Ticci Toby

Ableism is defined as:

The discrimination of and social prejudice against people with disabilities based on the belief that typical abilities are superior. At its heart, ableism is rooted in the assumption that disabled people require ‘fixing’ and defines people by their disability.

A set of beliefs or practices that devalue and discriminate against people with physical, intellectual, or psychiatric disabilities and often rests on the assumption that disabled people need to be ‘fixed’ in one form or the other.

Discrimination and social prejudice against physically or mentally disabled people. Ableism characterizes people as they are defined by their disabilities and also classifies disabled people as being inferior to non-disabled people.

A word for unfairly favouring non-disabled people. Ableism means prioritising the needs of non-disabled people. In an ableist society, it’s assumed that the “normal” way to live is as a non-disabled person. 

The existence of endogenic systems doesn't come under the definition of "ableism". Additionally, much of what's said against endogenic systems does fall under "discrimination" and "sanism"

The act, practice, or an instance of unfairly treating a person or group differently from other people or groups on a class or categorical basis

Sanism (also called mentalism or neuro-discrimination) is prejudice plus power; anyone of any neurological condition can have/exhibit neurocognitive-based prejudice, but in North America (and globally), neurotypical people have the institutional power, therefore Sanism is a systematized discrimination, antagonism, or exclusion directed against neurodivergent people based on the belief that neurotypical cognition is superior. 

And quite a lot of what's said against endogenic systems also falls under ableism. For example, claiming that endogenic systems are fake because they're delusional is ableism. It's both suggesting that folks with delusions are 'less than', as well as intentionally misinterpreting the meaning of 'delusion'.

“In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a delusion is defined as: A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everybody else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith). [] The question is what precisely makes the difference between a statement of internal experience (e.g., “I like that rich red color”) and a statement about the outer world (e.g., “It is raining”). An important difference is that utterances about one’s own mental states are not subject to external validation and there is little expectation of testing them, whereas statements about the outer world are always verifiable and subject to corrections, whether by observation or superior rational arguments by another person.”

"System" isn't a term exclusive to CDDs, nor was it a term made for CDDs. It was applied to them because of the original definition and usage of the word, I.e. 'assembly of related elements comprising a whole' and 'personality system'

The Haunted Self

Apa Psychology Dictionary

Systems Psychology

Systems Theory

Systems Thinking

Complex Systems

Jung's theory of the Ego

Personality Systems Framework

And of course, Internal Family Systems

This is why, in medial literature, the term 'system' is also used for non-traumagenic and endogenic systems.

“The term system is often used to describe a collection of these entities sharing the body. [] There is a diversity of experiences within plurals/systems, such that members of a system may have different gender identities and salience of gender; ages/experience of age; perceived internal appearances; varied beliefs, memories, feelings, and thoughts; and complex interrelationships with other system members. [] People who live as plural systems are almost always treated as though this way of living is a pathology. [] Yarbrough observed that many plural systems did not experience distress from the existence of other internal headmates, and recommended shared decision making among headmates when pursuing treatment. [] However, this study adopted a non-pathological approach to plural experience, in order to better understand systems’ authentic experiences."

"These strands of experience are characterized as multiple identities, internal people, self-states, or ‘alters.’ When alters take control of the body, they can be described as ‘fronting,’ and exchange control in a process termed ‘switching’. The term ‘system’ describes the collection of these entities sharing a body, while the term ‘system member’ is a neutral term, equivalent to ‘alter,’ which describes one individual entity within a plural body. Members of a system may have unique experiences of gender and salience of gender, perceived internal appearance, age or experiences of age, varied beliefs, memories, feelings, and thoughts. [] The present study uses the term ‘plurality,’ which emerged from the advocacy community of multiples, and recently has been incorporated into the scientific literature. This newer, more inclusive term describes a broad range of pathological and non-pathological multiplicity, denoting those who have more than one person or entity sharing one body as a ‘plural system.’”

“Overall, the term ‘parts’ was viewed as problematic by the participants as it could imply the plural system is not coexisting as a whole. [] Multiplicity has been defined as the experience of having two or more separate selves within one body, with the body’s behaviour being controlled by one-self at any one time. Those who experience multiplicity often refer to themselves as multiples or systems (a system of separate selves). The separate selves within the system, otherwise known as ‘alters’, ‘parts’ or 'headmates’, usually have differing ages, genders, feelings, thoughts and memories. Henceforth, we shall refer to people with DID or multiplicity as ‘systems’ to recognise a more inclusive approach to language for people identifying as multiple. [] The absence of distress experienced by systems identifying as multiple may suggest that DID and multiplicity vary in experience, and the dominance of DID in research highlights a fundamental limitation in the understanding of multiplicity.”

“Multiplicity experiences are phenomenologically distinct from clinical dissociative experiences and require understanding of how each system operates to inform language use and support. [] Holistic, person/system-centred therapeutic support can create a reflective space in which the system can make choices as to how to live well, without judgement or stigma. People and systems with lived experience of multiplicity explain their multiplicity as life-enhancing and positive.”

“There is particularly scarce research with young people who identify as multiple outside of a diagnostic conceptualisation of what being multiple means for the individual system (the selves residing within the body), which means we also miss a developmental perspective on the process of “becoming” oneself, which may include a greater or lesser sense of multiplicity for some young people. [] Comparatively, the stability of the system tends to fluctuate for many, with new selves emerging over time, and other selves making decisions to integrate into the body. As such, there is somewhat of an ebb and flow to how individuals conceptualise and recognise their system over time. [] Overall, people with experiences of multiplicity are aware of being an individual self, as well as being a member of a wider system who share one body."

“The plural person can be referred to as a system that is a collection of parts making up a whole. These systems can be open or closed. Emilia is a closed system. She said she discovered people living inside her but thought they had always been there. In contrast, in an open system, people may come an go throughout someone’s life. Alters may be present at some points and absent at others. [] Fronting can be understood as a representation of who controls the system, that is, the person to whom you are speaking. [] When it comes to informed consent for gender-affirming treatments, it is best to view plural systems in a gender-nonconforming way. A system can have a variety of genders present. [] Plurality makes up just one part of the larger diagnosis and does not necessarily cause distress. Although many people who are plural have a history of trauma, there are just as many who do not. A plural system is a collection of all the alters present. With some people these alters might come and go, whereas with others they are static and waiting to be discovered.”

“I define being plural first and foremost doxastically: a plural is a human being who explicitly believes that there are in fact multiple persons sharing their brain. I call this belief plural identity, though some further elements must be specified to give its precise intended meaning. (Note that I am offering my own account of what it is to be a plural; plurals themselves arguably use the term “plural” synonymously with the term “system,” which I define below.) [] Plurals often refer to the collection of headmates associated with one body or brain as a system, and I will sometimes use this language as well. (Headmates are therefore sometimes called “systemmates” instead.) Note that while I use the term “plural” to refer to a human being with a particular identity, the term “system” is slightly different, referring instead to the collection of headmates all associated with one particular plural. [] There is a difficulty here which I’m not sure how to get around: what about a system only one of whose headmates endorses the plural identity claim? (This is theoretically possible; I did for instance speak to one system of about ten headmates, one of whom insisted that they must all be parts of one person.) Relative to the way I’ve laid out the criterion for being a plural, such a human being would count as a plural, but I’m not sure plurals themselves would agree; perhaps this hypothetical edge case shows the limits of my approach. [] Some plurals identify with the diagnosis to the extent that they believe that their system was produced by trauma—a major factor in the etiology of DID—but claim that they never strictly met diagnostic criteria. [] Importantly, there are also systems that don’t have their origin in trauma to begin with. Some systems are intentionally created through so‐called tulpamancy. Tulpamancy is a practice or set of practices undertaken with the intention of creating an autonomous sentient being “inside” (and of course using) one’s brain; beings created in this way are called tulpas, and the people who created them are called tulpamancers. [] Then there are so‐called “natural” or “endogenic” systems. Some claim that they were just always multiple people, without ever having experienced childhood trauma of the sort that is generally believed to be the precipitating factor for DID and without having intentionally and effortfully created headmates in the way that tulpamancers do; other natural systems say that while they have experienced such trauma—just as have many singlets—they were already multiple by that time.”

Etc.

In relation to 'alters only coming from severe childhood trauma', the theory of structural dissociation isn't meant to explain every experience, per the authors of The Haunted Self. The ToSD is supposed to pertain only to trauma-related structural dissociation of the personality. Not any other form of dissociation or multiplicity, which they acknowledge as existing outside structural dissociation, in non-pathalogical forms.

"Trauma-related dissociation"

"Our definition of dissociation pertains to a division of the personality in the context of trauma. We are aware that this division may also occur in hypnosis and mediumship, that several other definitions of dissociation also address these other contexts, and that there are some indications that dissociation in these other contexts is also best understood as a division of personality."

For some related information,

"Because the manifestation of different identities is common to both mediumship and DID, it is surprising that there are so few actual empirical studies evaluating this issue with validated clinical questionnaires. [] Mediums and DID patients, although exhibiting some of the same dissociative experiences, would differ in the pathologic expression of dissociation, with DID patients exhibiting greater dysfunctionality and psychopathology. [] Our data suggests that Brazilian mediumship differs in important ways from DID, besides the fact that they share sharp identity discontinuities."

"The Watkinses recognized that ego-states were similar in content to Hilgard's hidden observers and also to the alters found in their MPD patients. In one study, wrote Helen: "when Hilgard's 'hidden observers' were activated in normal college students as hypnotic subjects, further inquiry into their nature and content elicited organized ego-states. We... consider that hidden observers and ego-states are the same class of phenomena. They represent cognitive structural systems that are covert, but are organized segments of personality, often similar in content to true, overt multiple personalities. The Watkinses, however, noted a clear distinction between the ego- states found in normal people and the alters in their MPD patients. Ego-states did not "take over" their hosts entirely because, as the Watkinses put it, the boundaries between them were permeable. Instead of being entirely cut off from each other, they shared memories and acknowledged each other's existence. [] This book is not for or about people with MPD-it is about the normal multiplicity common to us all. But understanding a little about that extreme form of multiplicity may help us to understand our own selves, because although the behavior of people with this condition seems bizarre, they are probably not as different from the rest of us as we like to believe.”

"In cross-cultural anthropological studies involving social observations in Pakistan and narrative analysis in Sri Lanka, formations of multiple selves have been observed and reported. In fact, Ewing contents that the multiple self concept is more acceptable to anthropologists because the Western concept of self as a cohesive, bounded, and autonomous structure is ethnocentric, and fails to hold up under direct observation in other cultures. [] Another source of information dealing with personality multiplicities comes from clinical psychology. Since Prince described a patient who came to him in 1898 with Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have collected a great deal of information about the condition. At present, there is little doubt among clinicians that personality multiplicities exist, at least within clients exhibiting MPD, and increasingly multiplicities are being recognised in other contexts as well. Although the present study centers on the existence of multiplicities within the normal population rather than those exhibiting pathology, there is obviously a certain degree of overlap between the two, and the clinical area provides information relevant to the evaluation of personality multiplicities in general.”

“To be possessed means to be out of control or, within some religions, to have an entity of a malignant nature taking control of one's body and actions. For the modern mind, possession is frightening because it is associated with a discontinuity in identity/personality, and alterations in consciousness and behavior. Nevertheless, possession experiences are widely reported across cultures, and those possessed are often regarded as a positive channel for various spiritual agents, such as deceased humans (in Spiritism and Spiritualism), nature deities or godlike beings (in Afro-American religions), or the Holy Spirit (in Evangelical Pentecostal churches and the Charismatic renewal movement of Roman Catholicism).”

“In Canada, for example, where possession and trance experiences are not broadly accepted cultural or religious practices, 32% of individuals from a large sample reported having experienced them at least once, and 19% reported having experienced them between 10 and 50 times in their lives. Other research from general and clinical (DID) populations, conducted in the United States and Turkey suggests that possession is not a culture-bound phenomenon. Thus, cases such as Dona Sara’s are likely to occur elsewhere. Future revisions of the DSM–5 need to include a more sophisticated framework that portrays these experiences as universal rather than culture or religious bound. This would be substantiated by what is known about variations of these experiences at not only the cultural level but the level of individual differences, including gender and personality trait.”

Outside of the multiplicity referenced by the authors of The Haunted Self, you can also find alters under:

"The third group that may be less familiar to clinicians, includes those identifying as Plural, but not considering themselves “disordered”. This group may include those with philosophical or spiritual practices that lend to an experience of multiplicity but do not consider themselves traumatized by this, as well as those who have chosen functional multiplicity as a goal for treatment rather than integration – and who do not consider themselves “disordered” because they are functioning and not distressed by symptoms. [] As the online community collaborated across platforms to develop the survey for the PPWC, other more politically correct terms were agreed upon during the voting process prior to the survey. Specifically, the need was to identify terms for certain types of alters (“parts”) that are frequently misunderstood in the clinical setting. One type of alter that needed a more appropriate term was what clinical trainings and presentations often refer to as “animal alters” or “alien alters”. The Plural community decided that it was more appropriate to call these “non-human alters” to be more inclusive, decrease stigma, and make fewer assumptions about them."

"It is pragmatically necessary to have a term to refer to the different beings that a plural believes are sharing their brain. The clinical term for such beings in someone with DID would be “alters,” but plurals themselves often dislike this term for being “dehumanizing” (de‐personalizing). A commonly used alternative is the term “headmates” - like “housemates,” except sharing a head instead of a house. (The term “head” here is helpfully neutral between whether headmates are believed to share or experienced as sharing a brain, a skull, or perhaps even a mind in some way.) I will use the term “headmates” myself, although without meaning to beg the question of whether headmates are entities, as the term suggests, or whether they are instead more property‐like. Plurals often refer to the collection of headmates associated with one body or brain as a system, and I will sometimes use this language as well. (Headmates are therefore sometimes called “systemmates” instead.)"

"Plurality is a more patient-centered approach to what has historically been referred to as dissociative identities. This is not the same as the DSM-5 diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder. Plurality makes up just one part of the larger diagnosis and does not necessarily cause distress. Although many people who are plural have a history of trauma, there are just as many who do not. A plural system is a collection of all the alters present. With some people these alters might come and go, whereas with others they are static and waiting to be discovered."

"A variety of language has been used. For the most part, this is the result of the current literature base, and participant’s own words. However, it should be noted that all terms currently used to explain multiplicity are not standardised across the whole community of people experiencing multiplicity. Currently there is an active community of people on social media who discuss and share experiences. Medicalised language such as ‘alter’ or ‘part’ will not be used unless included within direct quotations. More inclusive language such as ‘headmate’, ‘self’, ‘plurality’, and ‘multiplicity’ are used to describe the experience. It is important to note that while these terms are used within this research, the language used within the community and services are individualistic and should be preference led."

"Respondents discussed that there is a lack of understanding regarding how multiplicity develops without a basis in trauma. For respondents who did not have a trauma history, they described feeling ‘left out of the conversation’ and ‘unable to access support’ or resources. Many people discussed multiplicity in terms of being an experience and a part of their lives, rather than being a ‘disorder’ which needs to be treated or cured. [] By ensuring accurate language is used for the various experiences, it will become clear how varied individuals’ experiences are, and thus the support available can be tailored and improved. The medicalised language used to describe multiplicity was said to be a barrier to accessing support and information for many people. While traditional language such as ‘parts’ or ‘alters’ may be beneficial or appropriate choices within specific groups such as adult peer-support services, young people who responded to the consultation found them to be non-inclusive and ingrained within medical assumptions which do not reflect their experiences. They also discussed feeling a stigma attached to this language, echoed within the media, which is harmful to people with experiences of multiplicity. [] Respondents shared various positive terms which they prefer, including ‘system’, ‘headmate’, ‘system members’, and ‘plurals’. Utilising preferred language, as is true with other areas of mental health research and practice, allows the individual to feel supported, included and visible."

"Multiplicity has been defined as the experience of having two or more separate selves within one body, with the body’s behaviour being controlled by one-self at any one time. Those who experience multiplicity often refer to themselves as multiples or systems (a system of separate selves). The separate selves within the system, otherwise known as ‘alters’, ‘parts’ or 'headmates’, usually have differing ages, genders, feelings, thoughts and memories. Henceforth, we shall refer to people with DID or multiplicity as ‘systems’ to recognise a more inclusive approach to language for people identifying as multiple."

"Plurality is a newer, more inclusive term that our study uses to describe the broad range of experiences of having more than one person or entity (“headmates” or “alters”) sharing one body. It has been used in the scientific literature as well as the self-advocacy community and is an addition to the related terminology of dissociation and multiplicity. The term system is often used to describe a collection of these entities sharing the body."

"The present study uses the term ‘plurality,’ which emerged from the advocacy community of multiples, and recently has been incorporated into the scientific literature. This newer, more inclusive term describes a broad range of pathological and non-pathological multiplicity, denoting those who have more than one person or entity sharing one body as a ‘plural system.’. While the term ‘plural’ includes those in clinical distress and diagnosed with a dissociative disorder (DID or OSDD), authors have noted that many identifying with plurality found ways to live well with dissociation or did not experience distress from plural experiences. [] Experiences of plurality familiar to clinicians include Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) and Other Specified Dissociative Disorder (OSDD). They are characterized by “various simultaneously active and subjectively autonomous strands of experience that are rigidly and profoundly separated from each other in important ways, such as in memory, characteristic affects, behavior, self-image, body image, and thinking styles”. These strands of experience are characterized as multiple identities, internal people, self-states, or ‘alters.’ When alters take control of the body, they can be described as ‘fronting,’ and exchange control in a process termed ‘switching’. The term ‘system’ describes the collection of these entities sharing a body, while the term ‘system member’ is a neutral term, equivalent to ‘alter,’ which describes one individual entity within a plural body. [] Participants described their internal entities using words such as alters, headmates, system mates, system members, brainmates, entities, and spirits. The authors use the term ‘system members’ in this report, as it is a neutral term regarding the pathologization of plurality used by various groups within DID, plural, and multiple communities. The reported number of system members ranged from four to unlimited. Language used to describe plurality included system, plural, DID (dissociative identity disorder), OSDD (other specified dissociative disorder), multiplicity, polyfragmented and circle, with plural the most commonly used."

Non-traumagenic multiplicity as a concept is much, much, much older than the diagnosis of DID, MPD, and the word dissociation itself. It wasn't "created", it always existed in various forms, which some of what we've already linked discusses.

"The topic of this study was the self-perceived experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state. The research sought to affirm and expand the construct of inner selves as proposed by early theorists such as Assagioli (1965), Binet (1890/1977, 1896/1977), Federn (1955), James (1890), Janet (1907), and Jung (1916/1969). This study utilized transpersonal methods to investigate the transformative qualities of working with inner selves and their relationships with each other, the exterior world, and the sacred. The above theorists all proposed that the existence of inner personalities could be an ordinary occurrence for the normal person. [] Jung's comments on multiplicity draw attention to the fact that it need not be considered a psychopathology and can be an ordinary experience of those who are psychologically healthy. He advocates that inner multiplicity be viewed as entirely within the framework of ordinary or normal.”

"The phrase "self-perceived experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state" refers to the multiplicity (or inner selves) described by Beahrs as co-consciousness: The existence within a single human organism of more than one consciously experiencing psychological entity, each with some sense of its own identity or selfhood, relatively separate and discrete from other similar entities, and with separate conscious experiences occurring simultaneously with one another within this human organism. The multiplicity explored in this study is that which I believe occurs naturally and is experienced by the ordinary, everyday, common person, as opposed to the more publicized multiplicity experienced by persons with multiple personality disorder. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, multiple personality disorder was renamed Dissociative Identity Disorder. Since the word normal is used in statistical research to indicate the middle of the bell curve, I have chosen to use the statement "self-perceived” experience of multiplicity as an ordinary psychological state to contrast with the pathological state of disordered multiplicity.”

"My curiosities led me to extensive reading on multiplicity, much of which is in the literature review section of this study. I found the prime opinion to be an association of ordinary inner multiplicity with dissociation. Following this logic, multiplicity is considered to be created by an experience so distressful that a new self is created to handle it. This process is called dissociation in psychology; however, dissociation itself is not considered a psychological disorder until it reaches severe stages demonstrating irrational behavior and emotional pain. There appears to be a multiplicity continuum that ranges from a person's being totally unaware of these interior selves, on through awareness and usefulness, all the way to dysfunctional. Dissociation itself does not indicate a disorder, but the degree of dissociation may fall into that category.”

You don't seem to understand what subpersonalities are, or the difference between autonomous and non-autonomous identities. The theory of multiple selves covers a wide variety of experiences, and much research around it states that parts of yourself can often times be conscious of themselves rather than the whole. It also discusses how multiplicity lies along a continuum, how some view themselves as singular, some identify their parts as parts of themselves, and others have separate, autonomous parts naturally.

“The fMRI showed a significant decrease of connectivity in the Default Mode Network (DMN) especially between the posterior cingulate cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex. Our results and their contrast with the available data on fMRI in DIDs allows to draw the hypothesis of a continuum between healthy mind - where multiple identities may coexist at unconscious level and may sometimes emerge to the consciousness - and DIDs, where multiple personalities emerge as dissociated, ostensibly autonomous components yielding impaired functioning, subject's loss of control and suffering. If this is the case, it seems more reasonable to refrain from seeking for a clear-cut limit between normality (anyway a conventional, statistical concept) and pathology, and accept a grey area in between, where ostensibly odd but non-pathological experiences may occur (including so-called non-ordinary mental expressions) without calling for treatment but, rather, for being properly understood.”

“The theory of self-plurality can be found across a range of therapy modalities and includes such concepts as, ‘inner family systems’, ‘subpersonalities’, ‘parts of self’, ‘inner child’, ‘configurations of self’, and ‘plural identity’. Some writers have explicitly distanced this theory from the more controversial and stigmatised diagnosis of ‘multiple personality’ or ‘dissociative identity disorder’, but it is now more commonly accepted that the existence of separate parts or aspects of self is a universal experience, and not a pathological state as such. In childhood, our fluid sense of self shifts and morphs depending on context (school, play, home) and arises from our ability to role play and enter imaginary worlds, experimenting with different personality traits and characters.”

"This paper develops the thesis that co-consciousness is not only a feature of severe dissociative syndromes like multiple personality, or of “altered states” of consciousness like hypnosis, but is a universal feature of healthy living. The “hidden observer” in normal hypnosis is the primary objective datum, from which it is argued that consciousness must exist simultaneously at many levels. [] With co-consciousness now the norm, the multiple personality syndrome can no longer be seen as a freak of nature, but rather as a paradigm of how a process common to each and all of us can go wrong. Furthest from scientific understanding is the nature of the executive function or organizing force which gives us our sense of cohesive selfhood, and it is just this function which is most impaired in the multiple personality. The overriding therapeutic implication is that dissociation can no longer be viewed only like a pathological “entity” to be gotten “rid of,” but as a basic given which we should learn to use more effectively."

“This chapter queries how one type of human difference—alterity, the experience of multiple distinct consciousnesses, or “alters,” by one person—is pathologized in American culture. This experience is inscribed as a mental illness, labeled now as dissociative identity disorder and formerly known as multiple personality disorder. In this analysis, the notion of the modernist subject or self as a linear, cohesive, unitary consciousness is challenged as a method of suppressing difference. Alternative language is proposed for talking about the self. Those who experience alterity can be said to experience polyvalent selves. If a singular self is commonplace, then polyvalent selves are queer, unusual, different, and worthy of study because such difference represents a creative and dynamic uncertainty that cannot be easily suppressed, explained, or interpreted away by modernist institutions and theories.”

"Can best be described as a theory that all individuals have 'multiple personalities', though not to the dissociative extremes of sufferers of avowed multiple personality disorder. [] In cases of M. P. D., the dissociative barriers between these different 'parts' are thought to be such that all integrative identity, memory and consciousness processes may become interrupted. In less extreme cases of polypsychism, on the other hand, dissociative barriers may be semi-permeable, such that subpersonalities may have an awareness of each other's existence, but no empathetic understanding of the other's needs or values. [] Polypsychism is not relevant to all individuals. Self-multiplicity would seem to be a 'person variable' - a dimension along which all individuals lie. Some people do seem to experience a number of discrete self-identities, yet there are undoubtedly many who tend towards a more singular, fluid self-construct."

"Finally, we would contend that the self is not a unitary concept, but rather is a collection of multiple self-relevant identities. Although the notion of a single, true self may reflect a cultural caricature for those endorsing a relatively strong independent self-construal, a great deal of recent work in social cognition has supported the position that the self-concept is composed of many self identities. Indeed, much of the work in our lab has focused on how one’s self-aspects (i.e., one’s context-dependent self identities such as wife, athlete, or professor) exist in an interrelated associative network in memory, influencing one’s health, emotions, goal pursuit, and mental regulation. [] So far, our description of an individual’s self-concept attributes have been primarily trait based, but it is important to acknowledge that such a view is certainly too narrow. Although many approaches to self-concept representation focus on the self as being composed of personality traits, it is certainly the case that self-knowledge transcends trait summaries. For example, Carlston’s (1994) Associated Systems Theory (AST) assumes that social representation is composed not only of personality traits, but also of other types of information including affective and emotional responses, physical appearance details, embodied knowledge, social category memberships, and behavioral responses among others."

“In contrast, recognizing that multiple self-schemas operate at different times, in different contexts, or even simultaneously requires greater cognitive effort. For example, Hermans and Kempen argue that accessing the multiplicity of the self often involves active engagement in internal dialogues, which is less automatic than maintaining a unitary perspective. Similarly, the motivation to confirm a unified and consistent self-concept may limit individuals' awareness of their inner diversity. Therefore, the multiple self-mode is likely to be less accessible than the unitary self-due to the psychological effort required and the inherent preference for self-coherence.”

”Ewing has argued that the notion that individuals have a unified, whole self, is an illusion, particularly strong in the Western world. As Geertz has said: The Western conception of the person as bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's culture.”

Because this is how mental disorders work.

Edit under this cut here. Adding a tag for some anti-RQ blogs lol.