Deep embedding
I used to think structures like this existed only in the wildest fantasies of generativists. And yet, here is a real-life example of triple center embedding from Platoās prose:

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Deep embedding
I used to think structures like this existed only in the wildest fantasies of generativists. And yet, here is a real-life example of triple center embedding from Platoās prose:

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Universal Grammar couldn't evolve
We know that human beings evolved from ancestors without language. This means our language faculty must have evolved and it must therefore be capable of evolving. The innate grammar module the generativists propose is not "evolvable" and poses other problems besides, and cannot therefore be part of our language faculty. On the other hand, there probably are language instincts linked to babbling, selective hearing and the learning of words. Language is also based on a range of social instincts, but these are not language-specific.
~ Sverker Johansson, The dawn of language, p. 197
The Dawn of Language: Axes, lies, midwifery and how we came to talk on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The Dawn of Languag
The linguistics wars
Want to hear all the drama in linguistics? Check out āThe linguistics warsā, which documents one of the most vicious intellectual battles between what have become the two dominant camps in linguistics todayāgenerativism and functionalism.
The Linguistics Wars: Chomsky, Lakoff, and the Battle over Deep Structure [Harris, Randy Allen] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying
This paper argues that N. Chomsky's linguistics has been thoroughly saturated with intellectual dishonesty from at least the publication of his 1957 volume Syntactic Structures. This claim is suppo - lingbuzz, the linguistics archive
The level of vitriol in linguistic controversies never ceases to amaze me. Some people really, really donāt like Chomskyās theories.
I think this paper is grossly unfair to Chomsky. It makes some reasonable criticisms of his ideas, which is fine, but then talks as if those criticisms definitively, objectively prove Chomskyās ideas to be wrong (which I donāt agree with, and which in any case is not conducive to fruitful discussion), then goes on to accuse Chomsky of intellectual dishonesty because these criticisms are supposedly so devastating that he surely canāt have kept believing in his ideas after the criticisms were first published, yet he still kept acting as if he believed in them!
Itās also a great illustration of the pitfalls of assuming a strict binary distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. On pages 3--4, Chomsky is excoriated for his assertion in Syntactic Structures that every simple active sentence in English can be put in a passive form; the authors cite the following counterexamples:
(1) The kids want ice cream. / *Ice cream is wanted by the kids.
(2) That movie starred Julia. / *Julia was starred by that movie.
(3) The ocean liner neared the iceberg. / *The iceberg was neared by the ocean liner.
(4) Karenās remarks betrayed contempt for socialism. / *Contempt for socialism was betrayed by Karenās remarks.
The existence of these counterexamples, the authors say, demonstrates that Chomskyās assertion contained a āgross factual errorā. But their real complaint---since, they admit, āeven honest researchersā make mistakes now and then---is that Chomsky had already given examples of ungrammatical passives in an earlier publication from 1955 (*three pounds were weighed by this; *his punishment was gotten by him). So, they say, Chomsky was lying in Syntactic Structures---he knew the claim he was making was false.
Yet if your intuitions are anything like mine, you might notice something funny about these counterexamples: some of them are not actually counterexamples, according to your own intuition. For example, I think (4) is completely fine, whether itās in the active form or thr passive form. I also donāt object too much to the passives in (1) and (3), though they do sound a bit funny; (2) is the only one I would definitively say is ungrammatical to me.
So itās really a lot more complicated than either side in this dispute is making it out to be. Even if youāre committed to not concluding that grammaticality isnāt a binary, you have to at least admit that intuitions about grammaticality are not entirely reliable. They vary from speaker to speaker, or even at different times from the same speaker.
My charitable interpretation of Chomskyās actions would be that between 1955 and 1957 he simply changed his mind about whether āthree pounds were weighed by thisā and āhis punishment was gotten by himā were straightforwardly ungrammatical. Perhaps he realized that passive sentences were one of these domains in which grammaticality judgements seem to vary a lot between different speakers, and therefore concluded that his intuition on which passive sentences were grammatical or not wasnāt very reliable. Perhaps he talked to a colleague who claimed that āthree pounds were weighed by thisā was grammatical---I wouldnāt be at all surprised if such speakers exist. One can fault Chomsky for not addressing these conceptual issues with his theory, but thatās a different matter from accusing him of lying. Besides, from the small parts of it Iāve read, Syntactic Structures seems like a rather short, concise, elegant expository sort of work---perhaps he just didnāt want to get bogged down in these issues too much in the text.
There are similar problems with Levine & Postalās discussion of the A-over-A principle, where they cite counterexamples (this time grammatical counterexamples, which should be ungrammatical according to the A-over-A principle) which make use of topicalization. I find it very hard to judge the grammaticality of sentences making use of topicalization because topicalization always sounds somewhat wrong in English. Iām not sure which of āRobin, I love to hear stories about.ā and āStories about Robin, I love to hearā is better, but I can imagine somebody thinking the latter; but Levine & Postal make out the former to be straightforwardly better. In any case, the existence of edge-case exceptions to a principle doesnāt imply itās not useful as a generalization or as an initial hypothesis which can be refined by subsequent work, whether those exceptions take the form of ungrammatical sentences or grammatical sentences (Levine & Postal seem to think grammatical exceptions are a more serious matter than ungrammatical exceptions).
The final two criticisms Levine & Postal make have nothing to do with Chomskyās linguistic theories. Before the 1990s, Chomskyās theories made use of a concept called deep structure. In the 1990s, Chomsky decided as part of his latest revision of his programme (āMinimalismā) that deep structure was no longer necessary as part of his conceptual framework. But when he wrote about this he failed to cite the work of linguists who in earlier decades had sparred with him over a rival theory of theirs, Generative Semantics, one of whose central differences from Chomskyanism was the rejection of deep structure. I agree that it was impolite for Chomsky to fail to cite these authors, even though Iām fairly sure Minimalism is quite a different thing from Generative Semantics. Iām happy to say that Chomsky has some personality issues---Iām sure many great scientists are, or were jerks. But Iād be more interested in criticisms of Chomskyās ideas. The same goes for the last criticism, that Chomsky denigrates the accomplishments of the natural sciences. But I donāt even find that last criticism convincing. Levine & Postal make it out as if Chomsky is saying there are no secure facts in classical physics, which is obviously absurd. But Iād interpret him as saying that the fundamental principles of physics from which the secure facts get derived have been constantly questioned and revised, which is of course true. One might argue that Chomskyās theories have not been any good at establishing secure theorems, regardless of the constant axiom-revision; but itās not clear to me that this is the case, and Levine & Postal arenāt making the argument at that level.
9/15/16
Thing-A-Day #867 - Generativists
She says there's an organ way up in our brains that solely learns language; it soaks and it trains, and the math is so elegant, hard, and precise, that surely there must be some special device! But that's not realistic; I see no way how a brain could evolve in a way to allow the workload to split up, for what would that save? Reality need not with theories behave.

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A second way of making essentially the same point comes from thinking again about the logic of Chomskyās acquisition-based sense of Universal Grammar. What kinds of knowledge of language does the generative linguist most want to attribute to the initial state of the human child? In point of fact, we typically want to attribute those facts that are more abstract and remote from obvious every day experience to that initial endowment. There is (maybe) no serious language acquisition problem for the more obvious facts about word order, case marking, agreement, and use of lexical categories in a language. These matters are saliently and abundantly attested in the sample of language that is presented to any child, so they could be learned from the data by some kind of inductive process. The real acquisition puzzles come from those subtle and surprising but robust and replicable discoveries at the corners of a grammatical system that are often discovered by a formal-generative attention to detail, explicitness, and the special issues that can arise when simple structures are composed to form more complex structures. These include distinctively generative discoveries such as the Binding Conditions on pronouns and anaphors, the so-called Island Conditions that constrain movement operations, conditions on the interpretation of quantified expressions, and so on. Often distinctive facts about these matters show up clearly and unambiguously only in sentences of a certain complexity, sentences with a very particular combination of properties. For such properties, it is hard to imagine that every language user that demonstrates the knowledge was exposed to a sufficient number of the relevant structuresāand that they noticed them, and that they realized their significance for the grammatical point in question. These then are the grammatical properties that we have the most reason to attribute to Universal Grammar qua the innate endowment for language. It then follows that these are the grammatical properties that we have the most reason to expect to be universal also in the Greenbergian sense of being observable in all human languages. So we expect that the most abstract properties of languageāthe very hardest properties of that language for a linguist to discover, and thus the issues most rarely discussed in descriptive grammarsāalso to be the most universal properties of language.
Baker (2010)
Pretty harsh words on Chomsky and generativism from Antilla (1977). I donāt have an opinion on this issue myself (I know little about it, and from what I do know, it seems complicated). But it was amusing to find this little diatribe while I was browsing in the university library.
Generative linguistics is strucutralist in the sense that...
In broadest terms, generative linguistics is one way to study and model language structure. It is therefore a part of the broader structuralist program (see for instance F Newmeyer).
In particular, generativism shares these structuralist commitments:
Language as an interconnected hierarchical semiotic system
Distinction between competence and performance (languge/parole)
Meaning and function expressed through distinctive features
Language susceptible to syntagmatic and paradigmatic analysis
Specific concepts such as phoneme, morpheme, lexeme
Language units as symbolic pairings of meaning and form
Linearity of language
Etc.
While many of the generativist approaches grew out of a critique of the structuralist orthodoxy of the time, they still stayed firmly within the broader structuralist framework. In some way, generative linguistics could be seen as a contribution to a structuralist theory of syntax.
See full context on StackExchange Linguistics.