to return to the time before Italian nationalism?
One of the earliest and most intellectually interesting Fascists, the futurist leader Marinetti, lionized the automobile as a way of inculcating fascism on basically exactly the same grounds Adorno is doing here, the only real difference is that Marinetti thought that fascism was a good thing.
Doctrines which long for a return to the past can be non- or even anti-fascist, precisely because Fascism is so modern, but by the same token Fascism sells a lot better so not many people actually commit to those alternative ways of lionizing the past.
Just today, as I was walking home, I saw an older man in the middle of the street who had gotten stranded trying to maneuver a handcart and way too many bags. He had jaywalked into the middle of the street and couldn’t gather up all of his possesions in such a way that he could move when the light turned green.
I had to restrain myself from rushing out into the street to help him on the grounds that I might well get run over by one of the oncoming cars; there are two shrines to people who were run over crossing the street within walking distance of where we were.
Traffic simply maneuvered around him; drivers were probably feeling that if they stopped for him, they’d get rear-ended so people in the lane he was standing in just swerved into the other lane a little bit.
Once there was a break in traffic I ran over and helped him get his stuff to the sidewalk.
How else to describe this process but as one of pure functionality, which does not tolerate freedom of conduct? The car will move down the street; to interrupt that motion is to put your life at risk, so the people surrounding this old man find themselves at least unwilling, and quite likely actually unable to stop and help him reach a safer island.
Basically I have never had a more Hannibal.jpg reaction to anything on Tumblr than I have to that page of Adorno.
GO OFF BITCH
I haven’t read this exact book but people also need to understand that in a long-form work like this the main point probably isn’t that car doors and slide windows make you into a fascist and you’re fascist for having a door that doesn’t slam and all anti-fascists must remove these Evil Things from their homes to be Good Moral People. But also isn’t it interesting to try to look at the objects around you and see how they were designed and if there are any inbuilt assumptions or biases built into how they function? Isn’t it worth investigating whether constantly being around objects that are designed primarily for single users without regard for larger communities has any effect on society’s attitude towards communities? Maybe the answer is no, it doesn’t! But if you hadn’t asked you wouldn’t know for sure. And maybe the answer is, Maybe?! And then you can ask “huh is there anything to do about that?” And there might or might not be anything to do about that.
And the notes above about cars are a really good example of how this thinking can go further! And if you understand the point after reading the car examples, well then try to apply that same logic to the other examples! Does that tell you anything?
Sometimes thinking is just thinking and sometimes books are asking you to think about something for more than two seconds.

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Speaking of Vʔ in closed syllables, the word being translated as Unicorne in Job 39:9-10 in this 1611 KJV is רֵים rêm, and six of the nine times it shows up in the Hebrew Bible it's actually spelled רְאֵם rəʔēm instead—that is to say, it was originally *riʔm.
'Unicorn' is an interesting choice of translation, particularly given that three of the times the word shows up the text is talking about its horns, plural. E.g. Deuteronomy 33:17:
בְּכוֹר שׁוֹרוֹ הָדָר לוֹ וְקַרְנֵי רְאֵם קַרְנָיו בָּהֶם עַמִּים יְנַגַּח יַחְדָּו אַפְסֵי־אָ֑רֶץ וְהֵם רִבְבוֹת אֶפְרַיִם וְהֵם אַלְפֵי מְנַשֶּׁה׃ bəkôr šôrô hādār lô wəqarnê rəʔēm qarnāw bāhem ʕammîm yənaggaḥ yaḥdāw ʔapsê-ʔāreṣ, wəhēm ribəbôt ʔeprayim wəhēm ʔaləpê mənašše. The firstborn of his bull—majesty is his! His horns are the horns of a rəʔēm; with them he gores the peoples all together to the ends of the earth; such are the myriads of Ephraim, such the thousands of Manasseh.”
The KJV (or actually the Coverdale Bible, which these parts go back to) isn't the first to use 'unicorn' to translate rəʔēm: the Septuagint mostly uses μονόκερως 'one-horned' (once, it uses ἁδροὶ 'stout ones'), which the Vulgate calques as unicornis in four cases. E.g. Psalms 22:21 (21:22 in the Vulgate's numbering):
σῶσόν με ἐκ στόματος λέοντος καὶ ἀπὸ κεράτων μονοκερώτων τὴν ταπείνωσίν μου Salva me ex ore leonis, et a cornibus unicornium humilitatem meam.
In the remaining instances, the Vulgate uses rhinoceros (borrowed from Greek ῥινόκερως 'nose-horned'):
πρωτότοκος ταύρου τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ κέρατα μονοκέρωτος τὰ κέρατα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔθνη κερατιεῖ ἅμα ἕως ἐπ᾽ ἄκρου γῆς αὗται μυριάδες Εφραιμ καὶ αὗται χιλιάδες Μανασση Quasi primogeniti tauri pulchritudo eius, cornua rhinocerotis cornua illius in ipsis ventilabit gentes usque ad terminos terrae. Hae sunt multitudines Ephraim et haec millia Manasse.
Obviously people were confused about what kind of animal this was supposed to be. Akkadian has an obvious cognate rīmu, and the Babylonians were kind enough to depict one on the Ishtar Gate:
Rīmu is generally translated as 'wild bull' because your average Assyriologist doesn't know what an aurochs is, but it's an aurochs. They went extinct in the ANE and the eastern Mediterranean somewhere during the first millennium BCE, and it's very likely the Septuagint translators, in Egypt and the southern Levant, never saw one. Knowing only what was in the text—the rəʔēm is an animal whose defining features are (1) strength and (2) horns, both greater than a bull's—they took a punt.
It's actually not clear what they had in mind with μονόκερως; Aristotle, in his History of Animals and Parts of Animals, twice calls both "the Indian ass" and "the oryx" μονόκερως, and it's not particularly clear what he meant by that either. Probably they did know about rhinoceroses, and Jerome certainly will have—his rhinoceros all but certainly refers to an actual rhinoceros and not a mythical animal.
Modern translations all seem to use 'wild ox'.
Has Radical Behaviorism Lost Its Right to Privacy? - PMC
I may have the sudden thought that I have forgotten some papers and return to my office to retrieve them. Does my recalling the papers play no causal role in my subsequent behavior? Of course, we should rightly ask the question, “What brought about such a thought?” There are myriad possibilities and embeddings, including previous thinking, maybe about the content of the papers as I walked along. This raises a question about why this might have occurred, and so on. We can carry on this process indefinitely, but to what end? The Big Bang, the ultimate environmental cause?! Moreover, the more one attempts to get back to distal causes, the more speculative and uninformative they become.