#logistics vs combat command

Hephaistion in Combat

I have argued, in the past, that Alexander kept Hephaistion away from combat command largely because such doesn’t appear to have been his strength as a leader. Some have mistaken this for my saying that he kept him away from combat (he didn’t), or that Hephaistion wasn’t a good fighter (actually, he probably was). In addition, I’ve changed my mind a bit on this. (Btw, I’m not assuming the anon’s friends based their opinions on my papers—or even read my papers, assuming they read English. I’m speaking in general.)

But before I address the Hydaspes, let’s talk about the big honkin’ problem with this proposal in general: it treats Hephaistion like a woman, and would have destroyed his timē (personal honor and public standing), making it impossible for anybody to take him seriously as chiliarch.

Remember, the most famous fighting forces in Greece, both Sparta and the Sacred Band of Thebes, used love and devotion as a motivator to bravery. Plato also philosophizes about it. This is how ancient Greek men constructed even romantic ties between themselves. WOMEN need protecting. Men do not. Men protect each other. I deal with this in a couple places in Rise.

In “The Cult of Hephaistion,” I discuss his career and appointments. Again, in the monograph, I will alter some of the conclusions I drew in that paper (as one does after 15+ years and a re-examination of the evidence), but the fundamentals stay the same. Hephaistion’s primary gift, and role, at Alexander’s court was logistical and diplomatic. BUT that does not mean he never commanded troops in combat. He just didn’t do so with any regularity, unlike some of his contemporaries. If combat command wasn’t his jam, he was competent at it. What he apparently excelled at, however, was organization, whether for large groups of people (like an army on the move), or for securing and delivering needed goods and services (like food and water for an army), or building required structures (like bridges or cities). He also may have had some diplomatic-political assignments. Thus, Alexander employed him most often for what he was best at.

None of that means he couldn’t fight. At Gaugamela (where he was injured), he apparently led the agema (royal squad) of the Hypaspists (also called the Bodyguard when in combat situations, hence Diodoros’s confusion of terms). That meant he was in the brutal thick of it as Arrian tells us the king’s cavalry agema (and his bodyguard, e.g., Hephaistion’s unit) hit some fleeing troops after the Persian line collapsed, and this resulted in the worst knot of fighting in the entire battle where the most Companions fell, as Persians were desperate to get away.

We know that when Philip created this special unit (first called the Pezhetairoi and later the Hypaspists, then later yet, the Silver Shields [Argyraspides]), they were recruited for their size, not formed by canton. The royal unit (agema) fought around the king (originally Philip, who fought on foot): hence their combat name as Bodyguard, which is what Hypaspist means: “Shield bearer,” the traditional guard of a nobleman. You don’t put people in that unit (whatever their status or birth) who can’t fight, never mind appoint them to lead the unit. But what that unit does NOT do is decide overall battle strategy, nor command whole sections of troops on the field—hold them together and keep them alive.

In military societies such as Macedon, a respected commander must also be a good fighter. But the reverse is not necessarily true: the best fighters may not be the best commanders. The focus on fighting skill occludes a person’s ability at overall combat command. Again, I deal with this in both Becoming and Rise: where I make Hephaistion a very fine fighter in hand-to-hand. So, if the most respected commanders are typically good fighters too, the best fighters are usually not also top-notch combat commanders. These are two different skills.

So yes, actually I do think Hephaistion was not only fine as a warrior, I think he was probably on the very good side.

But he was better at organization…and that is how Alexander used him.

Now, as for the very specific question about his role in the Battle of the Hydaspes, we have two reports, and a third (related). Justin is far too abbreviated, and Plutarch says nothing useful (for the most part) about military matters.

Both Curtius (8.14.15) and Arrian (5.12.2, 5.13.4) give Hephaistion’s placement. Curtius puts his hipparchy, and Ptolemy’s and Perdikkas’s infantry battalions under Alexander’s direct command. Arrian gives Perdikkas’s battalion and Demetrios’s and Hephaistion’s hipparchies under Alexander’s direct command. I’m not sure why the difference, but I’m rather more inclined to trust Arrian on such details. Furthermore, at 5.14.4, Arrian gives the full line placements.

It was not normal for these sources to offer a lot of individual detail as to where people are at all times. We’re lucky if we’re given any detail at all (and Arrian is typically the one to do it). So, if he says Hephaistion (and others) are with Alexander at X point, that’s where they are for the rest of the battle (unless we’re told otherwise). This is just how our ancient sources work. To argue, “Well, they said he was here, but then don’t mention him again here” is meaningless, unless we would expect him to be mentioned later…and we wouldn’t. It’s important to understand how the ancient sources record things—and what they don’t bother to tell us. We might care. They don’t.

I’ve found that many modern readers assume a level of detail and bureaucracy that was simply foreign to the ancient mindset. This was, at best, a semi-literate culture. They just didn’t write down things like that…much less in triplicate and file it all. Ha. As time went on, documentation got better, but it was never anything like what one would expect today. Even 100 years ago, documentation was often voluntary, and therefore iffy.

But. But. But…wouldn’t people lie? You bet your sweet patootie. And it was harder to prove. Welcome to ancient history. 😊 But sometimes people just misremembered details. That’s no doubt why we get conflicting reports in Arrian and Curtius about which divisions were under Alexander at the Hydaspes.

Now, while Diodoros doesn’t give as much battle detail (he’s a shorter source), he does tell us (17.91.1-2) that after the battle, Alexander sent Hephaistion off to take the territory of the “unfriendly” Porus and give it to the (now) “friendly” Porus, which Hephaistion successfully did. Upon his return, Alexander commended him for his bravery: tais andragathias epeinesen (17.93.1). One doesn’t say that about somebody who just went out for some organizational rearranging. Hephaistion and his troops fought. He was in command. Alone. (So yes, this contradicts some of my earlier claims and is an example of where I’ve changed my mind on some matters.)

What we see, beginning in Baktria but really picking up steam in India, is Hephaistion’s rise as an independent commander of large chunks of the army. Krateros is the other one. That means Hephaistion is at least sometimes in overall command in combat situations. This often occurs when Krateros, or one of the other Big Dogs (such as Perdikkas), are already on assignment. But it may also involve cases where some organizational and dipolomatic talent would be required: as in the matter of transferring a region from one raj to another. We also see Krateros (and Perdikkas, et al.) performing similar administrative roles, and/or in command of foraging units. So that wasn’t always Hephaistion, either.

Commanders in the ancient world tended to wear more hats than they do today. And we’re not always (or even often) told why one person is assigned here and another there. It could be simple availability, or luck of the draw, or an honor(favor) owed, or there may have been particular reasons that have been lost to time. Ergo, I try to look at trends, rather than absolutes. And the trend was for Hephaistion to be often (but not exclusively) assigned to logistical and/or diplomatic roles.