The long read: When she was 30, Suzy Hansen left the US for Istanbul â and began to realise that Americans will never understand their own country until they see it as the rest of the world does
By the end of my first year abroad, I read US newspapers differently. I could see how alienating they were to foreigners, the way articles spoke always from a position of American power, treating foreign countries as if they were Americaâs misbehaving children. I listened to my compatriots with critical ears: the way our discussion of foreign policy had become infused since September 11 with these officious, official words, bureaucratic corporate military language: collateral damage, imminent threat, freedom, freedom, freedom.
Even so, I was conscious that if I had long ago succumbed to the pathology of American nationalism, I wouldnât know it â even if I understood the history of injustice in America, even if I was furious about the invasion of Iraq. I was a white American. I still had this fundamental faith in my country in a way that suddenly, in comparison to the Turks, made me feel immature and naive.
I came to notice that a community of activists and intellectuals in Turkey â the liberal ones â were indeed questioning what âTurkishnessâ meant in new ways. Many of them had been brainwashed in their schools about their own history; about AtatĂźrk, Turkeyâs first president; about the supposed evil of the Armenians and the Kurds and the Arabs; about the fragility of their borders and the rapaciousness of all outsiders; and about the historic and eternal goodness of the Turkish republic.
âIt is different in the United States,â I once said, not entirely realising what I was saying until the words came out. I had never been called upon to explain this. âWe are told it is the greatest country on earth. The thing is, we will never reconsider that narrative the way you are doing just now, because to us, that isnât propaganda, that is truth. And to us, that isnât nationalism, itâs patriotism. And the thing is, we will never question any of it because at the same time, all we are being told is how free-thinking we are, that we are free. So we donât know there is anything wrong in believing our country is the greatest on earth. The whole thing sort of convinces you that a collective consciousness in the world came to that very conclusion.â
âWow,â a friend once replied. âHow strange. That is a very quiet kind of fascism, isnât it?â
It was a quiet kind of fascism that would mean I would always see Turkey as beneath the country I came from, and also that would mean I believed my uniquely benevolent country to have uniquely benevolent intentions towards the peoples of the world.
During that night of conspiracy theories, Emre had alleged, as foreigners often did, that I was a spy. The information that I was collecting as a journalist, Emre said, was really being used for something else. As an American emissary in the wider world, writing about foreigners, governments, economies partaking in some larger system and scheme of things, I was an agent somehow. Emre lived in the American world as a foreigner, as someone less powerful, as someone for whom one newspaper article could mean war, or one misplaced opinion could mean an intervention by the International Monetary Fund. My attitude, my prejudice, my lack of generosity could be entirely false, inaccurate or damaging, but would be taken for truth by the newspapers and magazines I wrote for, thus shaping perceptions of Turkey for ever.
Years later, an American journalist told me he loved working for a major newspaper because the White House read it, because he could âinfluence policyâ. Emre had told me how likely it was I would screw this up. He was saying to me: first, spy, do no harm.
most of the article is boring but the last little bit really tells it like it is
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