Language is thus always legein ti kata tinos saying something-on-something; it is therefore always pre-sup-positional and objectifying language. Presupposition is the form of linguistic signification: speaking kat' hypokeimenou, speaking about a subject. The warning that Plato entrusts to the Idea is therefore that sayability itself remains unsaid in what is said and in that about which something is said, that knowability itself is lost in what is known and in that about which something is known.
The specific problem that is at issue in the letter, and that is necessarily the problem of every human discourse that wants to make a subject out of what is not a subject, is therefore: how is it possible to speak without sup-posing, without hypo-thesizing and subjectifying that about which one speaks? How is it thus possible legein ka'auto, to speak not by means of a presupposition but absolutely? And since the field of names is . . . that which is essentially said ka' auto, can language give reasons (logon didonai) for what it names, can it say what the name has named?
Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy















