how would "law and order" function under the anarchist system? if I find my neighbor got murdered and some dude's living on his land, is it my duty to chase him off/kill him and give the property to his kids, or all us neighbors share it if they're aren't any? and for example if there's any crime with an unknown perp, I guess they're aren't courts so should the community try and solve the crime and punish the guilty? i hope i don't sound insincere it sounds like an interesting system thanks.
There would still be courts, theyād just operate without a State under a system of Polycentric law
Now on one hand, in your scenario youād be within your rights to kill the interloper, provided you know he killed your neighbor. How you do this is a matter of who has the ability to do what has to get done - his 7 year old son isnāt going to take back his land, but his family might. The simplest solution would be to kill the thief and contact the family, and from there the polycentric court system would take care of the rest
Thereād still be defense agencies, investigators, and a robust enforcement of the NAP by the communities themselves.
Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
ā Live Streamingā Interactive Chatā Private Showsā HD Qualityā Free Actions
Free to watch ā¢ No registration required ā¢ HD streaming
WoSign and StartCom This document contains additional information, and Mozillaās proposed conclusion for community discussion, regarding the matter of WoSign and StartCom. For some weeks now, Mozilla has been investigating a list of potential incidents relating to the CA WoSign. Some of those tu...
One of todayās news items was, apparently, that a CA decided to engage in a little sneakiness with backdating certificates to get around the browsers all deciding to blacklist the issuing of new SHA-1 certificates from the start of 2016 (and more sneakiness hiding its ownership of another CA). In and of itself, itās an interesting write-up of an investigation and an entertaining bit of drama and lies.
But what I find interesting is what it implies about coordination and emerging authorities.
We started out with a decentralised CA system and many browsers, and the idea was that there would be no central authority. But browsers wanted to coordinate to agree on who was an accepted CA and who wasnāt, because otherwise there would be inconsistency, a poor user experience on the Internet, and barriers to switching browser. So they formed the CA/Browser Forum, which serves as a venue for negotiation and then adoption by consensus (of the browsers, not the CAs) of standards and procedures and deadlines.
And the result is a centralised authority which really no one can readily walk away from; if a CA breaks the browser-consensus standards, as happened here, it faces the end of its ability to issue certificates- and if a browser wants to walk away, unless it is a huge browser or able to negotiate a block to leave with it, it faces a poor user experience because it wonāt approve the same CAs as everyone else. Itās voluntary, but the exit rights are illusory- or at least expensive to the point that we really canāt rely on their exercise to control things. As they so often are.
Right now, that authority is being overtly friendly. But itās been very difficult for anyone to getĀ āCAsā using alternative security models for more decentralised security approved, and part of that is the need to plausibly convince all browsers to adopt the model for the CA to be any practical use.
Itās only existed since 2005, and we already have a bit of aĀ ācentralised authority emerges because decentralised authorities find it helps to coordinate, develops bureaucratic procedure for everyoneās good, and in practice limits experimentationā thing going on.
This is a pretty good example of corporations placed in similar positions to governments coordinating/centralising authority in a similar manner, and thereās implications for the idea of creating other kinds of decentralised authorities. We got really rapid recentralisation, so any plan counting on that not happening didnāt last long, and we should probably expect that to happen by default elsewhere, too.
On the other hand, itās notable that the browser-negotiated behaviour of the CAB Forum is doing a lot better than any major government would have done with control of CA standards. But, well, weāre only 11 years in, and IMO Google, which resists sclerosis 50 times a day, is an outlier adn should not be counted when it comes to corporate behaviour.
Charlotte Bowyer of the Adam Smith Institute has a new post commenting on my articleĀ āUber, But For Regulation,ā which discusses how āmulti-sided platform (MSP) technologies like Uber and AirBNB essentially produce and sell more effective forms of governance. Itās quite a good summary, arguably more cogent than my original article. HereāsĀ an excerpt:
These āmarket regulatorsā tend to be good at governance for a couple of reasons. One is that theyāre free to harness new technology and experiment with different setups, driving down transaction costs. Another is the fact that a rival platform may always come along an offer an alternative serviceā and, as Hammond notes, āthe only way to supplant an incumbent platform is to adjust the governance structure in a way that social costs are better compensated by maximising the bargaining surplusā. This ensures that even when a market regulator looks like a natural monopoly, so long as there is the possibility of exit, the cost of regulation will tend towards the social minimum.
Hammond argues that this means that MSP technologies are not just a bit better at governance than state institutions, but that āthey potentially meet the economic definition of an ideal āpublic interestā regulatorā. And, just as Uber challenges traditional taxi governance models, we can imagine a future where all property rentals are listed on something like Air BnB, with tenancy acts and local regulation displaced by market-set rules and regulations which efficiently balance the interests of renter and landlord.
Such a situation should perhaps not be understood as āderegulationā, but a shift in the act of governance from the state to the firm, resulting, we assume, in reduced costs to society as a whole.
Anya is live and ready to show you everything. Watch her strip, dance, and perform exclusive shows just for you. Interact in real-time and make your fantasies come true.
ā Live Streamingā Interactive Chatā Private Showsā HD Qualityā Free Actions
Free to watch ā¢ No registration required ā¢ HD streaming
In a state where regular people don't have the power to bribe police, the rule of law is strong, so politicians have power.
In a state where the police are susceptible to bribes from regular people, the politicians' power doesn't extend to the regular people as much.
A commonly bribeable legal system is the next best thing to a decentralised legal system.
Consider a series of studies conducted by the economist and political scientist Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the 1970s. These came at a time when academic and political opinion on local power was being tugged in two different directions. On one hand, there was a drive toward merging municipal governments and tightening their professional standards, moving away from the sorts of part-time work and volunteerism that many small communities rely on. On the other hand, a vocal group of dissidentsāsome on the right, while others came out of the New
Left and black power movementsāpushed hard for decentralization and community control.
Ostrom, who would later win a Nobel Prize in economics, decided to put the arguments to an empirical test. The results helped convince her that highly centralized government was inferior to what she called "polycentric" systems, in which political units of varying size can cooperate but act independently, without a clear hierarchy. She felt this idea applied to the police as much as anyone else: While economies of scale might make it sensible for, say, a single crime lab to serve a large region, she felt it would be better for that lab to contract with many relatively small departments than to be an arm of one big one
Jesse Walker,Ā Centralized Policing in the Wrong Solution
