#mutual recognition

Hngggg maybe uhhh Aventurine & Ratio (separately or both idrc) and others if you'd like with reader who's also a part of the Stonehearts? + their cornerstone has kind of the same effects as Aventurine's?

So like they're in a situation where they might've accidentally (purposefully) activated their cornerstone in front of the character o.O

You can choose what cornerstone reader has or it can be up to the reader's imagination idm :3

A Spark Meant to Be Contained

Tags: Aventurine x Reader, Ratio x Reader, Fluff, Subtle Angst, Power Discovery, Slow Burn, Rivalry to Respect, Banter, Mutual Recognition, Emotional Subtext, Duality Themes, Hidden Vulnerabilities, Found Family Elements.

Warnings: Mild Violence, Emotional Trauma, Manipulation Themes, Power Imbalance, Psychological Tension, Subtle Romantic Undertones, Identity Struggles.

The ruins of the Penaconian vault shimmer with fractured light, the aftermath of a collapsing simulation.

| call of duty masterlist | tf141 masterlist | main masterlist | navigation |

gary “roach” sanderson x male!reader

summary: you're late to a mission briefing. not by much—but enough to make ghost glance up. and across the room, you spot him: roach. dirt still on his gloves, balaclava pulled tight, not taking notes. just signing quietly to himself like the words live better in his hands. so you sign first. and it begins there.

setting: a cramped, sweltering mission briefing room deep in the heart of a tf141 base. folding chairs scrape against dusty concrete, the air thick with worn gear, old coffee, and recycled sweat. overhead lights flicker with that faint electric hum. half the squad’s nodding off or whispering. the projector’s too loud. maps are half-unreadable. it’s hot, close, heavy. warnings: lowercase prose, male!reader, soft-flirting, background ghost annoyance, subtle mutual interest, sign language as connection, roach doesn’t speak, beginnings of something

word count: 0.7k

note: this one means a lot to me. i really wanted to write a quiet kind of beginning—not loud or dramatic, just something warm that slips in under the noise. i think roach deserves soft moments like this, where someone sees him before they hear him. and maybe it’s nothing yet. maybe it’s just the start. but something about that unspoken spark between them—yeah. that’s the good stuff.

also: ghost definitely clocked all of it. he’s just choosing peace. for now.

my inbox is always open ♡♡

˚　　　　✦　　　.　　. 　 ˚　.　　　　　 . ✦　　　 　˚　　　　 . ★⋆.

you’re late.

not by much—just a few minutes past the start—but it’s enough to turn ghost’s head mid-sentence. he doesn’t stop the briefing, doesn’t call you out, but his gaze lingers for a moment too long. one eyebrow lifts under the brim of his cap, and you can practically hear the unspoken you’re lucky i like you behind his mask.

you nod in apology and slide into the nearest empty seat near the back, clutching a thin stack of mission papers against your chest. the room’s already packed, boots scuffing against concrete, pens scratching along the margins of printouts.

a few low murmurs ripple between squads. the air is thick with heat and the smell of worn gear and old coffee, like every other too-small room on base.

and that’s when you see him.

across from you, seated straight-backed at the edge of the long table, posture almost too still to be relaxed. his uniform’s still dusted with dirt and ash, a few darker stains dried into the seams of his vest. gloves on. helmet secure. face hidden behind a balaclava that only leaves his eyes visible—dark, sharp, and unnervingly alert.

you’ve seen him before, at a distance. roach. one of the task force’s ghosts, in a sense. not the masked lieutenant, but something just as quiet, just as deadly. the kind of soldier who doesn’t need words to leave an impression.

and he’s not taking notes.

you notice his hands first—gloved fingers twitching slightly beneath the table, forming quick shapes in a fluid, practiced rhythm. at first, you think it might be a nervous tic. but no—there’s intention behind it. structure. familiarity.

he’s signing. not to anyone. just quietly to himself, like a second layer of thought.

your chest pulls tight for a moment. it’s small, almost silly, but that flicker of recognition twists something inside you. most people wouldn’t notice. hell, most people don’t.

but you do.

you’re not sure when you started leaning forward. not far—just enough to make sure your movement wouldn’t be threatening. your voice stays quiet, low enough to not interrupt ghost’s rundown of the perimeter plan. you catch roach’s attention gently with a slight movement of your hand, then sign:

“you caught all that, or need a quick translation?”

for a second, he just stares at you. eyes unreadable behind the layer of tactical gear and shadow. like he’s not sure if you’re messing with him. then his head tilts slightly, and he signs back:

“you sign?”

you nod once, lips twitching upward. “my little brother’s deaf. been signing since i was nine. got good at it fast. had to—he’d drag me into every fight with my mum so i could translate his sass.”

his shoulders shift—the barest laugh, maybe. his eyes crease at the corners, and though his mouth is still hidden beneath the mask, you know he’s smiling.

then he signs something quick. too fast to catch every word, but you definitely recognize 'ghost' and 'pain in the ass' somewhere in the blur. your hand comes up instinctively to smother a laugh, but it still breaks through—loud enough that ghost falters mid-sentence and throws a brief glare in your direction.

you shake your head and wave him on. it’s nothing, your gesture says. keep going.

roach nudges your boot under the table a second later. not hard. just enough to get your attention again. when you glance back over, he’s already flipped open a small, spiral-bound notebook from one of his vest pouches. it’s old—edges soft and curling, half-filled with shorthand, map sketches, and notes written in cramped handwriting. he scribbles in the corner of a blank page, then turns it toward you.

“you’re the only one here who’s ever signed first.” “i like you already.”

you blink. caught off-guard. the words are simple, but something about them hits deeper than expected. you look up from the page, then back to him.

his gaze doesn’t waver.

you tap the notebook gently with your knuckle, then sign slowly—clearly this time, making sure he doesn’t miss it:

“good. ‘cause i’m not going anywhere.”

and he doesn’t just smile.

he beams.

eyes crinkling, breath catching ever so slightly behind the fabric of his mask. not a sound leaves him, but the room feels warmer anyway. like something quiet just cracked open between you both.

˚　　　　✦　　　.　　. 　 ˚　.　　　　　 . ✦　　　 　˚　　　　 . ★⋆.

The philosophy of intersubjectivity is one of the most important and complex developments in 20th-century thought. It addresses a fundamental problem: How can separate, subjective consciousnesses share a common, objective world? It moves philosophy beyond the isolated Cartesian cogito ("I think") to the foundational recognition: "We are."

Intersubjectivity is not merely "communication" or "empathy." It is the structural condition of possibility for any shared reality, objective knowledge, or genuine social life.

Core Definition

Intersubjectivity is the philosophical term for the shared, reciprocal, and constitutive relationship between conscious subjects. It is the process by which:

I recognize you as a subject like myself (not just an object in my world).

I understand that you also experience a world from your perspective.

We mutually constitute a shared world that is neither yours alone nor mine alone, but ours.

It is the bridge between the subjective (private, first-person experience) and the objective (public, third-person fact).

The Problem Intersubjectivity Solves

Without intersubjectivity, philosophy faces two insurmountable problems:

Solipsism: The inability to prove that other minds exist at all.

Relativism: The fragmentation of reality into incommensurable private worlds.

Intersubjectivity argues that the shared world is not a lucky coincidence of separate minds, but is actively, collaboratively built into the very structure of consciousness and social life.

Major Philosophical Frameworks of Intersubjectivity

1. Edmund Husserl: The Foundational Phenomenology

Husserl, the father of phenomenology, made intersubjectivity a central problem in his later work (notably the Cartesian Meditations).

The Problem: Phenomenology begins with the first-person perspective ("the transcendental ego"). How can it escape this starting point to account for the objectivity of the world and the existence of others?

The Solution: Analogical Apperception. I perceive your body (Körper) as behaving like mine. By a transfer of sense, I apprehend it as a living body (Leib) inhabited by another ego—an "alter ego." I do not infer your subjectivity; I appresent it directly in perception.

The Shared World: The objective world is not my private representation, but an "intersubjective transcendental constitution." The world is "there for everyone" because it is co-constituted by a community of monads.

2. Alfred Schutz: The Lifeworld of Everyday Life

Schutz applied Husserl's insights to sociology, founding phenomenological sociology.

The Reciprocity of Perspectives: In everyday life, I assume that if we exchanged places, we would see the same world. This is a practical, taken-for-granted fiction that makes social life possible.

The "We-Relationship": The face-to-face encounter (Umwelt) is the primordial sphere of intersubjectivity, where we experience each other as "growing old together" in a shared present.

Social Reality: The entire social world—institutions, roles, knowledge—is built upon these sedimented, intersubjective typifications.

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Intersubjectivity as Intercorporeality

Merleau-Ponty radicalized intersubjectivity by grounding it not in consciousness but in the body.

The Flesh of the World: My body and yours are not separate substances but different folds in the same flesh of the world. I understand your gesture not by analogy, but because I inhabit a similar body. Your smile is directly meaningful; I do not decode it.

Chiasm: The touching hand and the touched hand are reversible. This reversibility is the model for intersubjectivity: I am touched by your gaze even as I see you; we are intertwined.

Implication: Intersubjectivity is not a secondary achievement of isolated minds. It is co-primary with subjectivity itself. I am from the beginning a being-among-others.

4. Jürgen Habermas: Communicative Intersubjectivity

Habermas shifted intersubjectivity from consciousness to language and communication.

From Consciousness to Communication: The Cartesian "I think" is replaced by the We-speak of communicative action.

Universal Pragmatics: In any act of communication, speakers implicitly raise validity claims (truth, rightness, sincerity) that are addressed to an intersubjective community of hearers. Meaning is not in the speaker's head, but in the public, shared space of language.

Lifeworld and System: The intersubjectively shared lifeworld (background consensus, cultural knowledge) is the resource from which communicative action draws. Its colonization by impersonal systems (money, power) is the central pathology of modernity.

5. Emmanuel Levinas: The Ethical Primacy of the Other

Levinas offers a radical inversion: intersubjectivity is not symmetrical, and it is not primarily about knowledge or constitution. It is about ethics.

The Face of the Other: The Other (Autrui) is not an alter ego to be comprehended, but an absolute, transcendent alterity that commands me. "Thou shalt not kill."

Asymmetry: I am infinitely responsible for the Other before the Other is responsible for me. This responsibility is pre-original—it precedes my freedom, my choice, my being.

Critique of Husserl: Levinas accuses the entire phenomenological tradition of reducing the Other to a constituted phenomenon, thereby committing an act of epistemic violence. True intersubjectivity is not comprehension but proximity, substitution, and hostage.

6. Existential Intersubjectivity: Heidegger and Sartre

Heidegger: Dasein is fundamentally Being-with (Mitsein). The world is always already a with-world (Mitwelt). Others are not added to a pre-existing self; the self is constituted through its relations with others. (This is often inauthentic in the mode of das Man, but the structure is primordial.)

Sartre: Intersubjectivity is conflict. The Other's Look (le regard) objectifies me, steals my world, and reveals my vulnerability. "Hell is other people." Yet, this very struggle for recognition is constitutive of my self-consciousness.

Applications and Implications

Psychoanalysis (Intersubjective Turn): The mind is not a self-contained system but is formed and transformed within the intersubjective field of the analytic dyad (Stolorow, Atwood, Benjamin).

Social Theory: Social reality is not an aggregation of individual actions but is constituted and maintained through shared typifications, language, and mutual recognition.

Cognitive Science (Enactivism): Cognition is not a private computational process but is enacted through embodied interaction with others and the environment (Varela, Thompson, Di Paolo).

Political Philosophy: Recognition is not a psychological nicety but a fundamental human need and a condition for justice (Axel Honneth's theory of recognition).

AI and Posthumanism: Can non-biological agents participate in intersubjectivity? Or is it uniquely embodied and mortal?

Conclusion: The Primacy of the Between

The philosophy of intersubjectivity represents a paradigm shift from the philosophy of the solitary subject to the philosophy of the relation itself. It asserts that:

Subjectivity is not prior to intersubjectivity; they are co-emergent.

The world is not mine or yours, but ours.

Meaning, truth, and value are not private possessions but public, negotiated, shared accomplishments.

The self is not a substance but a node in a network of recognition.

Sarah Bakewell tells a story about Levinas and his discovery of mutual recognition:

In his best-known work, Totality and Infinity, published in 1961, [Levinas] made the relationship of Self with Other the foundation of his entire philosophy – as central a concept for him as Being was for Heidegger. He once said that this shift in thinking had its origin in an experience he had in the camp. Like the other prisoners, he had got used to the guards treating them without respect as they worked, as if they were inhuman objects unworthy of fellow feeling. But each evening, as they were marched back behind the barbed-wire fence again, his work group would be greeted by a stray dog who had somehow found its way inside the camp. The dog would bark and fling itself around with delight at seeing them, as dogs do. Through the dog’s adoring eyes, the men were reminded each day of what it meant to be acknowledged by another being – to receive the basic recognition that one living creature grants to another.

Application of the principle of mutual recognition on authorisations of plant protection products

In the following answer to a Member of the EU Parliament, the EU Commission did a useful recap of the applicable regime in the sector, quoting an ever useful guidance from 2014 about zonal evaluation and mutual recognition under of plant protection products under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009.

Question for written answer to the Commission -12th February 2020

Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 recognises…