#sa-11

"September 1962 NASA planned to fly four early manned Apollo spacecraft on Saturn I boosters. Cancelled in October 1963 in order to fly all-up manned Apollo CSM on more powerful Saturn IB.

Launched: 1965 Winter. Number crew: 3 .

A key prerequisite for these flights was complete wringing out of the launch escape system.

The tentative Apollo flight plan laid out the following unmanned tests before a manned flight would be undertaken:

Pad abort: Two tests to simulate an abort on the pad. These tests would qualify the launch escape system

Suborbital (Little Joe II): Three suborbital tests to qualify the launch escape system and the command module structure. Tests would include maximum dynamic and high altitude conditions.

Orbital (Saturn C-1): Flights SA-6 (with SA-8 as backup) would determine the launch exit environment. SA-7, SA-9, and SA-10 would flight-test components of or the complete emergency detection system. Four manned flights would then commence with SA-11.

By January 10, 1963, MSC and OMSF agreed that an unmanned Apollo spacecraft must be flown on the Saturn C-1 before a manned flight. SA-10 was scheduled to be the unmanned flight and SA-11, the first manned mission.

Early concept art of the Apollo Block I Command and Service Module separation from the S-IVB.

Image from Space Horizons Vol. No. 1, Issue No. 1 (1965)

By the later summer of 1963 the value of the Saturn I missions seemed increasingly in doubt. The limited payload of the Saturn I meant that only partial systems could be installed. At a September 26, 1963 meeting in Washington, D.C., NASA's scheduling contractor, Bellcomm, was asked to develop an Apollo mission assignment program without a Saturn I.

Bellcomm quickly responded, recommending that the Apollo spacecraft flight test program should be transferred from the Saturn I to Saturn IB launch vehicles. The Saturn I program should end with flight SA-10. All Saturn IB flights, beginning with SA-201, should carry operational spacecraft, including equipment for extensive testing of the spacecraft systems in earth orbit. Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller recommended the changeover on October 26. NASA Administrator James E. Webb's concurrence came two days later. Development of the Saturn IB for manned flight would be accelerated and 'all-up' testing would be started.

No crew assignments were ever made for these flights; the first two groups of astronauts were fully committed to the Gemini program. The third astronaut selection, in October 1963, was simultaneous with the decision to drop the Saturn I flights. Had these flights occurred, they would have run from fall 1965 to the end of 1966, concurrent with the flights of Gemini 5 to 12."

Cancelled missions:

SA-11 (AS-106): planned launch Winter 1965

SA-12 (AS-107): planned launch Spring 1966

SA-13 (SA-108): planned launch Summer 1966

SA-14 (AS-109): planned launch Fall 1966

-Information from Astronautix.com: link

Russia: Info 'War' in Malaysian Plane Disaster

U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power said Churkin made clear that Moscow's "real intention is not to learn about the investigation, but to discredit it."

BY Alex Davies, Wired, July 22, 2014

American officials believe the missile that destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was fired by pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, using a Russian-made system designed for bringing down fighter jets. That brings up the question: How easy is it to bring down a passenger jet with a weapon that’s meant to be used by trained soldiers?

Turns out, it’s pretty easy. As in, take a three-day course and go for it easy.

The weapon in question is the SA-11, a radar-guided surface to air missile (SAM) system. It’s been around since the Soviets deployed the first-generation model in 1979. The mobile system (it sits on a tank chassis) is made to serve near the front lines to protect ground forces from air attacks. Operated by a crew of four and designed to attack fighter jets, it can fire multiple missiles simultaneously. It fires high explosive proximity fuse warheads, which home in on their targets and detonate just before reaching them, to maximize damage. Targets 20 miles away and over 70,000 feet in the air are fair game. It’s a “big, heavy vehicle that has big missiles,” says Randal Cordes, a military intelligence analyst who has worked at the CIA and Pentagon. “To use an SA-11 against an airliner, it’s brutal overkill.”

The training required to properly operate the system can take weeks or months, which may explain why the Malaysia plane was destroyed in the first place. The problem with the SA-11 is that it’s difficult to properly identify and track targets, but easy to fire missiles. “The skill comes in knowing what you want to shoot at,” says Cordes. That’s because the SA-11’s radar system shows the same “blip” for all different targets. The operator sees an aircraft’s altitude, air speed, and vector, but not its size or type, says Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Airliners broadcast a four-digit transponder known as an IFF code that identifies them as civilian aircraft, and the SA-11 system is capable of picking up that information. But the training that goes into properly identifying aircraft takes months, especially since the window for acquiring and firing on targets is just a few minutes.

“You can’t take a crew, stick ‘em inside the cabin, and say here’s the on switch, and here’s the button you hit,” and expect them to operate it properly, says Wesley Paul, a former intelligence research analyst for the Air Force.

“Ready” and “aim” are difficult. “Fire” is easy.

It would take three to four days at most to teach someone to use the system well enough to shoot down a 777, Cordesman says. That’s partly because passenger planes fly at steady speeds and altitudes, and have no defense systems. They cruise higher than fighter jets do, at heights where they’re more easily picked up by radar.

“Once the radar picks up a target, it is a matter of telling the system that it should engage the target and issuing a fire command,” says Paul Huter, an aerospace engineer at Lockheed Martin. That involves following a checklist and selecting the target, either by clicking on a screen or pushing a button (or clicking with a mouse on a screen, depending on the system model). Training would consist of running through that procedure in various conditions, and would be so straightforward, Huter says, that “it is certainly possible for someone with no training to read through the checklist and successfully engage a target.”

"ONETSK, June 29, /ITAR-TASS/. Self-defence forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic have taken control over a missile defence army unit equipped with Buk missile defence systems, the press service of the Donetsk People’s Republic told Itar-Tass on Sunday.