Leftism, the DPRK and the Nuclear crisis
I thought id write a thing on this because most of the current far left talking points on this issue are terribly poorly informed. There’s a tendency amongst leftists online, particularly notable on twitter, but also here to conflate two kinds of commentary on contentious geopolitical issues into being one form of sin. Obviously the most current example is regarding the Singapore summit. The way its currently playing out in a lot of cases is basically as follows (I’m being a little snarky here but this is a fairly accurate play by play for a lot of the stupider stuff):
Prominent analyst, journalist, politician or Liberal pundit makes a statement criticizing the deal for a given reason. It might either be ordinary partisanship, or a genuine technical criticism of the content of the circumstances.Â
People comment on it in the retweets, claiming that the given person is in favour of Koreans getting exterminated, because all objections to the circumstances must be borne of a desire for war or something.
The difference between multiple forms of criticism gets totally ignored by the left, we dont learn anything and we continue patting ourselves on the back.
Obviously this is fairly normal for online stuff but even so i think we need to start paying much closer attention to these issues and at the same time, stop being so parochial in our thinking about issues such as these. Therefore I’m minded to make a few points here about why its short sighted to interpret this via the lens of western domestic political leftist rhetoric, the problem being that there’s severe limitations on that lens.Â
Firstly its primarily based on established rhetorical forms that are largely out of date or constrained by a lack of room for outside information. This prevents us from usefully adopting lines of analyses from schools of thought not traditionally connected to existing normal stances within leftism. On the occasions where this does occur, we co-opt it for our own benefit. Essentially, If there’s a form of analysis, or an area of academic or technical expertise where the information and commentary is not directly subordinate to a conservative, US-centric interpretation of anti-imperialism then it tends to get completely discounted. The main example of this type of thing i wish to talk about is an area of interest of mine, namely arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the place of nuclear weapons within a fairly basic Marxist influenced viewpoint on nuclear politics.Â
Secondly, this stance is limited by the dynamics of online sectarian politics and the desire to produce content. Everyones familiar with this and knows how it works so im not going to bother going into this in any great detail. Essentially its providing a great addition to our respective mutual firing squads.
A third issue is the presumption of knowledge, and of moral or intellectual high ground on a combination of ideological bases. This latter point ties into an ongoing dynamic of orientalist thinking and presumptions that tend to seep into leftist rhetoric on subjects surrounding the Korean Peninsula. This is notable particularly within Marxist-Leninist self styled “anti-imperialist” discourses, which are the main area of failure on all three of the issues ive listed, though there has been cross-pollination with other leftist sects. This behavior is reliant on making the nuclear crisis All About Us, unconsciously sliding over the human and political realities in order to establish credentials, ignoring regional factors beyond what is read about in a few articles and a surface level adherence to popular conceptions of anti imperialist praxis. Its essentially a highly banal form of watered down orientalism mixed with a vague presumption of superior politics. The reality is that we havent really learned anything from the crisis, because we’ve refused to.
Arms Control, Non-proliferation and a lack of far-left institutional knowledge:
I’m mainly going to address the first issue, that of a general lack of understanding of evolving dynamics in nuclear proliferation issues and arms control within the far left because its where i have the strongest base of knowledge relating to this matter. Functionally, nearly no-one in the circles of the online left I’m in actually knows how arms control is meant to work either in its form as a policy enacted between countries on a mutual basis, or in its form as a system in the world of geopolitics within which countries formulate policies. Im not trying to grandstand here as this circumstance is totally understandable: its a very niche topic and its not as if I’m particularly special for having made it something I’m interested in, but regardless there is a knowledge gap in leftist discussions on this issue and it seems important to highlight it. If there are any leftist arms control nerds that happen to see this assuming it gets more than a handful of notes by all means let me know.
Anyway, I think its wise at this point to make the following statement and to explain it:
In the particular example at hand, namely this weeks Singapore summit and the deal made there, what has just happened is very likely a disaster in the long term, and should be absolutely regarded as such by the left. This is due to a combination of technical and political factors relating to the context and structure of the agreement. I am saying this as a Marxist and as someone in favour of internationalism and popular movements directed towards nuclear disarmament.
Leftist institutional knowledge and the general knowledge in the community of how arms control works isn't really that great. During the cold war it was ok, due to the size and importance of the disarmament movement, but in the modern era its essentially non-existent. Anyway, the summit was a disaster for arms control and very few of us seem to get why. This is for a few reasons, but the main one is that it has established a precedent for successful, aggressive strategies of proliferation under extreme duress.
Arms control as a concept has taken a serious beating since 2003 and the Iraq war, with other major points of inflection since. The most significant of these have been the collapse of the JCPOA agreement with Iran and the various chemical warfare atrocities in the Syrian civil war. The collapse of the Libyan state stands as its own special case as well for its own reasons. In the case of the recent summit the precedent set has been one of the solidification of certain dynamics, of the transition undertaken by nuclear weapons from being articles characterized by their technical use into being primarily characterized by a capacity for abstract political use in a way that had not yet been achieved, and of the deliberate manipulation and degradation of existing institutions in order to facilitate proliferation. I am not merely talking about Nuclear weapons being used for political purposes. I am talking about a very specific type of political use. This dynamic is extremely bad and provides a model for action to accompany the diminishing difficulty in producing nuclear weapons, which will provide a great incentive to states seeking to proliferate nuclear weapons. The only outcome possible here is the furthering of the development of weaponry to be used against populations and in so doing, the armory of empire. This is not a victory for Anti-Imperialism, despite its surface appearance having had great propaganda value.
The deal has essentially entrenched both the (many) negative and the (few) positive aspects of the present crisis, essentially providing cover for the ROK to continue a gradualist approach toward achieving a sustainable end result at the same time as providing a model of success for proliferation as a state policy. In fact i would argue that one of the main contributions that this will all make to geopolitical history will be the establishment, testing, and success of a new model of proliferation, one with profoundly negative though interesting consequences from a leftist perspective.
Essentially, by forcing the nuclear issue, by making all of the political capital centered upon repeated escalating crises, comprising a protracted greater crisis, the DPRK strategy meant that all political questions were to be decided according to a single signifier of value: the technical usability and validity of its nuclear weapons, demonstrable to all onlookers from the outside. A value which the DPRK leadership were able to be the controlling agents of, determining its magnitude, qualities and effects. In doing so it has essentially managed to manipulate the existing notions of arms control agreements and non-proliferation principles in order to turn those structures to its advantage: to turn them from being systems which constrained nuclear proliferation, to using them as a basis for updating the nuclear weapon into taking on a modern form of its already infamous role as the ultimate political commodity. It was essentially a strategy of folding up all issues into one and forcing everyone's decisions to rest upon that single focused issue.
It is now far easier to proliferate nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in terms of technical restrictions than it was 30, 40, 50 years ago. The designs are no-longer unknown and the required production technology is no longer as challenging as it once was. Provided with this, directed efforts towards various kinds of proliferation now have new potentials: the end state no longer has to be one option from a three way fork between a failed program, a successful program and being attacked/sanctioned. Obviously nuclear weapons have always been used as chips to bet on and trade between states, but for the most part those items, in the historical contexts of the cold war, the India/Pakistan standoff, and in the cases of Israel, Iran and the DPRK prior to recent developments, were developed for strict military terms, as items of deterrence, as physical items for physical use as instruments of policy in the most literal sense. In other words, they have been pursued by states for their use either as weapons, articles of deterrence or as a combination of being usable weapons and articles of abstract political power realized. This has now changed, likely irreversibly, and the summit has been a notable moment in the change.
The realization of abstract powers, and the risks of a new Nuclear credit:
What the new development has done is to introduce the potential for the transformation from nuclear weapons as weapons into a sort of proto-commodity form, whereby proliferation, as a behavior that states may engage in and as a form of production existing in a political sphere, has been brought to a such point of technical and political development that it may now be used not merely as an action engaged in to achieve a physical end, a productive approach to achieving a state policy, but takes on a new meaning, as a form of bargaining chip in itself. Elements of this have been present with nuclear weapons since the cold war in relatively isolated minor forms but never reached the stage of proliferating for the sake of trading against that proliferation.
I believe that the summit has laid the groundwork for the establishment of such a dynamic and I suspect that the fallout from the summit and the ongoing crisis ( which is not at all over) will now exacerbate this tendency in future cases. It is as if they have succeeded in laying the groundwork for making nuclear weapons not merely commodity items between a state and its industrial complex, but have extended their existence as commodities right into the geopolitical sphere. The truly perverse thing about this is that this change has been achieved without the DPRK even having to actually physically trade any of them: it has merely made a vapor-deal based on vague promises to limit the most obvious cases of its potential power.Â
In this manner another well established dynamic has been reinforced: The confrontational relationship between the instability of deterrence and the long term tendency evolving from it for states to engage in proliferation. The repeated historical cases of the seeming success of deterrence, (a false semblance) have created a climate of encouragement for proliferation: existing nuclear weapons states are encouraged to expand and proliferate new powers to counter their antagonists advances, whilst non-nuclear weapons states begin to seek the weapons to achieve parity on various fronts. Against this backdrop, both the repeated crises in deterrence, the breakdowns of its various forms, political crises between states etc, and the longer periods of time between them, the long moments of false security, serve to enhance the fetishized value of deterrence. The illusory success of deterrent strategies encourage the proliferation dynamic. Deterrence will therefore, if i am correct, become a contributing factor in commodity-led proliferation. But now a new aspect of this dynamic has appeared: the change in nature of arms control into also becoming a contributing feature. Prior to this arms control was a diplomatic, technical activity, with strict technical aims. It may still take on that characteristic but is at severe risk of being held, in measure of value, against the new measuring standard that i fear is being established.Â
This situation is profoundly negative for leftist political positions: the brief lull in tensions may be whisked away by a new return to sabre rattling at any point if political capital is to be made, ushering in more risks of accident miscalculation or catalytic war and further it is a massive blow to the disarmament movement. It will certainly serve to entrench national military industrial complexes in nuclear states, as well as further contributing to regional problems in areas where proliferating states are players. Holding all this to be down to the blunderings of one leader and the energy of another is a useless way to think about this issue. This is to the detriment of internationalism.Â
