Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-Whole, and Being-Towards-Death (II.II, 279-311)
SECTION 46: The Impossibility of Being-a-whole
Heidegger lays out the big claim that “It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled“ with the lovely example “Hopelessness, for instance, does not tear Dasein away from its possibilities, but is only one of its own modes of Being towards these possibilities” (277). So, we Daseins are always Being-towards our possibilities. In fact, once Dasein no longer has any outstanding potentialities, it loses its Being-in-the-world and is no longer an entity. After a few ambiguous rhetorical questions, he lays out what he’s going to be talking about: death.
SECTION 47: The Death of Others and Grasping a Whole Dasein
When an Other dies, all of a sudden his/her Being gets transformed from Being-in-the-World to “Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more" (281). But that’s not to say s/he is just a “lifeless material Thing.” Instead, s/he’s now unalive (282). That former Dasein has not become a ready-to-hand object with which we have a concernful relationship; we get to carry on a form of Being-with. At the same time, though, “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him” (284). Actually, this whole bit on 283-4 is pretty confusing; it might be worth some close examination.
Heidegger wraps up the section by talking about how we need to “form a purely existential conception" of death. He’s going to get into it more in the next section, but don’t go with those lame physiological and biological definitions that are hung up on it being about the end of life.
SECTION 48: The End; Totality
Heidegger lays out three theses about death:
the belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a “not yet"
the coming-to-its-end of what-is-not-yet-at-an-end has the character of no-longer-Dasein (basically, death is the end of Dasein, not of life)
coming-to-an-end implies a mode of Being in which the particular Dasein simply cannot be represented by someone else (286)
Do not, Heidegger insists, misconstrue Dasein’s “not yet" as “outstanding.“ “Outstanding” is for things that have “belonging-to"—the sort of things we call “ready to hand.“ To illustrate this, Heidegger has some fun with the partially full moon and unripe fruit. Why? Even though all three have a “not yet,” the non-Daseins are on a path to self-fulfillment. Dasein’s don’t get to see their ends in that same sense. For fruit, fulfillment and death always coincide. Not so for Daseins.
But, for Daseins, Death isn’t simply disappearing (the way he describes the end of roads or rain). We know we Daseins are “Being-towards-the-end,” but it’s still a bit unclear what that end is (289). It’s not the end of fruit or of roads, but what is it? Heidegger wraps up by admitting that he would do well to come up with a positive definition of it. Next chapter!
SECTION 49: An Existential Analysis of Death
Heidegger talks a bit about biology and ontology. Guess which one is subordinate to the other? Of course, magnanimous victor that he is, Heidegger the ontologist says that the biologist’s definition of death is still worth talking about; but he’ll refer to biological dying as demise instead of death. Real dying, on the other hand, is “the way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death” (291). Don’t worry, Heidegger is going to get to what exactly “death" is at some point, but not in this chapter. Instead, he’s going to go on a tangent dismissing questions of the afterlife because we’ve got to figure out what’s happening in this world, first. That shit’s really pretty ontical, anyway. So let’s dive in further with the ontological issue of “Being-towards-the-end" (293).
SECTION 50: The Existential-ontological Structure of Death
After a helpful review of various modes of Being on 293, Heidegger trashes the idea of “not yet" as “outstanding" again, with the ominous insistence that “Death is something that stands before us—something impending” (294). Of course, Heidegger admits, there are a lot of things besides death that can also impend. The difference is that death is super-personal. Heidegger describes it as the “possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.” It is “distinctively impending” (294). So, despite all our Being-with, death seems to be pretty individual. We can’t get out of its impendingness, and it’s for just us. Feel special?
And how did we wind up in this relationship towards death? That’s right. We were thrown into it. Heidegger introduces another important term here: anxiety. Anxiety is our (primordial) state of mind facing our thrownness towards death, not to be confused with fear of death. Those who aren’t contemplating their deaths aren’t free of this state either; instead they’re simply “fleeing in the face of it" (295).
Wrapping up, Heidegger notes that “existence, facticity, and falling characterize Being-towards-the-end"—bringing us to a big claim: “dying is grounded in care” (296). He’ll come back to that claim, but, in the meantime, he lets us know he wants to talk about inauthenticity a bit more.
SECTION 51: Being-towards-death and Everydayness
The “they" are back, and now they’re doing everything they can to acknowledge death while keeping actually facing it as far away from us as possible. Heidegger does an impression of them: “One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us" (297). Of course, the “one" dying is always “nobody.“ Just like idle talk, discussion of death renders it completely ambiguous. Heidegger drops a pretty good zinger, charging that ”The “they" does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death.“ Instead, they put us in the mode of “falling,” where we are constantly “fleeing in the face of death” (298). Fucking they. Remember, though, even fleeing from death is still a mode of Being-towards-it. Heidegger underscores this point by deploying his first use of bold in the text.
SECTION 52: Everydayness and the Existential Conception of Death
Now Heidegger wants to talk about our certainty of death, even when we’re being inauthentic and pretending we’re not. He reminds us that certainty is grounded in truth, which in tern signifies disclosedness. From there, Heidegger does a quick detour to discuss the stupid certainty of the “they" who only are certain about death because of the empirical fact of demise. Losers. Instead, Heidegger uses the Derrida move that Anne mentioned last week to prove our certainly: “In evading its death, even everyday Being-toward-the-end is indeed certain of its death” (302). Convinced? The “they" also tries to rationalize that “Death certainly comes, but not right away.“ Assholes. The reality, Heidegger bluntly reminds us, is that ”it is possible at any moment.“ In fact, the ”indefiniteness“ of death accompanies its certainty.
So, with indefiniteness in the fold, Heidegger gives us a slightly fuller existential-ontological conception of death: ”death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility—non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped.“ And yes, we are still Being-towards it. He also reiterates that “not yet” stems not from something outstanding but rather from Dasein being “ahead-of-itself" (303). And, of course, fleeing in the face of it is a mode of Being-towards-death—just an inauthentic one. So now all we need to figure out is how to be authentic about the whole affair.
SECTION 53: Authentic Being-towards-death
Heidegger is very insistent here that we conceive of Being-towards-death as Being-towards a possibility. This isn’t the same as “expecting" death, which would just be “waiting for that actualization” (306). Instead, Heidegger uses “anticipation" to describe our Being-towards this possibility (with a translator’s note).
And now things get complicated. Here’s my best shot. Let’s discuss these last five pages in detail.
Anticipating death properly isn’t thinking about it’s actualization; it’s understanding it “as the possibility of the impossibility of existence at all” (307). So it’s not the sort of thing we can picture or talk about. I think. And then somehow, I think, considering that possibility allows us to consider our potentiality-for-Being—authentic existence—because death can wrench us away from the they.We still are caught up in solicitude and concern, but we get to consider our ownmost possibility. We get to think about “existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being“ (309).
After a quick reiteration of the certainty and truth of death, Heidegger makes the point that anticipation of death is Dasein opening itself to a ”threat arising out of its own ‘there’,“ returning us to anxiety. The upshot of all of this, a release from the they, the possibility of being oneself, and ”freedom towards death“ (Heidegger’s bold, 311). In closing, though, Heidegger acknowledges the difficulty of this awesome authenticity. How do we make this ontological possibility ontically real?
