if you are a regular degular person—while i expect you to generally know what you're talking about if you're gonna be involved in the conversation, i don't need you to be able to outline all the particulars of what was discussed at the 2000 camp david summit.
if you are CO-CHAIR OF THE DSA, a political party that has made palestine its ENTIRE PLATFORM for the past THREE YEARS—yes, i expect you to have knowledge of the stages of the peace process. if you want people to listen to your solutions, i expect you to know what has and has not already been tried, and to know why you would or wouldn't have been happy with the major proposals made at each major step. including at camp david in 2000.
you just demonstrated for the ten thousandth time to the israeli right wing that even the most politically-involved and aware pro-palestine voices can be utterly ignored because you don't know anything and have no meaningful ideas. you're making things worse. hope this helps.
For those wondering, this is my best summary:
In 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed, creating the framework for a future Palestinian state. In 1995, Oslo II was signed, which divided the West Bank into three parts: Area A, Area B, and Area C. Area A is under full Palestinian control. Area B is under Palestinian civil control with Israeli security. And Area C is under full Israeli control. (It also divided Gaza into Areas A, B, and C. Gaza is supposed to be Area A, but due to a little thing known as "the government in charge of Gaza killed a thousand Israelis in one day", there is substantial Israeli presence.) Jewish Israelis are barred from entering Area A, for their own safety. (Arab Israelis are also theoretically barred, but this ban isn't enforced as strictly.) Area A includes most of the West Bank's population.
This was supposed to be temporary, renegotiated after five years.
So, five years pass, and Clinton gets together the leader of Israel, Ehud Barak, and the leader of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, at Camp David to talk it out.
The Israelis really, really, want peace. Ehud Barak is begging for a deal.
As Robert Malley and Hussein Agha write in an article fairly critical of Israel and Barak, "Barak was eager for a deal, wanted it achieved during Clinton’s term in office, and had surrounded himself with some of Israel’s most peace-minded politicians." Malley and Agha continue later that "If there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or could go". They criticize him for, seemingly, being too flexible and acquiescent: "Yet, at the same time, he gave clear hints that Israel was willing to show more flexibility if Arafat was prepared to “contemplate” the endgame" (in a negative context). According to them Barak made massive concessions: sovereignty over all Arab sectors of East Jerusalem, a Palestinian state in over 90 percent of the West Bank with land swaps to help compensate. These were huge and changing. According to them, Arafat demanded sovereignty over the Temple Mount, as opposed to Israel's proposal for Palestinian "permanent custodianship" -- the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism (it now has the Al-Aqsa Compound on top of it), was to be in Palestinian hands, and that was a red line for him.
"Barak apparently took the view that, faced with a sufficiently attractive proposal and an appropriately unattractive alternative, the Palestinians would have no choice but to say yes. In effect, each successive Palestinian “no” led to the next best Israeli assessment of what, in their right minds, the Palestinians couldn’t turn down." Agha and Malley write. This was to be a dangerous mistake. Arafat turned down offer after offer after offer, making no counter-proposals and suggesting, contrary to the archeological, historical, and even Muslim record, that the Second Temple was in Nablus. (Previously, I have referenced him as saying it was in Hebron; this was in error, and I apologize for saying so. I do not know how the two got mixed up in my mind.) Shockingly, this did not suggest to Barak and the Israeli negotiating team that he was a reliable partner.
In late September 2000, a few months after the talks collapsed, Ariel Sharon, the leader of the right-wing party Likud (who would later unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, paving the way for Hamas' rule, but that's another story), visited the Temple Mount. Again: this is the holiest site in Judaism, and is, as basically all accounts agree, the site of the destroyed Second Temple. Sharon did not pray there. Sharon did not do much of anything there. He merely existed on the Temple Mount as a Jew.
That is what started the Second Intifada (which was, at best, tolerated by Arafat), in which over a thousand Jews died. A Jew existing on the holiest site in Judaism.
As Hussein and Agha continue, in late December, in the middle of the Second Intifada, Clinton and Barak made yet another proposal, which they summarize as follows: "Palestine would have sovereignty over 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank and it would as well have land belonging to pre-1967 Israel equivalent to another 1 to 3 percent of West Bank territory. Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to their homeland in historic Palestine, a right that would guarantee their unrestricted ability to live in Palestine while subjecting their absorption into Israel to Israel’s sovereign decision. In Jerusalem, all that is Arab would be Palestinian, all that is Jewish would be Israeli. Palestine would exercise sovereignty over the Haram [Temple Mount/Har HaBayit] and Israel over the Western Wall[.]"
Israel gave and gave and gave so much, and what it got in return was suicide bombings.
That is the environment in which Sharon came to power. That is, in many ways, what destroyed the Israeli left and its promise of peace. Because they tried peace, they tried so very, very, hard for peace, they gave up so much that no one else would be expected to give up -- and what they got in return was death and terror and fear. That is what Israelis think of when they hear intifada.
And I am not excusing Benjamin Netanyahu or his actions, nor the abandonment of the peace process, nor Israel's admittedly heavy-handed response to the Second Intifada.
But if you don't understand why Israelis are skeptical of peace, if you don't understand the cause of this view, if you don't understand what caused the collapse of the peace talks -- why the hell should I listen to you? Why should I care?
You don't need to know the precise details of the negotiations. What you need to know is this:
In 2000, Israel tried peace and was rejected, and then a Jew visited the holiest site in Judaism, and a thousand Jews died for that, and, as that was happening, Israel still tried again with even better terms for Palestinians, and was still rejected.
#this doesn’t mean peace isn’t possible
#but it does mean a lot of people believe it isn’t
#a lot of people believe there’s no hope for peace
#this combined with all the broken peace treaties in the last decade or so
#make it look like peace is not possible
#and it is so important that we both don’t give up hope
#and also understand the historical context
Not letting these stay in the tags. Peace is very much possible... but for it to happen, people need to have hope that it is possible, and that hope is not possible without understanding what has happened before to shape how the people involved understand their meaningful options.
After all, if you don't know what the people involved think of as their only options, why they actually think that way, or what has led them to think that way, you're never going to be able to convince anyone that a new option for peace is possible, let alone to take it, and will only be able to talk past people.
To quote past me:
--
and if you dig into the data a two state solution is, if not easy, surprisingly hopeful! let’s talk about the data for a moment. reminder: it is from september 2024.
The vague two state solution got less support than the more detailed one, so here’s the more detailed two-state solution the survey had. Now, I have so fucking many issues with this, but it is better than the current situation and that’s what matters.
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side.
The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry).
The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.
A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides.
The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years.
The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange of similar size. Israel will evacuate all other settlements.
West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state.
In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty.
Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.
The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.
The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states.
Now, 34% of Israelis (25% and 69% of Arabs) support this, and 34% of Palestinians (29% in the West Bank, 42% in Gaza) do. Those numbers aren’t great, but they don’t scream “this is impossible”. They scream “ok this is going to be hard but let’s try”.
But what makes this even better is the survey added one-sided and paired incentives. One-sided incentives are offered to one group (Israeli Jews and Palestinians, which I believe includes Israeli Arabs). The best performing one sided incentive, Israel releasing all Palestinian prisoners after the agreement is implemented, seems rather unfeasible. (Indeed, for Israeli Jews, even when paired with an incentive, it gets support to drop to just 16%)
But the second-best performing one, which gets almost 2/3rds of Palestinians to support a two-state solution?
Let Palestinians keep working in Israel. I’m not an expert on Israeli geopolitics, but given that per the wording it’s already happening it doesn’t seem terribly unfeasible.
For Israel, basically anything gets majority support. Palestine combating incitement! Israeli factories still being allowed to operate in Palestine! Security forces commit to cooperating! The best performing and probably easiest one is combating incitement.
They tested paired incentives but not the specific combination of combating incitement and Palestinian workers keeping their jobs, but it doesn’t seem terribly unlikely some sort of cobbled-together deal along those lines could gain majority support. And even if it doesn’t, sometimes leaders make unpopular decisions.
This can be done. This must be done. The only thing lacking is political will.
