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We will replace Dual_EC and ANSI X9.31 in ScreenOS 6.3 with the same random number generation technology currently employed across our broad portfolio of Junos OS products. We intend to make these changes in a subsequent ScreenOS software release, which will be made available in the first half of 2016.
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Juniper Firewalls with ScreenOS Backdoored Since 2012
Juniper Networks has announced that it has discovered "unauthorized code" in ScreenOS, the operating system for its NetScreen firewalls, that could allow an attacker to decrypt traffic sent through Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). It's not clear what caused the code to get there or how long it has been there, but the release notes posted by Juniper suggest the earliest buggy versions of the software date back to at least 2012 and possibly earlier
The backdoor impacts NetScreen firewalls using ScreenOS 6.2.0r15 through 6.2.0r18 and 6.3.0r12 through 6.3.0r20, states the advisory published by the company. However, there's no evidence right now that whether the backdoor was present in other Juniper OSes or devices. The issue was uncovered during an internal code review of the software, according to Juniper chief information officer Bob Worrall, and requires immediate patching by upgrading to a new version of the software just released today.
"Juniper discovered unauthorized code in ScreenOS that could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access to NetScreen devices and to decrypt VPN connections," Worrall said.
How Does the Backdoor Occur?
The backdoor occurred due to a pair of critical vulnerabilities:
First allows anyone to decrypt VPN traffic and leave no trace of their actions
Second allows anyone to complete compromise a device via an unauthorized remote access vulnerability over SSH or telnet.
In short, an attacker could remotely log-in to the firewall with administrator privileges, decrypt and spy on thought-to-be-secure traffic, and then even remove every trace of their activity.
Sounds awful, although Juniper claims the company has not heard of any exploitation in the wild so far and released patched versions of Screen OS that are available now on its download page.
Backdoor in NetScreen firewalls gives attackers admin access, VPN decrypt ability.
An operating system used to manage firewalls sold by Juniper Networks contains unauthorized code that surreptitiously decrypts traffic sent through virtual private networks, officials from the company warned Thursday.
It's not clear how the code got there or how long it has been there. An advisory published by the company said that NetScreen firewalls using ScreenOS 6.2.0r15 through 6.2.0r18 and 6.3.0r12 through 6.3.0r20 are affected and require immediate patching. Release notes published by Juniper suggest the earliest vulnerable versions date back to at least 2012 and possibly earlier. There's no evidence right now that the backdoor was put in other Juniper OSes or devices.
"During a recent internal code review, Juniper discovered unauthorized code in ScreenOS that could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access to NetScreen devices and to decrypt VPN connections," Juniper Chief Information officer Bob Worrall wrote. "Once we identified these vulnerabilities, we launched an investigation into the matter, and worked to develop and issue patched releases for the latest versions of ScreenOS."
A separate advisory from Juniper says there are two separate vulnerabilities, but stops short of describing either as "unauthorized code." The first flaw allows unauthorized remote administrative access to an affected device over SSH or telnet. Exploits can lead to complete compromise. "The second issue may allow a knowledgeable attacker who can monitor VPN traffic to decrypt that traffic," the advisory said. "It is independent of the first issue. There is no way to detect that this vulnerability was exploited."
IMPORTANT JUNIPER SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT POSTED BY BOB WORRALL, SVP CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER ON DECEMBER 17, 2015 Juniper is committed to maintaining the integrity and security of our products and wanted to make customers aware of critical patched releases we are issuing today to address vulne...
“ During a recent internal code review, Juniper discovered unauthorized code in ScreenOS that could allow a knowledgeable attacker to gain administrative access to NetScreen® devices and to decrypt VPN connections. “
Configuring Traceoptions for Debugging and Trimming Output in SRX Device
Configuring Traceoptions for Debugging and Trimming Output in SRX Device
Configuring Traceoptions for Debugging and Trimming Output in SRX Device.While the Junos ‘show’ commands themselves offer some great insight into the operating status of the SRX, there is another level of detail that can be gathered from the SRX using the JUNOS debugging features. In JUNOS debugging, it is called a Traceoption. For those familar with ScreenOS, the setup is slightly different in…
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ipsec in Linux on Linode.
I wasted a couple of days banging my head on this one. So I'm throwing it on the internet for those whom may also benefit. Linode recently upgraded there offerings, faster CPUs, more ram and ssds. There is one current caveat though, you need to run a 64bit kernel. For the most part all 32bit distros (especially Debian based) will be just peachy with a 64bit kernel and 32bit userland, except it seems, when userland uses kernel space extensions... When establishing the site to site tunnel, everything logged just peachy, with the exception of a very insignificant log line that occasionally popped up (that google quickly explained away with a bunch of totally irrelevant links..). It was to do with an argument length passed to netlink. It didn't log on every connection attempt, so I didn't give it any importance when debugging the connection failures (the establishment would get stuck at phase 2, then timeout and try again). My last straw was to update the firmware on my ssg520 and check the kernel for other versions in linode... That is when I noticed I had flipped to a 64bit kernel, but not upgraded to the hardware platform. Switching to a 32bit kernel and rebooting solved the problem immediately, and the tunnel was established just peachy. Summary: screenos to Debian ipsec tunnel via strongswan is now working.
