#consensual validation

Intersubjectivity, in the traditional sense, is defined as a state of overlapping individual understandings. One significance of this concept is that it serves as a means by which phenomenology becomes sufficient in the process of cognizing. Intersubjectivity accounts for objectivism of cognition, given that “no cognition could with reason be called objective unless it be a cognition effectively the same for all possible objects. A subject can only be a subject in a community of subjects, wherein a subject recognizes a personality of a higher order, its correspondent as Husserl calls it, Kulturwelt. It is in this where intersubjective verification of subjective insights ought to take place. Husserl claims that in this process, the intersubjective a priori ought to expand, and not to contradict, the subjective a priori. It can be said that intersubjectivity taken in this light places emphasis on finding a common denominator among all subjectivities. There is a tendency to disregard disagreements, viewing them as merely hindrances that need to be resolved in order to arrive at a final agreement. However, it is argued that disagreements constitute intersubjectivity, in such a way that it is in the process that intersubjectivity takes place. Intesubjectivity in the traditional sense is what is found. The proposed notion is that it is the process itself which is intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is not finding objective cognition. It is creating one. It is in the state of discord that intersubjectivity is achieved. It is the clashing, not the consensus. This leads one to ask what this would imply about Objective cognition/knowledge. The notion of “objective” as something eternal and unchanging is transformed into something that changes as the experiences of subjectivities progress. Experience is never stagnant. It follows that what is common among all experiences would continually be altered. Intersubjectivity, as seen this way, serves as a criticism of the first notion, yet it also defeats the long-held view about the Objective.   The following can be argued, then: that (1) Intersubjectivity does not support Objectivity as it is normally held, and (2) Intersubjectivity supports a kind of Objectivity that is subjective.

By JD Item, Mia Lua and Christopher Porras

Philosophical Discussion