#enthymemes

"Rhetoric (I), Chapter 2 + Rhetoric (II), Chapter 22-23 + Rhetoric (III), Chapter 19" - Aristotle

Def.:

"Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; (...).  But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects." (A)

Central issue: "Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics ), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions." (A, 1356b)     >> "I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction." (Ibid.)

             > Induction: "When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; (...)" (Ibid.)              > Syllogism: "(...) when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric." (Ibid.)

                          >>> "Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause." (Ibid.)

On Persuasiveness:

"A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades." (Ibid.)    > Unique nature of rhetoric: "But none of the arts theorize about individual cases: (...)  individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible." (Ibid.)           >> "In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, (...), but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate." (Ibid.)

On enthymemes:

Central issue: "We now come to the Enthymemes, and will begin the subject with some general consideration of the proper way of looking for them, and then proceed to what is a distinct question, the lines of argument to be embodied in them." (A, 1395) General rule: "(...) we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest." (A, 1395b)      >> "It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences. (...) We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined -- those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize: and there must, moreover, be no doubt in the minds of most, if not all, of our judges that the opinions put forward really are of this sort. We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties." (A, 1395b-1396a)                > The result: "(...) in handling the question whether justice is or is not a good, we must start with the real facts about justice and goodness. We see, then, that this is the only way in which any one ever proves anything, whether his arguments are strictly cogent or not: not all facts can form his basis, but only those that bear on the matter in hand: nor, plainly, can proof be effected otherwise by means of the speech." (A, 1396a-1396b)

    > "Consequently, (...) we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise and are suitable for us to handle; and then we must try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge; not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak on, and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear closely upon it: for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case; and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces." (A, 1396b) Elementary classes of enthymemes [1] (A, 1396b):

The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions [thereby proving that proposition].

The refutative [enthymeme is formed] by the conjunction of incompatible propositions [thereby disproving that proposition].

On concluding an argument:    "Finally you have to review what you have already said. (...) What you should do in your introduction is to state your subject, in order that the point to be judged may be quite plain; in the epilogue you should summarize the arguments by which your case has been proved." (A, 1419b)          > "The first step in this reviewing process is to observe that you have done what you undertook to do. You must, then, state what you have said and why you have said it." (Ibid.)                    >> Method of the ironic man:                          "Your method may be a comparison of your own case with that of your opponent; and you may compare either the ways you have both handled the same point or make your comparison less direct: "My opponent said so-and-so on this point; I said so-and-so, and this is why I said it." Or with modest irony, e.g. "He certainly said so-and-so, but I said so-and-so." Or "How vain he would have been if he had proved all this instead of that!" Or put it in the form of a question. "What has not been proved by me?" or "What has my opponent proved?" You may proceed then, either in this way by setting point against point, or by following the natural order of the arguments as spoken, first giving your own, and then separately, if you wish, those of your opponent." (A, 1419ba-1420b)