#jacobinism

TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Napoleon and Revolutionary Imperialism     

Thursday 15 August 2024 is the 255th anniversary of the birth of Napoleon Bonaparte (born Napoleone di Buonaparte; 15 August 1769 – 05 May 1821), who was born in the city of Ajaccio on the island of Corsica on this date in 1769.

Napoleon was one of the most consequential men of Western history. As such, he has served as a symbol and as an historical ideal, in Huizinga’s sense. But Napoleon meant many things to many men, so his use as a symbol is always ambiguous, and the many meanings that have been associated with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire have never converged on a single vision of history.  

Quora:              https://philosophyofhistory.quora.com/ 

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Newsletter:     http://eepurl.com/dMh0_-/

Text post:        https://geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/napoleon-bonaparte-and-revolutionary  

Video:              https://youtu.be/kQJ8UEZM6_s  

[This blog is in the midst of a series of postings that aims to share with the reader a history of the nation – albeit highly summary in nature – from the perspective of a dialectic struggle.  That is the struggle between a cultural perspective that emphasizes more communal and cooperative ideals of federalism and the individualistic perspective of the natural rights construct.

The general argument this blog has made is that federalism enjoyed the dominant cultural position in the US until World War II, and after a short transition, the natural rights view has been dominant.  Whether one perspective is dominant or the other; whichever it is, that fact has a profound impact on the teaching of civics in American classrooms.]

 Spurred by the introduction of the New Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt, the nation considered whether it wanted to leave its more local, communal approach of governance – its federalism – or take on a more national and centralized approach.  The latter is known as a Jacobinism-style model of governance.  This blog, in the last posting, reviewed and compared two levels of centralization, Jacobinism and consociationalism.  

That is, Jacobinism is a highly centralized model, and consociationalism, a less centralized and, consequently, a less democratic model.  This posting will move in the non-centralized direction and compare consociationalism and federalism, an even less centralized and democratic model.  Daniel Elazar provides the needed explanation of these models as he reports on the work of Arend Lijphart.[1]  

First, in this other comparison, one points out that both consociationalism and federalism are types of non-majoritarian forms of governance.  Lijphart calls the more centralized form, the Jacobin-style, the Westminster system.  He calls both consociationalism and federalism by the descriptive term, “compound majoritarianism.”  This is in line with the designation James Madison promotes in Federalist Paper, No. 51.

Elazar writes,

 … Madison presents the compound republic as the best republican remedy for republican diseases, in contrast with the simple republic … [In what he proposes] majority rule is not rejected, but majorities are compounded either from distinct territories (territorial democracy [read federalist arrangements]) or concurrent groups (consociationalism), [which are] not counted through simple addition.[2]

 That is, one can compound this notion of majority in various ways.  So, a key distinction is that consociationalism divides the populous in aterritorial ways whereas federalism relies on territorial divisions.  

Examples of consociationalism-style are, as mentioned in the previous posting, the Netherlands (with its “three pillars”), but also Austria (with its grand coalition) and Israel (with its camps and parties).  The reader is invited to look up these references to glean their distinguishing structural makeups, but here, this blogger continues this posting’s definitional explanation.

         For the sake of that explanation, one should note that what is highlighted by such compounded systems is how they characterize the majority. As opposed to just counting noses, they outline a system, where to be successful in getting policy enacted, one needs to build coalitions.  In turn, the type of coalition depends on the structural character of the system in which one is operating.

That is, how one goes about forming a coalition will depend on the type of compounded arrangement in which he/she is functioning.  What those strategies should be is a topic for another venue, but the point here is that these compounded settings call for wider consensus of support to enable them to successfully achieve policy either in the derived laws or the actual implementation of those laws.

         The timing of this posting could not be more apropos as the nation is witnessing the difficulty that Democrats in Congress are facing.  That is, in the two initiatives President Biden has proposed (voting legislation and the “Build Back Better” legislation), he and supportive Democrats have been unable to pass them into law.  This is the case even though polling indicates that those bills, substantively, have overwhelming support among the American public.  And in this, to the extent that majoritarian proposals go wanting, it reveals a potential problem for Americans.

         In line with this development, a lot of what is in the news lately has been about how democracy in America is under attack. The attack on the Capitol in Washington is just a visible reflection that things are a bit shaky.  Many are questioning whether the basic assumptions most Americans make concerning the health of their governmental system and its democratic quality still hold.

         Observed through this “compounded” lens, what might be a basic underlying malfunction – one Elazar alludes to – is whether the federalist nature of the system relies too much on its structural composition and not enough on the federal values and beliefs that provide the rationale for their existence.  

Many governmental arrangements around the world and in history have set up those structures, but are basically centered, simple majoritarian systems and do not promulgate or utilize federal values.  But perhaps that is not the problem in the US today.  To be federal is not just a matter of being sufficiently decentralized, but of not being centralized enough.  

That is why defenders of federalism do not use the term, decentralized, but instead use the term, non-centralized, to describe their dispersion of power.  And in that, has the American system drifted toward becoming too un-centralized or too indifferent to majority wishes?  The need is for the right balance between a respect for minority interests and the desires of the majority.

         Unlike consociationalism, which is based more on a social system and relies on its culturally based institutions – religion, ethnicity, and other social groupings – federalism relies on a set of principles. Elazar lists Lijphart’s federalist principles:

 1.    A written constitution which specifies the division of power and guarantees in both the central and regional governments that their allotted powers cannot be taken away;

2.    A bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large and the other the component units of the federation;

3.    Over representation of the smaller component units in the federal chamber of the bicameral legislature [is provided];

4.    The right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal constitution but to change their own constitutions unilaterally; [and]

5.    Decentralized government, that is, the regional government’s share of powers in a federation are relatively large compared to that of regional governments in unitary states [as in the case of France].[3]

 What this blog has hinted at is in terms of principle #3; with the filibuster and other provisions, perhaps the balance is too much in favor of non-central, overall minority rights.  And the minority being favored in the US today is that element made up of conservative factions or what some might call their reactionary desire to reestablish a white population-centered polity.  In that polity, racial and other ethnic minorities are “kept in their place.”  

While this is debatable, one can see that the debate needs to be held or one can expect that current anti-democratic developments will continue to grow and threaten what has been America’s style of democratic rule.  After all, ask the typical American what type of system America has and he/she is apt to say it’s a democracy.

         In any event, this posting will end with one more Elazar quote,

 Nevertheless, both [with consociationalism-style and federalist arrangements] the political wisdom that popular government is not only not enhanced by simple majoritarianism but is often defeated by it because civil society in a democracy is both complex and pluralistic and both its complexities and its pluralism must be properly accommodated.[4]

 While the narrative this blog is sharing has progressed to the first years of the twentieth century (with a review of the Progressive movement), one can see those debates – in this case over how federal the US system should be – have not been settled or resolved. The debates – sometimes in the open and loudly expressed, a la the January 6 attack on the Capitol, and other times subtle and below the surface – continue; the dialectic beat beats on.

[1] Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL:  The University of Alabama Press, 1987).

[2] Ibid., 19.

[3] Ibid., 22-23.  Whereas with consociationalism, they have two primary characteristics, grand coalitions and segmental autonomy, and two lesser characteristics, proportionality and veto power among minorities.

[This blog is in the midst of a series of postings that aims to share with the reader a history of the nation – albeit highly summary in nature – from the perspective of a dialectic struggle. That is the struggle between a cultural perspective that emphasizes more communal and cooperative ideals of federalism and the individualistic perspective of the natural rights construct.

The general argument this blog has made is that federalism enjoyed the dominant cultural position in the US until World War II, and after a short transition, the natural rights view has been dominant. Whether one perspective is dominant or the other; whichever it is, that fact has a profound impact on the teaching of civics in American classrooms.]

 This posting and the next take on a challenge that bloggers should avoid.  It’s going academic.  And the main focus is to not only be definitional – as to the meaning of federalism – but also to distinguish it from two other obscure terms, consociationalism and Jacobinism. The purpose for this madness is for the reader to more readily understand what one means by using the term republic by comparing three forms of this type of governance.

           By way of contextualizing, federalism doesn’t just mean something that sounds appropriate for some organizations to name themselves as in “The Federation of” whatever (such as workers, builders, teachers, etc.).  And it means more than a governing arrangement that has a central government and state governments.  It is a whole way of seeing how a people should or could be governed through their own auspices.  

It would be interesting to test Americans and see how they define the relationship between a central government and that of the states.  This writer worries that in the minds of most in this federated nation, people see states more like provinces than sovereign entities.  Yes, states, by being part of the US system, have relinquished certain sovereign powers but have retained others.

         But this is getting into the weeds without defining the outer boundaries of what federations are.  And in getting at this, this blogger relies on a name the readers of this blog have encountered many times.  That is the name, Daniel J. Elazar, and with the help of Arend Lijphart, Elazar provides his readers with basic definitions – in political science speak – of the above terms.  And in doing so, Elazar does what many contemporary political scientists hesitate to do.

         He writes,

For those who are willing to take … [a] normative step or at least to recognize the normative implication of the term [federalism], it may also be empirically useful in describing what is, after all, a universal phenomenon of particular significance in our age of highly complex governmental structures, relationships, and processes.[1]

And key is the use of the term, “intergovernmental relations,” since such a concern is universal among all nations.  

They all have, perhaps with the exceptions of city-states (Monaco comes to mind), cities, county like divisions, provinces, states, and other regional designations with constitutionally defined powers and limitations.  Therefore, every nation needs to find the procedural modes of operation by which to govern between and among these entities, hopefully in coordinated fashion.

         A comparative term, therefore, that one can use to assist in comparing political systems is “intergovernmental relations” that focuses on how and why these entities “mix it up” – which can be cooperative, competitive, communal, and/or collaborative – in either conducting both long range governance and in engaging in the politics of the day.

         And here a more common term comes into play. One can ask how democratic the system under analysis is or simply highlight the level at which the majority of citizens has its way to determine governmental policy.  Reminder (for long term readers of this blog): federalism argues for instituting a qualified majority rule.  It, federalism, mainly sees pure democracy as problematic in that it easily leads to the majority oppressing or exploiting a minority.

         In the US, for instance, and this is currently very much an active issue, its people’s migration to the urban centers, if the system were a purely majoritarian democracy, would lead to the abuse of rural populations.  So, the system holds certain constitutional protections for the less densely populated areas.

They include having equal representation among the states in the US Senate, the Electoral College provision, and the prohibition of the central government governing certain local affairs that don’t have constitutional protections – usually in the form of individual rights – such as in running public school systems. Of note, many believe that these anti-majoritarian provisions have tilted the system too much to protect this minority and they, in turn, are abusing the majority.

         So, at an ideal level of concern, systems that shy away from pure majoritarianism need to be conscious and directed toward respecting whatever level of democracy they choose to pursue or have established within their constitutional makeup.  And once one leaves the direct democracy model of an ancient Athens, representation comes into play.  That is, the people don’t directly choose their policies, but their representatives do and that makes such systems republics.  

But a question remains:  how dispersed will power be within such republics?  How respectful will a given system be in honoring the prerogatives of local governments or local populations?  Elazar identifies three levels of dispersion.  The most centralized system is Jacobinism and that can be found in France.  The purpose here is to point out that that system has the authorities in Paris having a strong hand in what policies will be implemented from a national to a local level – at least that has been that nation’s traditional approach to governance.

         But there has been of late a movement to allow for more localism in France’s governance, a movement of the last forty years or so.  Here is a general description of how localism has gained that respect in this Jacobin oriented system:

While local government in France has a long history of centralisation, the past 20 years [as of the writing of this source in 2003] have brought some radical changes. … In France there are three main tiers of local administration:  the commune, department and region.  These are both districts in which administrative decisions made at national level are carried out and local authorities with powers of their own. Legally speaking, a local authority is a public-law corporation with its own name, territory, budget, employees, etc. and has specific powers and a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis central government.  In addition, there are France’s overseas territories and regional bodies (collectivities territoriales) with special status (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Corsica, Mayotte and Saint-Pierre-et-Mequilon).[2]

Apparently in France, there have been popular demands to soften its Jacobinism, although this description does not indicate a less majoritarian character of that nation’s polity.

         The next level – one of more dispersion – is -style democracy and is exemplified by the Netherlands.  That nation is a constitutional monarchy (the head of state is a King or Queen with constitutional powers – albeit limited), but instead imparts the bulk of governmental powers on ministers.  

That is, the key characteristics that consociationalism-style arrangements exhibit are a grand or overall coalition, proportional distribution of power, mutual veto power, and autonomy dispersed to segmented territories. But the most defining element is the executive power-sharing arrangement, usually in the hands of an executive committee of what are called unionist or national ministers as exists in the Netherlands.  They can be more proactive policy makers than are allowed in federalist systems, but less so than in Jacobin-style systems.

That is, “consociational systems are dependent upon concurrent majorities, generally aterritorial in character.  Both [consociationalism and federalism] involve the systemic building of more substantial consensus than in simple majoritarian systems [i.e., Jacobin-style polities].”[3]  Therefore, both are not as proactive systems as simple majoritarian systems can be.

While much more can be said of these first two forms – Jacobinism and consociationalism – the purpose here is to merely introduce the reader to these other two republican forms of governance so as to better judge federalist systems in regard to majoritarian power arrangements and dispersion of power.  It turns out these two characteristics are related to each other.  The next posting will finish this review of these three forms of republican governance by focusing on federalism.  It will emphasize how federal systems deal with dispersion and majoritarian rule.

But before leaving this posting, a reminder:  the topic of republicanism and how Americans were to define it became an issue with the New Nationalism that Theodore Roosevelt introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century (see the last posting, “A Split in the ‘Bigness’ Debate,” January 18, 2022).  His proposal not only flew in the face of what Louis Brandeis – a more federalist advocate – favored but countered the historical foundation that the nation assumed its political culture to be.

[1] Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, AL:  The University of Alabama Press, 1987), 17.

[2] Nick Swift and Guy Kervella, “A Complex System Aims to Bring French Local Government Closer to the People,” City Mayors Government (June 23, 2003), accessed January 20, 2022, http://www.citymayors.com/france/france_gov.html .  British spelling used except for French terms.