Liu Yin (Chinese, 1984) - Summer (2025)

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Liu Yin (Chinese, 1984) - Summer (2025)

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âIt was a quiet way -- ...â
by Emily Dickinson
It was a quiet way â He asked if I was his â I made no answer of the Tongue But answer of the Eyes â And then He bore me on Before this mortal noise With swiftness, as of Chariots And distance, as of Wheels. This World did drop away As Acres from the feet Of one that leaneth from Balloon Upon an Ether street. The Gulf behind was not, The Continents were new â Eternity it was before Eternity was due. No Seasons were to us â It was not Night nor Morn â But Sunrise stopped upon the place And fastened it in Dawn.
I asked someone out on a 2nd date earlier this afternoon and have been waiting on a reply. I went out walking to enjoy the late summer solstice day, listening to animal collective and Jonathan Richman, I was thinking Iâd never felt more in sympathy with the summer elements on a solstice before now. I had just rewatched Rohmerâs A Summerâs Tale, a movie where a guy goes out on summer vacation and has trouble deciding between three women he could possibly go on a beach trip with (and in part such a difficult movie to watch, because itâs very obvious he should put all his effort into dating Margot). While out walking and thinking about the movie, I saw three rabbits chasing each other in a circle, with a lightning bug hovering above them all. By the end of my walk, as the twilight fully set in, the lightning bugs were in every lawn; some would come and hover next to me, keeping up with my slow steps and turning left and right. The fact I havenât gotten a reply yet makes me pessimistic about the 2nd date happening (though, realistically, Iâm never sure if this timing stuff means anything). Part of me might be glad because it allows me to continue fantasizing about dating another woman Iâm planning to ask out when she returns to the states later this summer. Thereâs still just a bit of light out now at 9:30, honestly a disappointing amount given itâs the solstice, but itâs a cloudy day: earlier while walking I could see the moon in the sky only hazily behind some clouds.
Wrestling with alligators and playing poker with chipmunks
mina loy

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The kantian ideal of a form of justice capable of being assented to by all rational agents in a social whole in abstraction from their own interests and positions could be overly idealist: that is, it requires too strong an ideal of consensus when a rational democratic society must likely expect to operate by means of compromise to achieve measurable outcomes that members of the society agree are desirable. On the other hand, there is something about it as an orienting paradigm I canât entirely dismiss still. Similarly, I am not sure if I can agree with the kantian criterion of beauty as something that although presented to one as an entirely singular instance not capable of being subsumed under an intersubjectively communicable concept, is nevertheless judged as beautiful, and thus felt as pleasing, by virtue of our thinking that all other subjects given this presentation would judge the same. Still, I think there is something to it that canât be flatly dismissed. If beauty is not a result of conceptually determinate properties, what does it mean to communicate to others that something is beautifulâand thus to share it with others? Perhaps it is only the agreement of a wide enough quantity of agents in identifying something as agreeable or desirable, but it seems to be more than that in requiring a specific social context transcending ordinary desire.
Thereâs a lot that could be said on how the immediate world can be beautiful and pleasant and yet the anticipated world terrifying. One interesting aspect of this is that sometimes those anticipations are rational and other times they are not. We live out our days in large part entertaining propositions about the anticipated world, our hopes and fears or even quite simply our curious attempts at prediction. When we are not doing so, we may be entertaining propositions about objects that transcend our personal lives (be these concerning God, scientific theories, literature, or what have you). On the other hand the immediate vicinity, when inspected, is infinite: it is everything that actually exists. The problem is that what actually exists has in its essence its necessity to give way to future events, and its possibility to be succeeded by events of varying forms that thus vary in desirability. We are forced to journey along the fine line of enjoying the full actual present and preparing ourselves for future enjoyments.
Had a dream featuring my mother where I suddenly realized she was losing her hair (presumably due to old age). Later this morning, reading Platonov's Chevengur, I got to a part where a character (Kopionkin) also dreamed of his old mother, who in turn began to become identified with an aged and sickly Rosa Luxembourg.
Attempting to describe the sight and smell of the secret fire that lies beneath the hidden mountain
Has the US suffered a more humiliating military defeat than what it appears we are suffering in the Iran War? Was Vietnam worse than this or on a par? The causes for the USâs involvement in Vietnam were at least a bit more manifold and not coming down to the stupidity of such a select few individuals in such a short span of time. Surely this is world historically embarrassing for the Trump regime. But if there really is billions of dollars from private businesses about to get funneled into Iran, maybe that will have a net positive effect for the Middle East. Especially since Israel is now looking increasingly ruined.

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archived on 2009-04-27 19:55:44
The Room, Tarzana, David Hockney, 1967
Can the music of a single phrase be equivalent to that of many such phrases?
Walking around in the sun and breeze, this afternoon Iâm the coolest of the chill guys existing on this planar realm of temporary purgatorial satisfaction
My hardened battle gnome is marching to the frontlines for one last war of lust and steel

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The bookâs principal limitations emerge at the macro level, where Schuringaâs overarching Marxist narrative at times feels imposed rather than earned. His portrayal of analytic philosophy as primarily a vehicle for bourgeois liberal ideologyââthe passive reception of inert factsâ, as he puts it (p. 4)âcan serve as a valuable critical lens for diagnosing certain methodological pathologies. The practice of âintuition pumpingâ, for example, in which intuitions are treated as quasi-experimental data (p. 231), has undeniably fostered otherworldly metaphysics and absolutist ethics. Such tendencies fully warrant the sharp critique Schuringa directs at them, and they align convincingly with his analysis of a liberal ideology that transforms illusions into unquestionable facts.
Yet a history of analytic philosophy should, at precisely this juncture, distinguish these developments as pathologies rather than as constitutive of the tradition itself. They stand in clear tension with its methodological foundations, especially as articulated by the logical empiricists. Schuringa unfortunately overlooks the fact that more sophisticated methodological frameworksâsuch as Carnapâs method of explication and his framework-relativismâhave recently enjoyed renewed attention for precisely this reason: they underwrite contemporary forms of conceptual engineering (e.g., Sally Haslanger) and formal ontology (e.g., Amie Thomasson) that are not only compatible with politically engaged philosophical projects (including potentially Marxist ones) but also decisively undermine the forms of foundationalism that Schuringa treats as analytic philosophyâs original sin and its supposed bourgeois core.
⌠One wishes he had taken the final step and traced a genuinely Marxist genealogy within analytic philosophy, rather than positioning Marxism solely in opposition to it. Doing so would not only have enhanced historical accuracy but also clarified the stakes of his argument. For if the left Vienna Circle and the Austro-Marxists were right, then orthodox Marxism-Leninism stands fundamentally at odds with both science and democracy. A political philosophy that aspires to be genuinely scientific and democratic cannot be Marxist in Leninâs sense. Instead, it must approximate the Vienna Circleâs visionâone that unites objective scientific inquiry with the evaluative and practical attitudes of individualsâwhereas Leninism sacrifices both scientific objectivity and individual freedom.
The real tension, therefore, lies within the Marxist tradition itself: between a dialectical-metaphysical understanding and a non-foundationalist, empiri cist conception of socialism. These perspectives are largely incompatible, rep resenting a decisive parting of ways that leads to two distinct lineagesâone stemming from Lenin, the other from Mach. A history of analytic philosophy that implicitly sides with Lenin from the outset can scarcely account for the movementâs political dimensions and will almost inevitably deny the existence of a genuinely Marxist current within analytic philosophy. âŚ
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Christian DambĂśck, âA Great Introduction to Analytic Philosophy and a Missed Opportunityâ
Noncognitivism is the view that moral statements do not express beliefs that can be either true or false, and thus these statements are not capable of truth. Moral statements are a matter of individual attitude, and there is no way to justify a moral statement beyond the mere fact that it expresses the wishes and desires of a person or group. Carnap was certainly an advocate of this view. But he adopted this noncognitivism only in a limited way, using the possibilities of rationality and science as âconstraintsâ (Carus 2017, 176). These constraints limit the noncognitivism of our moral attitudes insofar as a value is only rationally acceptable if it is the result of an epistemic process that takes these constraints or meta-values into account. What is special about meta-values is that, unlike all object-level values, there is clearly a sense in which we can take them to be cognitively justified.
Epistemic values are the most uncontroversial example of epistemically justified meta-values. They are justified because they lead to the production of true scientific claims and scientific knowledge, and their absence leads to the production of false claims and the absence of knowledge. But there are other meta-values that can also be seen as cognitively justified. These other meta-values also depend on epistemic values in that they use the possibilities of science and rationality to make our decisions more genuine, farsighted, and social. These values have something to do with instrumental rationality because they are all tied with investigation of consequences of a value or possible action and the task to choose desirable consequences and discard undesirable ones. Because these values concern fundamental rational principles that also guide scientific decision making, I will call them rational meta-values.
âŚ
Rational meta-values are epistemically justified, but unlike epistemic values, only indirectly, because the decisions they produce cannot be true or false in themselves. However, to act against these values is to make decisions that we later regret because they lead to consequences that we find undesirable, are inconsistent with other values, appear to be the result of a momentary surge of emotion or manipulation, or are non-cooperative and thus suffer from the fact that we must assume that there is a group of opponents who cannot accept our decisions and will therefore fight against them. In this sense, even though rational meta-values do not lead to claims that are true or false, but to decisions that cannot be true or false in themselves, these values are still cognitively justified because they characterize the good epistemic practice of rational reasoning.
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Christian DambĂśck, âCarnapâs Scientific Humanismâ