#bombercommand

Operation Chastise

Operation Chastise, the 'Dambusters' raid, was an attack by a squadron of RAF Lancaster bombers on the dams of the Ruhr basin in Germany in May 1943. Led by Squadron Leader Guy Gibson, the bombers breached two dams causing enormous flooding in the valleys below, disrupting industrial targets and killing at least 1,300 civilians.

Although the damaged factories, coal mines, and bridges were soon repaired, the mission showed the value of precision bombing by specially trained crews, diverted German resources to air defence, and reinvigorated Britain's position amongst its allies.

Objectives

The Ruhr basin in Western Germany was saturated with important heavy industry. These factories, many vital to the steel and armaments industry, were dependent on the water and hydroelectric power supplied by a series of massive dams. If Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers could breach the dams, the consequent floods would put the factories out of action. In a single mission, the same destructive result could be achieved that otherwise would have taken 3,000 bombers two weeks of bombing the factories directly. So vital was this area to the German war effort that RAF planners had considered it as a prime target before the war broke out in 1939. Operation Chastise was about to make these tentative plans a reality. Secondary aims of the operation were to deal a blow to German civilian morale and show both the British public and Britain's allies Russia and the United States that something was being done to take the war to Germany.

Five dams were targeted, but three were a priority: Möhne, Eder, and Sorpe. A second group, depending on the success against the first group, were Lister, Ennepe, and Diemel. The RAF knew that Möhne had air defences, and it was likely the others had, too. Möhne and Eder were concrete and, designed to withstand the massive pressure of water, immensely strong structures but relatively slim targets when seen from the air. Möhne, the primary target since a breach would directly flood the factories below (not the case with Eder), was the longest dam in Europe at 120 ft high (36.6 m), 25 ft thick (7.6 m) at the top, and 112 ft (34.1 m) thick at the base. The Möhne reservoir contained 140 million tons of water (Eder had 200 million). These dams were protected by two rows of anti-torpedo nets. Eder, much further to the east, was the second choice because it was concrete, although there were no military targets in the valley below. Sorpe was strategically more important than Eder, but because it was made of largely compacted earth, the effect of bombing was anticipated to be less. The destruction of these dams and others would require a completely new kind of bomb.

Avro Lincoln RF385 DX-G of 57 Squadron Royal Air Force

The Bombing of Berlin

The bombing of Berlin, aka the Berlin Air Offensive or Battle of Berlin (Air), was a sustained bombing campaign on the German capital by the British Royal Air Force and United States Air Force from November 1943 until March 1944. The objective, which failed, was to bomb Germany into surrender and win WWII without the necessity of land operations.

Area Bombing

The commander-in-chief of the RAF Bomber Command, Arthur Harris (1892-1984), had received backing at the highest level for the night-time area bombing (aka carpet bombing) of German industrial targets and industrial cities. The Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) had already conducted a Combined Bomber Offensive and made repeated attacks on the Ruhr industrial area of Germany (Battle of the Ruhr, March-July 1943) and on Hamburg with the utterly devastating Operation Gomorrah (July-August 1943). Typically, the RAF bombed by night and the USAAF by day in these combined operations. As Winston Churchill (l. 1874-1965), the British prime minister put it:

We shall bomb Germany by day as well as by night in ever-increasing measure, casting upon them month by month a heavier discharge of bombs, and making the German people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the miseries they have showered upon mankind.

(Liddell Hart, 189)

By the summer of 1943, the Allied leaders began to shift their focus to a future invasion of Continental Europe. The Allies issued the Pointblank Directive in June 1943, which stated that bombing raids in Europe should prioritise Germany's capacity to produce fighter planes, which could be used against ground troops in the D-Day Normandy landings (Operation Overlord) planned for the following summer. Air supremacy had to be achieved before Overlord could get underway. However, Harris remained sceptical of the possibility of hitting small but strategically important targets like weapons factories. This was in some way born out by the USAAF's Schweinfurt-Regensburg raids. The first Schweinfurt raid in August 1943 had not been very successful in damaging the crucial ball-bearing factories, and many aircraft had been lost in the process. (The USAAF returned to Schweinfurt and was more successful in October). Berlin did have key armaments factories, and these could be knocked out with a wider and more indiscriminate bomb-dropping strategy, Harris thought. Berlin was also an obvious transport hub and, of course, a prestige target, too. Harris believed that the heavy bombing of Berlin could ultimately lead to Germany's surrender and so the Allies might even avoid the necessity of dangerous and time-consuming land operations.

There were some flaws in the plan. Berlin was a much bigger city than those bombed previously and so would take many more raids to damage. Harris knew this, and so he called for a force of 6,000 bombers, but this was never possible; the RAF and USAAF combined only had some 3,000 bomber planes at any one time. Berlin was also well-defended with over 100 anti-aircraft batteries. The historian M. Hastings describes Berlin as "the largest and most heavily defended industrial urban area in Europe" (285). As the historian R. Neillands put it, Berlin "was always a difficult target. It lay a long way into Germany, close to the eastern frontier, and was a very big and very flat city, with few physical features…" (217).

Another problem was that in 1943, Allied fighter planes still did not have sufficient fuel range to escort bombers to targets deep in Germany. Finally, the other bombing campaigns, which included the thousand-bomber raid on Cologne in 1942, had not shattered civilian morale despite causing enormous casualties and damage. This had also been true of the German bombing of British cities and the London Blitz earlier in the war. Even if German civilian morale could be broken, in a totalitarian state built on violence, there was probably not much civilians could do to influence policy change anyway. Despite these pitfalls, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave Harris the green light, and the bombers were sent to Berlin. Crucially, the USAAF, preferring to pursue its own targets like Germany's oil supplies, would not join the raids until near the end of the campaign. The RAF bomber crews would be on their own in their effort to bomb into submission the city they called "Big B".

The Bombing of Dresden in 1945

The bomber raid on Dresden was a controversial and highly destructive combined operation by Royal Air Force Lancaster bombers and United States Air Force B-17 Flying Fortress bombers on 13, 14, and 15 February and 2 March 1945. The raid was part of Operation Thunderclap, which aimed to strike Berlin and other cities in eastern Germany, causing logistical chaos to support the Russian advance on the Eastern Front.

Operation Chastise

Operation Chastise, the 'Dambusters' raid, was an attack by a squadron of RAF Lancaster bombers on the dams of the Ruhr basin in Germany in May 1943. Led by Squadron Leader Guy Gibson, the bombers breached two dams causing enormous flooding in the valleys below, disrupting industrial targets and killing at least 1,300 civilians.

Although the damaged factories, coal mines, and bridges were soon repaired, the mission showed the value of precision bombing by specially trained crews, diverted German resources to air defence, and reinvigorated Britain's position amongst its allies.

Objectives

The Ruhr basin in Western Germany was saturated with important heavy industry. These factories, many vital to the steel and armaments industry, were dependent on the water and hydroelectric power supplied by a series of massive dams. If Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers could breach the dams, the consequent floods would put the factories out of action. In a single mission, the same destructive result could be achieved that otherwise would have taken 3,000 bombers two weeks of bombing the factories directly. So vital was this area to the German war effort that RAF planners had considered it as a prime target before the war broke out in 1939. Operation Chastise was about to make these tentative plans a reality. Secondary aims of the operation were to deal a blow to German civilian morale and show both the British public and Britain's allies Russia and the United States that something was being done to take the war to Germany.

Five dams were targeted, but three were a priority: Möhne, Eder, and Sorpe. A second group, depending on the success against the first group, were Lister, Ennepe, and Diemel. The RAF knew that Möhne had air defences, and it was likely the others had, too. Möhne and Eder were concrete and, designed to withstand the massive pressure of water, immensely strong structures but relatively slim targets when seen from the air. Möhne, the primary target since a breach would directly flood the factories below (not the case with Eder), was the longest dam in Europe at 120 ft high (36.6 m), 25 ft thick (7.6 m) at the top, and 112 ft (34.1 m) thick at the base. The Möhne reservoir contained 140 million tons of water (Eder had 200 million). These dams were protected by two rows of anti-torpedo nets. Eder, much further to the east, was the second choice because it was concrete, although there were no military targets in the valley below. Sorpe was strategically more important than Eder, but because it was made of largely compacted earth, the effect of bombing was anticipated to be less. The destruction of these dams and others would require a completely new kind of bomb.