#long telegram

In some ways the West was successful I. Containing communism in Europe. Communism did not spread to capitalist countries and remained mostly in areas that it had already been established after the war. The Soviets did not succeed in taking all of Germany through the Yalta conference in 1945, the Western side was secured by the Western allies, preventing communist expansion from reaching more countries. This is shown through their actions during the Berlin Blockade, although East Berlin was isolated from the West they airlifted supplies to the sector, showing that they would support the people and not back down.

However, in some ways the West was not successful in containing communism in Europe the West were worried about what the East wanted to do and tried to get as much information as possible, the Long Telegram told President Truman that the East was hostile. In Greece there was a civil war, the British wanted to reestablish the monarchy but the communists who had resisted Nazi control, wanted to take over. Britain could not afford to continue fighting due to a bad winter so America stepped in to help. This prompted Truman to implement the Truman Doctrine. The West failed to prevent Stalin from expanding Soviet control into Poland however and the spread of communism into other countries east of the “Iron curtain” such as Romania and Bulgaria despite being prepared to fight against it.

Il “Long Telegram”della Russia di Putin

L’insicurezza che George Kennan ha descritto nel 1946 persegue ancora il cuore russo.

Gli esperti russi, i politici e le testate televisive si stanno continuamente chiedendo se la Russiadi Vladimir Putin non stia per caso cercando di ricostruire l’antica Unione Sovietica sia nell’impero che nelle sue estese aspirazioni, perché altrimenti non si spiegherebbe il motivo per il quale il ​​paese, che…

In 1946, George F. Kennan, an expert in Russian history and a State Department official, penned this 8,000 word telegram from Moscow in what has been described as a “foundational text” of the Cold War and America’s emerging policy of containment:

"At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighbourhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with [the] economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between [the] Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about [the] world without or if foreigners learned truth about [the] world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it. 

…

Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhabiting or diluting [the] power of others. Moscow sees in [the] UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, [the] Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to [the] conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuits of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon the UNO. This would imply, however that they felt themselves strong enough to split [the] unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render [the] UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward [the] UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on [the] degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in [the] UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to [the] UNO[’s] ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical. 

…

Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.”

Description obtained from: http://caho-test.cc.columbia.edu/dbq/11006.html#H