イレネ

SHCHERBINA: We found ourselves in front of a situation that has not been considered before, which is why there hasn’t been any protocols in place for this type of an occurrence. The very project itself is built upon never allowing such a situation. There was an uncontrollable speeding up of the reactor. Immediately after the accident, there has been a lack of preparedness on-site to evaluate the situation. The Civil Defense did not warn people. Until the evening there were weddings being held in the city. The fire had to be smothered as soon as possible, and the radioactive fallout had to be reduced. 4 thousand tonnes of materials have been dumped at the reactor. We were able to knock the surface temperature down from 500 to 200 degrees. What shall we do beneath the reactor? People have approached the pool. It is possible that there is an opportunity now to release the water.

LIGACHEV: Don’t get ahead of yourself.

RYZHKOV: We’ll need to see about that. The most important thing is to avoid the explosion.

SHCHERBINA: The most difficult thing is deactivation.

(Note: Deactivation refers to the clean-up and burial of contaminated soil and water, etc - LSW)

GORBACHEV: The most important is to deal with the danger that is below.

SHCHERBINA: People are working selflessly.

(Note: It seems like they might all be talking over each other in an agitated manner. Wish we could hear a recording of this - LSW)

LEGASOV: The work is organized the following way: Comrade Shcherbina is in charge of organizing, Comrade Meshkov studies the reasons of the accident and I work on recommendations regarding prevention of the further spread of the fallout. There are also groups in Moscow conducting the analysis.

(Note: Legasov truly shines here, stepping in calmly and intelligently to get the discussion back on track. - LSW)

The considerations regarding prevention of the consequences of the accident that are being voiced in the West should be taken into account. These aren’t just guesswork, but a result of studies, conducted with other past NPP accidents taken into account. We had to do all the calculations on site, because we didn’t have any established protocols in place.

GORBACHEV: Plus in this case, there is water under the reactor.

LEGASOV: This was done to save money, otherwise one would have to build two separate buildings. Minsredmash did not agree with that. If we had 4-5 pipes that would be stretched away from the reactor and into some distance, this would not have been a problem. This is a miscalculation of everyone working in the energy industry.

GORBACHEV: What about the containment structures?

LEGASOV: Considering the force of the explosion that took place, a containment structure would not have saved anything.

GORBACHEV: We need to focus on what comes next.

LEGASOV: 10 hours later, we were able to stop the reactor. But it continues to emit radioactivity, because after a year of being in operation, it has accumulated a lot of isotopes. The heat output of those debris has been 14 megawatt in the first 24 hours, while today it is 8.5 megawatt. This is like burning 60 tons of coal every 24 hours. Besides that, graphite is burning, too. There is 2.5 thousand tons of graphite there in total. One ton burns up every hour. This equals 24 tons per day. The graphite will burn up completely in one-third of a year.

The number one task is to create a way of filtering out the radioactive isotopes. Right now the amount of them that gets emitted into air is 100-fold less than there would be without taking measures to drop sand and other materials on the reactor from the air. The area located in the vicinity of the reactor has been sacrificed, because dumping the materials from the height of 200 meters raised dust, which increased radioactivity near the power plant.

Currently, the mass that has been melted in the reactor is moving downward. This is difficult to control, because there hasn’t been monitoring devices installed that would allow doing that. This is my fault, too. But, not a single NPP in the world has something like that.

(Note: Remarkably, Legasov accepts blame for something he hasn’t even designed. Only that he hasn’t voiced his concern about this highly improbable scenario. Or maybe he did but doesn’t think he did it strongly enough? - LSW)

On the first day after the accident, the temperature of the melted mass was 1100 degrees, while yesterday at 18:00 it was 20 degrees. It goes up by 135 degrees every day.

(Note: “20 degrees” is clearly a typo and should say ~2000 degrees, as a quick calculation can confirm: 1100 + 135 x 7 days = 2045 degrees. - LSW) 

Last night, an experiment was conducted: the melted mass fell into water, and there hasn’t been an explosion. However, if the melted mass from the reactor reaches the water below, there will be powerful formation of steam.

The situation continues to be troubling. The reactor needs to be cooled from below. An underground tunnel needs to be created, and liquid nitrogen needs to be delivered via it. In 2-3 days, we need to allow the circulation of air. Yesterday, there were no air drops to enable the draft.

Regarding the potentially dangerous zone. It cannot be larger than 250 kilometers. Within which the active zone would be 30-50 kilometers. Our institute has previously considered a “Backstop” scenario, concerning this problem. So we have exact calculations on that account.

GORBACHEV: What would happen if the fuel reaches the ground water?

LEGASOV: This is where Velikhov and I could not find common ground. The pool needs to be emptied of water by pumping, not by shooting at it to pour it out.

GORBACHEV (to SHCHERBINA): We should let the site know, so they don’t shoot at it.

(Comrade SHCHERBINA steps out)

LEGASOV: And as for adding the concrete layer, that’s the final operation.

GORBACHEV: What about the remaining three blocks?

LEGASOV: The first two are in working condition. Barring another explosion, they will be fine. As for the third block, it might catch fire if there is another emergency.

GORBACHEV: Should we invite the foreigners? We shouldn’t do it in vain. But if we have to, then don’t be deterred by it.

LEGASOV: We were shown the cipher telegrams regarding this. Only two things were unknown to us: the French foam and the remote controlled robots from West Germany. So there is no need to send a general SOS message, whereas all the ideas originating overseas should be sent to the group for consideration.

RYZHKOV: If the strategy with pumping the water out via a pipe works, can the same pipe be used to pump the liquid nitrogen in?

LEGASOV: Yes. But it doesn’t cancel out the idea of a tunnel.

RYZHKOV: We should do both.

SHCHERBINA: I was just informed that the water pumping has begun.

(Note: looks like Shcherbina returned to the room after calling the site with this information. So, within this brief time span, Velikhov’s plan of shooting at the bubbler pool (with some sort of a projectile?) was rejected and Legasov’s idea was not only approved by Gorbachev, but actually started being implemented in real time. Amazing. - LSW)

(Note: another interesting takeaway is that they were arranging to bring Joker from West Germany way earlier than it was portrayed in the series. - LSW)

ALEXANDROV: Legasov reported everything correctly. Regarding the foreign assistance: it would be good to bring doctors who specialize in bone marrow transplants.

ALIEV: This type of a specialist is already working. 

(Note: this must be Robert Gale. - LSW).

LIGACHEV: Is there a possibility of a chain reaction?

ALEXANDROV: There is. But not an explosion, i.e. a momentary process. But there would be major steam generation.

SLAVSKY: Our Ministry is participating in limiting the consequences of the accident. My first deputy is there on site. One of the reasons for what has happened is that the Atomnadzor (Note: a nuclear watchdog/inspection agency - LSW) has done zero work. What is being done right now is correct. No further suggestions.

BREZHNEV (minister of transport infrastructure): Together with Comrades Shchadov and Usanov we went on site yesterday to survey the situation with approaching the water through drilling. The start of pumping is eased by its location. After the pumping, one must start pumping the clay-concrete mix. The drilling is complicated by the fact that the reactor cannot be approached to a distance closer than 250 meters. We have arranged with the military for them to deactivate the area so we could approach to a closer distance, 50 meters.

GORBACHEV: We should be picking up the pace. We should be working not only as if this was a wartime situation, but a nuclear one - around the clock.

RYZHKOV: Comrade Brezhnev should return on site and organize this work.

GORBACHEV: Yes.

GROMYKO: What’s the percentage of the fallout that enters the atmosphere?

LEGASOV: The SO is exceeded 22-fold. There will be zirconium. First, there was iodine coming out, and now it’s the rare earth minerals. The zone in the radius of 30 kilometers is dangerous. Iodine decays halfway in 8 days, and after 80 days there will be nothing left.

SEDUNOV (Deputy Chairman of Goskomgidromet): We are watching the situation with radiation from airplanes and the land sites. The spread of radioactivity depends on wind direction. First, the cloud went north, then west and south. There was a spread of radioactive air into Poland, Scandinavia, then into Romania and Bulgaria, yesterday - into Turkey. In Kiev, its level increased 80-fold above background, this morning it is 45-fold. A norm for the public is considered 10-fold above background over a year. In Minsk and Lithuania it’s 3-fold. In the North Caucasus, 2-fold. We suppose that in Kiev, it will start receding. But if the wind changes, the cloud can head toward Moscow. 

(Note: Goskomgidromet is the weather forecasting agency. - LSW).

SHCHERBITSKY: Someone confused roentgens and milliroentgens.

(Note: not sure what he is referring to? - LSW).

SEDUNOV: It is important to watch the isotope content of the precipitation. Iodine goes into milk. Today that’s where most of the danger is coming from.

GORBACHEV: What to do with the cattle?

SEDUNOV: No need to destroy it. The Kiev water reservoir may become polluted.

LYASHKO: The water probes are being taken every hour. Radioactivity was only found in upper parts of the Pripyat’ river. We banned the public from drinking water from open sources there.

SEDUNOV: In Moscow everything is normal so far.

SHCHADOV (minister of coal industries): It is dangerous to break through the wall. Water should be pumped out and then the mix should be pumped in. If necessary, we’ll dig under the building. 

(Note: Shchadov circles back to talking about the water problem and backs Legasov’s strategy. - LSW)

AKHROMEEV (deputy defense minister): Task number one is controlling the radiological situation. We started the deactivation of roads and other sites. Three thousand people are working on it. Today we will finish preparing the deactivation plan and report to the working group.

SOLOMENCEV: How effective is the cleanup?

AKHROMEEV: It reduces radioactivity by a factor of 3 to 4. We have to create burial sites for topsoil and water. We also have set up medical facilities at 7 thousand person capacity.

LIGACHEV: What does Akhromeev think about approaching the water under the reactor?

AKHROMEEV: My opinion is to break it with a cumulative projectile. 

(Note: I think this means an anti-tank missile. A true military man’s response, and one vote for Velikhov’s plan. - LSW)

RYZHKOV: There are enough people.

AKHROMEEV: If needed, we will bring more.

LYASHKO: The Dnieper system provides water for 32 million people. The water samples are taken every hour. Yesterday there was no alarm until the evening. But today, there is. On smaller rivers, radiation levels have increased and are now 10^-4, with 10^-8 being the norm. (Note: Units? - LSW). These areas were instructed to switch to water from closed sources.

Luckily, there are artesian wells here. If need be, we will bring water tanks. What would be more difficult is if we would have to dump the water out of Kiev Reservoir. There is already a water shortage in the South. We need Gosomgidromet’s recommendations on how long we should hold the water in Kiev Reservoir.

GORBACHEV: How are the evacuated people?

LYASHKO: Evaluation was carried out in 3 hours in place of planned 6. One bad thing was that we had no protocol in place for this kind of scenario, no training has ever been conducted. The food for the evacuated has been organized. There turned out to be a disconnect between the services of the 3-rd Minzdrav group and the regional medical services. (Note: Minzdrav is the Ministry of Health Services - LSW). They were kept too secret. I spoke to Comrade Burenkov about it. The situation is getting better now.

The census of the evacuated has been complicated by the fact that there were many who have left on personal transport for the holidays to other towns, to visit family, etc.

Construction workers were sent to other objects. 3.5 thousand people were assigned to the “Mayak” factory. Many went to work at agriculture jobs. They will receive medium wages. Because of property loss, people will have to be paid a compensation out of Gosstrakh (Note: a state insurance agency - LSW). The people from the countryside should be given a one-time amount of 100 rubles for the head of the household, and 50 rubles for each family member. The public insists on being provided more information and guidance: what to do in the situation they are in.

SHCHERBITSKY: It is very important right now.

GORBACHEV: I thought we have already decided to provide such information locally.

LYASHKO: We need the minister of health and the scientists to speak and broadcast these regionally. Water from under the reactor should not be let out into soil, even if it goes into a pit. A pool should be built. We can build this type of vessel. We also need vessels for the deactivated soil. But places like that should be guarded.

VLASOV: We will do that.

LYASHKO: The school year continues. The primary school needs to be let out in a week, the tenth graders should finish as usual. All the children, evacuated ones, should be taken into summer camps. I am requesting openings for them. The milk gets doubly checked. If there is contamination, it is being sent for butter and cheese production.

GORBACHEV: We have got the project of the resolution. What should we add? We should take into consideration that the situation is very difficult in all aspects: radiation, an enormous territory. There will be no definitive answers from scientists as far as the future goes. That’s why we need to work by the worst-case scenario. The top priority should be the reactor with all the options considered. The working group must consolidate all the necessary resources and mechanisms.

At the same time, the work with the public needs to be underscored: living conditions, jobs, healthcare, etc. Water is a special question. What should we do? We should carry out all the calculations, all the forecasts. Especially planning all that needs to be done in the danger zone.

Separately, we must decide how to be with the outside world. Information must be provided in a calm and balanced manner, without overconfidence but firmly. Panic is the luxury of the subordinates, and not of the Politburo or the government.

The local channels in Ukraine should broadcast more expanded information. Across the Soviet Union, primarily the facts should be broadcast. Maybe the informational frame can be expanded to the outer world, as well. Our adversaries are asking us questions that would on one hand, allow them to judge us as a whole, and on the other hand - smear us with mud. If we add more information now, it will be natural, because the time passes, and with that the amount of facts. But we should not create a picture of overconfidence. We are facing the fact that this situation is a signal to everyone. The public’s opinion should be turned toward the steps we are taking towards nuclear disarmament. This accident, on a nuclear object, tells us that a nuclear war should never be allowed to happen. We should talk about this at a press conference. So, the information needs to be added to, but responsibly.

As for bringing the foreign specialists? As I understood from Legasov, there is no need for it. If there will be a need, then we’ll decide. 

DOLGIKH: This is written in the next to last section.

GROMYKO: I agree with what Mikhail Sergeevich had said. It is correct that the situation remains serious. In the second section of the project it says: to consider.

GORBACHEV: It should say: approve the proposed measures and intensify the work.

GROMYKO: Section 10. We raised this question at the United Nations. We should use what we’ve already talked about previously.

SHCHERBITSKY: Section 9 needs to be expanded, to mention informing the populace regarding the situation.

GORBACHEV: Add this.

MEDVEDEV: Perhaps we should make a mention of periodically informing our friends.

GORBACHEV: It is already in the project. I suggest incorporating these suggestions and approving it.

POLITBURO MEMBERS: Agreed.

GORBACHEV: Boris Evdokimovich, you said that the analysis of the causes of the accident has been completed.

SHCHERBINA: Yes. On 25th of April, the power plant started conducting an experiment to test the reliability of its functioning, which has been approved by the Chief Engineer. It has been a crudest mistake to conduct such a test without taking the reactor functioning into account.

GORBACHEV: What kind of experimenting was it? This is a nuclear power plant.

SHCHERBINA: These kinds of experiments are conducted at power plants. But the nuclear watchdog agency should have been informed of that. The first scientific deputy hasn’t been there.

GORBACHEV: What about the version with hydrogen?

SHCHERBINA: No. There were two explosions inside the reactor.

GORBACHEV: What about the automated systems?

SHCHERBINA: None of the three systems worked.

GORBACHEV: There has already been resolutions regarding the improper operating procedures at Chernobyl NPP.

SHCHERBINA: The personnel have not been properly chosen.

CHEBRIKOV: We have two reactor systems - two-line (the more reliable ones) and the single-line ones. This is a single-line reactor. It doesn’t tolerate fluctuations in the operating procedure. Unplanned things lead to adverse circumstances. There are three systems in place to stop the reactor everywhere, but this one only had two. Capturing the extra heat output - that’s what the experiment was for. Its planning was done without involving the reactor designers.

SHCHERBINA: The hydrogen version was discarded right away. The problem was with the reactor vibrating and speeding up.

DOLGIKH: We should wait for the results of the final analysis.

GROMYKO: We should start discussing this in Central Planning. A big misfortune had struck us. Someone made an oversight, committed a crime and must be punished. What sort of thing they decided to experiment with. The decision should be such that many generations would not forget about this fact.

GORBACHEV: I suggest approving the resolutions regarding the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl and inviting Hans Blix to the USSR.

POLITBURO MEMBERS: Agreed.