#argumentation ethics

Blast Off! With Johnny Rocket Episode #33:Titan Of Choice! (W/ Robert P. Murphy) from the Mises Institute.

Show Summary:Johnny and Raylene couldn’t wait to talk to the Titan of “Choice”, himself, Robert P. Murphy.  This renowned economist from the Mises Institute is well known for being and esteemed author, a co-host on the show Contra Krugman and his new show “The Bob Murphy Show” He talks about “Argumentation Ethics”, environmentalism, market borders, and a variety of other topics, which you…

“The reaction from the other — Randian — side, represented by Rasmussen is different. He has fewer difficulties recognizing the nature of my argument [a priori of argumentation], but then asks me in turn “So what?” Why should an a priori proof of the libertarian property theory make any difference? Why not engage in aggression anyway? Why indeed?!

But then, why should the proof that 1 + 1 = 2 make any difference? One certainly can act on the belief that it was 1 + 1 = 3. The obvious answer is “because a propositional justification exists for doing one thing, but not for doing another.” But “why should we be reasonable?” is the next come-back. Again, the answer is obvious: For one thing, because it would be impossible to argue against it; and further, because the proponent raising this question would already affirm the use of reason in his act of questioning it. This still might not suffice and everyone knows that it does not: for even if the libertarian ethic and argumentative reasoning must be regarded as ultimately justified, this still does not preclude that people will act on the bases of unjustified beliefs either because they don’t know, they don’t care, or they prefer not to know. I fail to see why this should be surprising or make the proof somehow defective. More than this cannot be done by propositional argument.

Rasmussen seems to think that if I could get an “ought” derived from somewhere (something that Yeager claims I am trying to do, though I explicitly denied this), then things would be improved. But this is simply an illusory hope.

For even if Rasmussen had proven the proposition that one ought to be reasonable and ought to act according to the libertarian property ethic this would still be just another propositional argument. It could no more assure that people will do what they ought to do than my proof can guarantee that they will do what is justified. So where is the difference; and what is all the fuss about?

There is and remains a difference between establishing a truth claim and instilling a desire to act upon the truth — with “ought” or without it. It is great, for sure, if a proof can instill this desire. But even if it does not, this can hardly be held against it. And it also does not subtract anything from its merit if in some or even many cases a few raw utilitarian assertions prove to be more successful in persuading of libertarianism than the proof itself. A proof is still a proof; and socio-psychology remains socio-psychology.”

“...Of all utilitarian critics only Steele takes up the challenge that I had particularly posed for them: that the assignment of property rights cannot be dependent on any later outcome, because in this case no one could ever know before the outcome what he was or was not justified in doing; and that in advocating a consequentialist position, utilitarianism is strictly speaking no ethic at all when it fails to answer the all-decisive question “what am I justified in doing now?”

Steele solves this problem in the same way as he proceeds throughout his comment: by misunderstanding what it is. He misconceives my argument as subject to empirical testing; he misrepresents it as claiming to show that “I favor a libertarian ethic” follows from “I am saying something,” while in fact it claims that entirely independent of whatever people happen to favor or utter, “the libertarian ethic can be given an ultimate propositional justification” follows from “I claim such and such to be valid, i.e. capable of propositional justification.”

His response to the consequentialist problem is yet another stroke of genius: No, says Steele, consequentialism must not involve a praxeologically absurd “waiting for the outcome ethic.”

His example: Certain rules are advocated first, then implemented, and later adjusted depending on outcomes. While this is indeed an example of consequentialism, I fail to see how it could provide an answer to “what are we justified in doing now?” and so escape the absurdities of a waiting-for-the-outcome-ethic.

The starting point is unjustified [Which rules? Not only the outcome depends on this!]; and the consequentialist procedure is unjustified, too. [Why not adopt rules and stick to them regardless of outcome?] Steele’s answer to the question “What am I justified in doing?” is: that depends on whatever rules you start out with, then on the outcome of whatever this leads to, and then on whether or not you care about such an outcome. Whatever this is, it is no ethic...”

In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate use with ownership. The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership” simply overlap. However, “use” and “ownership” can be distinguished on logical grounds. Clearly, from the very fact that one sits on a chair it is impossible to infer that she is its owner. To determine the ownership, one has to find out who decides upon its use. This distinction between “use” and “ownership” is commonly illustrated by the difference in a firm between manager and owner. The function accomplished by a manager who takes all the current decisions concerning the use of resources in a firm is different from the function of an owner who decides as a last resort.

The last resort decision is epitomized by the fact that the owner can decide to fire the manager. In fact, the owner decides who should make the current decisions in a firm. Besides this distinction, the crucial question in ethics is: “Who has the legitimate ownership?” A different formulation may be: “Who has the right to own a specific resource?” Of course, from an ethical point of view an owner, i.e., a person who effectively control as a last resort a specific good, is not necessarily its legitimate owner. Here it is an obvious question to ask: am I the legitimate owner of the chair on which I am sitting right now?

Let us now apply this idea to self-ownership. If one can lose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can never lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land, the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by cancelling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e., by transforming her into a zombie or robot. For most of the scholars, this is the common way to understand self-ownership. “Man can neither be inherited, nor sold, nor given; he can be no one’s property” (Fichte, [1793] 1996, 124). Now it appears clearly why the “use of the body” and the “self-ownership” (even though they are logically distinct) have the same extension. While it is possible to sit on a chair without being its owner, it is impossible to use a body and not being its owner. This is the case because, one cannot not use her own body and one cannot not decide as a last resort of the action of her own body.

While the ownership in her own body cannot be alienated, one can be nonetheless coerced to act otherwise than she would have wished. This is the case of slaves, prisoners, victims of occasional robberies, etc. The master does not own a slave as one may own a piece of land. An owner of slaves does not own bodies but can coerce the self-owners to use their own bodies according to her wishes. Since land can be acquired, sold or stalled, the question to ask from an ethical standpoint is: am I the legitimate owner of the land? Obviously, the body cannot be acquired, sold or stalled but it can be aggressed.

Therefore, the right to self-ownership means the right to be free from coercion. As we have seen since the beginning of this article, this is precisely the sense of the self-ownership axiom. From this point of view, slaves should be considered coerced self-owners. The slaves have as a last resort the ultimate choice to obey their master or to revolt against her.