Enviro Blog

Well, this is the end of the road (for now).  With the semester heating up towards exam-time, this assessment is finishing up, and it's time to assess how I think we have done.  All in all, blogging has been a steep, but successful, learning curve for me.  I know little about e-communication, so it has been exciting and challenging to learn more.  In terms of content, applying IEM theory to contemporary events in the media is the best way to come to grips with what IEM looks like (and what it doesn't look like!) in the real world.  It has been fascinating to find out just what a wide difference there is in the way various environmental issues are approached, perceived, and dealt with, in reality, and it becomes easier and easier to judge management processes from an integrated perspective.  In terms of a successful blog, you will have to be the judge, but I have definitely struggled with attracting an audience, as the stats will show. 

From the months of July to October, almost 900 people visited this blog.

20% visitors decided to come back!

The issues discussed are obviously not unique to NZ, as evident in visits from other countries ...

Another week, another issue that gets my goat!  This time the National Government, in all its wisdom, has added the RMA to the list of policy 'amendments':

Widespread concern over proposed RMA changes (Scoop)

Proposed reform of the Resource Management Act (Local Government NZ)

RMA changes proposed in report (The Dominion Post)

Since the early 1980s there has occurred what some would describe as a Paradigm shift in both the judiciary and the polity of New Zealand, creating an opportunity to embed principles of sustainability, kaitiakitanga, and IEM,  within the legal and cultural framework of New Zealand resource management.  The strongest movement has come from the implementation in 1991 of the Resource Management Act, which holds as its sole purpose the sustainable management of resources.

The Principles set out the requirements to protect what is special and unique about New Zealand.The principles in section 6 currently include the requirement for protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes, the protection of significant indigenous vegetation and habitats, and preservation of natural character and the maintenance and enhancement of public access.  The TAG proposes to remove the requirements to protect, preserve or maintain and enhance key qualities of the environment. They also propose to limit consideration to regionally significant values thus preventing national policy and standards of protection.  The group proposes removing the reference to intrinsic values of ecosystems, finite characteristics of resources, maintenance and enhancement of amenity values, and the ethic of stewardship.

The proposal to remove consideration of intrinsic values show the TAG simply view the environment as a slave of people and ignores all that provide the wonder, beauty and inspiration from the environment.

The National Government have commissioned a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) study to propose broad and sweeping changes to this Act, which has been seen, until now, as a beacon by other nations aiming towards better environmental policy and planning.  these changes are aimed at removing the requirement for sustainability, and balancing resource use against the benefits of development and economic growth.  They do this while at the same time drumming up public support through use of  flimsy rhetoric about the environment and ‘greenies’ getting in the way of the economy, growth, and jobs, and going against the kiwi ‘no-nonsense’ ‘can-do’ attitude. Rod Oram, one of my favourite political pundits, has criticised the government for trying to conceal their (very obvious) agenda in amendments to natural hazard provisions of the act:

Rod Oram's Sunday Start Times column

He says: “The TAG is wrong on many other assertions it makes. It says, for example, that the RMA can’t adequately handle issues such as infrastructure, natural hazards and urban form. Thus, it says, the only solution is to radically rewrite sections 6 and 7, the operational heart of the Act.”   The proposed rewrite of the Principles of the Act would deeply wound environmental protection and are not required to strengthen the consideration of natural hazards under the Act. The Government also want to scrap the Environment Court, citing reasons of undue delay to consenting procedures in the mining sector.  Overall the changes would shift the RMA from being a statute that enables development while managing its adverse effects, to one that actively promotes certain categories of development.  This demonstrates perfectly the work of Burhs (2009) about the difference between policy integration and institutional integration, and the need to ‘green’ them both in order to achieve IEM. 

The RMA, and the Environment Court are, in my opinion,  great institutions to enable integrated, green policy, and environmental outcomes.  But the policy objectives of the incumbent government are not aligned with the institutional objectives,  and when these are not coordinated, IEM outcomes are very unlike to occur. Green spokeswoman Eugenie Sage said the proposed changes were a major assault on the RMA and on sustainable management.

Something that has caught my eye this week, and that I feel very strongly about, are the Government’s proposed amendments to the ETS.  Of course, what this means in practise, is that it is pulling out all its teeth, small and blunt though they were, so that it will not be worth the paper it was agonisingly drafted on.

When National came to power they significantly weakened the ETS through a $25 cap on the price of carbon, a two-for-one deal to effectively halve the market price, an exceptionally long phase-out of subsidies for exporters so they would meet only 50% of their obligations by 2050, not to mention a delay in agriculture’s entry into the ETS.  In the three or four years before forestry was brought into the scheme there was a "chainsaw massacre", in which a scramble to fell pre-1990 plantation forests was undertaken, before doing so would incur a deforestation liability.  This is exactly what climate policy, and in particular a carbon market, should be trying to avoid!

The latest amendment bill, which the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment calls “a farce”, makes all the temporary relief that was given to agriculture and forestry sectors permanent, even though international carbon prices have continued to plummet to $3-$4 a tonne. According to Rod Oram's column in the Sunday Star Times, this means that polluters in New Zealand will only have to face up to 5% of their emission costs indefinitely.

The amendment bill will also allow polluters to continue to meet 100% of their obligations by buying offshore credits. This is hugely attractive to them because the global market is drowning in a seemingly limitless supply of very cheap carbon credits. While those credits are technically legitimate, the vast majority are essentially scams. For example, Russia has plenty to sell because its industrial activity has collapsed.

Purchase of such credits by a NZ polluter does nothing to incentivise its own changes in technology or energy efficiency. Worse, the failure to buy NZ credits means forest owners and other generators of real reductions in carbon here get no reward.

Meanwhile, other countries are starting to clean up there acts.  The EU is overhauling its ETS to reduce the over supply of environmentally worthless credits. It already has an import cap averaging 20% while Australia’s cap is 50%. Among countries with some form of carbon pricing we are alone in having no limit on imported credits.

As a result, we’re destroying the domestic market for our credits. Understandably foresters, particularly those who planted lots of trees once the ETS was passed, are deeply aggrieved. They accept the international carbon price is market-set but they are appalled the government is trashing the local market through its amendments to the ETS.

Given the loss of the carbon value in trees, we’ll see fewer planted, more harvested but not replanted and more protests from forest owners, particularly Maori ones who were banking on carbon contributing value to the forest assets they received in treaty settlements.

This is also deeply damaging to our international reputation. We are the first country to include forest credits in its emissions trading scheme. But we are blowing the opportunity to prove the economic and environmental value of that and the integrity of such credits.

Heavy emitters don’t care because they can buy dirt-cheap, tainted credits overseas; and they don’t care that one day the international carbon price will start to rise.

They believe their subsidies and price caps will be long protected by the government’s planned amendments to the ETS. They also like the government’s plan to drop the regular independent reviews of the ETS. Likewise many leaders in the agricultural sector believe that the government will keep farming out of the ETS for years to come.

Emissions will rise faster, taxpayer liabilities will soar, deforestation will accelerate, our shift to clean and efficient technologies will stall, agriculture’s reputation will be hammered, regulatory uncertainty will escalate for business, public cynicism about government will deepen, Maori will add trees to their water grievances and New Zealand’s credibility in international negotiations will plummet. 

The Government has obviously failed to properly define the issue, and is framing the problem around supporting national industry and promoting a growth-based 'jobs' economy.  If it considered the real issues behind the ETS, it would realise that it was imperative to keep the price on Carbon at realistic levels, and address the externality problem that carbon emissions present under an open-slather system.  As Bardwell (1991) tells us, 90% of problem solving is spent solving the wrong problem, statting the problem so it cannot be solved, solving a solution, stating the problem too generally, and trying to get agreement on a solution before there is agreement on the solution.  It can be seen that the Government here is making several of these mistakes:

It is solving the wrong problem by trying to use the ETS to protect NZ industry and economy from foreign economies, basically adopting a free-rider position while the EU, Australia, and others make the required sacrifices.

By making amendments to the ETS, which was only just getting established, it is solving a solution, rather than the problem.  Instead, these amendments will have the reverse effect, causing an increase in emissions, and removing all incentives to reduce pollution.

ARTICLES: http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10151063563036709

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10836723

http://www.voxy.co.nz/politics/doctors-demand-govt-come-clean-emissions-trading-scheme/5/135218

The Forestry Association says a collapse in carbon prices has resulted in a lack of confidence in new planting.

Recently, as part of our group assignment, I have been looking at regulatory guidance, and the extent to which IEM principles are reflected within this in New Zealand.  In particular this week, I've been looking at how the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) for the Lyttelton Port Company Reclamation stacks up when assessed against some IEM criteria that we formulated for the task.  I think the results are pretty concerning, given the major environmental effects that this piece of legislation would have have had.  This particular Regulatory Impact Statement was prepared by the Ministry for the Environment, and provides an analysis of three options for a streamlined resource consent process to be included in an Order in Council (OIC) for the Lyttelton Port Company (LPC) to construct a reclamation up to 10 hectares (ha).  An analysis is presented of the different options available to the Lyttelton Port Company (LPC), and their accompanying timeframes, to gain consent to complete its land reclamation.  

The LPC and Government’s shared objective was to gain consent to complete its reclamation in the shortest amount of time possible through a non-notified consent process.  The RIS presents a range of three options, all or which state clearly how they will alter the status quo.  However, the range of options presented is poor, and are premised with a presumption that the reclamation is required, and must be made in that particular location, by the LPC.  The only component of the considered options that is measured is the timeframe in which the LPC can complete the reclamation.  

The preferred option allows for the application to be processed in the shortest amount of time.  The RIS clearly states how the preferred option will be given effect, however, communication with other agencies and enforcement procedures are not outlined in specific detail.  The RIS was prepared by The Ministry for the Environment, which was certainly the appropriate agency; however, a distinct bias against appropriate environmental management and towards economic efficiency was evident.  

There is a clear and obvious presumption that a particular outcome is going to occur, and that this decision has been made before regulatory analysis has been undertaken.  This demonstrates that RIS has not been integrated within the policy-making process.  This RIS appears to have been prepared as merely an additional procedural requirement that, at best, explains the merits of the policy decision, rather than actually assisting to determine the decision itself.

Although the RIS followed many of the requirements set out in the Cabinet Guides’ best practise guidelines, it was not an environmentally integrated RIS.  It has a narrow focus with issue characterisation, objectives, and regulatory options all focused around timeframes with little emphasis on other social, environmental, or cultural factors.  

The history of Lyttelton Port in the context of the current issue was covered comprehensively by the RIS:  Prior to the Christchurch earthquakes Lyttelton Port was the main deep water port for the South Island, however, due to the earthquakes the port lost 25 to 35% of its operating space, significantly reducing its operating capacity.  The RIS identifies the port as a “lifeline utility” for economic prosperity of the region, and also for getting required building supplies into Christchurch for the rebuild.  The issue has been characterised in terms of timeframes with the status quo identified as the LPC having to go through the normal resource consent process of notification, submissions, and a hearing.

Costs and benefits were not identified in monetary terms in this section but identified as timeframes which may be an appropriate analysis for this issue.  The RIS ignores the environmental impacts of building waste entering the Lyttelton Harbour as part of the reclamation: these are viewed purely in terms of earthquake recovery efficiency and are not future focused.  

The RIS opts to trade a non-notified resource consent for a reduced level of consultation and reduced environmental control for councils within their regions.  The RIS overtly acknowledges a lack of public participation, community awareness, or collaboration with other institutions and stakeholders in the creation of the RIS This RIS supports and recommends a top-down, declamatory approach to solving the regulatory problem, no coordination is outlined, administration is delegated only as far as  ‘relevant local authorities’, and no costs are considered.  Conflict, bargaining, and negotiation are ignored and ruled out when considering the options proposed under the RIS.  

No review of the RIS has been conducted by any external agency, and no mention of any future review is mentioned within the RIS.  Formalities that should have occurred included the collection of quality data, proper consultation with affected parties, the reclamation be publicly notified and the Council have input in to the reclamation consent.  Instead, a top-down approach from central government prevailed under the flag of the port being a “lifeline utility” for the earthquake recovery and that the reclamation needed to be fast tracked.

Articles:

Lyttelton Port

Burwood

Asbestos / Burwood

Asbestos

Landfill

I think this is a great decision by the Environment Court, which provides a perfect example of pressure points, and how by solving such contentious issues, you can make way for real progress on a holistic whole-of-systems approach to managing waterways and agriculture.  Aside from the polarised conflict still between farmers, the Court, and the Council, I think this is evidence of an IEM outcome.  This was a sticking-point that blocked progess on both properly monitoring and regulating the effects of intensive dairy farming, and made cleaning up waterways almost impossible.  By finally addressing this issue once and for all, and establishing a precedent for other councils to follow, Horizons and the Environment Court have broken through this bottle-neck pressure point and, hopefully, now real change can flow.

The Court approved provisions in the One Plan which require particular consideration to be given to cumulative adverse effects which might be caused by further developments. The Councils in the region will be required to give particular attention to avoiding new and significant adverse effects.

The most contentious issue was the control of nutrient (mostly nitrogen) loss through leaching and runoff from farming operations into streams and rivers. The main problem is that excessive amounts of nutrients, such as nitrogen, getting into waterways will cause a proliferation of pest plants and algal blooms. This leads to the clogging of the waterways, serious oxygen depletion and visual effects. The water will become undrinkable for stock and for humans and the ecosystems of plants and fish in the waterways will be destroyed.

The parties representing pastoral interests - Federated Farmers, Fonterra, Ravensdown - and Horticulture NZ, largely agreed on the need for a regime to control nutrient runoff - the differences arose in how best it was to be achieved, and whether sheep and beef farming, and horticulture, should be included in the controls. The evidence was that about one half of the nutrients presently being washed or leached into the region's waterways by farming and horticulture come from dairy farming, although dairying occupies only a relatively small percentage of the farmed land in the region. The original proposal had been to control only runoff from dairying, but the Court decided that it would be unfair for dairy farmers to be subject to controls when other types of farming were not. It was also obvious that controlling only dairying would deal with only half of the nutrient problem. The Court therefore decided that steps should be taken to bring both irrigated sheep and beef farming, and horticulture, into the nutrient management regime. The Court also accepted the view put forward by some of the parties that including all sheep and beef farming in the management regime, and a nitrogen trading scheme, had possible merit, although a trading scheme requires further detailed planning. The Court has suggested to the Council that these are matters which could be dealt with by way of a Plan Change in the future. Some farmers will need to change some practices to get their nutrient losses within the Plan's limits, but the evidence was that in most cases that can be done at acceptable cost. In the proposed version of the Plan, the lakes in the region's coastal areas, and Lake Horowhenua, were not included in the water management system. The Court has decided that those lakes should be included as the evidence is clear that, particularly for Lake Horowhenua, the water quality is severely degraded and requires concerted attention, although the Court acknowledges that the causes of the Lake's problem are long standing and complex.

http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/environment-court/one-plan/proposed-one-plan

http://www.stuff.co.nz/waikato-times/farming/7428206/Dairy-sector-strategy-placed-under-review

Cows not fenced out of waterways - BAD

The Listener article - http://www.listener.co.nz/current-affairs/one-plan-a-win-for-all-new-zealanders/

http://www.voxy.co.nz/politics/good-progress-te-waihora-biodiversity-projects/5/136889

Te Waihora Lake Ellesmere, one of New Zealand’s most important wetland systems, is a brackish, shallow lagoon with an average depth of 1.4m, which lies just to the south of Banks Peninsula. Covering around 20,000 hectares, it is New Zealand’s fifth largest lake and is internationally significant for its wildlife abundance and diversity.  The total number of bird species recorded at the lake is 167, with at least 37 species breeding. 43 species of fish have been recorded in the lake.  Recent decades have seen a great deal of land use intensification around the Lake, and deteriorating water quality. The IEM challenge is to find a balance between development and the environment.

This lake presents a crazy set of contradictions, and highlights the complexity and interdependency of IEM.  It is simultaneously an example of successful IEM processes, and of woefully poor resource management: while it represents a great example of coordination and collaboration, the Lake itself is in a terrible state of pollution and decline, resultant of intensive irrigation and nitrate driven dairying in the surrounding catchment.  This demonstrates a trap inherent in IEM, which is the desire to focus entirely on process, while outcomes suffer.  however, I think it also shows that IEM is about long-term goals, and that fixing years of neglect won’t happen overnight.  The lake seems to be on the right track now, if it isn’t already too late.

The Lake is managed by the Selwyn District Council and Ngai Tahu under a Joint Management Plan enabled under the RMA.  The Waihora Ellesmere Trust (WET) facilitates the Statutory Agencies Group for Te Waihora Lake Ellesmere, which is made up of representatives from Environment Canterbury, Selwyn District Council, Christchurch City Council, Ngai Tahu, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry of Fisheries, Fish and Game, and Lincoln University. The Group’s role is to develop and implement an integrated approach to the overall management of the Lake and its catchment.  WET was established in 2003 to implement a Community Strategy, developed over two years of community deliberation and consultation, which identifies goals, targets and actions to achieve a Vision for the Lake and environs.  WET, with the expertise of a Restoration Consultant, help groups to organise and undertake riparian planting projects.  They also maintain dialogue with experts on local history and ecology. The objects of the Trust are:

To promote and, where appropriate, support best management practices as a means of enhancing the ecological health of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and its tributaries.

To raise awareness regarding the cultural and historical significance of the Lake and its environs, including the settlement history and current status.

To provide appropriate dialogue opportunities for decision-making to ensure the various economic, social, cultural, recreational and environmental interests are considered.

To maintain the sense of place and character that makes the Lake and its environs special to current residents and users, and for future generations.

To raise awareness and understanding of the values of the Lake to recreational and other users to ensure the integrity of the Lake is not compromised.

In attaining the Objects the Trust shall recognise the views and expectations of Mana Whenua, to respect and implement the dual heritage of the partners of Te Tiriti O Waitangi.

Currently, the Trust Board has 13 Trustees and meets 4 times each year. The day to day management of the Trust is delegated to Management Committee of 5 Trustees who meet every six weeks.

This vision is included below, from the Waihora Ellesmere Trust website :

A Vision for Te Waihora Lake Ellesmere

A place where healthy and productive water provides for the many users of the lake while supporting the diversity of plants and wildlife that make this place unique.

A place of cultural and historical significance that connects us with our past and our future.

A place where environmental, customary, commercial, and recreational values are balanced while respecting the health of the resource.

A special wide open place for the enjoyment and wonderment of present and future generations.

A place of contemplation and tranquillity as well as activity, a place just to be.

Acknowledging the past and looking to the future, we:

Educate - enhancing understanding, awareness and the value of the Lake through education programmes, newsletters, and field days.

Facilitate -promoting better management practices through public seminars and by partnering with private landowners, community groups and government agencies.

Activate -  providing opportunities and encouragement for people to get actively involved in projects to rehabilitate the ecosystem through riparian and wetland enhancement.

IMPLEMENTATION: The Sustainable Drains Project presents a great opportunity to discuss implementation.  It is an initiative from WET, together with Environment Canterbury, Ngai Tahu, Selwyn District Council and Lincoln University.

The aim of the project is to support and encourage landowners to improve management of drains and waterways around the lake. The drainage network is vital for productive farms.

Good examples of drain management will be promoted and options, including planting natives along the waterways around Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, will be explored. The project will run over the next three years and aims to see improved management practices and an increase in drain/streamside planting, with improved stream health and ultimately improved water quality.

The project offers local landowners a free restoration planning service, help with finding funding, and advice on successful approaches to drain management and riparian planting.

Part of the project will be trying to get a better understanding of a wide range of costs and benefits of planting with natives, and putting dollar values around that.

This blog entry looks at how IEM, when implemented properly, can help to overcome what seem like insurmountable environmental conundrums.  The situation with Global fish-stocks is such as case: the problem seems impossible, but New Zealand, through good integrated policy, is showing the rest of the world how it can be done.  I am going to demonstrate how the implementation of out ITQ system is just the sought of IEM response we need to be taking to resource management. 

But first, we'd better have a look at the problem of fisheries, and the tragedy of the commons, to put in perspective what a significant achievement our fishery management practices are. 

  The “Tragedy of the Commons” is a theorem which describes the dilemma which occurs when multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally according to the economic principles of self-interest, will ultimately over-use a shared finite resource, even though it may be obvious that it will be detrimental to all in the long term if this occurs.   This is the case because the benefits of exploiting the resource by each extra unit accrue to the individual, who is motivated to maximize private benefit from the resource, while the extra unit of cost imposed by the extra unit of the exploitation are carried by all those reliant on the common.  When the resource units produced by a common-pool resource have a high value and no institutional framework constrains the way these units are appropriated, individuals will have strong incentives to exploit the resource leading eventually to congestion, overuse, and eventually the collapse of the ecosystem surrounding the resource.  

Because of the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries, the problem of free-riding is a serious threat to any effort to moderate harvesting and improve the long-term outcomes achieved from the use of the common-pool resources.  If some individuals are cooperative and do not harvest as many units, the benefits so generated are shared among all other users, whether the others cut back on their harvesting or not.

Although the notion of the tragedy of the commons was evident in the thinking of the classical Greek philosophers, the first modern reference to the idea as an economic principle is found in the lectures of W.F. Lloyd to Oxford University in 1832.[1]  It was subsequently expanded on by Garrett Hardin in 1968 in relation to the issue of over-population, using examples such as fishing stocks, Government-owned grazing land, and US water pollution.[2]  Since that time, it has been a commonly-held belief among many ‘free-market’ environmentalists and academics that the capability of central government analysts to design optimally efficient rules to govern and manage common-pool resources, to maximise both profitability and environmental outcomes.  

When it is assumed that all common-pool resources share a homogeneous structure and are interlinked, simple models of how they work will be constructed and adopted.  The presumption is then that the public interest will be best served through central government representatives implementing standardised rules for the region that determine the optimal level of harvest, divide this total amount into quotas, allocate quotas to individuals and firms within the industry, and then create a market for these transferable quotas to be traded to achieve Pereto-perfect efficiency.  In this way central government can apply identical regulation to control a wide range of natural resources and effectively ‘solve’ the environmental problem.  While this theory assumes that government will have access to reliable statistical information on key variables for an entire region, the reality is instead that huge variance will exist within all data, if that data is even available, and management strategies that are effective for one natural resource may not work for other examples due to issues of scale, complexity and practicality.

The two most common solutions to this problem are the application of private property rights or government regulation.  While the tragedy of the commons is often used as an argument for the necessity of government intervention in management of open-access or common pool resources, some authors argue that this isn’t always necessary because social and cultural responses, such as communal self-regulation, can offer more effective solutions to the problem.  Firstly, the dominant contemporary view that market failures caused by externalities can be best solved through privatisation or government control through regulation.   One solution is for an integrated approach to management, or comanagement, whereby local communities manage natural resources, assisted by central government through devolution of real autonomy and responsibility, including decision-making powers, while at the same time protecting them from external forces such as predatory corporations and pressure from outside users, which can subvert the aims of community management.

Common-property institutions, involving socially constructed systems of norms and rules that allocate rights, limit access, and regulate the use of commonly-held resources exist over most common-pool resources at a local community level. Within these institutional arrangements resource-users hold clear and secure rights to resources, but overarching rights and management decisions are vested in the group of users as a whole; both rights and responsibilities for joint use are specified, and graduated sanctions are applied in cases of non-compliance.[3]  

 A substantial body of contemporary research suggests that in a large number of instances common-pool resources can actually be more effectively and sustainably governed through co-management institutions or common-property arrangements, rather than by state control or privatisation.  To be effective these must exist within the local culture and institutional environments of those who depend on the whole ecosystem for their livelihood.  Therefore, the specific institutional arrangements that will be most effective in the management of a particular resource must consider the specific spatial and temporal scales, as well as the nature of the relationships that already exist around the use of the resource.  

It has been shown that cooperation with institutional arrangements fitted to local ecosystems will be much more successful in attracting local buy-in, than distant and faceless centralised management.[5]  Effective monitoring by officials and users is an essential ingredient of sustainable common-pool resource institutions. If those involved recognise and understand the system it will possess a greater degree of local legitimacy and users will be less likely to engage in illegal harvesting.

Taylor (1996) expresses a view that for common-pool resources to be regulated effectively and sustainably through a community-based model of voluntary cooperation, a firm basis of community, in its wider sense, involving direct, long-term, multi-stranded relations between people in a particular location, with a stake in the long-term well-being of their region and its resources must be already present.[6]  Provided the basis for this community is pre-existing, he claims that an integrated approach to management, or comanagement, whereby local communities manage natural resources, assisted by central government.  This must include devolution of real autonomy and responsibility, including decision-making powers, while at the same time protecting the community management structures from external forces such as predatory corporations and pressure from outside users, which can subvert the aims of community management.[7]  Ostrom (1990) identifies eight central requirements that are necessary for effective co-management of common-pool resources to occur:

“Clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of the resource system, and the individuals with rights to harvest resource units, are clearly defined.

Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules specifying the amount of resource units that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs.

Collective-choice arrangements: Many of the individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group who can modify these rules.

Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to users and/or are users themselves.

Graduated sanctions: Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, officials accountable to these users, or both.

Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.

Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource

Nested enterprises (for resources that are parts of larger systems): Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.”[9]

An example of successful adoption of co-management can be found in the New Zealand Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. Until the early 1980s, most fisheries were either completely unmanaged or managed under command-and-control regulations that governed the size of vessels, type and number of nets, the duration of the fishing season, and zones in which fishing could take place.  These kinds of regulations failed to check the number of vessels or the level of fishing effort, while encouraging the industry to work around equipment restrictions, rather than investing in more efficient practices and technologies. [10]   Under these regulations, fishermen had no sense of ownership over the fish until after they were caught, and no interest in the long-term preservation of the fishery.  This created a race to fish, with the result that the majority of commercial fisheries throughout the world are chronically over-harvested and on the verge of collapse. This classic example demonstrates both the tragedy of the commons in an open-access scenario, and the failure of Government regulation to effectively address the problem through command and control.  

The Paradise Shelduck, or ‘Parrie’ as they are known to hunters, is a prized game bird endemic to New Zealand.  Known to the Māori as Pūtangitangi, they were uncommon prior to European settlement, however, according to Fish and Game, changes to habitat caused by the conversion of forest to pasture, and the deliberate provisioning on ponds by hunting groups, has led to a large increase in the numbers of these ducks: 

"The paradise duck population has expanded its range into coastal areas in recent years and has more than doubled over the last decade. This increase has been due to agricultural development that has provided improved feeding opportunities with new pasture development and increased brood rearing areas with construction of stock water ponds. The regional population is approaching 20,000 birds Hunter harvest is also increasing with annual harvest estimated at 16% of the total annual waterfowl harvest. Paradise shelduck are defined as native game birds in the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998"   (Source: Fish and Game).

It came to my attention recently that an Environmental Policy Manager at one of Canterbury’s District Councils has been trying, with limited success, to create a conservation ethic for these birds.  While animal rights organisations, such as SAFE, are violently opposed to the bloodsport, farmers and hunters are highly protective of their right to hunt, and the hunting lobby and industry seem to have quite a bit of clout in New Zealand politics.  Meanwhile the ducks themselves are rapidly growing in number, and are blamed for damaging crops and spreading disease.  This got me thinking about how issues and problems are defined, how they are viewed by the public, and how conflict can polarize opinions, freezing progress on an issue, and negatively affecting outcomes. With the duck season behind us now, this issue will likely go onto the backburner again until next May, but I think that by examining the example of Tadorna variegate, it is possible to understand how an integrated approach to managing an environmental effort can be hampered by the list of 24 barriers to Integrated Environmental Management that are presented by Cairns and Crawford (1991).  Below I have selected ten of these barriers that are relevant to the paradise duck case to illustrate how it is that the issue has had little progress made either way:

IEM takes time.

All the parties in this dispute want their way, and they all want it to take effect from now.  No compromise is acceptable, and neither is delay, so parties won't sit around the table together to work things out, as they see this as 'giving in' to their position.

Turf battles occur in organisations.

This is perhaps true, although in this instance it is difficult to tell from the outside.  It is likely that the old MAF, now MPI, does not want the MfE or DOC stepping on the toes of farmers and the hunting lobby on such an issue, as the current administration relies both on agriculture to boost the economy, and the hunting and farming vote to stay in Office.  This could explain the reluctance of the Government to intervene, but of course it could just be that public opinion, or government policy, does not call for such protection at this time.

Job insecurity is the most important aspect of all.

The agricultural sector is quick to point out whenever something may compromise the potential profitability of their industry.  Job security for farmers has been held as paramount in this debate, on account of the devastating effect these birds can have on crops and pastures at certain times of the breeding cycle (molting).  The hunting industry, and hunting tourism are also particularly profitable for the New Zealand economy, and the protection of these jobs is also a factor in this debate.

Many are unwilling to compromise.

As mentioned above, between the animal rights lobby and the hunting and farmers group there is little love lost, and neither are willing to sit around the table and talk sensibly.

Short-term profits are too enticing.

This sits alongside job-security, as there is too much at stake at the moment, with the world economy in turmoil, and our own domestic finances balancing finely on the primary sector, the government, along with the hunters and farmers won't wan to do anything to compromise short-term profits in the interest of a duck...

Changes in lifestyle are strongly resisted by some and Present use is considered a "right" and is not open for discussion or compromise.

This is very much a 'Town' vs 'Country' situation, where the dispute comes back to the rights of those in the country, (as well as those townies who go out on opening weekend) who want to preserve their right to do what they have been doing for generations.  And being told so by people who buy their meet in cellophane at countdown, or at McDonald's, makes them understandably upset.

Change is only accepted in crisis, not when the problem is more manageable.

This issue doesn't have enough crisis to get off the ground and into the media at large.  There are still plenty of the ducks around, we never see the injured birds slowly drowning and dying in pain in the reeds once the hunters are finished for the day and are down the pub.  Without these images in front of our faces, or some crisis about the 'last 50 paradise ducks in the world', most people couldn't give a fig whether they are hunted or not.

People turn off when they face complex issues.

This issue has merit and truth on both sides, and this is often the case.  It is easy to sympathise with both parties, and almost be swayed by whichever one you heard last.  It is definitely true that people switch off when they actually have to think about things, probably even mores o that when Cairns and Crawford first wrote it!

Technical information is inadequate.

"Despite (Paradise Duck's) widespread distribution, its impact on agricultural pasture and crops, and its importance as a game species, only a few studies have been conducted and that was 30 years ago." - Massey University

This goes to show how difficult it will be to reach consensus.  With both sides making claims about these issues, it will take a lot of work and research before any minds will be changed!

The political process is oriented toward polarized issues rather than IEM.

This is definitely an issue.  The government does not win swing voters with decisions like an IEM approach to managing conservation of Paradise Ducks, it makes it with contentious issues with wide coverage that are urgent and critical.  This is (they think) just too small for them to waste the required resources on necessary to address the problem.

"Unlike other native duck species in New Zealand, the paradise shelduck has benefited from the extensive human modification of natural landscapes throughout the country ... Because these ducks spend large amounts of time feeding on pastures, often in large groups, farmers consider them pests and occasional, legal culls take place. Generally however, hunting is controlled through bag limits and seasonal permits, which are set based on the birds' productivity and movements in each part of the country. (Source: Department of Conservation)."

ARTICLES

Safe's campaign against duck shooting

Hunters can help clear paradise ducks

First things first: Welcome to Enviro Blog!  This is a blog which aims to explore the concept of Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), to understand what it is, its advantages and its barriers, how it is implemented, what it looks like in practice, including both success stories and failures.  By interpretation and the theory, and applying it to contemporary environmental issues highlighted in the media, we can understand IEM in both a New Zealand and international context.

Given the turbulent, and frankly, at times, a little scary, nature of the developments around Environmental Policy occurring under our benign and benevolent national government, I think now is a fascinating time to look at how integration works in a New Zealand context, where it is evident, and where it is not.  For this reason I am planning on focusing mostly on New Zealand examples to relate back to the theory as we work through it with Ken and Roy (my most excellent IEM lecturers), but as the bard Rabbie Burns said, “the best laid plans of mice and men...”  So we’ll just see how we go! So perhaps we should begin by looking at what IEM is, which we’ve been looking at in lectures at the minute.  This has some early alarm bells ringing, to be honest, as so far IEM seems to have been defined by most academics either in terms of what it isn’t, or what it should include.  This makes me think that perhaps it isn’t going to be such a simple concept to grasp... IEM is best understood, I think, as an inclusive problem solving framework which can be applied to almost any environmental issue.  IEM theory was designed to acknowledge the intrinsic interconnections between humans and the surrounding environment (Cairns & Crawford, 1991).  Bardwell (1991) states that environmental decision making had a tendency to be performed in a knee-jerk, narrowly focused, and poorly co-ordinated manner, and similarly, Cairns and Crawford (1991) describe traditional approaches to environmental management as being “… narrow, compartmentalised, uncoordinated, reactionary …”  Buhrs (1995) states that IEM, on the other hand, represents an effort to come to grips with the enormous complexity and potentially all encompassing character of the ‘environmental problematique’.  The development of IEM was an attempt to encapsulate a range of other contemporary environmental concepts (watershed management, ecosystem management, integrated resource management)into to one robust inclusive concept (Margerum & Born, 2000). The problem, as I see it, is that political decision-making is often directed towards garnering wide public favour in the short term, with decisions made in reaction to vigorous public debate rather than comprehensive problem analysis (Cairns & Crawford, 1991), and too often the election cycle plays a major role in policy formulation, design, and implementation.  Arguably, there is a history of such decision-making in New Zealand’s approach to environmental management, with issues such as the Seabed and Foreshore Bill, Project Aqua consultation, and West Coast forestry. The aim of environmental management should be (in line with sustainable development thinking) a decision making process that seeks the best practicable environmental option that satisfies basic human needs for the present while ensuring that it sustainably provides for future generations.  As the nature of environmental problems means increasingly that they will directly affect the lives of all people, approaches to solving these problems must be inclusive so that the needs of communities are sustainably met (Born & Sonzogni, 1995). There are a number of comparable definitions of IEM, I quite like that of Margerum and Hooper (2001) which tells us that it is: “a holistic approach to environmental planning and management that encourages participants to consider a wide array of social and environmental connections” (Margerum & Hooper, 2001, p. 1). However, I find that you almost need to consider a number of definitions at once in order to gain a rounded understanding, as all have something to add.

“... an approach to the management of the environment that takes into account its complex, multi-faceted, and interconnected nature.” (Buhrs 1995)

“Coordinated control, direction or influence of all human activities in a defined environmental system to achieve & balance the broadest possible range of short- & long-term objectives.” (Cairns & Crawford 1991)

“A process of formulating & implementing a course of action involving natural & human resources in an ecosystem, taking into account the social, political, economic, & institutional factors operating within the ecosystems in order to achieve specific societal objectives.” (modified after Dixon & Easter 1986; cited in Margerum & Born 1995)

Another key aspect I have come across that I have found helpful is that IEM is a continuous process that does not simply end when a decision is made or a policy implemented. Well, that’s about all I can think of to explain what IEM is at the minute, so tune in next week for another exciting instalment! 

In the meantime, this amazing video by William Mcdonough gives a great example of a holistic, systems approach to architecture and design, that could change the way we live!  It shows IEM in practice...

P.s. In order not to disrupt the flowing elegance and striking visual quality of my blog, (and so you don't have to keep scrolling up and down to find them), I have listed all my references on a handy page under the 'references' link at the top of the page.