#charmides

eye candy

alcibiades (good for him)

alcibiades (bad for him)

designated scapegoat

baby's first drug experience

didnt know it was profaning, thought he was going to a symposium and then just didnt leave

lost a bet

boytoy (see number 1)

Charmides

What is temperance—modesty, self-control, or something deeper? In this analysis of Plato’s Charmides, we explore how knowing one’s limits, defending legitimate skill, and aiming for the good can protect us from deception, error, and corruption—even when knowledge is uncertain.

After exploring courage in Laches and poetic inspiration in Ion, Charmides returns us to the inner life—with a sharp inquiry into a virtue both admired and elusive: temperance (sophrosyne).

Set just after Socrates returned from battle, the dialogue began with a seemingly simple question:

What is temperance? Is it modesty? Self-control? Knowing oneself?

Charmides, a strikingly handsome and well-behaved youth, seemed like the perfect candidate to embody this virtue. But as Socrates questioned him, the conversation began to unravel. Is temperance a feeling, a skill, or a kind of knowledge? Can someone truly be temperate if they don't know what temperance is?

Socrates initially entertained a definition through his usual filter: perhaps temperance was “knowing what you know, and what you do not know.” But this led to paradoxes.

Rather than offering a final answer, Charmides exposed how easily modesty could mask confusion, and how introspection could be misleading if conflicts of interest were not brought out into the open.

For modern readers, this dialogue offers a striking reflection:

Can we really know ourselves?

Is knowledge ever final?

Is it possible to have too much confidence?

In an age flooded with self-help advice, what is true self-mastery?

The dialogue opened with Socrates returning from the Battle of Potidaea between Athens and Corinth. He was met by friends Chaerephon and Critias and keen for a hearty debate. "I in my turn began to question them with respect to affairs at home, about the present state of philosophy and about the young men, whether there were any who had become distinguished for wisdom or beauty or both." Critias notified Socrates of an approaching politician and celebrity. "As far as beauty goes, Socrates, I think you will be able to make up your mind straight away, because those coming in are the advance party and the admirers of the one who is thought to be the handsomest young man of the day, and I think that he himself cannot be far off...You probably know him, but he was not yet grown up when you went away. He is Charmides, the son of my mother's brother Glaucon, and my cousin."

SOC: "Good heavens, of course I know him, because he was worth noticing even when he was a child. By now I suppose he must be pretty well grown up. You mustn't judge by me, my friend. I’m a broken yardstick as far as handsome people are concerned, because practically everyone of that age strikes me as beautiful."

"But even so, at the moment Charmides came in he seemed to me to be amazing in stature and appearance, and everyone there looked to me to be in love with him, they were so astonished and confused by his entrance, and many other lovers followed in his train. That men of my age should have been affected this way was natural enough, but I noticed that even the small boys fixed their eyes upon him and no one of them, not even the littlest, looked at anyone else, but all gazed at him as if he were a statue."

CPH: "Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn’t he a splendid face?"

SOC: "Extraordinary."

CPH: "But if he were willing to strip, you would hardly notice his face, his body is so perfect."

Socrates moved beyond the surface of power and celebrity and requested a more holistic approach. "By Heracles, you are describing a man without an equal—if he should happen to have one small thing in addition, if he happens to have a well-formed soul. It would be appropriate if he did, Critias, since he comes from your family."

CRI: "He is not only a philosopher but also, both in his own opinion and that of others, quite a poet."

Socrates used the example of doctors of the age and how they mixed magical charms as therapy to go along with the crude medical knowledge of the time. "In keeping with this principle, they plan a regime for the whole body with the idea of treating and curing the part along with the whole. Or haven't you noticed that this is what they say and what the situation is? I learned it while I was with the army, from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are also said to make men immortal...So it is necessary first and foremost to cure the soul if the parts of the head and of the rest of the body are to be healthy. And the soul, my dear friend, is cured by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that temperance arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body."

While sophrosyne is a complex Greek concept, it is often translated into English as temperance, though this term primarily emphasizes self-control. What the Greeks were aiming at was more a person of sound-mindedness, prudence, and self-knowledge. The sound-mindedness had a grasp of reality. The prudence assumed cautious skillfulness and harmony, and self-knowledge allowed for humility and desire for self-mastery, like when Socrates famously admitted his ignorance in the face of unassailable knowledge. Difficult terms like these communicated different things based on the person you were talking to. When questioned, Charmides recalled temperance as being a "sort of quietness."

With the richness of sophrosyne, Socrates began to question whether quietness was a sufficient enough foundation for the good, by bringing up examples of temperate people with skillful habits who could move quickly, be confident and lively. Charmides then adjusted his definition to "modesty," which moved Socrates to jump to the root of all virtues, which was his style at the time, to go as deep as possible beyond the term, to which he exposed it as being far too self-deprecating and underselling of oneself. "And it would follow that temperate men are good? And could a thing be good that does not produce good men? Then not only is temperance an admirable thing, but it is a good thing. Well then, you don't agree with Homer when he said that 'modesty is not a good mate for a needy man?' Then temperance would not be modesty if it really is a good and if modesty is no more good than bad."

Typical of most people who don't examine their own beliefs Charmides resorted to his cultural memory of people withdrawing from society and living a quiet life. "I have just remembered having heard someone say that temperance is minding one's own business." With the possibility that Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens, was the one Charmides was referring to, and something a tyrant might say to an underling, Socrates pointed to courage being something of an experiment that relieved the pressure to be always right, and so he joined in to defend himself.

Socrates brought up the necessity of needing to live with a government and economy so that everyone was, to a certain extent, "in each other's business," and business always involved some element of craft where both people in an exchange are supposed to come away satisfied with no harm done, which is often translated as Good, like when finished products were, and still are, called Goods. "Do you think a city would be well governed by a law commanding each man to weave and wash his own cloak, make his own shoes and oil flask and scraper, and perform everything else by this same principle of keeping his hands off of other people's things and making and doing his own? If a city is going to be temperately governed, it must be governed well...Now tell me: do you also agree with what I was just saying, that all craftsmen make something? The doing of good things or the making of them or whatever you want to call it—is this what you say temperance is?"

CRI: "Yes, it is."

SOC: "And the man who performs evil actions is not temperate, but the man who performs good ones? So I give you a clear definition of temperance as the doing of good things. Tell me if you think that a doctor, when he makes someone healthy, does something useful both for himself and for the person he cures. Does a doctor have to know when he cures in a useful way and when he does not? And so with each of the craftsmen: does he have to know when he is going to benefit from the work he performs and when he is not?”

What Is Temperance, Really?

The dialogue went into the same territory as in Laches where a moral compass of goodness and virtue had to intervene in all the other virtues because skills could be used both for good and evil, depending on the intent of the subject or their level of ignorance. Critias trusted a doctor must follow the inscription of Delphi to "know thyself," to know the limits of one's knowledge, an early epistemology. "Well, if knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of science and must be of something, isn't that so? Then medicine, too, is a science and is of health? If you should ask me, 'If medicine is a science of health, what benefit does it confer upon us and what does it produce?' And if you should ask me about housebuilding, which is a science of building houses, and ask what I say that it produces, I would say that it produces houses, and so on with the other arts. So you ought to give an answer on behalf of temperance, since you say it is a science of self, in case you should be asked."

Plato: Laches: https://rumble.com/v6utof9-plato-laches.html

By aiming always at the Good, like always making a situation better than it was before, it would remove the danger of being taken in by the ignorant, or even worse by manipulators and con-artists. Like in the Bible, or in science, you judge by the fruits and results. Whether one adopts a modest temperament or an experimental, scientific approach, being a good person in this context means avoiding boastfulness. Harmony is preserved by an artisanal attitude of skill development that is gradual and non-harming, and by using science to demonstrate what is good in the first place. This temperance has then the potential to reach the technological limit of the age that is confirmed by the observation of others who are also honest enough to admit what is unknown. There are always gaps in knowledge, so scientific advancement theoretically is always possible, when each generation is allowed the opportunity to develop and given an environment that doesn't punish learning.

Mind Valley Founder Says He Can Read a Book by Touching It - Zilla-Verse GuruJi: https://youtu.be/ckrH0p-9wQs?si=-zudGqwFma4u5mwO

Epistemology is the discipline concerned with showing that true knowledge is more justified than mere opinion—and when those justifications fall short, the mind is tempted to fall back on boasting or deception. "But how the person possessing [temperance] will necessarily know what he knows and what he does not know? I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self. Supposing that there is a science of science, will it be anything more than the ability to divide things and say that one is science and the other not? And is it the same thing as the science and absence of science of health, and as the science and absence of science of justice? One is medicine, I think, and the other politics, but we are concerned with science pure and simple. Therefore, when a person lacks this additional science of health and justice but knows science only, seeing that this is the only knowledge he has, then he will be likely, both in his own case and in that of others, to know that he knows something and has a certain science, won't he? And how will he know whatever he knows by this means of science? Because he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and housebuilding by that art, but not by temperance, and so on—isn't it so? But by temperance, if it is merely a science of science, how will a person know that he knows the healthy or that he knows housebuilding?"

Being stuck in the definition of epistemology as the basis for temperance, which in Greek is an ethical person who takes accountability, without short-changing their true skills, and pursues incremental improvements in skill and knowledge to advance society. Ideally a well run society could be made out of this science where The Good would increase standards of living and well-being, but the big assumption was that rulers would control their appetites and pursue only The Good with their expertise, which is a big IF. Also, knowing what is good, when a person is hungry with physical and emotional appetites, their lack of skill will tempt them to resort to criminality to get what they want and skip all the steps of skill acquisition.

SOC: "If, as we assumed in the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand—rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them—nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the science. And thus, by means of temperance, every household would be well run, and every city well-governed, and so in every case where temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably and well in all their doings and, faring well, they would be happy. Isn't this what we mean about temperance, Critias, when we say what a good thing it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?"

Socrates bumped into the "charm" of epistemology, but failed to recognize it, yet Plato's inconclusive ending only appeared so on the surface because it led the reader to think for themselves. "Charmides seems to have benefited from the discussion to some extent. Yet he is still inclined—under the influence of Critias?—to use force to get what he wants. Again Plato probably intends to remind his readers of what Charmides would become."

The danger of not using temperance and pursuing the good is that mutually beneficial exchanges can easily degenerate into tyranny, theft, and brutality: A use of force to possess the Good, or a deceptive charm to fool victims, which are all forms of evil. "And I am still more vexed on behalf of the charm I took so much trouble to learn from the Thracian, if it should turn out to be worthless. I really do not believe this to be the case; rather I think that I am a worthless inquirer. Because I think that temperance is a great good, and if you truly have it, that you are blessed. So see whether you do have it and are in no need of the charm—because if you do have it, my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a babbler, incapable of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument, and yourself as being exactly as happy as you are temperate."

SOC: "Are you going to use force, and don’t I get a preliminary hearing?"

CHA: "We shall have to use force, seeing that this fellow here has given me my orders. So you had better take counsel as to your own procedure."

SOC: "What use is counsel? Because when you undertake to do anything by force, no man living can oppose you."

CHA: "Well then, don't oppose me."

SOC: "Very well, I shan’t."

Why This Dialogue Still Matters

Even though no final definition was accepted for temperance, Socrates aimed at the good and believed that part of temperance was to work harmoniously with others to achieve the collective good. Like a doctor following the Hippocratic Oath, the skillful person refrains from continuing their activity until they fill gaps in their knowledge so as to preserve The Good, and reduce harm. Skill development required experimenting to go beyond opinion and find the true fruits of any labor.

In the realm of politics or economics, when Greeks used the term science (epistēmē), what they meant was finding value that increased human well-being, so temperance was knowing what was valuable and then pursuing those skills to exploit that value, while not exploiting others in the process. Plato, through Socrates, didn't want to destroy the bridge that connected good intentions with good actions. When you add the danger of grifters as Socrates warned about, they could exploit in the sense of not offering anything good in a deceptive exchange, while demanding what was truly good from others, like Charmides' solution to obey a corrupt master and get things by force.

Because perfection can't be achieved on this planet, the current level of knowledge always has to give way to new inventions and developments. One proposition is replaced by another, and so confidence can never be total. "One discovers what one believes by coming to have the beliefs in question. That is, insofar as one's self consists in what one believes, one realises oneself epistemologically–becomes aware of what one believes–by realising oneself metaphysically, in coming to have those beliefs by a process of critical scrutiny of propositions."

Societies based on cultural propositions are then under the pressure to modernize as soon as there are new discoveries. Mistakes in temperance, by those with power to mold, force the common populace to experience unnecessary suffering when they are molded against their will and waiting through all those years that are usually required to make true reforms. Plato recognized the pull of appetite, but he erred in assuming that wisdom alone could control it, not to mention the appetite of the powerful. "The dialogue also shows how a utopian vision of social relations may degenerate into dystopian fantasy, if the underlying moral and epistemological principles are flawed. This anticipates criticisms leveled against the Republic from a perspective which, if not explicitly democratic, is at least conducive to and supportive of democratic political relations."

“The beginning of love is to let those we love be perfectly themselves... and not to twist them to fit our own image. Otherwise, we love only the reflection of ourselves.”

~ Thomas Merton

A person of temperance would admit what they don't know and try to learn what was missing so they could provide goods to others in exchange for what they wanted. The more good they could provide as their skills improved, the more they could demand in exchange with a clear conscience.

The final danger was that if one was honest about one's faults, this opened the door to scapegoating from others who were skilled at shifting blame and avoiding accountability. A defense against that would have to be to defend what one does legitimately well or demonstrate it in an unmistakable way, so as to communicate where experiment, skill development, and improvements lay to restore trust where it mattered. True temperance meant knowing your limits, but also defending your legitimate value.

Honesty without strength invites exploitation. Strength without honesty invites corruption. But when both are present, so is respect. When the truth is uncertain, a character reveals itself not in what it claims to know, but in how it seeks—and how it learns from mistakes.

Laches and Charmides - Rosamond Kent Sprague:https://www.isbns.net/isbn/9780672603792/

Plato's Charmides: Positive Elenchus in a "Socratic" Dialogue:https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/plato-s-charmides-positive-elenchus-in-a-socratic-dialogue/

Plato's Charmides - Raphael Woolf:https://www.isbns.net/isbn/9781009308199/

Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality - Walter Thomas Schmid:https://www.isbns.net/isbn/9780791437643/

Intimitate conține unul dintre cele mai bune poeme pe care le-am citit vreodată, Insinuare pe lângă o ființă ciudată. Am primit cartea cadou și am deschis-o aleatoriu la acest titlu, care m-a cucerit instant. Boala despre care vorbește Angela ar putea fi cea care “i-a măcinat tinerețea între 15 și 26 de ani1“, tuberculoza. Pentru cititor însă, poate fi vorba inclusiv de o tulburare psihică,…