Why Saves Are More Real Than Any Other Closer Stat
From time to time I notice things in âthe real worldâ that can be further explained with behavioral economics. Todayâs topic is baseballâs save stat.
Ask any baseball stathead their thoughts on saves and the value of closers and youâre sure to get a scornful response.
Announcers and sportswriters continue to question why teamsâ seemingly best relievers are only used for save situations. Teams lose games without ever putting in their best reliever, and then that same pitcher âsavesâ a game 4 days later that the team very likely would have won anyway.
Surely, most front offices today (sorry Phillies fans) are using better methods to evaluate relievers. And surely this new information can be used to optimize how arms in the bullpen are used.
Yet the save stat prominently lives on and bullpens are still managed around it. Why?
Humans Arenât Computers
Humans donât act in their own rational self-interest. They donât make logical decisions, they make emotional ones that often come from an irrational place. There are countless cognitive biases always in effect, and the rationality of a decision is bounded by the information we have at the moment we make it.
Whatâs going on in the case of closers, the save stat, and the decisions around those 2 things is a result of Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory is very interesting in itself - I recommend you click that link and read about it. The two components relevant to the context of this article are:
Losses hurt more than gains feel good. The effect is about 2.25 times more powerful. For example, according to the irrational human brain, avoiding a $5 surcharge feels equal to getting a discount of $11.25.
Humans are risk-averse when there is a high probability of feeling a gain, and they are willing to overpay for certainty. For example, given a 95% chance to win $10,000 or 100% chance to obtain $9,499, theyâll take the $9,499 (and probably even less) even though the expected payout of the first scenario is $9,500.
The End of a Baseball Game is Prospect Theory at Work
When itâs the end of a game, and it doesnât feel certain that a victory is at hand (a reasonable cutoff for that feeling being a lead of 4+ runs), managers, GMs, fans, and players alike are all willing to overpay for the certainty of not feeling a loss. So in comes the closer for the save. This is normal, risk-averse, human behavior and itâs not going to stop until teams are managed by computers or Phil Ivey.
How about close games? Why are closers saved for when a team is ahead? And why arenât they used in the 7th inning with no outs and Mike Trout coming up with the bases loaded?
Here are the possible outcomes of a baseball game ranked on a âfeeling scaleâ from most powerful to least powerful.
-4.5: Losing when you thought you were going to win
+3.25: Winning when you thought you were going to lose
0: Game suspended due to rain
Pitchers canât create a win (from the mound, at least). They can only not lose. So the 2 losing scenarios govern a managerâs bullpen decision-making in those close games.
Technically, a pitcher canât ânot loseâ in the 7th inning as there are still 2 more innings to play. In that moment, there are all kinds of unconscious calculations a managerâs brain makes in the background to help him quickly decide how to optimize the use of the bullpen to not lose.
Whatever those calculations are, the decision is usually the same: the closerâs butt stays glued to the bench and in comes a non-closer reliever. And the real reason why, no matter what the manager says, is that heâs optimizing to avoid the greatest loss possible: losing when you thought you were going to win.
Itâs fair to reiterate that this isnât something managers are consciously doing. They arenât calculating odds of victory (or not losing) and choosing a reliever accordingly. This is all happening unconsciously based on thousands of years of evolution that has turned us into loss-avoiding scaredy cats.
So why is losing when you thought you were going to win so painful? Any loss sucks. It feels crappy. But when you thought you were going to win? That feels much worse! Why? Itâs because your point of reference changed. You already felt and accounted for the gain of the win. So now instead of feeling one loss, youâre feeling that loss PLUS the loss of the win you thought you had. Major bummer!
The save stat is simply a representation of loss avoidance. Closers arenât paid to accumulate saves. Theyâre paid for what the save attempt represents: an opportunity to increase the certainty that a teamâs stakeholders wonât feel the pain of losing what, in their mind, is already a win. In other words, they arenât paid to get saves, theyâre paid to not get blown saves. This differs from what non-closer relievers are paid to do and, as weâve already learned, humans are willing to overpay to avoid the loss of a near-certain gain.
Thatâs why saves and blown saves matter. Theyâre the best metrics we have to describe the reality of the irrational human brain of baseballâs decision makers.
I used Spotracâs Free Agent Tracker to get a list of all the free agent reliever signings from 2012-2015 (2012 is as far back as it goes). I used FanGraphs to filter the list of relievers to those with a SD-MD% of over 60% in order to remove the relievers signed for middle-innings mopop work. Depth relievers arenât signed to not lose. Last, I compared the average annual value of the remaining closer contracts to the non-closer contracts to get a ratio of how much closers are valued over regular relievers.
I averaged the 4 ratios and it comes out to 2.91. To be honest, I thought itâd be more like 2, as the value of relievers signed to not lose (2.25) is half of those signed to not lose when you thought you were going to win (4.5).
This variance might be due to small sample size, incomplete data, using the wrong data, or perhaps I just donât know what Iâm talking about.
What do you think? Do you agree? Have a better idea of how to do the data analysis? Is this all a bunch of fuff?