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Not my image. We've got more brands signalling an anti-capitalist message. This time through a metapolitical aesthetic of minimalism compared to the !!! Bazinga bazinga we got a 2.1% sale if you buy a JUMBO SIZE COCONUT but ACT NOW Maximalism of regular advertisements. Despite this, the brand 'No Name' is actually run by a megacorp, Loblaw Companies Limited.
By the way, Roy, here, another example. Yeah you know what fucking cluely is? Does anyone want to fucking know? It's AI. It's just an AI transcriper/note taker. It was sold with the tagline: "help you cheat on anything' Fuck you. Fuck you Roy Lee. Take your cultural capitalism and shove it up your fucking ass.
“Im not saying I love the movie, but in a way I admire the movie Kung Fu Panda”
I had a dream where my friend randomly has Slavoj Zizek at his house and he was just watching the television. Yes another dream with a philosopher
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Condillac, whom Nietzsche admired greatly, replaced the hypothetical figure of a “blind man made to see” with an entirely virtual model: that of a statue internally organized just as we are, but covered on the outside with marble, and animated by a spirit that induces no ideas in it.
The marble that covers the surface of the statue does not allow it to use any of its senses.
In the mental experiment involving this statue, Condillac removes portions of the marble from its body bit by bit, in order to clear (in different combinations) the way for different senses, and to “observe” what happens.
In relation to the sense of sight, Condillac introduces an interesting distinction: “The statue doesn’t need to learn how to see, but it has to learn how to look. . . .It seems that we don’t know that there is a difference between seeing [voir] and looking [regarder].”
The statue does not need to learn how to see, because it sees all there is to see, that is, a colored net of light (generally considered to be the only “pure sight”).
However, the statue has to learn how to look—that is to say, how to “put things in perspective.”
The dichotomy between “net of light” and (perspectival) depth of field was central to this debate, and the passage from the former to the latter was conceived as the moment of the constitution of the ego.
The statue, limited only to the sense of sight, was supposed to perceive what it saw as part of itself.
In other words,the statue that sees only the net of light sees no-thing, because what it sees is a part of itself qua thing.
The sense of touch must gradually teach it how to look—that is, make it conceive of the consciousness of what it sees as a consciousness of something other than itself, of something exterior (i.e. as something that “is seen” outside).
The statue, being at first nothing but part of a net composed of rays and sparkling colors, now emerges as an eye, as the organ of sense.
That is to say: the constitution of the ego (and of its limits) corresponds to the statue abandoning a portion of itself (and of its life) to the outer world, to the world of objects that are themselves constituted in this very same gesture.
The statue ceases to be a thing, and becomes a subject, at the moment when a part of itself is irredeemably lost, and transformed into an object.
The Shortest Shadow
A. Zupancic
Ok yeah it’s true I know I said Mr Eastern Europe to supply the idea that this a place w less cultural diversity than many others what is that sociological term lol bc they all speak the same language in some places but they war like … but still Islam has also been in Eastern Europe for a very long time making things more perplexing
Lacan's further point is that this covert Sadean dimension of an "ethical (sexual) passion" is not read into Kant by our eccentric interpretation, but is inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice. If we put aside the body of "circumstantial evidence" for it (isn't Kant's infamous definition of marriage-"the contract between two adults of the opposite sex about the mutual use of each other's sexual organs"-thoroughly Sadean, since it reduces the Other, the subject's sexual partner, to a partial object, to his/her bodily organ which provides pleasure, ignoring him/her as the Whole of a human Person?), the crucial clue that allows us to discern the contours of "Sade in Kant" is the way Kant conceptualizes the relationship between sentiments (feelings) and the moral Law. Although Kant insists on the absolute gap between pathological sentiments and the pure form of moral Law, there is one a priori sentiment that the subject necessarily experiences when confronted with the injunction of the moral Law, the pain of humiliation (because of man's hurt pride, due to the "radical Evil" of human nature); for Lacan, this Kantian privileging of pain as the only a priori sentiment is strictly correlative to Sade's notion of pain (torturing and humiliating the other, being tortured and humiliated by him) as the privileged way of access to sexual jouissance (Sade's argument, of course, is that pain is to be given priority over pleasure on account of its greater longevity-pleasures are passing, while pain can last almost indefinitely). This link can be further substantiated by what Lacan calls the Sadean fundamental fantasy: the fantasy of another, ethereal body of the victim, which can be tortured indefinitely and nonetheless magically retains its beauty (see the standard Sadean figure of a young girl sustaining endless humiliations and mutilations from her deprived torturer and somehow mysteriously surviving it all intact, in the same way Tom and Jerry and other cartoon heroes survive all their ridiculous ordeals intact). Doesn't this fantasy provide the libidinal foundation of the Kantian postulate of the immortality of the soul endlessly striving to achieve ethical perfection, i.e., is not the phantasmic "truth" of the immortality of the soul its exact opposite, the immortality of the body, its ability to sustain endless pain and humiliation? Judith Butler pointed out that the Foucaultian "body" as the site of resistance is none other than the Freudian "psyche": paradoxically, "body" is Foucault's name for the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists the soul's domination. That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the "prison of the body," Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-Christian definition of the body as the "prison of the soul," what he calls "body" is not simply the biological body, but is effectively already caught into some kind of pre-subjective psychic apparatus. Consequently, don't we encounter in Kant a secret homologous inversion, only in the opposite direction, of the relationship between body and soul: what Kant calls "immortality of the soul" is effectively the immortality of the other, ethereal, "undead" body?
Kant and Sade: the Ideal Couple Zizek 1998