#processodepaz

Colombia’s announcement of a cessation of conflict with the FARC on June 23 was the culmination of over 3.5 years of negotiations, and stands to be the most momentous shift in Colombian society after five decades of conflict. As I wrote in January, the successful implementation of a peace agreement would halt one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, responsible for over 220,000 deaths, vast internal displacement and deep social scars. The announcement was hailed as a triumph by both sides. However, a number of hazards remain for successful implementation of peace. This includes achieving public consent, achieving adherence throughout the FARC’s ranks, President Santos’ dwindling political capital and former President Uribe’s outspoken opposition against the agreement.

Public approval. Although not bound to do so, President Juan Manuel Santos has promised that any peace agreement would be subject to ratification by the Colombian public. The mechanism for public approval remains under consideration by Colombia’s courts. The Government is pushing for a plebiscite requiring a straight yes or no vote, while the FARC is arguing for a constituent assembly, with deeper powers to examine the details of the peace agreement. Opinion polls suggest a plebiscite would pass. However, there is significant discord over Santos’ peace negotiations, particularly between the country’s wealthier city inhabitants, and the countryside, which remains much closer to the front lines of conflict. I have also observed a generational divide. Much of this division is driven by Santos’ popularity, which plummeted during the course of negotiations.

FARC adherence to demobilization. Should the peace agreement be approved and demobilization commence, concern remains over the adherence of the FARC’s rank and file soldiers. Key to their demobilization will be their acceptance back into society by the public, many who are victims of the conflict. Secondly, the threat of reprisals from paramilitary gangs who are hardened foes of the FARC must be quelled. This was a key condition of the FARC during negotiations, and will remain critical to the demobilization process. Thirdly, productive alternatives must be presented to narco-trafficking and other illicit activities that have been the lifeblood of the FARC and other groups for decades. Economic development and reducing inequality are the long-term centerpiece to stability in Colombia, particularly in the country’s most isolated reaches, where the presence of the State has historically been scarce. It was these themes that spurred the creation of Colombia’s leftist forces such as the FARC, and ironically, their resolution still remains essential.

Financial pressures, and Santos’ dwindling political capital. Demobilization requires capital, financially and politically. Colombia’s economy has suffered from the slide in oil prices over the past two years. Oil exports comprise a significant proportion of the Country’s export revenue. The IMF predicts a slide in GDP in 2016 to 2.5%, down from an annual high of 6.6% in 2011. To counter the fall in government revenue, the Santos administration has flagged a tax increase. Given Santos’ sliding popularity, a tax increase will erode his government’s already low political stock.

Uribe looking to block and spoil for political advantage. Looming opposite Santos’ peace agreement remains former president Álvaro Uribe. Santos was anointed by President Uribe as his protégé as he left office, however they are now bitter foes. Uribe maintains a sense of betrayal by Santos for initiating peace talks with the FARC, after Uribe’s presidency took a hard line military approach. Uribe has ascended to be the primary opposition figure to Santos’ peace negotiations with the FARC, and he remains an outspoken critic and defender of his presidential legacy. Uribe remains a formidable politician, and must be given some credit for Santos’ decline in popularity. He will fight hard in the event of a plebiscite. His ability to undermine Santos’ efforts shouldn’t be underestimated, nor should the societal division that a bitter plebiscite campaign could trigger.