Our experiments were inspired by a prominent theory in neuroscience that was developed to explain how conscious access works: the global workspace theory. This account pictures the brain as a collection of specialist systems that work in parallel, unconsciously, and largely in isolation from one another. A piece of information becomes consciously accessible when it gains entry to a small shared channel, the āworkspace,ā which is broadcast to other brain systems that can see it and make use of it. Based on our findings, we think the J-space plays a similar āworkspaceā role in Claude. For example, we find evidence that Claudeās J-space has especially strong connections to the rest of its neural network, allowing it to fulfill this kind of broadcasting role.
None of this tells us whether Claude is conscious in the way people are, or whether it feels anything at all; weāll come back to that question at the end of the post. But whatever its philosophical significance, the J-space is a practically useful tool for us, as it gives us a way to see what Claude is thinking but not saying. For instance, weāre able to use it to catch Claude privately noticing that itās being tested, intentionally producing fabricated data, or pursuing a hidden goal that we planted during training. Weāve also developed a technique to influence what lights up in Claudeās J-space, and thereby influence its decision-making.
More broadly, these findings have changed our understanding of how Claudeās mind works, revealing a privileged mental workspace that can be used for deliberate reasoning, operating amidst a sea of more automatic, inflexible processing. Rather than being a chaotic jumble of numbers, Claudeās internals have organized themselves in a way that is reminiscent of our own minds.
Our experiments don't show Claude can have experiences, or feel things in the way humans doāin fact, itās unclear whether any scientific experiment could prove this to be true or false. But philosophers often distinguish this capacity to have experiences, often referred to as phenomenal consciousness, from another idea, so-called access consciousness, which is defined in purely functional and computational terms. A thought is āaccess-consciousā (or āconsciously accessibleā) if you can report it, reason with it, and use it to guide what you do. It remains a contested philosophical question whether or not access consciousness implies phenomenal consciousness, or if the ability to have experiences requires some other property.
We think our results do have something substantial to say about access consciousness in language models. The J-space appears to support the functions associated with conscious access: it holds the thoughts Claude can report on, deliberately bring to mind, and reason with, while the rest of its processing runs automatically beneath. Notably, none of this structure was designed into Claudeāit emerged on its own during training, presumably because it was a useful way to organize computation. That suggests a mental workspace supporting conscious access isnāt just a peculiarity of how human brains happen to be wired. Instead, it appears to be a general solution that intelligent systems arrive at in order to solve certain kinds of problems. Now that weāve identified this structure in Claude, it means we can make a meaningful distinction between the decisions Claude has made deliberately and those that happened automatically.
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