Alex Gourevitch and Aziz Rana have a great article as a part of Salon's "the 99 Percent Plan" series, which seeks to explain how, even as income inequality and social immobility are becoming increasingly common topics of political debate, the common political rhetoric that opposes "equality of opportunity" with "equality of outcomes" misses a deeper distinction between different understandings of what social mobility might mean. The article is worth reading in full, but to best understand it, The New Class War recommends first reading Rana's earlier piece on a similar theme for N+1. Here's a quote from that earlier article:
"Throughout our history there have always been multiple versions of the American dream. These accounts held in common the hope that hard work, discipline, and self-reliance would allow those recognized as citizens not only to improve their economic lot and achieve personal happiness, but to participate fully in political life. Today, however, only one version of the dream continues to make sense as a sustainable personal project. This is the dream exemplified by Barack and Michelle Obamaâas well as by their former rivals Hillary and Bill Clintonâa dream of success through higher education and a life in professional work. It is a vision of social advancement that leaves little room for historically important narratives of blue-collar respectability.
At the time when Brandeis was describing the promise of professionalism, three earlier accounts of the American dream not only survived but were real competitors for social preeminence. In Thomas Jeffersonâs founding republican vision, yeoman farmers were âthe most valuable citizens . . .  the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, . . . tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interest by the most lasting bonds.â To this Jeffersonian vision of âthe cultivators of the earth,â a rapidly urbanizing nineteenth century added the small-business owner and the unionized industrial worker. The former aspired to the same freedom as the farmer by cultivating a shop instead of acreage; the latter strove (with mixed results) to achieve economic independence through collective political activity. In Brandeisâs time, these three versions of the American dream each still constituted a viable route to meaningful political and social life.
Today, by contrast, all such dreams are essentially foreclosed. The independent farmer lives on in the national imagination, but industrial farming has rendered him marginal both politically and socially. The quantity of small businesses begun each year suggests that the aspiration of having oneâs own shop persists. Yet for the past half-century bankruptcy has been more likely than success. Statistics cited by Bushâs own Small Business Administration (SBA) show that more than half of small businesses close within four years and more than 60 percent within six. The title of the SBA article, âRedefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Failure and Closure,â perfectly captures the difficulty of sustaining optimism, even for propaganda purposes, about the vitality of small-scale entrepreneurship. As for blue-collar workers, deindustrialization and the weakening of the labor movement have made the wage earnerâs dream of middle-class respectability less and less tenable. Real incomes for working-class families have been declining for three decades, and highly skilled jobs once available to high school graduates are now memories from a previous era.
...we have been left with the professional ideal, which values only certain types of work and thus implicitly disdains the rest. It is an inherently exclusive ideal, structured around a divide between those engaged in high-status work and those confined to task execution. The political theorist Iris Marion Young writes, âToday equal opportunity has come to mean only that no one is barred from entering competition for a relatively few privileged positions.â The idea of exclusivity is a necessary structural feature of professionalization. As a model for society, however, it validates an economic and cultural divide between those with meaningful access to social respectability and the vast majority of Americans, who remain consigned to low status and low-income employment.
This divide is antithetical to democracy. The professional and educational meritocracy justifies a basic hierarchy in which only those with professional status wield political and economic power. The democratic ideal of ordinary citizens collectively deciding the fate of key institutions has little in common with this logicâa logic that is aristocracy by another name. Precisely because all three alternative versions of the American dream were universal, all imagined workâwhether industrial, agricultural, or entrepreneurialâas a training ground for democratic citizenship. Farmers and entrepreneurs developed the personal virtues necessary for political decision making. As for the industrial worker, the union was considered a continuous education in democratic control, and oneâs role in its management and success were a miniature form of collective self-rule."
These do a fantastic job of articulating one of the underlying reasons that The New Class War finds both American political parties so (a) pathetic and (b) frustrating -- neither party articulates a vision for what an America that provides "middle-class achievement, economic independence, and democratic inclusion" to the working class would look like under current global economic and technological conditions.