Philosophical Arguments

Men tend to outnumber women in fields such as physics and philosophy that prioritize ‘genius,’ study says

"When this message is delivered early, even women with the utmost confidence and academic ability might be discouraged from entering a particular field, she said. In philosophy, a field that is overwhelmingly male-dominated, Leslie recalled that in the 1980s, scholars in her field used to describe intelligence in terms of what was known as the beam.

A long list of options, but I'm going to attempt to do this. 

Preface:

Branches of Philosophy:

Physics – material (concerned with an object), deals with nature and what is, has an empirical side and a metaphysical side

Ethics – material, deals with freedom and what ought to be, empirical (anthropology/psychology) and metaphysical (moral philosophy, which is Kant’s concern in this text)

Logic – formal (concerned with understanding and reason themselves), pure/not empirical

Kant is concerned with the metaphysics of morals, not the empirical side of morals which he calls anthropology. Pure moral principles are dictated by reason and are discernible irrespective of experience. Only a priori motives are important for a metaphysics of morals, and a posteriori motives are irrelevant. (Although he doesn’t discuss these here, an analagous distinction is that between categorical moral imperatives and hypothetical moral imperatives: the latter are contingent upon desire, whereas the former as given by pure reason irrespective of any entity’s desire.) The purpose of establishing a metaphysics of morals is not only to investigate “the source of practical principles which are present a priori in our reason” but also to establish a norm for behavior that will conform with the moral principle. If we aim to be morally good, we must not only conform with a law but have the intention to conform with it and uphold it; otherwise, good moral behavior will only be coincidental and random.

Chapter 1: Passage from Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to Philosophical [The good will.] Good will is the only thing that can be called good without qualification, and it is “the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy.” The goodness of other valued things, such as intelligence and courage (examples of qualities of temperament/character), wealth and health (examples of gift of fortune), and moderation and sober reflection, is contingent upon good will (which sounds like it is comparable to good intention). Kant gives an example of a virtue that seems valuable irrespective of good will in order to show us that its goodness is really contingent upon it: the coolness of a scoundrel makes him more abomindable than he would be without coolness.

[The good will and its results.] A good will is good in itself, not because what it accomplishes or its effects. the mere existence is commended even if it does not actually will anything. Its usefulness does not even add to its value.

[The function of reason.] The function of reason is not happiness, preservation, welfare, or satisfaction of needs and appetites. We merely need instincts for those aims. Some complain that reason is obstacle for happienss and curse it [cf. "Consciousness is a curse;" "Happiness in intelligent people is the rarest thing I know."] The main function of reason is to establish a good will, which is the condition for all virtues, including happiness. Even though good will is the condition for all other goods, it is valued for itself and a not a means to other goods.

[The good will and duty.] We need to clarify why the good will is valuable in itself irrespective of its accomplishments. The next section will relate it to duty to complete this task. Duty creates limits and obstacles that help one discern good will.

[The motive of duty.] Only acts that are performed through duty, without any influence from inclination or desire, have moral worth. Here Kant distinguishes himself from Aristotle, who says that a virtuous person (who is inclined to follow the good and does so) is more moral than a continent person (who is not inclined to follow the good but does so). Kant gives several examples of acts that have moral content and those that don’t, and what distinguishes the latter from the former is solely intention and the presence or absence of inclination. Some examples: a) A shoperkeeper he serves honestly: moral content if he does so out of love for men; no moral content if just does not want to lose business b) Duty to preserve one’s life: moral content if suicidal/depressed; no moral content if inclined to preserve your life anyway c) Helping others (donating to charity too): moral content if help others despite your disdain from them; no moral content if enjoy helping others c) Duty to be happy (this is a duty because without happiness, one is more likely to transgress duty): healthy because have to vs. healthy because want to be ( I’ll give one last example: d) Take two vegetarians. The one who really loves meat but gave it up for ethical reasons is more moral than the one who never cared for meat, even if she feels that same sense of duty towards animals. So the presence of duty and inclination are not mutually exclusive, but the presence of latter negates the moral worth of performing the duty. Inclination may not fully negate moral worth if it is irrelevant in the explanation for an action that is performed solely for sake of duty.

[The formal principles of duty.] A duty is performed for formal reasons, not material reasons. In other words, the volition to perform a duty is more important than the actual realization of this volition. Cf. Preface and “The good will and its results” above.

[Reverence for the law.] “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.”  In a note, Kant explains that reverence is a feeling (analagous to either fear and/or inclination) produced internally by a rational concept and not imposed from the outside. Moreover, it is the effect of a law and not a cause of the law; perhaps one can say it is the law internalized. But one must also add that the law is not arbitrary but born out of some objective, rational principle. Paton gives a clearer definition of reverence than I can muster up: It is “the thought that my will is subordinated to such a universal law independently of any influence of sense.” In this section, Kant reiterates a concept/theme found elsewhere in Chapter 1 and the Preface, namely that the moral worth of an action depends on intention more so than performance. He also discusses rationality’s function again which is to be moral/have good will. He ends this section by saying, “Nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which admittedly is present only in a rational being–so far as it, and not an expected result is the ground determining the will–can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral, a good which is already present in the person acting on this idea and has not to be awaited merely from the result.”

[The categorical imperative.] A categorical imperative is a universal law. It is valid not for its consequences nor is it contingent upon any agent’s desires. All should try to act according to a universal law, or, as Kant says, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” (This initially reminded me something Sartre says in Existentialism is a Humanism: “In choosing for myself, I choose for all man,” but there are shortcomings in this comparison.) In order to act in conformity with universal law, I must ask myself, “If everyone followed the same maxim as I, what would the universal law look like?” Kant gives an example of breaking promises. There are certainly some situations in which breaking a promise produces more convenient and better results than keeping it. However, before breaking a promise, I must ask myself, “Would I be content if everyone held this maxim (of breaking promises)?” A law such as this would be futile and self-destructive.  If I do not think that breaking promises, lying, or the like should become a universal law, I should not do them myself. Kant also makes an interesting distinction in this section that I think relates to the relationship between freedom and ethics. When I decide to break or uphold a promise based on a consequentialist cost-benefit analysis, I am not acting according to a law I gave myself but rather according to empirical results outside of me. If I uphold a promise, independent of whether this produces felicific results for me or others, “this action already contains in itself a law for me.” According to Michael Sandel in the Justice series, Kant says that I act freely when I act in accordance with a law I give myself.

[Ordinary practical reason.] Ordinary practical reason is a decent guide for moral action for the common man. Philosophical systems may cause one to become uncertain about moral principles and thus philosophy and science may corrupt one’s moral compass. Philosophy is only necessary to complete a moral science but it need not be consulted for normal ethical behavior.

[The need for philosophy.] Kant dialectically contradicts the argument from the most recent section. Philosophy and science offer a basis for prescribing moral behavior and for knowing if one is behaving rightly. Man often experiences a conflict between his natural inclinations and his sense of duty and philosophy needs to be mediate this. The ambiguitiy and uncertainty arrives before philosophy is introduced, not as an effect of its introduction. Common man is thus impelled to look to practical philosophy for guidance, peace, and solution to moral dilemmas.

Chapter 2: Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals [The use of examples.] As Kant already noted in the Preface, he is not concerned with empirical morality but only metaphysical morality. Experience in this context is antithetical to pure reason. Kant is aware that it is impossible to see if any act matches up to his standards of moral judgment. How can we know if someone is motivated solely by duty and not self-interest? We cannot, and he recognizes that our motivations are often hidden even from ourselves. In the Preface, Kant also mentioned that morality is concerned with what ought to be (in distinction to physics – or moral anthropology – which are concerned with what is). We do not need empirical examples to deduce, via reason, what ought to be; we do not need reality to determine ideals. Kant adds that we need to discern the ideal before we can even recognize the good, and the faculty that determines ideals also recognizes God as the “Idea of moral perfection.” The conclusion is that examples have no place in a metaphysics of morality for the latter is concerned with a priori principles. Their only possible function is to serve as encouragement by showing us how ideals can be applied – but we cannot derive the ideal from experience for “imitation has no place n morality.”

[Popular philosophy.] An account of morality should not aim from the outset to be popular for this will only create a “disgusting hotch-potch of second-hand observations and semi-rational principles on which the empty-headed regale themselves, because this is something that can be used itn the chit-chat of daily life.” How could a metaphysics of morals be popular if it avoids everyday examples and the blending of different fields of knowledge – as most ‘pop-psychology’ or ‘pop-philosophy’ books due? An account of morality should, as Kant aims to do, ground itself on metaphysics. After having established a satisfying account of that, it can take on a popular character. This is exactly what Kant aims to do (see titles of chapters, for instance). As argued in “the need for philosophy” in Chapter 1, philosophy is not just esoteric play without relevance in daily moral affairs. On the contrary, a metaphysics of morals is “a desideratum of the utmost iportance for the actual execution of moral precepts.” A mixed moral philosophy may create confusion and guide us randomly towards both good and bad.

[Review of conclusions.] Moral precepts of a priori, independent of experience. Their purity allows them to serve as ideals and practical principles. Universal moral laws must hold for rational beings as such, independent of any contingencies or human particularities. Mixed moral accounts are not good arbitors or guides for moral behavior. A note from Paton is helpful: “We must pass from subjective principles (or maxims) to conditioned objective principles (hypothetical imperatives), and from them to the unconditioned categorical imperative of duty (especially the imperative of autonomy–which prepares the way for the concept of freedom).” We need a metaphysics of morals before we can establish moral principles.

[Imperatives in general.] What one should objectively do and what one subjectively wills do not always (or often) correspond. For this reason, we need imperatives, which implore an agent to act in accordance with the objective law; it necessitates a command for the will. A divine will obviously would have no use for imperatives for what they will always corresponds to a universal law.

“Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws–that is, in accordance with principles–and only so has he a will… [T]he will is nothing but practical reason.” The human will fails to be purely reasonable though, which is why we have imperatives.

[Classification of imperatives.] The first types of imperatives Kant discusses are the hypothetical and the categorical. “Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will). A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.” A hypothetical imperative encourages an action that is good as a means to an ends; a categorical imperative encourages an action that is good in itself.  The latter represents a universal ‘ought’ that is independent of desire, whereas the former is contingent upon desire. Hypothetical imperatives can be further divided into problematic or assertoric practical principles – the former if an action is good for a possible purpose and the latter for an actual purpose, such as attaining happiness. Categorical imperatives are all apodeictic and do not refer to objects or purposes. The categorical moral imperative is the imperative of morality. The third type of imperative Kant discusses is an imperative of skill. Parents are often giving these types of imperatives to their children when they say they want them to be “well-rounded.” Skills are about finding ways to get to an end, such as the solution to a scientific problem. In sum, the three types of imperatives are skilled (“technical” – concerned with art), hypothetical (“pragmatic” – concerned with well-being), and categorical (“moral” — concerned with free conduct as such/with morals.)

[How are imperatives possible?] Kant’s main concern here is how categorical moral imperatives are possible and justified since it is impossible to distinguish action performed from pure reason from action performed from self-interest. In other words, categorical imperatives may all be hypothetical imperatives in disguise (as J. L. Mackie argues). First Kant discusses imperatives of skill and hypothetical imperatives. The former’s possibility is easy to account for: if one has an end (such as solving a problem), of course one wants to find the means to attain that. The situation is a little bit trickier for imperatives of prudence (hypothetical imperatives). Although they also have an established goal and recommend a means to attain it, this goal is speculative. For example, how do I really know that I am for happiness or old age? Should I be careful what I wish for? These ends are established with the help of experience and thus are not as trustworthy goals as those set up by pure reason. Kant adds that imperatives of prudence are more-so recommendations than commands. He concludes his discussion of the first two types of imperatives by saying that since both of these analytically set up ends and try to deduce means to get there, their possibility is not in question. “Any rational agent who wills an end ought to will the means to this end” (Paton). Categorical imperatives, as we saw, are a different case. Unlike the other imperatives, categorical imperatives are laws, not principles, and thus not conditional on some sort of purpose. They are synthetic, not analytic, meaning “the predicate is not contained in the subject-concept and cannot be derived by analysis of the subject-content” (Paton). One can abandon the ends established by imperatives of skill or prudence but not by moral imperatives. “To justify a categorical imperative we have to show that a fully rational agent would necessarily act in a certain way–not if he happens to want something else, but simply and solely as a rational agent. A predicate of this kind, however, is not contained in the concept ‘rational agent’ and cannot be derived by analysis of this concept. The proposition is not analytic but synthetic, and yet is an assertion of what a rational agent as such would necessarily do” (Paton). Kant discusses the difficulty of establishing categorical imperatives since they are a priori and thus will return to this task later.

[The Formula of Universal Law.] Even though the question of a categorical imperative’s possibility must be postponed until the last chapter, we at least know the formula for a categorical imperative. Unlike a hypothetical imperative, which I cannot know until told its condition, one always knows what a categorical imperative contains: “the necessity that our maxim should conform to a universal law.” Thus the only categorical imperative, from which all imperatives of duty are derived, is “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Cf. “The categorical imperative” above.)

[The Formula of the Law of Nature.] Since the universality of law could be called “formal” nature (opposed to “material” nature*), the categorical imperative can also be formulated as follows: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” *Paton’s note is helpful: “When we speak of ‘nature,’ we may take it in a material sense as equivalent to the sum total of phenomena; or we may take it in a formal sense as equivalent to the sum total of the laws governing the existence of natural phenomena.”

[Illustrations.] Kant divides duties into duties towards self (inner duties) and duties towards others (outer duties) and then into perfect and imperfect duties (the latter are accompanied by inclinations). The first two examples Kant gives are inner duties. In the first case, a depressed but reasonable man contemplates suicide and asks himself if his principle of self-love (that his will kill himself if he expects the rest of his life will bring more pain than pleasure) would conflict with the universal law. He has to answer in the negative for this principle would actually destroy life rather than preserve it as the universal duty commands. The principle would “contradict itself.” In the second case, a man needs to borrow money but knows he won’t be able to pay it back. When he tries to turn his self-love into a universal law, he realizes that a principle of breaking promises could not be universal because it would make promises would be meaningless. Again, we see a contradiction between self-love and nature. The first two illustrations exemplify perfect duties since they are unaccompanied by inclinations: the universal duty to preserve oneself holds irrespective of an individual’s suicidal inclinations, and the duty to keep promises means to keep promises to everyone, whether one is inclined to or not. The imperfect duties, by contrast, have a certain about of “latitude” as we shall see in the third and fourth examples. In the third illustration, a man contemplates whether he should develop his talents or live a life of indulgence. When he sees if this maxim “of neglecting natural girls” could be in accordance with duty, he realizes two things: first, that this lifestyle of indulgence may be in accordance with nature but not with rationality, and second that he cannot will that this should become a universal law of nature. Part of his duty as a rational being is to will development of his talents. In the fourth example, a man asks himself whether he should help others or maintain a maxim that all should only help themselves. While it is again possible that the maxim would be in accordance with nature, one cannot will that this would hold as a law of nature. I may one day need sympathy and help from others, and this maxim would not allow them to help me. These last two examples are examples of imperfect duties because one has to decide – perhaps arbitrarily – what talents to develop and who to help. At the same time, the duties to help others are perfect in their existence but not in their application. In other words, I have a perfect duty to not “thwart” these duties but my positive duty to obey them is imperfect in practice. (In the next section, Kant calls perfect duty “narrow, rigorous duty” and imperfect duty “wider, meritorious duty”

[The canon of moral judgment.] The “general canon for all moral judgment of action” is “we must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become a universal law.” As we saw in the last section, a maxim may not be in accordance with universal law for two reasons: with the first two examples, I could not conceive of my maxim becoming universal law without there being a contradiction; in the second two examples, I could not will the maxim as what ought to be. Kant notes that we recognize categorical imperatives of duties but often give ourselves exemptions and make exceptions to rules. When we exempt ourselves from universal law, there is a contradiction or opposition between the will of reason and the will of inclination.

[The need for pure ethics.] Here Kant repeats several themes we’ve already seen, such as the distinction between subjective inclinations and objective duty and the need for a metaphysics of morals opposed to a “popular” moral philosophy. Kant returns to the discussion of the difficulty of establishing a metaphysics of morals since there is no analogue for moral laws in experience. Nonetheless, an empirical account of ethics may be “highly injurious to the purity of morals,” which is why we need pure ethics. I think that Kant’s mini-rant against popular morality is worth quoting (see also “Popular Philosophy”): “Against the slack, or indeed ignoble, attitudee which seeks for the moral principle among empirical motives and laws we cannot give a warning too strongly or too often; for huma reason in its weariness is fain to rest upon this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions (which lead it to embrace a cloud in mistake for Juno) to foist into the place of morality some misbegotten mongrel patched up from limbs of varied ancestry and looking like anything you please, only not like virtue, to him who has once beheld her in her true shape.” Again, Kant is concerned with what ought to happen, and consideration of experience can taint our conception of ‘ought.’ We should only consider a priori reason.

[The Formula of the End in Itself.] Unlike other types of imperatives, the categorical imperative contains an ends in itself. Each rational being’s is also an end for him/herself. The existence of each of these two things is valuable in themselves/has an absolute value. The principle that “Rational nature exists as an end itself” is both a subjective principle and an objective one, from which should be able to derive all laws for the will. The practical imperative of this formula is “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”

[Illustrations.] Kant illustrates the formula of the end in itself with the same examples from above. In the first example, a man cannot commit suicide because in doing so he is treating his person as solely a means to maintain a “tolerable state of affairs till the end of his life.” In the second example, a man who makes false promises uses others as a means to an end he does not share. In the third example, even though to neglect one’s talents may not disrupt humanity, it does not harmonize or promote it. ["It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can be admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end."] In the fourth example, to refuse to help others may not impact humanity negatively, but it certainly will not impact it positively either. As with example 3, we have a duty not just to “maintain” humanity but also “promote” it; we do not just have a negative duty but also a positive one.

[The Formula of Autonomy.] First Kant applies what he has said about universal laws – namely that they are a priori, objective, and come from pure reason – to the Formula of the End in Itself. It is not obvious from experience that each man’s existence is an end in itself. The ends of something has a subject now, which is any rational being. Kant states, “The ground for every enactment of practical law lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universaliy with (according to our first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); subjective, however, it lies in the end; but (according to our first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but (according to our second principle) the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in himself.” The third principle, he adds, is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.” In other words, as Paton clarifies, “the law which we are bound to obey must be the product of our own will.” Kant concludes that that man is not merely subject to a law but also the one who wills or makes the law. In other words, I am the author of the law of which I am subject. I think one can anticipate this conclusion from the section “Reverence for the Law” in chapter 1.

According to Paton, the Formula of Autonomy (third principle) is a synthesis of the Formula of Universal Law (first principle – objectivity) and the Formula of the End in Itself (second principle – subjectivity).

[The exclusion of interest.] One reason why other moral accounts have failed is they fail to see why people feel compelled to follow laws. In trying to account for man’s reverence to law, of which they think he is only subject to, they have to conclude that man follows it due to some interest. Kant thinks that people actually feel the need to conform to duties and law, even those they feel no inclination for, because they will the duties/laws themselves. In other words, even though the laws are universal, they are also subjectively willed – this is part of the definition of a categorical imperative. Kant calls his opponents’ conception of the will, which follows the law due to interest, “Heteronomy of the will,” and he counters this with his “Autonomy of the will.” The former conception of the will can only give rise to hypothetical, and thus non-moral, imperatives.

[The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends.] In the Kingdom of Ends, all rational beings are solely willing maxims that are in accordance with universal law, and the only treat others as ends in themselves (see Formula of Autonomy). It seems like a moral utopia. The head of this kingdom is never the subject of a law he does not make himself. The head does not need to have a concept of duty, for duty is only necessary for those who are not the makers of their own laws, or when the subject’s maxim is not in accordance with the universal law. Making/willing laws is not for any future motive or advantage but only for the dignity of rational being (and his freedom, presumably.)

[The dignity of virtue.] “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignitiy.” The former has relative worth and can be substituted by some equivalent, whereas the latter is instrincia dn has no equivalent. There are two types of prices: a market priceand a fancy price (Affektionspreis). The former relates to human needs and inclinations whereas the latter relates to imagination and “fancy.” “Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination, and humor have a fancy price; but fidelty to promises and kindness based on principle (not on instinct) have an intrinsic worth.” One again, the same characteristics of the categorical imperative apply to here to dignity – dignity has absolute value as an end in-itself and is not contingent on any subject, condition, or recommendation. The same characteristics of a hypothetical imperative apply to price, such as contingency upon desire and being a means to an end.  Morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, are the only things that have dignity. Our Autonomy to create laws for ourselves is the ground for this dignity.

[Review of the Formulae.] The three formula Kant reviews here are the (1) Formula of the Law of Nature, the (2) Formula of the End in Itself, and the (3) Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. The first deals with form, or universality, the second with matter or ends, and the third with both form and matter. The unity of form + the multiplicity of its matter = the totality of the system of ends. Even though it is the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends contains the same material as both the first and second formulae, Kant says we should use the Law of Nature to as the basis of a categorical moral imperative, namely: “Act on the maxim which can at the same time be made a universal law.” If the first formula contains the test to apply for determining if a maxim can be universalized, the second two formulae purport “to bring an Idea of reason nearer to intuition and so nearer to feeling.”

[Review of the whole argument.] -A good will is not in contradiction with a universal law; reiteration of categorical imperative but with one addition: the mention of a universal law of nature. Principle: “Act on that maxim which can at the same time have for its object itself as a universal law of nature.” -Rational nature – and thus man insofar as he is capable of rationality/morality – is an ends in-itself. We should treat people only as ends, never a means to an end. Principle: “Act on a maxim which at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational beings.” -Man, as an end in himself, is the maker of universal laws and not only subject to them. -A kingdom of ends is possible for man who makes his own laws, which are both subjective and objective. Principle: “So act as if your maxims had to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational beings).” -Addition: kingdom of nature; Paton clarifies, “The kingdom of ends can be realized only if all men obey the categorical imperative, but even this would not be enough: unless nature itself also co-operates with our moral strivings, this ideal can never be attained.” -If we only had the kingdom of nature, we could not be free for we could not make live according to laws we give ourselves. We would only act based on inclination and need. -autonomy of the will (opposed to heteronomy of the will) – the former is a better explanation for why we follow laws/duties than the latter for it says we make them ourselves; the latter says we follow laws out of some interest…if that were the case, there could be no categorical imperatives, only hypothetical ones. -addition: holy will vs. obligation/duty — comparable to head vs. members of the “Kingdom of Ends” The former never has to act on a law other than that which he gives himself for his maxim is always in accordance with universal law. The holy will is fully autonomous (God). -dignity of man is grounded on his autonomy, i.e. his status as maker of laws

AUTONOMY OF THE WILL as the supreme principle of morality. As we have seen, the Autonomy of the will consists in its ability to determine laws for itself. The principle of autonomy, is the “supreme principle of morality,” is “Never to choose except in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal laws.” This is a synthetic proposition, opposed to an analytic one, because it “cannot be proved by mere analysis of the concepts contained in it.”

HETERONOMY OF THE WILL as the source of all spurious principles of morality. Kant repeats the characterizations of the heteronomy of the will. It wills conditionally, as a means to an ends such as the fulfillment of some desire. It is only hypothetical and administers “an alien interest,” thus it is obviously in conflict with freedom.

CLASSIFICATION of all possible principles of morality based on the assumption of heteronomy as their fundamental concept. All principles of based on heteronomy of the will are either empirical (drawn from happiness and based on moral or natural feeling) or rational (drawn from perfection, which is either the cause or effect of our will).

[Empirical principles of heteronomy.] Empirical principles, such as that of happiness and based off of feeling, are incredible as moral groundings. In contrast to Utilitarians, Kant asserts that living well/happy is not equivalent to living morally. He thinks it is “absurd to base morality on sensuous motives.” We could add his critique of empirical, rather than pure, morality found elsewhere (such as in “Popular philosophy” and “The need for pure ethics.”)

[Rational principles of heteronomy.] One should not obey moral law just for self-perfection. The concept of perfection is useless for discerning moral principles and it only yields circular reasoning. Kant thinks that theological justifications for the goodness of morality also yield circular reasoning for one cannot derive goodness simply from saying god is good; religion should be derived from morality and not vice versa If Kant had to choose between empirical principles and rational principles of heteronomy, he would choose the latter, for at least it takes perfection focuses on pure reason.

[The failure of heteronomy.] Under heteronomy or hypothetical imperatives, the object determines the will rather than the will determines an object, thus the individual is subject to “alien” forces/”impulsions” governing his/her behavior. When we act in accordance with hypothetical imperatives, we act because we want an object. The heteronomous will is governed by the law of nature rather than universals.

Chapter 2. Moore’s Attack on Ethical Naturalism

2.1 Moore's Strong Cognitivism and Account of 'Natural' 

naturalistic fallacy

Moore on 'natural' 

natural = subject of natural sciences or psychology

But what unifies ‘natural’ sciences and psychology? Some propose that by natural, Moore means causal and discernible by the senses. 

(b) Was Moore a strong cognitivist? 

On the one hand, it might look like Moore is a weak cognitivist, since his Intuitionism is makes him agnostic on the origin of cognition of moral judgments

On the other hand, it looks more like he is a strong cognitivist, since he thinks that moral judgments are the deliverance of some cognitive faculty, which is like sense-perception insofar as things perceived by the senses are also incapable of formal proof. 

2.2 The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Classical Open-Question Argument

Moore argues against definitional naturalists. He is concerned with conceptual analyses of ‘good,’ not uses of the term ‘good.’

naturalistic fallacy: good is neither a natural property (e.g. what we desire) or a metaphysical property (e.g. approved by God). However, even if it were a natural property, one would still committee the naturalistic fallacy in attempting to define it, since it is indefinable. 

2.3 Three Objections to the Classical Open-Question Argument

Frankena's objection

“The charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy can be made, if at all, only as a conclusion from the discussion and not as an instrument of deciding it.” (William Frankena, The Naturalistic Fallacy, 1938: 465)

Moore begs the question against analytical naturalism by assuming that there is an open-question about the analysis. If the analytic naturalist’s definition of ‘good’ is correct, then genuinely asking the question, “Is X Y?” does betray some conceptual confusion, though Moore would have us think otherwise. The OQA only works if we already assume or have proven that analytical naturalism is false, but that is in fact the conclusion of the OQA. Moore begs the question by presupposing the falsity of AN when he intends to prove it. 

(b) The 'no interesting analyses' objection 

"The OQA assumes that it is impossible for a conceptual analysis to be true but informative and interesting.” (16)

Moore’s response: Yes, that’s just the paradox of analysis. There are no interesting and informative analyses. (cf. Meno)

Response to Moore’s response: There is no paradox of analysis. We can, for example, grasp a concept without being able to produce an analysis of it. This is because we can have knowledge how to do something without having propositional knowledge about it or knowledge that. 

(cf. Oakeshott — cookbook example)

(c) The 'sense-reference' objection

Can have same reference though different senses. 

‘Hesperus' and ‘Phosphorus' have the same reference but different senses. We can know the sense of an expression without knowing its reference, but we can discover that the references are in fact the same. Perhaps there is an analogous case in ethics, where two words, say ‘good’ and ’’N,’ have the same reference (‘denote the same property’) though they have different senses. We can discover, though, that they have the same reference

What would this process of discovery look like, though, in the case of the ‘good’ and ’N'? 

Evaluation of the Objections

(1) and (2) are incisive. (3) is not. Moore is attacking ethical naturalists that assume that the property of being good is identical with or reducible to the property of being N in virtue of some conceptual or analytic equivalence between the two terms. But two expressions are analytically equivalent if they have the same sense, not if they are discovered to have the same reference. The sense-reference theorist has already conceded that ‘good’ and ’N’ have difference senses, and thus they are not analytically equivalent. 

At the same time, Obj (3) allows us to acknowledge that Moore only successfully argues against analytical or definitional naturalism. What about synthetic or metaphysical naturalism, where the question is not whether the two expressions have the same sense but rather if they have the same reference. 

2.4 Can the Open-Question Argument be Salvaged? 

Baldwin's 'open-question' argument

Baldwin attempts to establish a presumption against, rather than a decisive refutation of, the analytical naturalist: 

If 'good' and 'N' are analytically equivalent, then ceteris paribus competent speakers should - after conceptual reflection - come to find it natural to guide their evaluative judgements by the analysis.

After conceptual reflection, the conviction that 'Is an x which is N also good?' is an open question persists among competent speakers. So after conceptual reflection they do not come to find it natural to guide their evaluative judgements by the analysis of 'good' in terms of ’N'.

Therefore, 

We can conclude that 'good' and 'N' are not analytically equivalent, unless ceteris aren't paribus (i.e. there is some other explanation of why competent speakers do not come to find it natural to guide their evaluative judgements by the analysis).

"The argument establishes only a presumption against the analytic naturalist, because it is of course open to the naturalist to attempt to 'explain away' our persisting conviction that the question is indeed open - perhaps in terms of 'our attachment to an illusory conception of distinctive ethical meaning' (Baldwin 1990: 89).”

Cf. Soames’ ‘expanded open question argument’

. P1.  If for all x, if x is D, then x is good is analytically obvious, then the question (i) Granted that 􏰅 is D, is 􏰅 good? is a trivial self-answering question on a par with (ii), (iii), and (iv). (ii) Granted that 􏰅 is a male sibling of 􏰆, is 􏰅 a sibling of 􏰆? (iii) Granted that 􏰅 is chartreuse, is 􏰅 colored? (iv) Granted that the successor of n =􏰐 the successor of m, is it the case that n 􏰐= m? In each of these cases ((ii–iv)), the proposition corresponding to the question is an obvious necessary and apriori truth; moreover, anyone who truly understands the interrogative sentence, and thereby entertains the question it expresses, must realize that the answer to it is yes—failure to know this would be evidence that one doesn’t fully understand the sentence, or grasp the question. 

. P2.  There is no complex, or simple natural, property P and expression D, such that D expresses P, and the interrogative sentence (i) in P1 expresses a trivial, self-answering question on a par with (ii), (iii), or (iv). C1. Therefore, there is no analytically obvious generality, for all x, if x is D then x is good, in which D expresses either a complex property, or a simple natural property. C2. Thus, there is no extendedly analytic sentence, for all x, if x is D then x is good, in which D expresses either a complex property, or a simple natural property. 

(b) Darwall, Gibbard and Railton's 'open-question' argument

Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton offer another presumption in favor of the Open Question Argument, though they admit that there is no such thing as the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ We can imagine otherwise competent speakers believing that something has a certain property, N, but not being motivated to act in accordance with that belief in the same way we expect them to act in accordance with a belief that something is good. This property, N, might not be action-guiding in the same way that good is action-guiding. Since there is no conceptual link between N and being action-guiding, whether N is itself good is an open-question.

This argument, like Baldwin’s more implicitly, assumes internalism. 

There is a conceptual or internal link between making a moral judgement and being motivated, ceteris paribus, to act as that judgement prescribes. (Internalism) 

Competent and reflective speakers of English are convinced that they are able to imagine clear-headed (and otherwise psychologically healthy) beings who judge that R (some naturalistic property) obtains but who fail to find appropriate reason or motive to act in accordance with that judgement.

If there were no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly, we would expect competent and reflective speakers of English to have the conviction described in (2) 

Therefore,

Therefore, unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in (2), we are entitled to conclude that there is no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly,

And,

the judgement that R obtains isn't a moral judgement [from (1)….because moral judgments entail being motivated].

And,

the property of being morally good is not identical or reducible to the property of being R as a matter of conceptual necessity.

Evaluation of both

Baldwin, unlike GRD, fails to offer an explanation for why competent speakers do not find it natural to guide their actions with conceptual analyses. GRD does offer an explanation: moral judgments are intrinsically motivated, the result of the conceptual analysis is not. 

Moves available to naturalist:

1. Deny internalism.

When discussing a particular philosopher’s view, put an asterisk next to his name (e.g. Lewis*) to indicate that you're not actually committed to getting the view of the real philosopher (e.g. Lewis) completely right. (Cf. Divers - "The Modal Status of the Lewisian Analysis of Modality")

When the terms used have little bearing on the question you are asking, say something like this: “In the main text of the paper, I allow myself to speak in realism-friendly terms. If you find this to be a distraction, feel free to replace them with your favorite terms instead.” Just substitute your own terms if you don't like mine. Apply this rule only if larger questions in your field, such as metaethics (e.g. realism vs. antirealism) or metaphysics (e.g. nominalism vs. realism) are not at stake in your article. (See, for example, David Enoch, "A Defense of Moral Deference")

1.1 What is Metaethics?

Meaning - What is the semantic function of moral discourse? 

Metaphysics - Do moral facts or properties exist?

Epistemology & Justification - Is there such a thing as moral knowledge?  How can we evaluate whether moral judgments are true or false? 

Phenomenology - How are moral qualities represented to an agent making a moral judgment?

Moral psychology - What is the relationship between motivation and moral judgment? 

Objectivity - Is there moral truth?

1.2 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism

Cognitivism: Cognitivists believe that moral judgments are beliefs and can be true or false.

Non-Cognitivism: Non-cognitivists believe that moral judgments express desires or emotions and thus are not truth-apt.

1.25 Strong Cognitivism vs. Weak Cognitivism

Strong Cognitivists believe that: 

moral judgments are apt for truth-evaluation

moral judgments are the upshot of cognitive access to moral properties or states of affairs

Weak Cognitivists accept (a) but reject (b)

1.3 Strong Cognitivism: Naturalism

Naturalists believe that moral properties are identical with or reducible to natural properties. A moral judgment is true or false in virtue of some natural state of affairs. A natural property is, as defined by Moore, the subject of natural sciences or psychology. A natural state of affair involves the instantiation of some natural property. 

Cornell Realists — Believe that moral properties are irreducible natural properties

Richard Boyd (1988 - “How to be a Moral Realist”), Nicholas Sturgeon (1988 - “Moral Explanations), David Brink (1989 - Moral Realism and the Foundation for Ethics)

Naturalist Reductionists — Believe that moral properties are reducible to natural properties

Richard Brandt (1979 - A Theory of the Good and the Right), Peter Railton (1986 - “Moral realism,” “Facts and Values”)

1.4 Strong-Cognitivism: Non-Naturalism

Non-naturalists believe that moral properties are irreducible and sui generis. 

G. E. Moore - moral properties are non-natural, simple, indefinable, and unanalyzable (1903 - Principia Ethica) 

John McDowell (e.g. 1998 - Mind, Value, and Reality) & David Wiggins (e.g. 1987 - “A Sensible Subjectivism”) 

Note: Naturalists and non-naturalists alike are moral realists 

1.5 Strong Cognitivism Without Moral Realism: Mackie’s ‘Error-Theory’

All moral judgments are false because moral judgments are metaphysically queer, we have no epistemological account of how we could access such facts, or how something could be intrinsically motivating once known

All our thinking involves us in a radical error 

Mackie (1977) - Inventing Right and Wrong

1.6 Weak Cognitivism about Moral without Moral Realism: ‘Best Opinion’ Theories

Weak cognitivists accept (a) but reject (b). That is they agree with strong cognitivists that moral judgments are truth-apt, but they do not believe they are the result of cognitively accessing moral properties or states of affairs. 

“An example of a weak cognitivist theory would be a ‘response-dependence’ view which held that our best judgements about morals determine the extensions of moral predicates, rather than based upon some faculty which tracks, detects or cognitively accesses facts about the instantiation of moral properties. ”

Rejects moral realism on the basis that moral facts are not independent of human opinion

Crispin Wright (1988) - “Moral values, projection, and secondary qualities”

1.7 Non-Cognitivism

Non-cognitivists believe that moral judgments do not express beliefs and are thus not truth-apt.

A. J. Ayer’s Expressivism (1936 - Language, Truth, and Logic) — moral judgments express emotions and sentiments 

Simon Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism (1984 - Spreading the Word) — moral judgments express the dispositions to form sentiments of approval or disapproval

Allan Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism (1990 - Wise Choices, Apt Feelings) — moral judgments express our acceptance of norms

Objection: Frege-Geach Problem — how to deal with statements such as “murder is wrong,” where the statement is not expressing an emotion, as, for example, when featured in a conditional 

Argument from moral psychology:

Moral judgments can express beliefs (Cognitivist Assumption)

Being motivated to do something requires a belief & a desire (Humean Theory of Motivation)

There is an internal and necessary connection between judging something is good and pursuing it (Intenalism)

If a moral judgment expressed a belief, then this belief would have to be internally and necessarily connected to a desire (by 3)

But 4 is impossible, because, as Hume said, desires and belief are distinct existences, and there are no internal and necessary connections between distinct existences

Therefore, our assumption that moral judgments can express beliefs (1) must be false. 

Non-cognitivists deny 1

Railton and Brink deny 3 (Internalism); they are externalists

McDwowell and Wiggins deny 2 (The Humean Theory of Motivation); they are anti-Humeans 

1.8 Internalism and Externalism, Humeanism and Anti-Humeanism 

Internalism: There is an internal or conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation

Externalism: There is only an external and contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation

Humeanism: Motivation to act in accordance with a moral judgment requires both a belief and a desire.