#bellegarde

Pinned for now until we get a better one. Just some random dates to give context. To be expanded.

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1812

December 5: Napoleon leaves what remains of the Grande Armée at Smorgoni, giving superior command to Joachim Murat. Eugène begs Napoleon to be allowed to leave for Italy because there is so much bad blood between him and Murat, but is told to stay and do his duty

The Grande Armée then completely breaks down and dissolves, the retreat turns into a flight without order or organisation

1813

January 17, Posen (Poland): Having asked for permission to go to Naples twice and never having received a reply, Murat decides to leave the army. He summons Eugène and hands over superior command to him – or tries to, because Eugène refuses to accept it from him, if Napoleon has not consented to it. It’s only on Berthier’s insistance that he takes over command provisionally (letters by Eugène from January 17). As Eugène later writes to his wife: »This devil of a king of Naples now has left me with this great burden.« He also asks her to inform herself if Murat really had passed through Milan - »because to us he said he was ill and would go to Kassel to cure himself! Not bad for a sick man  to pass the Alps and make the trip to Naples in one leg!« - In other words, he’s really mad at Murat.

January 27, Paris: An article of »Le Moniteur«, France’s main newspaper, states that »The King of Naples, being indisposed, had to leave the command of the army, which he handed over to the Viceroy. The latter is more accustomed to large-scale administration. He has the full confidence of the Emperor.« This wounds Murat deeply.

A letter from Napoleon to Caroline further widens the gap between Napoleon and Murat

In Germany, Eugène desperately tries to reorganize what is left of the army but can only conceed territory for time, while Napoleon builds a new army in France

Spring and summer: Murat in Naples starts talks with both Austrian (Mier) and British (Bentinck) diplomats. (Letters from that period)

April: Napoleon returns to Germany with a fresh army and joins forces with Eugène’s.

May 2: Battle of Lützen. (Death of Bessières)

May 12: Eugène, exhausted and despirited, is allowed to return to Milan. Last time he sees Napoleon.

June 4: Armistice of Pleiswitz between France on one side and Russia and Prussia on the other. Austria remains neutral and declares herself mediator.

June 26: Metternich and Napoleon meet in Dresden for an eight-and-a-half-hours discussion. Metternich tries to explain to Napoleon that in order ro receive peace, he will have to make territorial concessions and give up France’s stranglehold on the rest of Europe. Napoleon refuses but still agrees to peace talks in Prague

July 12 – August 10: Peace congress of Prague (with Caulaincourt as negotiator for France). Ends with an Austrian ultimatum: If Napoleon does not agree to certain concessions, Austria will declare war on France. Napoleon refuses. Austria declares war.

August: Murat leaves Naples, joins the French army in Germany and returns to Napoleon’s side, his talks with Austria are broken off for now

In Upper Italy, Eugène is meanwhile attacked by Austrian forces after having to give up Illyria completely. He retreats to the Adige.

October 8: Bavaria, the largest of Napoleon’s Rhinebund states, joins the Allies. Huge effect on Eugène both practically (direct neighbour state, his northern flank is exposed) and psychologically: The Bavarian king is the father of his beloved wife and a very close friend. Eugène over the next days has to retreat to the Mincio.

October 17 – 19: Battle of Leipzig. Napoleon is soundly defeated and has to retreat behind the Rhine. The Rhinebund dissolves, its member states one by one joining the Allies

End of October/beginning of November: Murat leaves Napoleon (last time he sees him) and returns to Naples. He has to stop in Milan due to having lost his carriages in the mountains. Immediately resumes his talks with Austria, but the British commander in Sicily, Lord Bentinck, now has become hostile towards Murat personally and stalls negotiations

November/December: Napoleon expects Murat to send auxiliary forces to Upper Italy to help Eugène, Murat refuses, arguing his own kingdom is threatened by British forces

November 23: Eugène meets with a secret messager sent by his father-in-law, King Max Joseph of Bavaria, who tries to make him join the Allies and offers him the crown of the Kingdom of Italy. Eugène refuses

December 31: Allied forces cross the Rhine. France will be invaded within the coming weeks

1814

January: Murat signs a treaty with Austria. He now is supposed to move against Napoleon’s remaining forces in the Italian peninsula: Miollis in Rome, Elisa in Tuscany, Borghese in Piedmont and Eugène in the Kingdom of Italy (Lombardy). Eugène, who has been Napoleon’s main lieutenant in Italy for years, being the main opponent

January 16: Austrian envoy Count Mier returns to Naples and adresses the situation at court and Murat’s disposition

January/February: Neapolitan troops slowly move north through the Italian peninsula. As Murat has not officially declared himself an enemy yet, in the beginning they are even invited in by the French and receive weapons and support from their depots. But the ways they act rouse more and more suspicion.

January 14: Eugène writes a letter to Murat, basically asking: so what now, you with us or against us? Murat answers: … well, I’m not sure … I guess against you … kinda … but tell Napoleon I love him, okay? - Eugène: WTF? (They keep exchanging letters of that kind until March.)

January 17: Napoleon for the first time acknowledges to Eugène that Murat has jumped ship

Murat goes to Bologna to join his troops. His new Austrian and British allies are more and more weary of him as he does not seem to be willing to attack Eugène’s Italy-French forces

February 8: Napoleon improvises a plan to evacuate Italy and leave the whole country to Murat, he wants all forces back in France for a final struggle against the invading allies

February 16 - 19: Eugène refuses to follow Napoleon’s order to return to France, arguing that Murat has not even attacked him yet, and complains to Napoleon about his lack of trust.

February 26: On learning that Murat’s treaty with the Allies has not been ratified yet, Napoleon immediately orders Joseph to write to Murat and to get him back onto Napoleon’s side (Joseph writes his letter on February 28)

March 1: After yet another secret meeting between one of his officers and Murat, an exasperated Eugène sends a “note of proposals” to Napoleon - with conditions under which Murat would be ready to return to attack the Austrians; Eugène declares he is “in fact communicating this ridiculous piece only to give [Napoleon] a fair idea of the delirium that has taken hold of the king’s head“. To his wife he calls Murat “decidedly nuts“ (letters to be found at the end of this post).

March 7: Murat attacks Eugène’s Italians in Reggio but seems to have retreated again almost immediately, leading to yet another fallout with Austrian commander Bellegarde and a long letter of excuses

March 12: After receiving a letter from Murat, assuring Napoleon of his love and devotion and basically begging for forgiveness, and Murat’s conditions for his return into the French camp, Napoleon orders Eugène to betray Murat: Promise him whatever he wants, just so he returns to our side; we do not have to keep promises with that one.

March 23: Negotiations between Eugène and Murat about the division of Italy are broken off / postponed by one infuriated viceroy

March 31: The Allied forces occupy Paris

April 6: Napoleon abdicates as both Emperor of the French and King of Italy (Eugène’s position and powers of viceroy thus seize to exist)

April 16: Military convention between Eugène and Bellegarde, the commander of the Austrian forces. All French forces return home. Eugène calls on the Senate in Milan to install him as King of (Upper) Italy/Lombardy. Uprising in Milan by Italian partisans (general Pino among them), the minister of finances, Prina, gets tortured to death.

April 23/4: Second military convention between Eugène and Bellegarde. Eugène hands over the remnants of the Kingdom of Italy to Austria and leaves with his family for Munich

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Fort de Bellegarde, Le Perthus, Pyrénées-Orientales, France.

www.castlesandmanorhouses.com

The Fort de Bellegarde, or Castell de Bellaguàrdia in Catalan, is a 17th-century fortification above the town of Le Perthus in the Pyrenees.

Bellegarde became French territory under the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659).  It was captured by the Spaniards in 1674, but retaken by the French in 1675. In 1678, de Vauban’s plans for the new fortress of Bellegarde were approved. During the War of the Pyrenees, the fortress was besieged in May - June 1793 by the Spanish and then by the French (May - Sept. 1794).

Briefly (okay, not really) back to family trouble and that truely complicated almost-father-son-relationship between Napoleon and Eugène. In mid-February, as related earlier, Napoleon had had Josephine write to Eugène in order to repeat to him an order to evacuate Italy. This had wounded Eugène deeply as he – probably rightfully – saw this as distrust from Napoleon's side. Distrust in Eugène’s loyalty; apparently, Napoleon had felt the need to bring Josephine into this, in order to give Eugène sufficient motivation to remain in Napoleon’s camp.

And, as has also been said, Napoleon in truth had ample reason to question where Eugéne really stood in this struggle. From his private correspondence it becomes pretty clear that Eugène’s only hope for the empire to continue lay in Napoleon making peace, not in him winning. Eugène refused to go along with the plan to evacuate Italy (even if for good reasons), he had never completely given up his correspondence with the enemy (i.e., with his family in Bavaria), he continued to negotiate with Murat (in a way Napoleon could not directly oversee), and he had on several occasions even contacted his Austrian opponent Bellegarde, both on business (armistice) and in private matters: about his family.

The one thing Eugène truely worried about was the fate of his wife and children. He had four kids at the time (three daughters and one son), and Auguste was due to have her next child in mid-April. Eugène was mortified at the idea that Auguste might fall into the hands of enemy troops (or possibly of rioting Italians?) without him being able to come to her aid. (Maybe that’s his childhood memories resurfacing. He had grown up during a revolution, after all; he had lost a father on the scaffold.) In order to make sure nothing would happen to her, Eugène had contacted Bellegarde early on, and Bellegarde not only gave all sort of promises for Auguste’s safety and liberty, but even contacted his emperor. Who actually sent the following note:

Emperor Franz of Austria to the Vice Queen. Troyes, February 18, 1814:

Madam my cousin, Marshal Bellegarde having reported to me the determination of Your Imperial Highness to fix her stay momentarily at the castle of Monza, I pray her to be convinced that this general has perfectly fulfilled my intentions by anticipating all that can be pleasant to Your Imperial Highness. I have just ordered that a guard of honour be formed for your suite: your suite will in any case enjoy the most complete freedom, and I can only regret the reasons which force you, Madame, to a decision which would flatter me in all other respects. I beg you, Madame to accept the assurances of the very distinguished consideration with which I am, Madame my cousin, of Your Imperial Highness, the good cousin,

François.

This letter would reach Eugène and Auguste on March 2. On a sidenote: How all these good cousins and other relatives managed to write all these polite letters while having people fire at their recipients is beyond me. - Anyway, this is the letter Eugène asked Auguste to tell her father about in order to calm Max Joseph’s fluttering nerves.

It should also be pretty clear that this sort of amicable conversation between enemies was not what Napoleon had in mind when it came to defending the borders of his empire. And so, right after having sent off his own letter to Napoleon, defending himself about not evacuating Italy, Eugène received yet another missive from his imperial step-father.

Napoleon to Eugène. Château de Surville close to Montereau. February 19, 1814 My son, the vice queen must immediately go to Paris for her delivery; my intention being that under no circumstances she should remain in a country occupied by the enemy: therefore, make her leave immediately. [...]

This is when for Auguste and Eugène the proverbial shit really hit the fan. What could this be, other than Napoleon’s reaction to Eugène’s disobedience? Napoleon was basically taking Auguste hostage, in order to make sure Eugène would remain loyal to him!

On top of that, Auguste was already approaching the last five weeks of her pregancy, and as she had suffered of bad health after giving childbirth before, she had really not planned on travelling in her state, particularly not on winter roads. But that was not really what infuriated her. She had already been angry about Napoleon before, about the divorce, for him having stripped Eugène of his right to the crown of Italy, and especially for the reproaches regarding the evacuation of Italy. The way Auguste saw it, Eugène was always there, always Napoleon’s last resort, was always called in to clean up other people’s mess, and never did he get any reward for his efforts. In an earlier letter to Eugène she had already written:

I am appalled, my dear Eugène, and I am no longer surprised that the Emperor is abandoned. Is it possible to be more ungrateful than this man is? You who sacrifice everything for him, who have done wonders, to receive reproaches as a reward! No, my friend, I did not expect this last blow which crushes me, I feel all that you must feel at this moment, I am disgusted with this world and with men; it is clear, the family of the Emperor, and perhaps the Emperor himself, is jealous of you, they would like to see you make mistakes. The King of Naples will be forgiven his treason, but they will never forgive you for the reputation and esteem you enjoy. [...]

And now Napoleon ordered her to Paris. Under a pretext, obviously – after all, France was just as menaced by enemies as Italy! The Allied armies were closing in on Paris already. This really was too much!

Eugène’s own reply was still somewhat toned down, stating basically »Okay. I’ll tell her. She won’t like it. And I really don’t know what I have done to deserve this.« However, Auguste this time took to the plume as well.

Auguste to Napoleon. Milan, February 27, 1814.

Sire, Eugène has just communicated to me the order given to him by Your Majesty: it surprised me greatly, for I did not expect that after all the proofs of attachment Eugène never ceases to give you, you would also demand of him to risk the health and even the life of his wife and children, the only asset and consolation he has in this world. If he does not speak on this occasion, it is for me to do so. Without doubt I know his and my duties towards Your Majesty. We have demonstrated this to you often enough, and we have never failed to do so; our conduct is known to all; we do not resort to intrigue, and we have no other guides than honour and virtue. It is a sad fact that our reward has been nothing but sorrow and mortification, which we have borne in silence and with patience. Although we have done no harm to anyone, we have enemies, I cannot doubt it, who seek to harm us in your Majesty's mind; for, if you would open your heart, you would not treat us as you do.

What have I done to deserve such a harsh order of departure? When I got married, I never thought that things would come to this.

My father, the king, who loves me dearly, had offered to take me in when things were going so badly, so that I might be able to give birth in peace. But I refused, fearing that this step would cast doubt on Eugène's conduct, although his actions spoke for him, and I intended to go to France. I have since been ill, and the doctors told me that I would be risking a great deal if I made such a long journey at this time, being already in the eighth month of my pregnancy, and so I decided to retire to Monza, if Eugène was forced to leave Italy, believing that Your Majesty could not find it bad; but I see that you no longer take any interest in what may happen to me, which grieves me deeply.

In spite of this I will obey your orders, I will leave Milan if the enemies should come here; but my duty, my heart, makes it a law not to leave my husband, and, since you demand that I risk my health, I want at least to have the consolation of ending my days in the arms of the one who possesses all my tenderness and who makes all my happiness.

Whatever his fate will be, I will share it, and it will always be worthy of envy, since we will be able to say to each other that we have deserved a happier one, and that we will have a conscience without reproach.

In spite of the sorrows which Your Majesty is causing us, I shall never cease to rejoice in His happiness, and to wish for that of the Empress.

However, this time, they probably really did Napoleon an injustice. He, but also Josephine and Hortense had talked about Auguste coming to Paris for the birth of her child on several occasions before (apparently, all French ladies were convinced that life outside of Paris was unliveable). And Napoleon never made much words about personal matters. (This at least Eugène could have known – Eugène’s invitation to his own wedding had basically read: »Be here! Yesterday, if possible!«) Napoleon indeed answered Auguste very politely:

Napoleon to Auguste. Soissons, March 12, 1814.

My daughter, I received your letter; as I know the sensibility of your heart and vivacity of your mind, I am not surprised by the way in which you have been struck. I thought that, with your disposition, you would have a bad time in a war zone and among enemies, and that the best thing to do for your safety was to come to Paris. I did not tell you this earlier, because Paris was then in danger, and I saw nothing to gain by placing you in the midst of the alarms of Paris instead of those of Milan. But, as soon as the danger of Paris was over, I thought that this journey had all sorts of advantages for your state. Acknowledge your injustice, and it is your heart that I hold responsible for punishing you.

It was – who else - Eugène at the receiving end of the imperial wrath:

Napoleon to Eugène. Soissons, March 12, 1814. My son, I have received a letter from you and one from the vice queen, both of which are extravagant! You must be out of your mind. It is by reason of human dignity that I wished the vice queen to come to Paris to give birth, and I know she is too delicate to find herself in this state among the Austrians. At the request of Queen Hortense, I could have written to you earlier, but then Paris was threatened. From the time when that city is free, there would be nothing simpler today than to come and give birth in the midst of one's family and in the place where there is the least cause for concern. You must be mad to suppose that this has anything to do with politics. I never change my style or my tone, and I have written to you as I have always written to you. It is unfortunate for the century in which we live that your reply to the King of Bavaria has earned you the esteem of the whole of Europe; as for me, I have not paid you a compliment because you have only done your duty and that is a simple thing. However, you have already been rewarded for it, even in the opinion of the enemy, whose contempt for your neighbour is in the highest degree. I am writing you a letter in figures to let you know my intentions.

»What’s up with you two? You gone both totally bonkers now? All I said was: come to Paris!«

In the first chapter of his book on Joachim Murat, author Helfert mentions how exasperated the Austrian commander, Feldmarschall Bellegarde, was when his supposed ally King Joachim did not attack the troops of Viceroy Eugène de Beauharnais but instead gave him lengthy explanations why he could not do it. Helfert offers one letter by Murat as an example. As I do not know if it’s been cited elsewhere, I’ll give it in full, just to be on the safe side.

Modène ce 8 mars 1814.

Monsieur le Maréchal Comte de Bellegarde!

Mr. le Lieut. Gl. Millet, mon Chef d'État major, vient de me communiquer Votre lettre du 5 mars de Villafranca. Je ne puis Vous dissimuler toute la peine qu'elle m'a causée, par l'idée qu'elle a pu me donner qu'on pouvait vouloir jeter sur mon armée l'echec de Mr. le Comte de Nugent, et les motifs que Vous faites valoir de ne pas avoir passé le Mincio. Quant au premier article, ma lettre du 18 février et les événements ont plus que justifié le danger que j'avais prévu en se portant trop imprudemment sur Plaisance. Je répéterai ici, et je le répéterai à tous les militaires du monde, qu'il est impossible de passer l'Enza pour agir sur Plaisance, sans laisser sur Reggio et Modène des forces suffisantes pour observer le pont de Borgoforte, tant que la ligne du Mincio ne sera pas franchie, et je Vous dois la justice que vous avez approuvé Vous même ces considérations qui m'avaient empêché de marcher avec toutes mes forces sur Plaisance. Quant aux motifs que vous donnez de ne pas avoir attaqué le Mincio, Vous me permettrez de ne pas partager Votre opinion. Le Viceroi commença dès le 23 février à en détacher des trompes pour les réunir sur Plaisance aux 8000 hommes qui s'y trouvaient déjà. Cette force fut portée suivant les renseignements que nous avons pu recueillir jusqu'à 19000 hommes. Vous fûtes soigneusement instruit par Mr. le Lieut. Gl. Millet, mon Chef d'État major général, des dispositions que j'avais cru devoir ordonner, soit pour appuyer le mouvement du Comte Nugent sur Plaisance, soit pour l'établissement d'un pont sur Sacca au dessus de Casalmaggiore, et MM. les Comtes de Mier et Nugent et Mr. le Général Ekart ellrent soin depuis de Vous tenir au courant tant de nos mouvements que des ceux de l'ennemi; ils voulûrent bien surtout vous faire connaître les résultats obtenus par nos mouvements sur Plaisance et sur l'Oglio par le pont de Sacca. J'avais dû espérer qu’informé assez à temps Vous auriez profité de l'affaiblissement du Viceroi sur le Mincio pour passer ce fleuve et forcer ce Prince à la retraite ; lorsque j'appris que le Comte de Nugent était ramené sur le Taro, je crus devoir rappeler les troupes que j'avais détaché à Carpi et à Guastalla, pour les réunir sur Modène et sur Reggio; de Reggio je soutenais le Comte de Nugent, et de Modène je contenais tout ce qui aurait pu déboucher de. Borgoforte sur Guastalla, et je pouvais réunir en un jour toute mon armée pour livrer bataille à l'ennemi. Celles de mes: troupes que j'avais mises à la disposition de Mr. le Cte de Nugent prirent part à toutes ses affaires, et informé à Bologne à 7 heures du soir que le Cte Nugent était attaqué sur le Taro, je partis en poste pour me rendre à Reggio, à l'effet de conserver ce point: mais arrivé à Modène j'appris que le Cte Nugent avait repassé la Secchia avec la majeure partie de ses troupes , et que la division que j'avais à Reggio était sous Rubiera. Cependant le Cte Gl de Starhemberg restait en position sur Reggio. Je me portai de ma personne à Rubiera, et je fis connaître l'intention où j'étais de m'y défendre.

Cependant, Mr. le Maréchal, Vous avez été soigneusement informé de tous ces détails, et Vous aviez annoncé par Votre lettre du 5 qne Vous aviez fait toutes Vos dispositions pour passer le Mincio le 1er, mais que Vous en aviez été empêché par ce qu'on Vous a fait connaître, que je pouvais avoir le projet de ne livrer bataille que sur le Panaro. Permettez moi de Vous faire observer que je ne conçois pas l'influence que pourrait avoir ma détermination sur la Votre. Il Vous suffisait, ce me semble, d'avoir acquis la certitude que le Viceroi avait affaibli sa ligne au moins de 12000 hommes, pour Vous déterminer à l'attaquer franchement et à le rejeter sur la rive droite de l'Oglio, qu'auriez Vous eu à craindre alors de laisser derrière Vous Mantoue, parceque le Mincio passé le pont de Borgoforte tombait, et que Vous n'auriez plus eû à craindre les communications de cette place avec le gros de l'armée qui eût été sur la droite? Il me semble que vous auriez dû faire lorsque vous apprîtes que le Cte Nugent était attaqué par des forces supérieures, ce que je fis avant-hier et hier, lorsque je dûs supçonner que le Viceroi, après avoir poussé le Cte de Nugent, avait pu rappeler le Gl Grenier sur le Mincio pour Vous attaquer et Vous forcer à repasser l'Adige. Les attaques de ces deux journées et la reprise de Reggio ont dû faire échouer ce projet qu'on devait lui supposer. Lorsque le Gl Nugent était attaqué sur Fiorenzuola, si Vous eussiez attaqué le Mincio, l'ennemi n'eut jamais passé le Taro, comme il n'est plus en mesure aujourd'hui d'attaquer le Mincio. Lorsque le Cte Grenier passait le Taro, le Viceroi en personne passa à Borgoforte avec une division et se porta sur Guastalla. Ce double mouvement ne confirma que trop l'opinion que je Vous avais déjà manifestée dans ma lettre du 18 février sur les dangers qu'il y avait de me porter avec toutes mes forces au delà de l'Enza.

Permettez-moi, Mr. le Maréchal Comte de Bellegarde, de relever l'observation que vous me faites dans Votre lettre du 20 février, et qui Vous faisait différer de mon opinion relativement à une attaque sur Plaisance le même jour que vous auriez attaqué le Mincio. Vous y dites que l'effet ne s'en serait pas fait ressentir le même jour sur ce fleuve, et qu'en cas d'échec ou de revers Vous n'auriez pas pu être secouru par moi. Monsieur le Maréchal, cette observation ne me parait pas juste, puisqu'il n'existe aucun pont sur le Po, et par conséquent aucun moyen de Vous porter du secours dans le cas dont Vous parlez.

Je Vous prie, Mr le Maréchal, d’être persuadé de toute la peine que j'éprouve de me voir forcé à entrer dans tous ces détails avec un Général que j'ai appris à connaître par ses exploits militaires, et par tant d'autres belles qualités qui le distinguent; mais je dois justifier les mouvements de mon armée relativement aux vôtres.

Monsieur le Maréchal, je vais me résumer en peu de mots. Vous m'annoncez que Votre conduite est simple, et que le principe en est d'unir Vos mouveinents aux miens et de mettre de l'accord dans nos opérations; mon systême est le même. Je Vous déclare donc que je suis prêt à me porter sur le Taro et Plaisance le jour que vous aurez passé le Mincio, parceque alors je n'aurai plus rien à craindre de Borgoforte, en laissant l'armée du Viceroi sur le Mincio, et que de l'Enza que j'occupe, et du Taro que je puis occuper demain, j'ai assez d'avance pour arriver à Plaisance avant le Viceroi, que vous forcerez de quitter le Mincio. Rien ne s'oppose donc plus à ce que Vous l'attaquiez; je Vous prie seulement de m'en faire connaître le jour, afin que je puisse moi-même commencer mes opérations.

Le Gl Ekart a bien voulu se charger de vous faire connaître les résultats des deux attaques qui eûrent lien hier et avant hier; ces deux affaires nous ont donné 6 ou 700 prisonniers, dont un Gl de division et plusieurs officiers. L'ennemi a certainement encore eû plus de morts et de blessés. Je dois les plus grands éloges à la bravoure des troupes de la division Nugent. Le Gl de Starhemberg a montré autant de bravoure que d'intelligence, et a dû se porter ce matin sur l'Enza, et peut-être arrivera-t-il jusqu'à Parme, présumant que l'ennemi n'y tiendra pas à cause du danger qu'il y aurait de laisser derrière lui le Taro, qui pouvant se déborder d'un moment à l'autre pourrait lui ôter sa retraite. Le Gl Gober étant à Correggio pour tenir en échec les troupes qui pourraient déboucher de Guastalla, Mr. le Colonel Gavenda débordait la droite de l'ennemi par Scandiano. Toute mon armée manoeuvrait sur la grande route. Mes troupes ont constamment donné à côté des Vôtres. J'ai eu lieu aussi d'en être satisfait.

Vous voyez, Monsieur le Maréchal, que je suis très en mesure, et je me flatte que vous aurez vu avec plaisir mon mouvement offensif sur Reggio, parcequ'il a dû paralyser le projet que le Viceroi aurait pu former contre Vous.

Mr. le Cte Eszterházy et Mr. le Capitaine d'Aspre se sont fait distinguer. Je les recommande à Votre bienveillance.

And in English, to the best of my abilities when it comes to military matters

Modena, 8th March 1814 Mr. Marshal Count de Bellegarde! Lt. Gl. Millet, my Chief of Staff, has just communicated to me your letter of 5 March from Villafranca. I cannot conceal from you all the sorrow which it caused me, by the idea which it might have given me that somebody could wish to lay the failure of Mr. Count de Nugent on my army, and the motives which you claim for not passing the Mincio. As for the first article, my letter of 18 February and events have more than justified the danger which I had foreseen in moving too imprudently towards Piacenza. I will repeat here, and I will repeat it to all the military men of the world, that it is impossible to pass the Enza to act on Piacenza, without leaving on Reggio and Modena sufficient forces to observe the bridge of Borgoforte, as long as the line of the Mincio is not crossed, and I owe you the justice that you approved yourself of these considerations which had prevented me from marching with all my forces on Piacenza. As for the reasons which you give for not having attacked the Mincio, you will permit me not to share your opinion. The Viceroy began as early as February 23 to detach troops from the Mincio in order to unite them on Piacenza with the 8,000 men who were already there. According to the information we were able to gather, this force was increased to 19,000 men. You were carefully instructed by Mr. Lieut. Gl. Millet, my Chief of Staff, of the dispositions which I felt I had to ordain, either to support the movement of Count Nugent on Piacenza, or for the establishment of a bridge over Sacca above Casalmaggiore, and Messrs. Count de Mier et Nugent and General Ekart took care since then to keep you informed of both our movements and those of the enemy; they were especially willing to let you know the results obtained by our movements on Piacenza and on the Oglio by the bridge of Sacca. I had to hope that informed in time You would have taken advantage of the weakening of the Viceroy on the Mincio to pass this river and force this Prince to retreat; when I learned that the Count of Nugent was brought back to the Taro, I thought I had to recall the troops which I had detached to Carpi and Guastalla, to gather them on Modena and Reggio; From Reggio I supported the Count of Nugent, and from Modena I contained all that could have emerged from Borgoforte on Guastalla, and I could have gathered in one day all my army to give battle to the enemy.  Those of my troops which I had placed at the disposal of Count Nugent took part in all his affairs, and informed in Bologna at 7 o'clock in the evening that Count Nugent was attacked on the Taro, I left on post to go to Reggio, with the aim of preserving this point: but arriving at Modena I learned that Count Nugent had crossed the Secchia again with the greater part of his troops, and that the division which I had in Reggio was under Rubiera. However Count GI of Starhemberg remained in position at Reggio. I carried myself to Rubiera, and I made known my intention to defend myself there. However, Mr. Marshal, you were carefully apprised of all these details, and you had announced in your letter of the 5th that you had made all your arrangements to pass the Mincio on the 1st, but that you had been prevented from doing so by what you were made aware of, that I could have the project of fighting only on the Panaro. Allow me to point out to you, that I do not comprehend the influence which my determination could have on yours. It was sufficient, it seems to me, to have acquired the certainty that the Viceroy had weakened his line by at least 12,000 men, to determine you to attack him directly and to reject him on the right bank of the Oglio, so what would you have had to fear in leaving Mantua behind you, because once the Mincio had been crossed the bridge of Borgoforte would have fallen, and you would no longer have had to fear the communications of this place with the main part of the army which would have been on the right? It seems to me that when you learned that Count Nugent was attacked by superior forces, you should have done what I did the day before yesterday and yesterday, when I had to suspect that the Viceroy, after having repulsed Count Nugent, had been able to call back General Grenier to the Mincio in order to attack you and force you to repass the Adige. The attacks of these two days and the recapture of Reggio must have caused this supposed plan to fail. When Gl Nugent was attacked on Fiorenzuola, if you had attacked the Mincio, the enemy would never have passed the Taro, just as he is no longer able to attack the Mincio today. When Count Grenier passed the Taro, the Viceroy himself passed through Borgoforte with a division and moved on Guastalla. This double movement confirmed only too well the opinion which I had already expressed to you in my letter of February 18 about the dangers of carrying myself with all my forces beyond the Enza.

Allow me, Mr. Marshal Count de Bellegarde, to point out the observation you made in your letter of 20 February, and which caused you to differ from my opinion with regard to an attack on Piacenza on the same day that you would have attacked the Mincio. You say in it that the effect would not have been felt on the same day on this river, and that in case of failure or setback you could not have been helped by me. Mr. Marshal, this observation does not seem to me to be correct, since there is no bridge over the Po, and consequently no means of bringing you help in the event of which you speak.

I beg you, Mr. Marshal, to believe that I am sorry to see myself forced to enter into all these details with a General whom I have come to know by his military exploits, and by so many other fine qualities which distinguish him; but I must justify the movements of my army in relation to yours.

Monsieur le Maréchal, I will sum up in a few words.

Bellegarde at this point, presumably: “Yes, please!”

You tell me that your conduct is simple, and that the principle of it is to unite your movements with mine and to bring our operations into agreement; my system is the same. I therefore declare to you that I am ready to move to the Taro and Piacenza the day that you have passed the Mincio, because then I will have nothing more to fear from Borgoforte, by leaving the army of the Viceroy on the Mincio, and that from the Enza which I occupy, and from the Taro which I can occupy tomorrow, I have enough advance to arrive at Piacenza before the Viceroy, whom you will force to leave the Mincio. There is therefore nothing to prevent You from attacking it; I only beg you to let me know the day, so that I can begin operations myself.

Gl. Ekart has kindly taken it upon himself to inform you of the results of the two attacks which took place yesterday and the day before yesterday; these two affairs gave us 6 or 700 prisoners, including a divisional Gl and several officers. The enemy has certainly had more dead and wounded. I owe the highest praise to the bravery of the troops of the Nugent Division. Starhemberg's Gl showed as much bravery as intelligence, and had to move this morning on the Enza, and perhaps he will arrive as far as Parma, presuming that the enemy will not hold there because of the danger of leaving behind him the Taro, which being able to overflow from one moment to the next could take away his retreat. Gober being in Correggio to hold in check the troops which could emerge from Guastalla, Mr. Colonel Gavenda overran the enemy's right by Scandiano. My whole army was manoeuvring on the main road. My troops constantly fought alongside yours. I also had reason to be satisfied with them.

You see, Marshal, that I am very much in control, and I flatter myself that you will have seen with pleasure my offensive movement on Reggio, because it must have paralyzed the project which the Viceroy could have formed against you.

Count Eszterházy and Captain d'Aspre have distinguished themselves. I recommend them to your benevolence.

Let’s say I can see why Bellegarde would not have reacted kindly to being lectured like that. It also almost makes me want to go look in Eugène’s correspondence what he wrote about the same combats to Napoleon and to his wife. Almost.

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Edit: Okay, so I did check. But before I got to the events of March 7, I was already stuck on the 6th:

Eugène à la vice-reine, 6 mars 1814

Deux mots seulement, ma bonne Auguste, car Bataille revient des avant-postes ou je l'avais envoyé porter la lettre à l'empereur d'Autriche pour qu'elle fût remise sûrement, et j'ai beaucoup à causer avec lui. Je suis monté à cheval aujourd'hui comme à mon ordinaire, et croirais-tu que j'ai trouvé des violettes, je te les envoie; elles me rappellent l'heureux temps où nous les cueillions ensemble. Patience, il reviendra bientôt.

Eugene to the Vice Queen, 6 March 1814

Two words only, my dear Auguste, for Bataille has just returned from the outposts where I sent him to deliver the letter to the Emperor of Austria so as to have it handed over safely, and I have much to discuss with him. I have been riding today as usual, and would you believe that I have found violets, I am sending them to you; they remind me of the happy times when we picked them together. Be patient, they' ll be back soon.

It seems like both commanders had their priorities straight at this point: Murat wrote excuses to the Austrians, and Eugène was busy picking flowers… The letter to Emperor Francis, btw, was about what would happen to Eugène’s pregnant wife in case the Austrians invaded further into the kingdom of Italy (and, unspoken, in case of Eugène being killed, I assume). Eugène had asked for her to be allowed to then either remain in Milan or for safe passage to Munich.

Eugène also wrote another letter to Murat on the 7th, invoking a peace that both he and Auguste seem to seriously have expected to be on the horizon, due to the Congress of Chatillon that was going on at the same time, and on the 9th he tells Clarke (French minister of War) about the Neapolitan advance on Reggio. To Auguste he writes:

Ma bonne Auguste,

le roi de Naples a enfin levé le masque. Il nous a attaqué hier matin à Reggio avec 18 à 20,000 hommes; je n'y avais pas 3,000 hommes, et on a tenu toute la journée; le général Sévéroli y a eu la jambe emportée et nous y avons perdu 250 à 500 hommes. Nos troupes se sont repliées sur Parme et ont pris en arrière la position du Taro; cela me fera faire un second mouvement sur Plaisance, surtout si le roi de Naples continue à s'avancer. Le général ***, que j'ai laissé sur le Mincio, a une peur de tous les diables depuis que je n'y suis plus.

Je t'engage, ma bonne amie, à continuer tes préparatifs, et demain ou après-demain je t'enverrai Triaire; tout cela dépendra, du reste, des nouvelles et des événements!

My good Auguste,

the king of Naples has finally lifted his mask. He attacked us yesterday morning at Reggio with 18 to 20,000 men; I did not have 3,000 men there, and we held on all day; General Sévéroli had his leg carried off and we lost 250 to 500 men. Our troops fell back on Parma and took the position of the Taro in rear; this will make me make a second movement on Piacenza, especially if the King of Naples continues to advance. General ***, whom I left on the Mincio, is scared to death since I am no longer there.