Aristotle and Cephalus: Justice Expanded by Friendship
Reciprocal justice is not an unfamiliar concept to us in POLS 383, when Aristotle brings up the theory in Ethics. We have already seen this in The Republic, with Cephalusâ idea of justice introduced by Plato. However, after having read The Republic, I couldnât help but wonder if Aristotle was moving backwards from Socrates. Wasnât Cephalusâ idea lesser than the perfect society Socrates had described? After reading the sections of both Ethics and Politics, I came to a different conclusion.
I did a little research on Aristotle before reading Ethics and Politics, and some websites suggested that Aristotle and Plato did not see eye to eye. After reading The Republic I can see why some people might think that. Their views on citizenship and justice do seem to be significantly different. While I agree with Aristotle and Cephalus that paying your dues is important, I donât think thatâs where justice ends. Cephalus says justice is,
 âspeaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred.â (The Republic, Book I)
In Ethics, Aristotle focuses on telos, or an âend goalâ of every object, including humans. I canât help but initially compare this to Cephalusâ definition of justice, an âend goal,â seems relatable to a debt which needs to be paid. However, after reading Aristotle on friendship, in Book VIII of Ethics, I think Aristotle is hitting on something much deeper than Cephalus.
Particularly when Aristotle discusses the 3 areas of friendship, I think he demonstrates that justice is much more than paying your debts. Now, I could be totally wrong and maybe Aristotle meant exactly what he said all the time, but this is something I took from it. Aristotle says,
âThere are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.â (Ethics, Book VII, Chapter 3)
Here Aristotle is not referring to âtrueâ friendship, or the best possible kind of friendship. He covers three types, the first being friendship that only exists because both parties benefit from it. The second is based on pleasure, such as romantic lust. These two are the types of âfriendshipâ described in the quote above, and as Aristotle states, these are easily dissolved.
Finally, Aristotle describes what he would call true and necessary friendship, or Philia. This is what makes a city possible. People coming together and forming a city is the highest goal, and the most natural and successful way to get there is friendship.
 âPerfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good -- and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure -- good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling -- and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men.â (Ethics, Book VIII, Chapter 3)
Now lets go back to Cephalus for a moment. The reason I believe Aristotleâs meaning of justice runs much deeper than Cephalusâ, is due to his explanation of this specific type of friendship. Are you truly only paying your dues with this type of mutual friendship? A type of friendship not based on a motive for benefit or gain, but a union of mutual love and respect. Is that type of commitment and loyalty truly âdueâ to the other party?
Personally, I do not think most people today view friendship that way. I think most of us think about friendship the way Cephalus thinks about justice. We do favors for those âfriendsâ of ours who will in turn be guilted into giving us back favors because they feel obligated to; because of course, they are going to want another favor down the road. If politicians started treating friendship the way Aristotle sees Philia, would we begin to see less of the âIâll scratch your back if you scratch mine?â If man is a political animal as Aristotle claims in Politics, how can we control the beast?
 âAnd why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech.â (Politics, Book I)
For Aristotle, speech is essential to humanity and friendship. Aristotle says there is no humanity without politics, but doesnât that mean that there is no humanity without Philia, or true friendship? If Philia is friendship, and friendship creates the city, and the city/politics creates humanity, couldnât human interactionâspeech, caring, friendship, and loveâactually be the essential pieces of fostering humanity, and thus the city? Maybe Aristotle would disagree, but I canât imagine our telos could be anything less than creating a prefect society or polis. And doesnât Aristotleâs definition of justice and friendship create such a thing? Friendship, true âfriendship,â in Aristotleâs definition of the word, is the key element between a perfect polis, and our telos of finding happiness.Â
I think Plato/Socrates left out something essential in The Republic. That was friendship. Although Socratesâ ideal society was peaceful and just, I felt as though something was lacking. I think that in my interpretation of The Republic, friendship was considered one of those âextraâ things, not a need, but a desire, which Socrates did not consider an essential part of the society. In my opinion, however, society cannot function without friendship. If our telos, (or at least mine) ended in happiness, friendship would be an irreplaceable aspect. Was Plato/Socrates wrong? No, I donât think so, but I think as time goes on we continue to reinterpret and attempt to perfect these amazing philosopherâs ideas of human perfection.