#tortious interference

The District Court concluded that the defendant’s statement was protected under the First Amendment as opinion, therefore, exempted from liability. Summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants. Plaintiff Unelko Corp. appealed.

In this case, the Court of Appeals delivered its opinion based on the below presented issues:

1) Was the defendant's statement an assertion of fact so as to be considered a defamatory statement?

2) Was defendant's statement the legal cause of plaintiff suffering injury so as to give liability for product disparagement and tortious interference of business relationships?

In regards to the first issue, the Court of Appeals stated that in a defamation claim the statement must satisfy three conditions to imply an assertion of fact:

1) The statement must not be figurative or hyperbolic language. The use of figurative or hyperbolic language will nullify a claim for defamation.  Rooney’s statement about Unelko's product that “it did not work” was not in a manner of figurative or hyperbolic language. It was rather a factual assessment of Rain-X capabilities. It produced the impression to audiences that the Rain-X failed to perform as guaranteed.  For this reason, the District Court's ruling on the first factor should not weigh in favor of protecting Rooney from liability for defamation.

2) The general tenor of the statement.  The tenor in which the statement is given maynegate the factual impression of a defamation claim.The humorous and satirical nature of Rooney’s segment of “60 Minutes” did not negate the impression that he was making a factual assessment about Rain-X performance when applied to his vehicles. Although part of the report was humorous, the statement “it did not work” was presented as fact and understood as such by several viewers who wrote to CBS. Rooney’s negative evaluation of Rain-X’s capabilities differed significantly from his personal assessment of the other items he received in the mail. Thus, it received no protection based on the overall tenor of his “60 Minutes” segment.

3) The statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false: A factual statement needs to be substantially true in order to be protected from suit for defamation.  Truth is a defense to defamation.  Unelko Corp. failed to provide any concrete evidence that demonstrated any of Rooney’s statements were false in substance. Thus, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Unelko's defamation claim in favor of the defendant.

In terms of the second issue, the Court of Appeals stated that product disparagement requires an intentional publication of an injurious falsehood. Furthermore, to consider tortious interference with business relationships, there must be some wrongful conduct beyond the fact of the interference itself. But in this case, there was no genuine issue of fact provided to prove that Rooney’s words constituted a defamatory statement. The Court reasoned that these claims were subject to the same first amendment protection and analysis as defamation (see analysis above).  Because the defendant's statement was determined not to be defamatory, it follows that his statement also cannot be liable for disparaging plaintiff's product nor tortiously interfere with plaintiff's business.  Thus, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on Unelko's claims of product disparagement and tortious interference.

The District Court judgment is affirmed.