#emotives

One of Nuim's special features is how it requires its speakers to overtly express their feelings and to state how they know what they're saying is true.  Nuim 1.0 handled this with two sets of particles.  Nuim now handles this with ten emotive verbs and four evidential suffixes.

The emotive verbs are intransitive and appear as follows:

Emotive, English

oye, happy

nuo, sad

oref, afraid

cekus, angry

yafo, loving

suhuf, hateful

wokki, surprised

cuti, jealous

huyat, aggressive

honi, submissive

What are you feeling, right now?

It’s usually difficult to say, because we’re simmering emotional cocktails capable of experiencing…

"...But statements about the speaker's emotions are prominent examples of a type of utterance that is neither constative (descriptive) nor performative, neither "doing things with words" nor offering an account or representation of something. Emotional utterances of the type "I feel afraid" or "I am angry"— which I will call first-person present-tense emotion claims—have (1) a descriptive appearance, (2) a relational intent, and (3) a self-exploring or self-altering effect.

1. Descriptive Appearance

First-person present-tense emotion claims have a descriptive appearance in the sense that emotion words are used in predicates that apply to personal states. Predicates of this kind about personal states are very widespread in the world's communities. "I am sad," "I have a heavy heart," "I feel elated"—these types of utterances present themselves at first glance as semantically the same as "I have red hair," "I am clean," or "I feel ill," which are genuinely descriptive or consta- tive. As descriptive statements, however, emotion claims do not admit of inde- pendent verification. The only way to determine the "accuracy" of an emotion claim such as "I am angry" is to notice the coherence of such a statement with other emotionally expressive utterances, gestures, and acts—all of which make reference to something no one can see, hear, or sense. Instruments that monitor autonomic nervous system (ANS) states and endocrine system (i.e., glandular and hormonal) states offer a slightly wider spectrum of expressive cues but still do not allow direct observation of "emotion" (see Ortony and Turner 1990:319).

2. Relational Intent

A large number of observers have noted that statements about emotions in social life occur most frequently as part of (or appear to designate) specific sce- narios or relationships. Some have gone so far as to argue that emotions are nothing but such scenarios.9 To say "I am afraid of you" may be a way of refus- ing to cooperate with someone or a request for a change in the relationship. To say "I feel like going to a movie" is to propose an outing; to say "I am in love with you" may propose or confirm a long-term sexual liaison.

3. Self-Exploring and Self-Altering Effects

However emotions are defined, observers tend to agree that they involve widespread activations of thought materials—variously called "appraisals,""cognitions," or "judgments"—some of which may only be semiconscious or imperfectly glimpsed and some of which may spill over into facial signals, ANS or endocrine system arousal, tone of voice, and so on (Averill 1994; Bornstein 1992; Frijda 1994; Greenspan 1988; Ortony and Turner 1990; Solomon 1984). As studies of "automaticity" show, the range and complexity of thought material activated at any given time can be so great, and can so completely exceed the ca- pacity of attention, that attempts to summarize or characterize the overall tenor of such material inevitably fail (on automaticity, see, for example, Greenwald et al. 1995; Isen and Diamond 1989; Logan et al. 1996; Ste-Marie and Jacoby 1993; Strayer and Kramer 1994; see also Wegner 1994). A first-person emotion claim is such an attempt. Such an attempt is, moreover, an endeavor in which the activated thought material itself plays a role and in which very important rela- tionships, goals, intentions, and practices of the individual may be at stake. As a result, the attempt inevitably has repercussions on the activated thought mate- rial. The changes made by attention as it formulates and utters an emotional statement can be very far-reaching in their consequences for the multivocal thought patterns that are excited or dampened down. A person whose current state includes an element of confusion may say "I love you" in order to find out if it is true; and the "truth" or "falsehood" of the statement depends on its effects on the speaker. Daniel C. Dennett cites the following passage from a biography of Bertrand Russell by Ronald W. Clark:

It was late before the two guests left and Russell was alone with Lady Ottoline. They sat talking over the fire until four in the morning. Russell, recording the event a few days later, wrote, "I did not know I loved you till I heard myself telling you so—for one instant I thought 'Good God, what have I said?' and then I knew it was the truth." [Clark 1975:176, quoted in Dennett 1991:246]

A great range of outcomes are possible following an emotional claim. One could categorize them, in an oversimplified way, as confirming, disconfirming, indifferent to, intensifying, or attenuating the emotion claimed. In the Russell example above, a combination of confirmation and intensification appears to have followed his avowal. This would appear to be a very common outcome (im- plicit in findings of Hochschild [1983]).

A number of researchers have remarked on the powerful effects that emo- tional utterances can have on emotions. For example, psychologist Phoebe Ellsworth recently remarked, "The realization of the name [of an emotion one is experiencing] undoubtedly changes the feeling, simplifying and clarifying" (1994:193). Philosopher Ronald De Sousa's (1987) well-known concept of "bootstrapping" differs from the approach presented here only in that De Sousa regards the emotional effects of emotion claims as self-deceptive, or at any rate as diverging from a "true" state of affairs (Whisner 1989).10 Kapferer (1979) has also emphasized the emotion-inducing intent of ritualized emotional expression."

The startling features of those emotional utterances that take the form of first-person present-tense emotion claims warrant their designation as constitut- ing a form of utterance that is neither descriptive nor performative. I propose that we call such utterances "emotives." The exterior referent that an emotive appears to point at is not passive in the formulation of the emotive, and it emerges from the act of uttering in a changed state. Thus, emotives are similar to performatives in that emotives do things to the world. Emotives are themselves instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, and intensifying emotions. There is an "inner" dimension to emotion, but it is never merely "represented" by statements or actions. It is the necessary (relative) failure of all efforts to rep- resent feeling that makes for (and sets limits on) our plasticity. Many ways of ex- pressing feeling work equally well (poorly); all fail to some degree. It is here that a universal conception of the person can be founded, one with political relevance.

There are several types of utterances and forms of expression that share in the special features of the first-person present-tense emotion claim which can only be mentioned in passing here. First-person emotion claims in the past tense or about a present state extending into the past or a future emotional state also have emotive effects because they clearly imply things about the present. Other claims about the speaker, such as "I am thinking it over" or "I thought you loved me," have just as much power to influence the present state of the speaker as do emotives and may have the status of implicit emotives if they are accompanied with attentively chosen emotional intonation or gesture. Second- and third-per- son emotion claims such as "You appear angry" or "He is afraid" are not emotives for the person who utters them, but they can force rehearsal of the claim in the first person on the person spoken about, and such a rehearsal is an emotive. A child, when told by its mother, "Don't be afraid," may accept at once that she is afraid. Or, in the case of a dispute between peers, the person spoken to might respond with a highly self-altering denial, such as "I am not afraid." Claims about third persons who are not present are not emotives, of course, but their truth value suffers from the same limitations as emotives, for such claims can only be considered "true" if the equivalent emotives were efficacious for the person characterized. The concept of emotives forces a redefinition of sincerity. Because of the powerful and unpredictable effects of emotional utterances on the speaker, sincerity should not be considered the natural, best, or most obvious state toward which individuals strive. On the contrary, probably the most obvious orientation toward the power of emotives is a kind of fugitive instrumentalism. One at- tempts to use this important tool to achieve ends that may be only tangentially related to the content of the claim. For example, one wants to sell a car, and so one says to a prospective buyer, "I am happy to meet you." The relational intent and self-altering effects of emotives often go hand in hand; emotion claims that are implicit promises or refusals often do successfully call up feelings appropri- ate to the carrying out of the promise or to persistence in refusal. But sometimes the two diverge. A person who becomes adept at managing such divergence (the proverbial used car salesman or gigolo) may be said to lie about her or his feelings, although such a lie is not the same as a constative lie or the performative lie of, say, a bigamist. It is worth noting that routine acceptance, and management, of divergences between relational intent and self-altering effect can result in a person giving up on the self-exploratory effects of emotives. One ceases to use them to find out what one feels because one is habituated to expect the worst, to being confronted with feelings that do not match the implicit promises one is making. This style may be called "hypocrisy," "self-deception," or "denial"—but only if one recognizes that no claims about the self have a straightforward truth value. Claims about "hypocrisy," "self-deception," or "denial" have their own potential emotive effect and concomitant failure of referentiality. They are highly political in character.

Even though we must hold others responsible for their actions in certain respects, it is also true that no one can be faulted for not knowing everything that is going on with him- or herself. Social life must allow for self-exploration and self-alteration by means of claims about personal states. It is too difficult for attention to cover all the terrain of thought that may be activated by varying circumstances for us simply to fulfill the roles assigned to us like automata..."

-William M. Reddy

Selling to Emotives

If you are attempting to sell products to an Emotive person, keep in mind the need to move at a pace that holds the attention of the prospect. Be enthusiastic and avoid an approach that is too stiff and formal. Take time to establish goodwill and build relationships. Do not place too much emphasis on the facts and details. To deal effectively with Emotive people, plan actions that provide support for their opinions, ideas, and dreams.30 Plan to ask questions concerning their opinions and ideas, but be prepared to help them get “back on track” if they move too far away from the topic. Maintain good eye contact and, above all, be a good listener.

Selling to Directives

The key to relating to Directives is to keep the relationship as businesslike as possible. Developing a strong personal relationship is not a high priority for Directives. In other words, friendship is not usually a condition for a good working relationship. Your goal is to be as efficient, time disciplined, and well organized as possible and to provide appropriate facts, figures, and success probabilities. Most Directives are goal-oriented people, so try to identify their primary objectives and then determine ways to support and help with these objectives. Early in the sales presentation, ask specific questions and carefully note responses. Look for specific points you can respond to when it is time to present your proposals.

Selling to Reflectives

The Reflective person responds in a positive way to a thoughtful, well-organized approach. Arrive at meetings on time and be well prepared. In most cases it is not necessary to spend a great deal of time building a social relationship. Reflective people appreciate a no-nonsense, businesslike approach to personal selling. Use specific questions that show clear direction. Once you have information concerning the prospect’s needs, present your proposal in a slow, deliberate way. Provide as much documentation as possible. Do not be in too big a hurry to close the sale. Never pressure the Reflective person to make quick decisions.

Selling to Supportives

Take time to build a social relationship with the Supportive person. Spend time learning about the matters that are important in this individual’s life—family, hobbies, and major interests. Listen carefully to personal opinions and feelings. Supportive individuals like to conduct business with sales personnel who are professional but friendly. Therefore, study their feelings and emotional needs as well as their technical and business needs.