Actually, different alters of an individual with DID presenting with different mental disorders is a well recorded phenomena. In many cases, this is caused by alters manifesting the symptoms of a disorder that the individual themself technically has. For example, itâs not uncommon for an individual with DID to have one alter in particular who obsessively handles all aspects of an eating disorder or even serves as a conduit for eating disorder related thoughts and perceptions. On the other hand, some alters may present with symptoms of disorders that the body does not have. In these cases, the presentation is usually the result of either the effects of trauma mimicking a disorder (for example, severe neglect leading to an alter presenting as autistic) or an alter introjecting the disordered traits of an another individual (for example, an alter presenting as if they have ASPD because they represent an abuser who had ASPD).
While itâs true that the physical structure of the brain is constant between alters, the way that the brain and body responds to different alters, particularly trauma-oriented versus non-trauma-oriented alters, is known to change. (x x x) It should be noted that individuals without DID fail to match these differences.
Only 2-14% of all presentations of dissociative disorders can be attributed to either factitious disorder or malingering with higher rates being found within specialty dissociative disorder units and within referrals to expert consultants. (x) These rates are very similar to rates found in the respective populations for other disorders and diseases (for example, one study placed the prevalence of factitious disorders in tertiary care settings such as specialized treatment for cancer at 9% (x)). It should also be noted that DID is not actually a commonly used defense in court, though PTSD is.
In regards to the overlap of symptoms, DID is often viewed as the most extreme disorder on a spectrum that includes PTSD (a trauma- and stressor- related disorder; I assume this is what you would call a âsevere stress disorderâ). This fits the theory of structural dissociation (addressed below) and also matches the fact that both disorders involve dissociative symptoms (flashbacks are often described as dissociative intrusions) and are the result of trauma or extreme stress. Despite this, itâs clear that the phenomena experienced by those with co-morbid PTSD and DID goes beyond that experienced by those with only PTSD. As well, because of the origin of DID, it, like PTSD, does have high co-morbidity rates with anxiety and depressive disorders. However, Iâve never seen any suggestions that DID could actually be either an anxiety or depressive disorder because the criteria between these categories of disorders are vastly different. May I ask how you came to such a unique conclusion?
While iatrogenic DID is possible, neither iatrogenic nor sociocognitive sources can explain the majority of cases of DID. One study found that 73% of individuals with DID have corroboration for having experienced dissociative symptoms prior to receiving a diagnosis of DID and 67% for dissociative symptoms prior to therapy. (x) Other studies have found treatment for DID to be highly effective at lowering self-injurious behaviors and the number of necessary hospitalizations; increasing adaptive functioning; lowering levels of dissociation, PTSD, and distress; improving Schneiderian first rank symptoms, mood and anxiety disorder symptoms, and somatization symptoms; and decreasing the number of psychiatric medications prescribed. Integration was associated with more significant improvements. (x x) Itâs highly unlikely that treatment that led the fabrication of a previously non-existent syndrome would lead to such drastic improvements. Finally, itâs been shown that individuals with DID consistently show symptoms that are not widely, popularly, or even always clinically associated with DID. (x)
In addition to the above evidence that DID is not iatrogenic, there is strong evidence that DID is traumagenic. Part of this evidence lies in the differences between trauma-oriented and non-trauma-oriented parts as was discussed in the second paragraph of this response.The theory of structural dissociation also strongly links DID with childhood trauma, as does the extremely high rate of co-morbidity between DID and PTSD. One study confirmed reported cases of child abuse in eight out of nine cases of DID and all twelve cases of DDNOS (now OSDD) studied. (x) There are many also similarities between the brains of individuals with PTSD and DID, though there are also unique differences, some of which can be correlated to the level of dissociation experienced by the individual. (x x)
Dissociative disorders do not rely on the Freudian concept of repression. Not even DID or dissociative amnesia rely on the Freudian concept of repression, and depersonalization/derealization disorder certainly has nothing to do with it! (On that note, Iâve also never seen depersonalization/derealization disorder contested despite it being a dissociative disorder.) I highly suggest that you research the theory of structural dissociation in order to better understand current theories on the formation of DID. Iâve briefly explained the theory below, but a cursory overview really isnât enough to convey the theory correctly.
The theory of structural dissociation centers around two main points. The first is that children are not born with a stable sense of self but instead develop one under normal conditions by integrating loose collections of ego states. The second is that trauma can disrupt the natural integration of information. Adults who survive traumatic situations develop PTSD when they fail to integrate the trauma into their sense of self and personal history. This leads to the existence of an âemotional partâ (EP) that contains all of the dissociated, or non-integrated, traumatic materials. The apparently normal part (ANP), or the part of the individual that survives after the rejection of the traumatic material, experiences the negative symptoms of PTSD (dissociation, amnesia, emotional numbing) in attempts to avoid activating the EP which is associated with positive PTSD symptoms (dissociative intrusions in the form of flashbacks, intense emotions, ego-dystonic reactions, and so on).
When the trauma is more complex, varied, or long lasting or when it begins at a younger age, the individual may develop C-PTSD, BPD, or OSDD-1. According to the theory of structural dissociation, these disorders are characterized by the presence of one ANP and multiple EP. This results when different EP are needed to hold different aspects of the trauma. For example, an individual with C-PTSD may have an EP that, when activated, responds with a strong flight action path, an EP that responds with a strong fight action path, and an EP that experiences a loss of bodily sensation and submits to perceived threats. An individual with BPD may have an EP that attaches to authority figures and an EP that reacts negatively to attachment and is overwhelmed by fear of abandonment. An individual with OSDD-1 may have an EP that holds the visual memories of being abused, another that holds the emotions associated with the abuse, and yet another that acts out as a way to express these dissociated emotions.
Finally, the theory of structural dissociation postulates that individuals develop DID when they experience severe, repeated, or long-term trauma at such a young age that their personality never had the chance to fully integrate. Individuals with DID have not just multiple EP but also multiple ANP that handle different aspects of daily life. Each ANP not only avoids anything that could trigger the activation of an EP and so cause symptoms that might interfere with their functioning but also experience some degree of amnesia in regards to other ANP. Alters are often highly phobic of each other because they learned at a very young age that to acknowledge the trauma that they experienced when not permitted to do so could be lead to worsened or increased abuse, neglect, abandonment, or even threats of death. (x)
Dissociative amnesia as a disorder or as part of DID has nothing to do with repression as described by Freud. Please keep in mind that rejecting the existence of dissociative amnesia not only rejects the experiences of abuse survivors but also of war veterans (x x x) and Holocaust survivors. (x) Finally, keep in mind that many cases of repressed memories of childhood abuse have been proven to be accurate. (x)
To return to the original point, the asker wanted to know if alters can have different disorders even if the individual with the alters does not have DID. You expressed doubt in DID as a valid diagnosis and in the possibility of different alters having different diagnoses even if it is valid. Most of my above post combats these points. You then expressed that youâre unaware of a dissociative disorder that involves alters but is not DID. In response to this, I wonder how thorough your research actually was and suggest that you broaden your search in the future. You missed that OSDD-1, previously known as DDNOS-1, also involves the presence of alters and is differentiated from DID by either a lack of amnesia between these parts or by an insufficient differentiation between parts as would be required for a diagnosis of DID. Because it is so similar to DID, itâs highly likely that an individual with OSDD-1 could also have alters with their own mental disorders.