[...] in the institutional mode, participation often refers to the progressive âauthorizationâ to partake in what Judith Schlanger in Penser la bouche pleine would call a professional economy of seriousness, by which academic disciplines, forms of expertise and judgment, sources of funding, as well as criteria of publication and employability, become established. [...] If the practice of thinking-with poses a different kind of challenge, it is because it belongs to the intimate question of whom one is learning to think with, and as such, situates this apprenticeship as a demand to resist an unthinking participation in the way in which seriousness circulates in thought. To recall the Argentinian writer Julio CortĂĄzar, who is perhaps the schoolâs most secret member and who once asked, âWho will save us from seriousness?â (La Vuelta al dĂa, 54), the difference is between citing others in order to be right, in order to seek authorization, and citing others because we âwant to gather our friends together.â In this way, the attempt to think with others confronts one directly with a kind of influence that is neither that of the historical determinations by which a given epoch determines what mattersâwhat or how it may be relevant to thinkânor that of the socializing processes by which one may become a âseriousâ thinker. My sense is that what is put into play is a much more intimate and felt influenceâ a veritable reverberation that shakes up the surface of our being, and whose aim is not that of restoring thought to its origins but of bringing new thinking into existence. To borrow the words of Schlanger again, to think-with is âto find in ourselves the doings of others as well as our doings upon those others, it is to think that we become,â and to become as we think, âthrough the profound company of othersâ (Le neuf 31). It seems to me that the kind of adventure involved in âthinking withâ is therefore one that plays out in an encounter with practices to which the questions are not simply about what they âsayâ or what they âdo,â but about what they cultivate in their doingâ about what, through their careful gestures, they enable to come into existence, as well as what they attempt to resist. This is a plane of thought where what is at stake is the cultivation of certain sensibilities, certain tones and dispositions of feeling that, as William James in The Will to Believe would put it, make rationality more of a sentiment than a faculty, and that rather than tell us what to think, force us to come to terms with the open problem of taking care of how we think.
Martin Savransky, âThe Humor of the Problematicâ












