Is the National Security Agency Constitutional?
The Internet’s multiverse world exponentially grows and expands since the modern marvel’s invention in the 20th century. Although the Internet’s space isn’t tangible, governments around the would have created organizations, agencies, and programs to moderate the vastness of the Internet’s wide space. The National Security Agency, for example, is an intelligence agency funded by the American government that surveils all electronic activity in the United States—as well as the rest of the world. The NSA’s main mission is to have the “upper hand” with intelligence procured on the internet and other communication devices in order to protect American citizens from potential danger or harm. The NSA obtains information on the internet and its communication counterparts by working with a multitude of methods in order to gain a decision advantage for America and its allies. Although the NSA’s purpose is in good intention, the constitutionality of the NSA’s actions upon its citizens for the sake of national security is compromised. The NSA’s methods of data collection is a breach of American privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, proving the NSA compromises a citizen’s privacy in regards to ensuring national security. In this research paper, the NSA’s privacy breaches will be discussed when considering American legislation, jurisprudence, as well as the “leaked” methods of data collection.
      The topic of American privacy compromised by the NSA has entered the public discussion of the NSA’s surveillance programs in 2013 when former NSA contractor Edward Snowden systematically downloaded thousands of NSA classified documents and uploaded them on websites such as WikiLeaks (Grimmelmann 261). Snowden’s leaked discoveries revealed the NSA’s actions that continuously breach American privacy. Additionally, Snowden’s leaks revealed NSA’s actions throughout the years of its existence, such as the NSA’s involvement with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the age-old Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The NSA’s actions mandated by American legislation impedes over the right of privacy to American citizens in order to provide a better sense of security.
      First, it is necessary to explain how the NSA acquires surveillance information. The agency surveils all sources of electronic communication with Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) (Lin). Signals intelligence refers to information contained in electronic signals used by foreign targets of interest (Lin). The NSA uses SIGINT in bulk metadata and bulk data collection. Although these actions are protected by laws mandated by the federal government, they do not necessarily parallel the “end goal” of the NSA, to prevent danger from foreign powers (Lin). Rather, the mandate of collecting bulk data and metadata intelligence impedes over an American citizen’s right to privacy and unlawful searches guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Lin). Therefore, the NSA disregards all U.S. citizen’s privacy in order to promote security. Â
      The National Security Agency originated its surveillance on foreign powers in order to promote American prowess and safety on the world stage. In 1978, the Cold War was at the peak on the tension between the United States and the USSR. In order to get an upper hand from the Soviets and their allies, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sought to power the NSA and other governmental branches to take advantage of new technologies and to engage in necessary foreign intelligence gathering, while preventing the foreign intelligence communities from engaging in sweeping surveillance of U.S. citizens (Donohue 141). Congress, concerned with the well-being and privacy of the American citizens, enacted multiple restrictions requiring surveillance targets only to be a foreign power with probable cause support a claim to survey, and heightened protection of U.S. citizens’ information (Donohue 141). Although FISA expanded gradually with physical searches, pen registers, and trace devices, the new authorities retained much of the structure that defined the statute (Donohue 141). The further legislation expanded the power of the NSA, permitting the NSA’s bulk collection of data and metadata through signal intelligence technology. Bulk data and metadata contradict the general approach Congress adopted in enacting FISA (Donohue 141). Therefore, the NSA’s actions are unlawful when considering a U.S. citizen right to privacy for the sake of national security.
      The mandate for further intelligence searches by the NSA based on bulk metadata was furthered in the 21st century. After the devastating terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001, Congress passed the Patriot Act with a controversial letter of this law known as “Section 215” (Beaudette 28). Section 215 expanded the ability of the government to collect business records for the purpose of investigating suspected terrorist activity (Beaudette 28). Although Section 215 was enacted with “foreign intelligence collection” in mind, it allowed the NSA to identify national security threats within the United States through citizen bulk metadata. (Beaudette pg. 28). Edward Snowden’s NSA leak provided Section 215’s legislation apparent in American society. On May 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approved an FBI application for an order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. section 1861, a section of Section 215, which required Verizon to turn over all telephony metadata to the National Security Agency, and concluded with all major U.S. telecommunication providers handing over their telephone metadata as well (Donohue 759). Over the next seven years, the FISC issued orders renewing the bulk collection program thirty-four times (Donohue 759). Almost all of the data collected related to the activities of law-abiding citizens unrelated to subjects of any investigation (Donohue 760). Edward Snowden’s leak of this information was followed up by official documents from the government stating metadata collection is necessary for counterterrorism efforts and foreign intelligence, and does so in a legal and constitutional way (Donohue pg. 760). The telephony metadata collection process includes all communications routing information, except for the substantive content of communications, nor does it include the name, addresses, or financial information (Donohue 761). Although Snowden’s leaks did not reveal all of the classified information, the program’s main goal was revealed to the public. The NSA’s purpose and main goal is obtaining foreign intelligence and protecting against international terrorist threats both in the United States and overseas (Donohue 763). However important the purpose, the NSA’s bulk collection of telephony metadata embodies precisely what Congress sought to avoid by enacting the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the first place (Donohue 763). The program violates the spirit and letter of the law and gives rise to troubling rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Donohue 763). Therefore, the collection of bulk metadata mandated by the NSA impedes over a U.S. citizen’s right to privacy in regards to national security. Â
      Although SIGINT spies on data from “targets” of interest, most of the data the NSA collects is not by specific targets, but in bulk collection. Bulk collection is defined in presidential policy directive (PPD-28) as “the authorized collections of large quantities of signals intelligence data, which, due to operational considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants” (Lin). Although bulk intelligence makes the NSA’s objectives easier, the issue lies in the fact that “discriminant” is not precisely defined, leaving the NSA to interpret discriminants as whoever the agency desires (Lin). For example, all signals intelligence associated with “Pennsylvania” would be regarded as “targeted” because “Pennsylvania” was used to separate Pennsylvania traffic from other internet traffic (Lin). Therefore, all signals intelligence associated with Pennsylvania would be monitored (Lin). Bulk intelligence is an issue for the NSA because it is allowed to spy on any communications via the internet with authority mandated by law. Any search term regarding any location, foreign or in the country, can reveal anyone’s particular communications. The NSA’s actions of bulk collection of signals intelligence impede over any Americans right to privacy and is utilized for the NSA’s “easier” execution of providing security.
      Issues arise with bulk collection of signals intelligence and deal with the commonsense meaning of the term “bulk” collection and whether or not the process is “easier” in comparison to surveying an individual target’s data. According to a National Resource Council (NRC) study on PPD-28 argued that “if a significant portion of the data collected is not associated with NSA targets of interest, it is bulk collection, otherwise it is targeted (Lin). The study continued to conclude that no precise definition could define bulk collection and can be argued of what “significant” data should mean, whether that be 10%, 90%, or a number in between of the overall data collected (Lin). The term “collection” has two modern day definitions utilized by the NSA and raises the issue of the agency’s legitimacy of collecting data. Under one definition, collections occur when the electronic signal of communication is first captured (Lin). Conversely, the collection is deemed important in an environment in which different communications streams are interleaved on the same physical channel and occurs only when the signal has been processed to determine whether it is relevant to the purpose of collection (Lin). Under both definitions, however, all signals from bulk collection is received, interpreted, and acted upon based on the interpretation by the NSA. However, definition two encompasses more complexities into three steps: extraction of data into discrete data items from a communications channel, filtering the extracted data for items of interest, and storage of these items in a database controlled by the U.S. government (Lin). Although the NSA does not consistently survey bulk intelligence on a grand scheme, their ability to do so is a daunting reality, and is a breach of anyone’s privacy.
      Although the NSA’s goal is to prevent dangerous incidents from arising, the efficacy of preventing terrorism through counterintelligence generated from bulk surveillance can be discussed. Opponents to bulk data have argued that bulk collection of phone metadata authorized under Section 215 has been of minimal value. There has not been a single terrorist plot that was prevented due to the bulk information derived from the program (Lin). In other words, the Section 215 program has been proven unnecessary for thwarting any terrorist plot. However, the controversy arises at this instance, whether bulk surveillance is helpful to the NSA’s efforts in protecting its American people. According to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), “any particular technique or legal authority can be identified as the key component without which a terrorist plot would have succeeded. Intelligence-gathering tools can provide value in more indirect ways, by helping to advance investigations and focus efforts in ways that are sometimes difficult to measure” (Lin). However, the PCLOB has concluded that the Section 215 program has made no evidence to prove its alleged value to NSA counterintelligence (Lin). Other organizations such as the PCLOB argue that bulk surveillance results in information overload that makes it difficult for analysts to find the important information they need (Lin). These analysts argue that it is like finding a needle in a haystack in order to find necessary information from bulk surveillance (Lin). Consequently, the time needed to search for said needle can overwhelm analysts and is a great burden to overcome when finding the necessary information for counterintelligence. The NSA’s tool of bulk intelligence from SIGINT cannot be regarded as justified because it provides some value in protecting the nation from terrorism, and breaches an overwhelmingly wide amount of privacy with little to none security benefits. Therefore, the NSA’s actions breech privacy in order to provide security for the American people.
      The National Security Agency’s collection of bulk data and metadata is considered unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, proving the NSA’s breach of privacy in order to ensure security. According to this Amendment, citizens are guaranteed “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” as well as “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Barnett pg. 4). As stated earlier, under Section 215, all telecommunication companies are required to submit all call detail records. This action mandated by the FISC can be generalized as a blanket seizure subject the private information of American citizens to the risk of searches and exposure, without their knowledge (Barnett 6). The seizure of one’s personal effects, including their telephone metadata, is utilized for evidence of criminality such as terrorism. Additionally, putting such information permanently in the hands of the government for future use is an abuse of power and is an invitation to restrict the liberties of American citizens whenever such restrictions become politically popular (Barnett 6). This trend has already been in practice since the Patriot Act’s passing in Congress in times of a national threat from terrorism.
      The constitutionality of data collected by the NSA can be justified by past Supreme Court cases. In 1967, the case of Katz v. United States concerned the power of law enforcement and a citizen’s right to privacy (Barnett 7). Katz was taken to the stand and testified against the government’s “bugging” of a phone conversation via a telephone booth (Barnett 7). He pleaded his innocence based on the Fourth Amendment’s protection of communications with a “reasonable expectation of privacy” (Barnett 7). In other words, people reasonably expect their conversations in a phone booth to be private, and their conversations cannot be wire-tapped by law enforcement without first obtaining a search warrant (Barnett 7). The Supreme Court ruled that Katz was entitled to his private conversations under the Fourth Amendment, stating that a warrant must be attained with probable cause of a crime (Barnett 7).
      Another case, Smith v. Maryland, can be argued for the NSA’s unlawful actions of search and seizure of citizen’s personal effects. In this case, Smith applied the “third-party doctrine,” which constitutes that individual phone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the records of their phone calls since the phone company itself has access to all the information (Barnett 8). Law enforcement agencies right to install a “pen register” on telephone accounts, which records and reports numbers called and duration of calls, but not the voice conversations without a warrant (Barnett 8). In this case, the police did not obtain a warrant to install the pen register, but they had the suspicion that Smith, the accused, engaged in illegal activity (Barnett 9). Therefore, the police were able to convict him for his crime without breaching the Fourth Amendment’s citizen’s right to the unlawful seizure of personal effects.
      Governmental institutions utilize judicial review to enact methods and procedures ensured as constitutional and legal. Specifically, the NSA uses both of Katz v. United States and Smith v. Maryland as evidence that upholds the constitutionality of data seizure (Barnett pg. 8). Under Smith and Katz, the FISC court reasoned that data collected is the very information in which Smith sustains, while consumers have no reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz (Barnett 8). Although logical on the surface, the FISC court’s interpretation of Smith has been misapplied. (Barnett 10). In Smith vs. Maryland, the pen register only spied on “third-party” business records, which was placed by the phone company on a particular person with reasonable suspicion of a crime committed. The Fourth Amendment was set in law to differentiate between a general warrant and a reasonable particularized search or seizure and is upheld in Smith on the basis that he committed a crime based on the preponderance of evidence (Barnett 12).  However, this is where discrepancy of the law lies. Although the NSA has a right to access telephony metadata records, The NSA data seizure is warranted with the premonition of all citizens being considered as criminals, without any suspicion that any citizen has done anything wrong (Barnett 9). Additionally, under Katz, the statement “reasonable expectation of privacy” draws private borders between anything privately owned, including, under the Fourth Amendment, “persons, houses, papers, and effects” (Barnett 13). Consequently, a U.S. citizen’s ownership of themselves and their things is a protected right from state power (Barnett 13). Under the Fourth Amendment, the NSA’s collection of bulk data and metadata is a modern-day equivalent of the general warrant that compromises the legality of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of particularity in a lawful seizure of property from a law abiding citizen (Barnett 13). Therefore, the NSA’s actions are unconstitutional and is a breach of American privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. The NSA’s actions breach American privacy to ensure security for its American people.
      The NSA and its supporters claim that data breaches of law abiding citizens is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when considering national security. However, this rationale cannot justify the NSA’s seizure of American data and metadata for domestic law enforcement purposes (Barnett 17). Two legal models of constitutional powers can be applied when considering the NSA’s constitutionality. The domestic model empowers the government to protect the rights of citizens from being violated by other members of the community. The wartime model is designed to protect the rights of American citizens from being violated by foreign enemy powers (Barnett 17). Under the domestic model, the issue of national security cannot be argued when considering data seizures from the NSA (Barnett 17). The NSA’s collection of data for domestic law enforcement purposes assumes that the government polices its citizens in order to protect others who are also members of the American community (Barnett 18). If a citizen is accused of violating the rights of others, they deserve to be considered innocent until proven guilty before subject to punishment (Barnett 18). Consequently, it is important to protect civil liberties of people from those in law enforcement who could abuse their power to protect public safety (Barnett 18). Under the war model, the government utilizes its military to protect the rights of citizens from foreign powers, powers not protected under the Fourth Amendment (Barnett pg. 18). If foreign power has a presence within the United States, the enemy is hidden among the population, the means of war are turned against citizens themselves to identify an enemy within (Barnett 18). Therefore, civil liberties of all American citizens are compromised by NSA data breaches. Â
      The Internet and modern communication devices such as telephones reinvented communication for the modern world today. Governments that plan to protect the rights of citizens from foreign powers have an upper hand when a mass communication device is monitored. The NSA is a perfect example of government-mandated power that monitors for threats against national security and has a justifiable reason for doing so. FISA, for example, permitted US surveillance on enemy foreign powers and targets in order to protect American citizens, with the right to a citizen’s privacy in mind. However, further legislation for greater surveillance for national security threats, such as the establishment of the FISC and the Patriot Act disregarded American citizens right to privacy constituted by the Fourth Amendment. These acts approved of NSA data collection, particularly bulk data and metadata collection, which, without a particularized probable cause, breaches the data of any, if not, all, American citizens. The constitutionality of these mandates can be considered through interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as well as past Supreme Court cases such as Katz v. United States and Smith v. Maryland. In all of these scenarios, data collection by the NSA is seized from the third party and an individual’s sole electronic communication without any regard to a citizen’s protected right to an unlawful search of personal belongings. These claims can be tested on both domestic and war models of constitutional powers given to the American government. Therefore, the NSA’s goal of maintaining security for its American people is a direct and blatant breach of a constitutional right to privacy for “the greater good” of national security. Not only does the NSA breach privacy, it relies on the data seized for its purpose, which alone, is hypocritical to America’s determination to serve the people. Instead, the NSA portrays America as the antithesis of a constitutional republic, a government controlled police state that has massive amounts of data for every citizen stored in a governmental facility. The actions of the NSA is unconstitutional because of its compromise to an individual’s privacy and should be taken to Congress to revise its original purpose of protecting Americans from foreign infringements.
WORKS CITED (MLA)
Barnett, Randy. "Why The Nsa Data Seizures Are Unconstitutional." Harvard Journal Of Law & Public Policy 38.1 (2015): 3-20. Business Source Elite. Web. 20 Nov. 2016. Â Â Â
Beaudette Jr., Major Peter. "Compliance Without Credit: The National Security Agency And The  International Right To Privacy." Air Force Law Review 73.(2015): 25-59. Academic Search Complete. Web. 20 Nov. 2016.
Donohue, Laura K. "Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory And Constitutional  Considerations." Harvard Journal Of Law & Public Policy 37.3 (2014): 757-900. Political Science Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
Grimmelmann, James. Internet Law: Cases and Problems. Lake Oswego, OR: Semaphore, 2016. Print.
Lin, Herbert. "Having A Conversation About Bulk Surveillance." Communications Of The ACM 59.2 (2016): 40-42. Business Source Elite. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.


















