#arms control

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Any transfer of weapons or ammunition to Israel that would be used in Gaza is likely to violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately, UN experts warned today.

Archives at Home: The Vladivostok Summit Meeting on Arms Control

President Ford traveled to Vladivostok in the USSR in November 1974 to meet Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev for a summit on arms control. The United States and the Soviet Union first reached an agreement on strategic arms limitation in May 1972. That agreement was set to expire in 1977, so both sides pressed for a permanent and more encompassing accord.

The leaders and their advisers met for two days at the Okeanskaya Sanatorium, with sessions on November 23 stretching past midnight. On November 24 President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev concluded their meeting by signing a joint communique. Their talks served as a significant step forward in developing a framework for a second agreement. The terms they negotiated included limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and deployment of new types of offensive arms, as well as a ban on new land-based ICBM launchers.   

Not all issues had been addressed during the summit, so talks continued throughout the Ford administration and into the Carter administration. President Jimmy Carter and Secretary General Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty on June 18, 1979. 

Explore selected resources related to the Vladivosok Summit Meeting here.

The Atomic Deadlock: UN vs. USSR

Newsweek, 21 November 1949

I thought id write a thing on this because most of the current far left talking points on this issue are terribly poorly informed. There’s a tendency amongst leftists online, particularly notable on twitter, but also here to conflate two kinds of commentary on contentious geopolitical issues into being one form of sin. Obviously the most current example is regarding the Singapore summit. The way its currently playing out in a lot of cases is basically as follows (I’m being a little snarky here but this is a fairly accurate play by play for a lot of the stupider stuff):

Prominent analyst, journalist, politician or Liberal pundit makes a statement criticizing the deal for a given reason. It might either be ordinary partisanship, or a genuine technical criticism of the content of the circumstances. 

It gets retweeted

People comment on  it in the retweets, claiming that the given person is in favour of  Koreans getting exterminated, because all objections to the circumstances must be borne of a desire for war or something.

The difference between multiple forms of criticism gets totally ignored by the left, we dont learn anything and we continue patting ourselves on the back.

Obviously this is fairly normal for online stuff but even so i think we need to start paying much closer attention to these issues and at the same time, stop being so parochial in our thinking about issues such as these. Therefore I’m minded to make a few points here about why its  short sighted to interpret this via the lens of western domestic political leftist rhetoric, the problem being that there’s severe limitations on that lens. 

Firstly its primarily based on established rhetorical forms that are largely out of date or constrained by a lack of room for outside information. This prevents us from usefully adopting lines of analyses from schools of thought not traditionally connected to existing normal stances within leftism. On the occasions where this does occur, we co-opt it for our own benefit. Essentially, If there’s a form of analysis, or an area of academic or technical expertise where the information and commentary is not directly subordinate to a conservative, US-centric interpretation of anti-imperialism then it tends to get completely discounted. The main example of this type of thing i wish to talk about is an area of interest of mine, namely arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the place of nuclear weapons within a fairly basic Marxist influenced viewpoint on nuclear politics. 

Secondly, this stance is limited by the dynamics of online sectarian politics and the desire to produce content. Everyones familiar with this and knows how it works so im not going to bother going into this in any great detail. Essentially its providing a great addition to our respective mutual firing squads.

A third issue is the presumption of knowledge, and of moral or intellectual high ground on a combination of ideological bases. This latter point ties into an ongoing dynamic of orientalist thinking and presumptions that tend to seep into leftist rhetoric on subjects surrounding the Korean Peninsula. This is notable particularly within Marxist-Leninist  self styled “anti-imperialist” discourses, which are the main area of failure on all three of the issues ive listed, though there has been cross-pollination with other leftist sects. This behavior is reliant on making the nuclear crisis All About Us, unconsciously sliding over the human and political realities in order to establish credentials, ignoring regional factors beyond what is read about in a few articles and a surface level adherence to popular conceptions of anti imperialist praxis. Its essentially a highly banal form of watered down orientalism mixed with a vague presumption of superior politics. The reality is that we havent really learned anything from the crisis, because we’ve refused to. Arms Control, Non-proliferation and a lack of far-left institutional knowledge: I’m mainly going to address the first issue, that of a general lack of understanding of evolving dynamics in nuclear proliferation issues and arms control within the far left because its where i have the strongest base of knowledge relating to this matter. Functionally, nearly no-one in the circles of the online left I’m in actually knows how arms control is meant to work either in its form as a policy enacted between countries on a mutual basis, or in its form as a system in the world of geopolitics within which countries formulate policies. Im not trying to grandstand here as this circumstance is totally understandable: its a very niche topic and its not as if I’m particularly special for having made it something I’m interested in, but regardless there is a knowledge gap in leftist discussions on this issue and it seems important to highlight it. If there are any leftist arms control nerds that happen to see this assuming it gets more than a handful of notes by all means let me know. Anyway, I think its wise at this point to make the following statement and to explain it:

In the particular example at hand, namely this weeks Singapore summit and the deal made there, what has just happened is very likely a disaster in the long term, and should be absolutely regarded as such by the left. This is due to a combination of technical and political factors relating to the context and structure of the agreement. I am saying this as a Marxist and as someone in favour of internationalism and popular movements directed towards nuclear disarmament. Leftist institutional knowledge and the general knowledge in the community of how arms control works isn't really that great. During the cold war it was ok, due to the size and importance of the disarmament movement, but in the modern era its essentially non-existent. Anyway, the summit was a disaster for arms control and very few of us seem to get why. This is for a few reasons, but the main one is that it has established a precedent for successful, aggressive  strategies of proliferation under extreme duress. Arms control as a concept has taken a serious beating since 2003 and the Iraq war, with other major points of inflection since. The most significant of these have been the collapse of the JCPOA agreement with Iran  and the various chemical warfare atrocities in the Syrian civil war. The collapse of the Libyan state stands as its own special case as well for its own reasons. In the case of the recent summit the precedent set has been one of the solidification of certain dynamics, of the transition undertaken by nuclear weapons from being articles characterized by their technical use into being primarily characterized by a capacity for abstract political use in a way that had not yet been achieved, and of the deliberate manipulation and degradation of existing institutions in order to facilitate proliferation. I am not merely talking about Nuclear weapons being used for political purposes. I am talking about a very specific type of political use. This dynamic is extremely bad and provides a model for action to accompany the diminishing difficulty in producing nuclear weapons, which will provide a great incentive to states seeking to proliferate nuclear weapons. The only outcome possible here is the furthering of the development of weaponry to be used against populations and in so doing, the armory of empire. This is not a victory for Anti-Imperialism, despite its surface appearance having had great propaganda value.

The deal has essentially entrenched both the (many) negative and the (few) positive aspects of the present crisis, essentially providing cover for the ROK to continue a gradualist approach toward achieving a sustainable end result at the same time as providing a model of success for proliferation as a state policy. In fact i would argue that one of the main contributions that this will all make to geopolitical history will be the establishment, testing, and success of a new model of proliferation, one with profoundly negative though interesting consequences from a leftist perspective. Essentially, by forcing the nuclear issue, by making all of the political capital centered upon repeated escalating crises, comprising a protracted greater crisis, the DPRK strategy meant that all political questions were to be decided according to a single signifier of value: the technical usability and validity of its nuclear weapons, demonstrable to all onlookers from the outside. A value which the DPRK leadership were able to be the controlling agents of, determining its magnitude, qualities and effects. In doing so it has essentially managed to manipulate the existing notions of arms control agreements and non-proliferation principles in order to turn those structures to its advantage: to turn them from being systems which constrained nuclear proliferation, to using them as a basis for updating the nuclear weapon into taking on a modern form of its already infamous role as the ultimate political commodity. It was essentially a strategy of folding up all issues into one and forcing everyone's decisions to rest upon that single focused issue. It is now far easier to proliferate nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in terms of technical restrictions than it was 30, 40, 50 years ago. The designs are no-longer unknown and the required production technology is no longer as challenging as it once was. Provided with this, directed efforts towards various kinds of proliferation now have new potentials: the end state no longer has to be one option from a three way fork between a failed program, a successful program and being attacked/sanctioned. Obviously nuclear weapons have always been used as chips to bet on and trade between states, but for the most part those items, in the historical contexts of the cold war, the India/Pakistan standoff, and in the cases of Israel, Iran and the DPRK prior to recent developments, were developed for strict military terms, as items of deterrence, as physical items for physical use as instruments of policy in the most literal sense. In other words, they have been pursued by states for their use either as weapons, articles of deterrence or as a combination of being usable weapons and articles of abstract political power realized. This has now changed, likely irreversibly, and the summit has been a notable moment in the change.

The realization of abstract powers, and the risks of a new Nuclear credit:

What the new development has done is to introduce the potential for the transformation from nuclear weapons as weapons into a sort of proto-commodity form, whereby proliferation, as a behavior that states may engage in and as a form of production existing in a political sphere, has been brought to a such point of technical and political development that it may now be used not merely as an action engaged in to achieve a physical end, a productive approach to achieving a state policy, but takes on a new meaning, as a form of bargaining chip in itself. Elements of this have been present with nuclear weapons since the cold war in  relatively isolated minor forms but never reached the stage of proliferating for the sake of trading against that proliferation.

WPS News Staff ReporterBaybay City | March 14, 2026 As we step into 2026, the volatile geopolitical landscape is drawing increased attention to the looming threat of nuclear weapons. This resurgence is driven by rising tensions and the evolving strategic discourse around nuclear capabilities, which pose significant risks to global stability. With tensions escalating among key nuclear-armed…

Introduction: War Without Direct Battle The Cold War arms race was unlike any previous military competition. Instead of open battlefield confrontation, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a prolonged struggle defined by deterrence, technological escalation, and strategic restraint. The paradox of the Cold War was that peace depended on the constant preparation for total…