The last two installments in this series of blog posts on Taurellus and Timpler discussed the relation of 'nothing' (nihil) and prime matter (prima materia) in the creation of the world - still pursuing the problem how to interpret 'the ultimate why question', namely why there is something rather than nothing in the context of early modern thought. While researching on Kircher's view of the relation of 'nothing' and 'matter', it became clear that Eilhard Lubinus is an important figure in this debate, too, not least, because his views allow to put Kircher's version into context.

The discussion here will be limited to the Disputatio hypermetaphysica, de materia prima, sive de prima causa et origine, defended by Heinrich Biesenthal in 1599 at the University of Rostock. We may surmise that the text itself was written by the praeses, Eilhard Lubin. Again, the only aim is to find out about the meaning given to the complementary terms 'something' (aliquid) and 'nothing' (nothing).

The dissertation discusses both terms in the context of the overall project to to defend prisca philosopha, the wisdom of the ancients, against its misinterpretations in Zoroastrinaism and Manicheism.1 Lubinus agrees with Taurellus and Timpler that 'nothing' in the context of creation ex nihilo must be identified with prime matter. But at least implicitly he is committed to the more radical thesis that this prime matter is itself uncreated. Only what is good has been created by God.2 Prime matter, however, is the source of evil rather than goodness (so it cannot be the result of God's creation):

Agemus igitur de Materia Prima, ut Platonici loquuntur, hoc est, de Non Ente, ex quo Deus summum Ens tanquam e materia prima omnia creavit, et quae postea in creatis est prima origo, ut cum Plotino loquar, et prima quasi caussa efficiens omnium malorum.3

Prime matter or nihil in the absolute sense consists in the complete absence of being, goodness and forms (deformitas omnium deformitatum).4 So because, strictly speaking, 'nothing' does not exist, it cannot be cognised directly: We must oppose it to Being in order to find out more about it.5

The dominant contrast concerns God and non ens, imum malum, imum non ens (evilness and nothingness to the highest degree). This highest degree of 'nothingness' cannot be grasped adequately in human language.6

Nothingness in this sense does not refer to a quality.7 And it is no substance, either: If prime matter was opposed to the Good as a substance, it would be a substance itself. But prime matter has no being (because it is a non ens), so it is no thing and no quality of a thing.8

This leaves us with the impression that, for Lubinus, there is only 'nothing' and 'something'. But this is only half of the story, because he distinguishes two kinds of 'nothingness': 'absolute' or 'negative' nothingness and 'privative' nothingness. Privative nihil applies to those things that can still function as a bearer of properties (subiectum) but lack some essential characteristics. Negative nihil refers to the lack of existence as such.9

Correspondingly, there are two ways of being, infinite being (God) and finite being, created things which were nothing before creation, have a beginning in time, and are caused by God:

Hoc Ens vel bonum duplex; Unum infinitum, aeternum, creator, et caussa efficiens omnium rerum, quod proprio idiomate Summum Bonum Deum vocamus. Alterum finitum, quod antequam esset nihil fuit, in tempore incipiens, effectus illius summi Boni, quod suo Idiomate creaturam appellamus.10

What has been created is only improperly ens. It has not existed eternally and, since it has been created ex nihilo (i. e. from prime matter) it retains some 'seeds of nothingness'. Created entia thus rely on Divine intervention for their continuing existence:

Improprie vero et δευτέρως ipsi creaturae tanquam finito Enti et bono in tempore, quod eo nomine finitum est quatenus ab aeterno no fuit, sed olim ex nihilo creatum fuit, cujus semina in se retinet, in quod etiam resolvitur sua natura, nisi Dei tanquam summi Entis, [...] virtute et omnipotentia fulciatur.11

So finite beings are 'nothing' in a sense (improprie), too, because they are bound to perish, unless they are conserved by God.12 Both sorts of nihil, namely negative nihil and privative nihil can be contrasted with finite beings. Negative nihil then corresponds with the total absence of esse, while privative nihil consists in the fact that some being does not have all properties it should have. Prime matter - the absolute nihil - is vastly inferior even to finite beings that exist in a state of privation:

Imo haec materia prima ipsis rebus, quae bona quadam re privantur, longe deterius quid. Cum privatio dicatur certi cujusdam subjecti ratione, quod reliquum est, et quatenus reliquum est, qualecunque id tandem sit, est aliquid adhuc, et a Deo adhuc tanquam bonum sustentatur, licet a sua perfectione et bono finito desciverit, et ad nihil negativ paullatim accedat.13

So even those finite beings which are no exemplary instantiation of their species are still superior to absolute nihil.

In sum, Lubenius' ontological model is built on four categories for ordering the world: infinite being (God), finite being that participates in nothingness, but is a perfect instantiation of its genus, being that participates in nothingness, but does not have all traits essential to being a perfect instantiation of its genus, and absolute nothing/prime matter.

Insofar as things are 'from God', they are good. Insofar as they have defects, they are 'attracted' to 'nothingness':

Quatenus res sunt, a Deo sunt, et sunt bonae, quatenus autem corrumpuntur, et ad defectum vel nihilum vergunt, ex Nihilo contrahunt, unde creatae sunt, quod tunc fit, cum Summum Ens, cujus beneficio aliquid erant, et subsistebant, omnipotentem suam manum illis subtrahit, illasque ad materiam primam relabi patitur.14

It is God's will that in finite beings 'seeds of nothingness' (semina quasi et vestigia ipsius Nihili) remain. These seeds are responsible for the tendency of finite beings to vanish into nothing, unless they are conserved, again by Divine fiat:

Nimirum, quia Summum illud Ens (ut moneamur omnia olim ex Nihilo fuisse condita) in illis omnibus quae ex Nihilo creavit, semina quasi et vestigia ipsius Nihili reliquit, hoc est, inclinationem quandam, qua sua natura in Nihilum vergunt, et ultro feruntur, nisi quatenus Summi Entis virtute fulciuntur.15

For Lubinus, absolute 'nothingness', i. e. prime matter, remains 'active' in finite beings, so they have an inherent tendency to be annihilated that must be balanced by conservation in God. So for Lubinus, how to understand 'nothing' in contrast to 'something' depends on how both terms are interpreted. If 'nothing' is understood as 'absolute nothing', both finite beings and God may be regarded as 'something'. If compared to God, finite beings are 'nothing', and only God is 'something', because they are not self-subsistent and contain 'seeds of nothingness'.

Cf Th. 1. I quote the numbered theses, since the dissertation is unpaginated. ↩︎

Cf. Th. 3: "Demonstrabimus autem Deum omnia bona ex nihilo creasse, [...]" ↩︎

Th. 4. ↩︎

Cf. Th. 12: "Est ergo hoc Nihil absentia Entis, hoc Malum absentia Boni, haec materia absentia Ideae vel Formae, per quam Ideam Plato Deum intellegit. Vel, ut Plotinus ait, est deformitas omnium deformitatum, imus defectus, extrema omnium rerum indigentia." ↩︎

Cf. Th. 5: "Quia vero hujus Materiae primae tanquam, non Entis nullae sunt qualitates, utpote, quae per se, ut Plotinus ait, nec cognosci, nec cogitari potest: Contemplabimur illud ex collatione cum suo contrario Ente vel Bono." ↩︎

Cf. Th. 10: "Liceat autem nobis his vocabulis ac verbis humanis uti, cum divina desint, minus forte proprijs; quorum potissimum penuria in hac materia laboramus." ↩︎

Cf. Th. 14: "Cum enim huic Malo Bonum opponimus, [...] non intelligimus qualitatem quandam: [...]" ↩︎

Cf. Th. 15: "Sic cum Materiam Malum dicimus, non illud Bono opponimus tanquam Substantiam: Sic enim bonum esset. Hoc autem absurdissimum, Cum Substantia qua Substantia, hoc est qua bonum quid est, Substantiae id est bono non opponatur; et Materia prima formam etjam, vel Esse non habeat." ↩︎

Cf. Th. 24f: "Opponitur autem hoc nihil ipsis creatis dupliciter, vel tanquam privans, vel tanquam negans, ut Scholastici loquuntur. Negans appello, cum ne subjectum quidem amplius reliquum est; Privans autem, cum subjectum adhuc superest, quod aliqua re bona privat, quae suae naturae conveniebat." ↩︎

Th. 6f. ↩︎

Th. 9. ↩︎

Cf. Th. 19f: "Huic Enti creato, et finito, ratione infiniti boni, (cui proprie illud non Ens opponi diximus) improprie hoc Nihil opponi dicemus. Idque eo, quod Summum Ens ex noc Nihilo non sit; utpote cui ab aeterno opponitur: Res autem creatae ex noch Nihilo creatae sunt. Deinde hoc nihil a Summo Ente, ab aeterno infinito intervallo disjunctum est; cum ejus reliquiae in finitis bonis in tempore creatis, reliquae adhuc considerentur; quibus nisi Dei virtute fulciantur, rursus perire possunt." ↩︎

Th. 27. ↩︎

Th. 31. ↩︎