#biointernet

Time of Life and Time Travel Management

What is it, Time of Life? How to change Time of Life? Time of Life meaning Time of MY Life Time of Life synonym and Time synonymous Time of Life in Bible Intuitive Information Sight – complex of practical trainings developed by Dr. Zolotov and his group – ability to see (receive information), without using eyes. Intuitive Information Sight Technologies developed in 80-90 of XX century by Dr. Boris Zolotov (1947-2015) and his group in Soviet Union Boris Zolotov was born in 1947 and gives his seminars in the former USSR and some neighboring countries (Bulgaria, Hungary) from 1988. Before taking this “job” he worked for Soviet Academy of Sciences on a high level on the edge between science and paranormal like dolphin research. Some things Boris Zolotov and his team are doing – expert-operator interaction: operator sends signals, expert receives them. He is teaching this on seminars. (More about EOI) If one learned how to be an expert, one can easily give a medical diagnosis, making the sick person an operator. Supposedly, a team of Zolotov trained operators monitors Russian submarines in Pacific ocean and fixes problems before they occur. I know it sounds unreal. Some insiders link the “Kursk” submarine tragedy to the fact that one of the girls from Zolotov team suddenly left it to pursue life outside “the system”. – your usual contacts with alien civilizations. They are very good at this. – fast learning through love. Supposedly, if you really-really strongly love each other with somebody and you managed to open to each other completely, you can “glean” the knowledge from your partner.

What is it Time of Life? IIS technologies – Intuitive Information Sight Technologies by Dr. Boris Zolotov developed in Soviet Union at the end of XX century (1988). More details about Intuitive Information Sight Technologies here. What does the phrase “time of life” mean in Genesis 18:10? And he said, I will certainly return unto thee according to the Time of Life; and, lo, Sarah thy wife shall have a son. And Sarah heard it in the tent door, which was behind him. More about Time of Life in Bible here

Any Research is Symbolism

Time Symbolism, or time semiotics as it’s known in technical circles, plays such a large part in human communication because people are constantly looking for deeper meaning. Whether it’s in the stars, drawn on a cave wall or in the newest visual content, we add such meaning to our communication through the use and interpretation of signs. The multiplication sign, also known as the times sign or the dimension sign, is the symbol X The multiplication sign (×), often attributed to William Oughtred (who first used it in an appendix to the 1618 edition of John Napier’s Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio), apparently had been in occasional use since the mid 16th century. Time Travel + Time Management = Time Travel Management Time Travel Management is Time Travel Reality and Time Management system, using time management tools, for organizing Time-Space Time Travel Management TTM training on My Hourglass Collection project using the Biointernet modes (trainings) and the Biointernet Equipment Bio-Net, The Biointernet Mask, The BLAGA System and more TTM training is the Biointernet Mode, Practice developed by Dr. Boris Zolotov and coordinate by Kirill Korotkov and Sergey Avdeev TTM based on Dynamic Vision Board technologies by Kirill Korotkov Intuitive Information Sight mode using the Biointernet Mask and Translighters Games – basic level for TTM training The Time of My Life Lyrics Now I've had the time of my life No, I never felt like this before Yes I swear it's the truth And I owe it all to you'Cause I've had the time of my life And I owe it all to youI've been waiting for so long Now I've finally found someone to stand by me We saw the writing on the wall And we felt this magical fantasy Now with passion in our eyes There's no way we could disguise it secretly So we take each others hand 'Cause we seem to understand the urgencyJust remember You're the one thing I can't get enough of So I'll tell you something This could be loveBecause I've had the time of my life No, I never felt this way before Yes I swear it's the truth And I owe it all to you Hey babyWith my body and soul I want you more than you'll ever know So we'll just let it go Don't be afraid to lose control, noYes, I know what's on your mind when you say "Stay with me tonight" (stay with me) And remember You're the one thing I can't get enough of So I'll tell you something This could be loveBecause I've had the time of my life No, I never felt this way before Yes I swear it's the truth And I owe it all to you 'Cause I've had the time of my life And I've searched through every open door (never felt this way) Till I found the truth And I owe it all to youNow I've had the time of my life No, I never felt this way before (never felt this way) Yes I swear it's the truth And I owe it all to youI've had the time of my life No, I never felt this way before (never felt this way) Yes I swear it's the truth And I owe it all to you 'Cause I've had the time of my life (I had time of my life) And I've searched through every open door (you do it to me, baby) Till I found the truth (you do it to me, baby) And I owe it all to you Source: LyricFind Songwriters: John De Nicola / Donald Markowitz / Frank Previte(I've Had) The Time of My Life lyrics © Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd. Dirty Dancing - Time of my Life (Final Dance) Johnny pulls Baby up on stage at the end of season revue at Kellermans. Features the classic "Time of my life". https://youtu.be/WpmILPAcRQo

See also:

Time symbolism

Time is… The Full History of Time Time in physics and time Science Symbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht Dürer Time and Text

DADA Time

Text, Time, MHC Extinction Rebellion – Time against Life The End of Time Hourglass and Death on St Thomas’ Church Hourglass – symbol of Death Death does not Exist Hourglass and Skeleton “Hourglass and Cards” Exhibition Father and Mother of Time Time Hub Time Philosophy Time synonyms Time perception and Sense of Time Time Travel + Time Management = Time Travel Management The Hourglass, Hourglass History Hourglass symbolism Hourglass Figure Hourglass Tattoo Symbols of Time Beauty Bio-Net Father Time Department Father Time and Mother Nature Lunar calendar and Moon’s phases Time Management Time Management tools Time Travel Management MHC SM: MHC Flikr, MHC Pinterest, MHC Facebook, MHC Instagram, MHC YouTube, MHC Twitter

The Hourglass Figure:

IUMAB Archive 1998  IUMAB Congress Abstracts 1998  Science Information Spirit Bondarev Human Monopulse Plasmography IUMAB Congress Abstracts 1998. Bioelectrography Research. Welcome to IUMAB! Science Information Spirit on IUMAB Library! GDVCAMERA

The Hourglass of Emotions

Erik Cambria, Andrew Livingstone, Amir Hussain Abstract Human emotions and their modelling are increasingly understood to be a crucial aspect in the development of intelligent systems. Over the past years, in fact, the adoption of psychological models of emotions has become a common trend among researchers and engineers working in the sphere of affective computing. Because of the elusive nature of emotions and the ambiguity of natural language, however, psychologists have developed many different affect models, which often are not suitable for the design of applications in fields such as affective HCI, social data mining, and sentiment analysis. To this end, we propose a novel biologically-inspired and psychologically-motivated emotion categorisation model that goes beyond mere categorical and dimensional approaches. Such model represents affective states both through labels and through four independent but concomitant affective dimensions, which can potentially describe the full range of emotional experiences that are rooted in any of us. Keywords Cognitive and Affective Modelling, NLP, Affective HCI  LNCS 7403 - The Hourglass of Emotions

The Hourglass of Emotions Introduction Emotions are an essential part of who we are and how we survive. They are complex states of feeling that result in physical and psychological reactions in- fluencing both thought and behaviour. The study of emotions is one of the most confused (and still open) chapters in the history of psychology. This is mainly due to the ambiguity of natural language, which does not allow to describe mixed emotions in an unequivocal way. Love and other emotional words like anger and fear, in fact, are suitcase words (many different meanings packed in), not clearly defined and meaning different things to different people . Hence, more than 90 definitions of emotions have been offered over the past century and there are almost as many theories of emotion, not to mention a complex array of overlapping words in our languages to describe them. Some cat- egorisations include cognitive versus non-cognitive emotions, instinctual (from the amygdala) versus cognitive (from the prefrontal cortex) emotions, and also categorisations based on duration, as some emotions occur over a period of seconds (e.g., surprise), whereas others can last years (e.g., love). Full text PDF The Hourglass of Emotions: Download The Hourglass of Emotions

The Hourglass of Emotions NLP References 1.Minsky, M.: The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind. Simon & Schuster (2006)2.James, W.: What is an emotion? Mind 34, 188–205 (1884)3.Dalgleish, T.: The emotional brain. Nature: Perspectives 5, 582–589 (2004)4.Broca, P.: Anatomie comparée des circonvolutions cérébrales: Le grand lobe limbique. Rev. Anthropol. 1, 385–498 (1878)5.Papez, J.: A proposed mechanism of emotion. Neuropsychiatry Clin. Neurosci. 7, 103–112 (1937)6.Maclean, P.: Psychiatric implications of physiological studies on frontotemporal portion of limbic system (visceral brain). Electroencephalogr Clin. Neurophysiol. suppl.4, 407–418 (1952)7.Ledoux, J.: Synaptic Self. Penguin Books (2003)8.Vesterinen, E.: Affective computing. In: Digital Media Research Seminar, Helsinki (2001)9.Pantic, M.: Affective computing. In: Encyclopedia of Multimedia Technology and Networking, vol. 1, pp. 8–14. Idea Group Reference (2005)10.Cambria, E., Hussain, A.: Sentic Computing: Techniques, Tools, and Applications. Springer, Dordrecht (2012)11.Cambria, E., Grassi, M., Hussain, A., Havasi, C.: Sentic computing for social media marketing. Multimedia Tools and Applications 59(2), 557–577 (2012)12.Cambria, E., Song, Y., Wang, H., Hussain, A.: Isanette: A common and common sense knowledge base for opinion mining. In: ICDM, Vancouver, pp. 315–322 (2011)13.Cambria, E., Havasi, C., Hussain, A.: SenticNet 2: A semantic and affective resource for opinion mining and sentiment analysis. In: FLAIRS, Marco Island, pp. 202–207 (2012)14.Cambria, E., Benson, T., Eckl, C., Hussain, A.: Sentic PROMs: Application of sentic computing to the development of a novel unified framework for measuring health-care quality. Expert Systems with Applications 39(12), 10533–10543 (2012)15.Charles, D.: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. John Murray (1872)16.Ekman, P., Dalgleish, T., Power, M.: Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley, Chichester (1999)17.Scherer, K.: Psychological models of emotion. The Neuropsychology of Emotion, 137–162 (2000)18.Parrott, W.: Emotions in Social Psychology. Psychology Press (2001)19.Prinz, J.: Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford University Press (2004)20.Douglas-Cowie, E.: Humaine deliverable d5g: Mid term report on database exemplar progress. Technical report, Information Society Technologies (2006)21.Kapoor, A., Burleson, W., Picard, R.: Automatic prediction of frustration. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65, 724–736 (2007)22.Castellano, G., Kessous, L., Caridakis, G.: Multimodal emotion recognition from expressive faces, body gestures and speech. In: Doctoral Consortium of ACII, Lisbon (2007)23.Averill, J.: A constructivist view of emotion. Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience, pp. 305–339 (1980)24.Russell, J.: Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological Rev. 110, 145–172 (2003)25.Osgood, C., Suci, G., Tannenbaum, P.: The Measurement of Meaning. University of Illinois Press (1957)26.Russell, J.: Affective space is bipolar. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, 345–356 (1979)27.Whissell, C.: The dictionary of affect in language. Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience 4, 113–131 (1989)28.Plutchik, R.: The nature of emotions. American Scientist 89(4), 344–350 (2001)29.Frijda, N.: The laws of emotions. American Psychologist 43(5) (1988)30.Freitas, A., Castro, E.: Facial expression: The effect of the smile in the treatment of depression. empirical study with portuguese subjects. In: Emotional Expression: The Brain and The Face, pp. 127–140. University Fernando Pessoa Press (2009)31.Mehrabian, A.: Pleasure-arousal-dominance: A general framework for describing and measuring individual differences in temperament. Current Psychology 14(4), 261–292 (1996)32.Fontaine, J., Scherer, K., Roesch, E., Ellsworth, P.: The world of emotions is not two-dimensional. Psychological Science 18(12), 1050–1057 (2007)33.Cochrane, T.: Eight dimensions for the emotions. Social Science Information 48(3), 379–420 (2009)34.Lazarus, R.: Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford University Press, New York (1991)35.Lewis, M.: Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In: Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, vol. 2, pp. 623–636. Guilford Press (2000)36.Scherer, K., Shorr, A., Johnstone, T.: Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research. Oxford University Press, Canary (2001)37.Tracy, J., Robins, R., Tangney, J.: The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research. The Guilford Press (2007)38.Ma, C., Osherenko, A., Prendinger, H., Ishizuka, M.: A chat system based on emotion estimation from text and embodied conversational messengers. In: Int’l Conf. Active Media Technology, pp. 546–548 (2005)39.Alm, C., Roth, D., Sproat, R.: Emotions from text: Machine learning for text-based emotion prediction. In: HLT/EMNLP, pp. 347–354 (2005)40.Lin, W., Wilson, T., Wiebe, J., Hauptmann, A.: Which side are you on? identifying perspectives at the document and sentence levels. In: Conference on Natural Language Learning, pp. 109–116 (2006)41.D’Mello, S., Craig, S., Sullins, J., Graesser, A.: Predicting affective states expressed through an emote-aloud procedure from autotutor’s mixed-initiative dialogue. Int’l J. Artificial Intelligence in Education 16, 3–28 (2006)42.Danisman, T., Alpkocak, A.: Feeler: Emotion classification of text using vector space model. In: AISB (2008)43.Strapparava, C., Mihalcea, R.: Learning to identify emotions in text. In: ACM Symp. Applied Computing, pp. 1556–1560 (2008)44.D’Mello, S., Dowell, N., Graesser, A.: Cohesion relationships in tutorial dialogue as predictors of affective states. In: Proceeedings of Conf. Artificial Intelligence in Education, pp. 9–16 (2009)45.Grassi, M., Cambria, E., Hussain, A., Piazza, F.: Sentic web: A new paradigm for managing social media affective information. Cognitive Computation 3(3), 480–489 (2011)46.Zeki, S., Romaya, J.: Neural correlates of hate. PloS One 3(10), 35–56 (2008)47.Cahill, L., McGaugh, J.: A novel demonstration of enhanced memory associated with emotional arousal. Consciousness and Cognition 4(4), 410–421 (1995)48.Bradford Cannon, W.: Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An Account of Recent Researches into the Function of Emotional Excitement. Appleton Century Crofts (1915)49.Barrett, L.: Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10(1), 20–46 (2006)50.Krumhuber, E., Kappas, A.: Moving smiles: The role of dynamic components for the perception of the genuineness of smiles. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 29(1), 3–24 (2005)51.Lewis, M., Granic, I.: Emotion, Development, and Self-Organization: Dynamic Systems Approaches to Emotional Development. Cambridge University Press (2002)52.Csikszentmihalyi, M.: Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. Harper Perennial (1991)53.Minsky, M.: The Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster, New York (1986) About this paper Cite this paper as: Cambria E., Livingstone A., Hussain A. (2012) The Hourglass of Emotions. In: Esposito A., Esposito A.M., Vinciarelli A., Hoffmann R., Müller V.C. (eds) Cognitive Behavioural Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7403. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg Print ISBN 978-3-642-34583-8 Online ISBN 978-3-642-34584-5 eBook Packages Computer Science The Hourglass of Emotions See also:

Time symbolism

Time is… The Full History of Time Time in physics and time Science Symbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht Dürer Time and Text

DADA Time

Text, Time, MHC Extinction Rebellion – Time against Life The End of Time Hourglass and Death on St Thomas’ Church Hourglass – symbol of Death Death does not Exist Hourglass and Skeleton “Hourglass and Cards” Exhibition Father and Mother of Time Time Hub Time Philosophy Time synonyms Time perception and Sense of Time Time Travel + Time Management = Time Travel Management The Hourglass, Hourglass History Hourglass symbolism Hourglass Figure Hourglass Tattoo Symbols of Time Beauty Bio-Net Father Time Department Father Time and Mother Nature Lunar calendar and Moon’s phases Time Management Time Management tools Time Travel Management MHC SM: MHC Flikr, MHC Pinterest, MHC Facebook, MHC Instagram, MHC YouTube, MHC Twitter

The Hourglass Figure:

Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia is sensitive experience

Qualia and Time Perception

Qualia

Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences

Qualia is qualities of awareness

Qualia is sensitive experience See also: Time perception and Sense of Time, The Hourglass of Emotions, Time Travel Management What it feels like, experimentally, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic "feel" and also what distinguish them from one another. Qualia have traditionally been thought to be intrinsic qualities of experience that are directly available to introspection. However, some philosophers offer theories of qualia that deny one or both of those features. Qualia, standard psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy term:  The word Qualia refers to the range of ways in which experience presents itself. Experiences can be richly colored or bare and monochromatic, they can be spatial and kinesthetic or devoid of geometry and directions, they can be flavorfully blended or felt as coming from mutually unintelligible dimensions, and so on. Classic qualia examples include things like the redness of red, the tartness of lime, and the glow of bodily warmth. However, qualia extends into categories far beyond the classic examples, beyond the wildest of our common-sense conceptions. There are modes of experience as altogether different from everything we have ever experienced as vision qualia is different from sound qualia. Qualia and Time Sense

Philosophy of perception

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. More about Philosophy of perception on Wiki.

Philosophy is like Sex - you can get some exciting results, but it is not why you will do it Why do you FEEL pain or pleasure? Do plants have emotions? How is possible that some people do not understand other’s emotions? Emotions seem to be everywhere, giving meaning to all events of our lives. They are the backbone of social activities as well as they drive the cognitive processes of several living entities. Several animals, including humans, have emotions. Do machine can have emotions? Qualia and Time Sense

Sense data

Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a “sense datum.” Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena, rather than mere mental images, or because they believe that the mental phenomena involved in perception do not have the properties that appear to us (for instance, I might have a visual experience representing a red, round tomato, but my experience is not itself red or round). Defenders of sense data have argued, among other things, that sense data are required to explain such phenomena as perspectival variation, illusion, and hallucination. Critics of sense data have objected to the theory's commitment to mind-body dualism, the problems it raises for our knowledge of the external world, its difficulty in locating sense data in physical space, and its apparent commitment to the existence of objects with indeterminate properties.

What Are Sense Data?

1.1. The Standard Conception On the most common conception, sense data (singular: “sense datum”) have three defining characteristics:  Sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in perception,Sense data are dependent on the mind, andSense data have the properties that perceptually appear to us. More about Sense data on the website Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. Qualia and Time Sense

Deepak Chopra about Qualia

Deepak Chopra explores and explains ways of describing our subjective experiences - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions.* Qualia is a term used to describe these subjective experiences, how can we use these qualitative units to describe experience? And what is the relationship between consciousness and experience? Deepak addresses these and other facets of experience. (See on YouTube)

MHC Exhibitions

Exhibitions:Beauty Bio NetHourglass and CardsArt GlassMHC Dead Sea CollectionThe Full History of Time3DHM ExhibitionHourglass Figure Sophia Loren Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia ain’t in the head

ALEX BYRNE Massachusetts Institute of Technology MICHAEL TYE The University of Texas at Austin Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different addition of some relatively innocuous assumptions, they are inconsistent. Take color as an example. Consider Bill and Ben, ordinary humans who are enjoying color experiences with different qualia. Let x be a (possible) duplicate of Bill, and let y be a (possible) duplicate of Ben. Given a specific externalist theory of content (which need not be reductive), with some ingenuity we can plausibly construct different environments for each, such that the theory predicts that x and y’s color experiences have the same content; so, by (weak) intentionalism, they have the same qualia. By qualia internalism, x’s experience has the same qualia as Bill’s, and y’s experience has the same qualia as Ben’s, so x’s and y’s experiences differ in qualia; contradiction. Alternatively, since an intentionalist about color qualia will typically endorse the converse thesis that the color content of an experience supervenes on its color qualia, we can start with a pair of duplicates x* and y* in different environments and use content externalism to argue that their experiences differ in content. Since x* and y* are duplicates, their experiences have the same qualia; by the converse intentionalist thesis, their experiences have the same content. So: content externalism and intentionalism (jointly, ‘‘externalist inten- tionalism’’) naturally lead to qualia externalism. And what’s wrong with that? Isn’t the doctrine of qualia internalism the last bastion of a widely discredited Cartesian conception of the mind? Not according to many philosophers, who view qualia externalism with the same incredulity that greeted Churchland-style eliminativism. Qualia externalism, they think, is an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense. To his credit, Adam Pautz (2006) does not rest his opposition to qualia externalism on this kind of ‘‘intuition’’. He attempts to provide an argument against the principal motivation for it, namely externalist intentionalism. Moreover, the argument purports to be in significant degree empirical, drawing on results from a variety of disciplines, including psychophysics and neuroscience. The orthodox response to our quasi-inconsistent triad is to deny inten- tionalism, not content externalism. Interestingly, Pautz takes the other option, and embraces content internalism. So far, we have not mentioned the issue of reductive physicalism, which looms large in Pautz’s presentation. In our view, bringing in inevitably controversial reductive theses of the ‘‘awareness relation’’ at the start just makes it harder to see what is going on. Accordingly, we will initially set out Pautz’s argument against externalist intentionalism while ignoring the various reductive proposals that Pautz discusses. After having explained why Pautz’s argument fails, we then turn (in section 2) to the entirely separate issue of whether there is some relatively compact wide physicalistic account of the awareness relation. Full text here. Qualia and Time Sense

New Times

Sundial watch Object #336 Vintage postal envelope The Hourglass of Emotions Wham! – Last Christmas Time Machine How to dress an hourglass figure Time of Life #335 Flow away MHC Flikr Time synonyms Cyclocosmia hourglass spider

What is it, Time of Life? Qualia and Time Sense

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia

David J. Chalmers Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 ] 1 The principle of organizational invariance It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper. To put the issue differently, even once it is accepted that experience arises from physical systems, the question remains open: in virtue of what sort of physical properties does conscious experience arise? Some property that brains can possess will presumably be among them, but it is far from clear just what the relevant properties are. Some have suggested biochemical properties; some have suggested quantum-mechanical properties; many have professed uncertainty. A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates. In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully determine any conscious experiences that arise. To clarify this, we must first clarify the notion of functional organization. This is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between the components of a system, and perhaps between these components and external inputs and outputs. A functional organization is determined by specifying (1) a number of abstract components, (2) for each component, a number of different possible states, and (3) a system of dependency relations, specifying how the states of each component depends on the previous states of all components and on inputs to the system, and how outputs from the system depend on previous component states. Beyond specifying their number and their dependency relations, the nature of the components and the states is left unspecified. A physical system realizes a given functional organization when the system can be divided into an appropriate number of physical components each with the appropriate number of possible states, such that the causal dependency relations between the components of the system, inputs, and outputs precisely reflect the dependency relations given in the specification of the functional organization. A given functional organization can be realized by diverse physical systems. For example, the organization realized by the brain at the neural level might in principle be realized by a silicon system. A physical system has functional organization at many different levels, depending on how finely we individuate its parts and on how finely we divide the states of those parts. At a coarse level, for instance, it is likely that the two hemispheres of the brain can be seen as realizing a simple two-component organization, if we choose appropriate interdependent states of the hemispheres. It is generally more useful to view cognitive systems at a finer level, however. For our purposes I will always focus on a level of organization fine enough to determine the behavioral capacities and dispositions of a cognitive system. This is the role of the "fine enough grain" clause in the statement of the organizational invariance principle; the level of organization relevant to the application of the principle is one fine enough to determine a system's behavioral dispositions. In the brain, it is likely that the neural level suffices, although a coarser level might also work. For the purposes of illustration I will generally focus on the neural level of organization of the brain, but the arguments generalize. Strictly speaking, for the purposes of the invariance principle we must require that for two systems to share their functional organization, they must be in corresponding states at the time in question; if not for this requirement, my sleeping twin might count as sharing my organization, but he certainly does not share my experiences. When two systems share their organization at a fine enough grain (including the requirement that they be in corresponding states), I will say that they are functionally isomorphic systems, or that they are functional isomorphs. The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system. Full text about Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia here. Qualia and Time Sense The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club) Andrés Gómez Emilsson from the Qualia Research Institute presents about the Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences. At a high-level, this video presents an algorithmic reduction of DMT phenomenology which imports concepts from hyperbolic geometry and dynamic systems theory in order to explain the "weirder than weird" hallucinations one can have on this drug. Andrés describes what different levels of DMT intoxication feel like in light of a model in which experience has both variable geometric curvature and information content. The benefit of this model cashes out in a novel approach to design DMT experiences in order to maximize specific desired benefits. Qualia and Time Sense

Principia Qualia

Blueprint for a new science

v1 Michael Edward Johnson Qualia Research Institute Special thanks1 to Dr. Randal Koene, whose mentorship, feedback, and conversations about brains helped make this research happen. To Dr. Radhika Dirks, for feedback & editing, physics expertise, encouragement, and wisdom. To Andres Gomez Emilsson, who saw the full problem, rolled up his sleeves, and worked on it. And to my family & Lili Mao. Thanks also to Giego Caleiro, Scott Jackisch, Romeo Stevens, Anthony Rudd, Stephen Frey, Adam Safron, Joshua Vogelstein, Duncan Wilson, Mark Lippman, Emily Crotteau, Eli Tyre, Andrew Lapinski-Barker, Allan Herman-Pool, Anatoly Karlin, Alex Alekseyenko, and Leopold Haller for offering helpful feedback on drafts along the way. 1 Except as noted the views herein are my own, and the above acknowledgements of contribution do not imply endorsements of my positions. 2 collaborative meetings with Dr. Koene. ​The background arguments about brains and IIT were significantly aided by an extensive series of Abstract: Philosophers have been wondering about the nature of consciousness (what it feels like to have subjective experience) and qualia (individual components of subjective experience) for as long as philosophy has existed. Advancements in physics and neuroscience have informed and constrained this mystery, but have not solved it. What would a ​systematic​ solution to the mystery of consciousness look like? Part I begins with grounding this topic by considering a concrete question: what makes some conscious experiences more pleasant than others? We first review what’s known about the neuroscience of pain & pleasure, find the current state of knowledge narrow, inconsistent, and often circular, and conclude we must look elsewhere for a systematic framework (Sections I & II). We then review the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and several variants of IIT, and find each of them promising, yet also underdeveloped and flawed (Sections III-V). We then take a step back and distill what kind of problem consciousness ​is​. Importantly, we offer eight sub-problems whose solutions would, in aggregate, constitute a ​complete theory of consciousness (Section VI). Armed with this framework, in Part II we return to the subject of pain & pleasure (valence) and offer some assumptions, distinctions, and heuristics to clarify and constrain the problem (Sections VII-IX). Of particular interest, we then offer a specific hypothesis on what valence ​is​ (Section X) and several novel empirical predictions which follow from this (Section XI). Part III finishes with discussion of how this general approach may inform open problems in neuroscience, and the prospects for building a new science of qualia (Sections XII & XIII). Lastly, we identify further research threads within this framework (Appendices A-F). Introduction: Some experiences feel better than others, and this informs and undergirds everything about the human condition. But why-- what ​makes​ some experiences better than others? This question has been a recurring puzzle, posed in various forms by e.g., Epicurus, Shakespeare, Jeremy Bentham, and affective neuroscience. But despite literal millennia of research, we know an embarrassingly small amount about the mechanisms and metaphysics behind it, and there’s little agreement on even what a proper answer should ​look​ like. We can call this the problem of ​valence​. I believe there’s a ​rigorous, crisp, ​and relatively ​simple​ solution to this puzzle, but there’s a lot of theoretical scaffolding that needs to be put in place first. Part 1 reviews what is known and the leading quantitative hypotheses about valence, qualia and consciousness, with a focus on affective neuroscience and IIT. I end this section by summarizing and synthesizing a framework for understanding consciousness research in terms of modular, granular sub-problems. Part 2 directly addresses valence as a sub-problem in consciousness research, offers a hypothesis as to what valence ​is​, and suggests specific empirical tests of the hypothesis. In Part 3 we discuss further predictions, implications, practical applications and current relevance. Finally, in the appendices we describe how to grow this approach into a ​formal science of qualia​. Readers with a strong grasp of the literature on valence and on IIT, or those wanting to quickly get to the heart of the argument, should feel free to jump to Section VI. Contents Part I - Review Why some things feel better than others: the view from neu​roscience Clarifying the Problem of Valence The ​Integrated Information Theory​ of consciousness (IIT) Critiques of IIT Alternative versions of IIT: Perceptronium and FIIH Summary and synthesis: eight problems for a new science of consciousness Part II - Valence Three principles for a mathematical derivation of valence Distinctions in qualia: charting the explanation space for valence Summary of heuristics for reverse-engineering the pattern for valence A simple hypothesis about valence Testing this hypothesis today Part III - Discussion Taking Stock Closing thoughts Appendices A-F Part I - Review I. Why some things feel better than others: the view from neuroscience Affective neuroscience has been very effective at illuminating the dynamics and correlations of how valenceworksinthehumanbrain,ona​practical​level,andwhatvalenceis​not,​ ona​metaphysical​level. This is ​useful​ yet not ​philosophically rigorous​, and this trend is likely to continue. Full text Principia Qualia here Qualia and Time Sense

State of the Qualia, Fall 2019

Qualia Research Institute’s inaugural newsletter. What is QRI trying to do? Our long-term vision is to end suffering. To destroy hell, and to build tools for exploring all the bright futures which come after. To take the Buddha’s vision of 2600 years ago, support it with advanced theory and technology, and make it real for all creatures. Our medium-term goal is to build a ‘full-stack’ approach to the mind and brain, centered around emotional valence. Critically, better philosophy should lead to better neuroscience, and better neuroscience should lead to better neurotechnology. We’re skeptical of any philosophical approaches that don’t try to “pay rent” by building empirically useful things. Our short-term deliverables are to refine our tools for evaluating EEG readings of emotionally-intense states (e.g. 5-MeO-DMT), build a hardware platform for non-invasive precision brain stimulation, and release an updated version of our full-stack theory of brain dynamics (‘neural annealing’). We think we’re on track for all of these goals. On one level this is a huge claim- but as Archimedes said, “Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world.” We think we have that lever, and we’re building a place to stand. More Qualia References, Links and Bibliography Block, N. 1999. ‘‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’’. Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 39–70. Bradley, P., and M. Tye. 2001. ‘‘Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves’’. Journal of Philosophy 98: 469–87. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2003. ‘‘Color Realism and Color Science’’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 3–21. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2004. ‘‘Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism’’. Journal of Philosophy 101: 37–43. Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett. Lewis, D. 1984. ‘‘Putnam’s Paradox’’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36. Mollon, J. D. 1997. ‘‘‘‘. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone’’: Some Perceptual Themes 1946–1996’’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A: 859–78. Pautz, A. 2006. ‘‘Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism’’. Nouˆs 40: 205–40. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tye, M. 2006. ‘‘The Puzzle of True Blue’’. Analysis 66. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘‘Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?’’ In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. Block, N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed.) `Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press, 1980 Block, N. (1990) Inverted earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed J. Tomberlin. Ridgeview Block, N. (1995) “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247 Block, N. (2002) “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35 Byrne, A., (2001) "Intentionalism Defended", Philosophical Review 110, Chalmers, David, 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York Dennett, D. (1988) `Quining Qualia.' In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press: Oxford Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little Brown: New York Harman, G. (1982) “Conceptual Role Semantics” The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Horgan, T. (1984) `Jackson on physical information and qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly Jackson, F. (1986) `What Mary didn't know.' Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-95 Jackson, F. (1993) `Armchair metaphysics'. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Levine, J. (1993) `On leaving out what it is like.' In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Loar, B. (1990) `Phenomenal properties.' In J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Ridgeview. Lycan, W. (1996) Consciousness and Experience MIT Press: Cambridge McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6), 1-21. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press: Oxford Peacocke, C. (1989) `No resting place: a critical notice of The View from Nowhere', The Philosophical Review 98, 65-82. Perry, J. (2001), Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, MIT Press: Cambridge Rey, G. (1993) `Sensational Sentences Switched'. Philosophical Studies 70, 1: Shoemaker, S. (1975) `Functionalism and qualia.' Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315. Shoemaker, S. (1981) `Absent qualia are impossible--a reply to Block'. The Philosophical Review 90,4:581-599 Sturgeon, S. (1994) “The Epistemic View of Subjectivity” The Journal of Philosophy XCI, 5, 1994 Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, MIT Press: Cambridge Van Gulick, R. (1993) Understanding the phenomenal mind: are we all just armadillos? In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) White, S. L. (1986): `Curse of the qualia', Synthese 68: 333-368. White, S. L (1995) `Color and the narrow contents of experience' Philosophical Topics 23 Block, N. (1981). Troubles with functionalism. In (Block, ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27. Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69. Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). The `causal power' of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 442-4. Savitt, S. (1982). Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 342-3. Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. https://www.qualiaresearchinstitute.org https://www.iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Qualia and Time Sense

Q,Q,Q - Quality, Quantity, Qualia (soon)

See also:

Time symbolism

Time is… The Full History of Time Time in physics and time Science Symbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht Dürer Time and Text

DADA Time

Text, Time, MHC Extinction Rebellion – Time against Life The End of Time Hourglass and Death on St Thomas’ Church Hourglass – symbol of Death Death does not Exist Hourglass and Skeleton “Hourglass and Cards” Exhibition Father and Mother of Time Time Hub Time Philosophy Time synonyms Time perception and Sense of Time The Hourglass of Emotions Time Travel + Time Management = Time Travel Management The Hourglass, Hourglass History Hourglass symbolism Hourglass Figure Hourglass Tattoo Symbols of Time Beauty Bio-Net Father Time Department Father Time and Mother Nature Lunar calendar and Moon’s phases Time Management Time Management tools Time Travel Management MHC SM: MHC Flikr, MHC Pinterest, MHC Facebook, MHC Instagram, MHC YouTube, MHC Twitter

The Hourglass Figure:

Time perception or sense of time is a subjective experience

Time perception is measured by someone's perception Time perception is a construction of the brain Understanding of Subjective Time & Objective Time Time perception online experiment - Half an Hour for you :*

Time perception or sense of time The Experience and Perception of Time We see colours, hear sounds and feel textures. Some aspects of the world, it seems, are perceived through a particular sense. Others, like shape, are perceived through more than one sense. But what sense or senses do we use when perceiving time? It is certainly not associated with one particular sense. In fact, it seems odd to say that we see, hear or touch time passing. And indeed, even if all our senses were prevented from functioning for a while, we could still notice the passing of time through the changing pattern of our thought. Perhaps, then, we have a special faculty, distinct from the five senses, for detecting time. Or perhaps, as seems more likely, we notice time through perception of other things. But how? Time perception raises a number of intriguing puzzles, including what it means to say we perceive time. In this article, we shall explore the various processes through which we are made aware of time, and which influence the way we think time really is. Inevitably, we shall be concerned with the psychology of time perception, but the purpose of the article is to draw out the philosophical issues, and in particular whether and how aspects of our experience can be accommodated within certain metaphysical theories concerning the nature of time and causation. What is ‘the perception of time’?Kinds of temporal experienceDurationThe specious presentPast, present and the passage of timeTime orderThe metaphysics of time perception Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries

MHC Time Experiments

Experiments with Time, Time travel, Time Symbolism

Hourglass 24 We’ll be back 

This is “Half an Hour” of your life

You can make your life longer for the Half an Hour. This is free 30 min for your Life. Use it fo free and enjoy MHC Time experiments. How to use this Time (30 min)

What is ‘the perception of time’?

The very expression ‘the perception of time’ invites objection. Insofar as time is something different from events, we do not perceive time as such, but changes or events in time. But, arguably, we do not perceive events only, but also their temporal relations. So, just as it is natural to say that we perceive spatial distances and other relations between objects (I see the dragonfly as hovering above the surface of the water), it seems natural to talk of perceiving one event following another (the thunderclap as following the flash of lightning), though even here there is a difficulty. For what we perceive, we perceive as present—as going on right now. Can we perceive a relation between two events without also perceiving the events themselves? If not, then it seems we perceive both events as present, in which case we must perceive them as simultaneous, and so not as successive after all. There is then a paradox in the notion of perceiving an event as occurring after another, though one that perhaps admits of a straightforward solution. When we perceive B as coming after A, we have, surely, ceased to perceive A. In which case, A is merely an item in our memory. Now if we wanted to construe ‘perceive’ narrowly, excluding any element of memory, then we would have to say that we do not, after all, perceive B as following A. But in this article, we shall construe ‘perceive’ more broadly, to include a wide range of experiences of time that essentially involve the senses. In this wide sense, we perceive a variety of temporal aspects of the world. We shall begin by enumerating these, and then consider accounts of how such perception is possible. More

Time Perception

Time perception is a distinct area of study with its own psychophysical methods designed for assessing the perceived duration of a temporal interval. From: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001 What part of the brain controls time perception? Moreover, the diverse brain regions associated with the sense of time (frontal cortex, basal ganglia, parietal cortex, cerebellum, and hippocampus) are responsible for receiving, associating and interpreting information in fractions of milliseconds, seconds and minutes. The kappa effect The kappa effect or perceptual time dilation is a temporal perceptual illusion that can arise when observers judge the elapsed time between sensory stimuli applied sequentially at different locations. In perceiving a sequence of consecutive stimuli, subjects tend to overestimate the elapsed time between two successive stimuli when the distance between the stimuli is sufficiently large, and to underestimate the elapsed time when the distance is sufficiently small. Time perception refers to a person’s subjective experience of the passage of time, or the perceived duration of events, which can differ significantly between different individuals and/or in different circumstances. Although physical time appears to be more or less objective, psychological time is subjective and potentially malleable, exemplified by common phrases like “time flies when you are having fun” and “a watched pot never boils”. This malleability is made particularly apparent by the various temporal illusions we experience. Biopsychology Time is not directly perceived, and so time perception is essentially a construction of the brain, which can therefore be manipulated and distorted in various ways (see the section on Temporal Illusions). Biopsychology, also sometimes known as behavioural neuroscience or psychobiology, studies the way the brain (at the level of nerves, neurotransmitters, brain circuitry and basic biological processes) does that. Although another person’s perception of time obviously cannot be directly experienced or understood, there are techniques within psychology and neuroscience that can allow us to objectively study the phenomenon. Time Perception Internal Clock The actual mechanism by which the brain perceives and processes the concept of time is complex and not fully understood. The judgement and perception of time is known to involve different part of the brain in a highly distributed system, and the cerebral cortex, cerebellum and basal ganglia are all involved to some extent. However, experiments on rats that have had their cortexes completely removed show that they can still successfully estimate a time interval of about 40 seconds, suggesting that time estimation may actually be a more low-level or sub-cortical process. Neurotransmitters such as dopamine and norepinephrine (adrenaline) are integrally involved in our perception of time, although the exact mechanism is still not well understood. Some neuropharmacological research indicates that the human brain possesses some kind of “internal clock” (distinct from the biological or circadian clock), that is typically used to time durations in the seconds-to-minutes range. This timing mechanism appears to be specifically linked to dopamine function in the basal ganglia region of the brain, and norepinephrine also serves to slow down our internal clock (as do some drugs – see the section on Temporal Illusions). Neuroscientist Warren Meck has carried out experiments showing how specific neurons near the base of the brain become active when a person is asked to estimate a duration of time. Neurochemicals are released by these cells that trigger other cells in the frontal cortex, which is what allows us to judge the passing of time. Meck also believes that the brain may have several different clocks working together but independently, and that the brain selects a “winner” from these different possible timings depending on the context. In experiments with rats in conditions of sensory deprivation, psychologist Howard Eichenbaum discovered that certain neurons in the hippocampus region of the brain (an area important in memory function among other things) seem to fire in sequence almost like the ticking of a clock. For example, some cells fired when the rat first enters the sensory deprivation area, some in the next second, some in the third second, some in the fourth, etc. Over extended periods, some cells drop out of the “ticking”, some fire at different times, and some that were not firing earlier begin to fire. Eichenbaum has called these neurons “time cells”, similar to the “place cells” which are also found in the hippocampus (i.e. some cells seem to respond mostly to distance or location, while some respond mostly to time).

BERGERET LE MAITRE DU TEMPS HORLOGE SABLIER Human time perception and its illusions David M. Eagleman

SUMMARY

Why does a clock sometimes appear stopped? Is it possible to perceive the world in slow motion during a car accident? Can action and effect be reversed? Time perception is surprisingly prone to measurable distortions and illusions. The past few years have introduced remarkable progress in identifying and quantifying temporal illusions of duration, temporal order and simultaneity. For example, perceived durations can be distorted by saccades, by an oddball in a sequence, or by stimulus complexity or magnitude. Temporal order judgments of actions and sensations can be reversed by exposure to delayed motor consequences, and simultaneity judgments can be manipulated by repeated exposure to non-simultaneous stimuli. The confederacy of recently discovered illusions points to the underlying neural mechanisms of time perception. Keywords: time, time perception, temporal illusions, duration, temporal order, causality, psychophysics

Introduction

The visual system brags a long history of parlaying illusions into an understanding of the neurobiology, but only recently has the study of temporal illusions begun to blossom. New illusions of duration, order and simultaneity illustrate that temporal introspection can often be a poor guide to the timing of physical events in the world. Temporal judgments are constructions of the brain, and, as we will see below, surprisingly easy to manipulate experimentally. Time perception is a term that encompasses many scales. For the purpose of this review, we will only address illusions of time perception at the ‘automatic’ or ‘direct sensation’ time scales – that is, sub-second timing. Timing of longer scales, such as second and minutes and months, are categorized as ‘cognitive’ and appear to be underpinned by entirely different neural mechanisms. More Delays in Time Perception Although thought and perception appear to take no time at all, they are nevertheless constrained by the speed of neurological processes (e.g. the time for signals to leap across synapses, for action potentials to move along the axons of neurons, etc). The brain processes different types of sensory information (e.g. auditory, tactile, visual, etc) at different speeds using different neural architectures. But it appears to be able to overcome these speed disparities in order to achieve a temporally unified representation of the outside world, through a process sometimes referred to as temporal binding. As an example, if touch our nose and our toes at the same time, the signal from our distant toes must take longer to arrive at the brain than the signal from our nearby nose, but we perceive them as occurring simultaneously. The brain also uses this process, also known as integration, to integrate our sense of time into a seamless and fluid experience. This works in a similar way to the way in which the brain makes our sense perceptions of the outside world into a complete and unitary picture, glossing over any discontinuities and inconsistencies (e.g. the way we perceive a smoothly-moving movie, rather than a series of discrete and separate frames, and the way we can usually piece together meaning from a partially heard sentence). Neuroscientists have found that our brain actually waits about 80 milliseconds for all the relevant input to come in before we experience a “now”, rather like a time delay in broadcasting “live” television or radio. So, if the discrepancy in time between different inputs is less than about one-tenth of a second, the brain is able to process the different sensory input together. If two images are flashed in fast enough succession, therefore, we are not able to tell which came first and which second. To use a real-world example, so long as television audio and video signals are synchronized to within one-tenth of a second, viewers’ brains are able to automatically re-synchronize the signals; any more of a delay and a mis-synchronization becomes noticeable.

Hourglass 304, small, Magic Card Time Expectations There is an increasing body of research suggesting that the brain operates on some kind of an expected order and speed of events, and alterations to these expectations may lead to illusions like the kappa effect (see the section on Temporal Illusions). One study has shown how, when a video game player becomes used to a slight delay in computer mouse reaction time, and that delay is then removed, they may even experience a reversal in temporal perception judgement, feeling as though the effect on the screen happened just before they commanded it. Other studies have shown that, when a pair of tactile stimuli are delivered to each hand in rapid succession, and the subject then crosses their arms across the body’s midline, they may experience the order of the stimuli as reversed. Interestingly, this reversing effect was not observed among congenitally blind subjects (as opposed to late-onset blind subjects), suggesting that the brain has a whole set of tactile/visual/spatial associations as regards time perception, which it develops during childhood. Tests have shown that a person under hypnosis can judge time more accurately than the same person in a normal waking state. Unconscious time perception may therefore actually be more accurate than conscious time perception, possibly due to the lack of trained or conditioned responses and expectations that are present in the conscious state. Mental Chronometry The speed of neuron firing in the brain is also of interest to psychologists and neuroscientists for other reasons. Mental chronometry is a technique used in experimental and cognitive psychology to assess how fast an individual can execute certain mental operations. This involves measuring a person’s reaction time, i.e. the elapsed time between the presentation of a sensory stimulus and their subsequent behavioural response, typically the pressing of a button or sometimes an eye movement or vocal response. This can then be used as a measure of cognitive processing speed and efficiency, from which an assessment of the person’s general intelligence or IQ can be made. Mental chronometry techniques are also used in other areas of cognitive and behavioural neuroscience and psychophysiology.