#scotism

This is the second of a series of blog posts analysing responses to Aristotle's dictum that "science and art come to men through experience". The first author to be examined, Antonius Andreas, is no early modern: Also known as Doctor dulcifluus or Scotellus, he was born in the Aragonese city of Tauste (approx. 1280) and seems to have died around 1320. He entered the Franciscan Order at around 1295, studied first at the studium generale in Lérida, later in Paris with Duns Scotus himself. (More detailed biografical information can be found in a paper by M. Gensler, "The making of a Doctor Dulcifluus: Antonius Andreae's contribution to the formation of Scotism", Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia 1996, S. 57-67, online via http://www.ub.edu/telemac/40121.htm). Andreas' position is taken into account here, because it provides a reference point for early modern debates on the topic of experience. In the following, I refer the Leipzig edition published before 1494 (EMTO 43427).

The fifth question of Andreas' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics asks: "Queritur utrum ex experientia generatur ars" (fol. 10 v). "It is asked whether art is produced from experience." It should be noted that Andreas understands ars in this context as a generic term covering all kinds of knowledge about causes, regardless of whether it aims at contemplating truths or bringing about a certain object or state in the world. Before getting acquainted with Andreas' answer to this question, it might be helpful to introduce some conceptual distinctions that will play a role in all of the metaphysical theories of experience to be presented here:

The first and most essential distinction concerns, of course, sensation and experience. Since there is some disagreement on how to define experience, a detailed account must be postponed. In a first approximation it can be stated safely that experience consists (at least) in repeated sensations of identical or sufficiently similar objects.

The second distinction concerns the difference between knowledge that has been newly discovered (knowledge found via inventio) and knowledge that is transmitted in teaching (doctrina). Moreover, for the Aristotelians under review here, understanding a concept is a different kind of knowledge ("non-complex" knowledge) than knowledge of a proposition ("complex" knowledge). And knowledge of the principles of a science – the "axioms" allowing for the deduction of further truths – must be distinguished from knowledge of the conclusions that are drawn from these principles. Finally, knowledge of simple facts (knowledge quia) differs from knowledge of facts and their proper causes (knowledge propter quod).

Andreas' position can be summed up as follows:

New knowledge is ontologically basic and more valuable than knowledge that can be learned in the schools.

The concepts we use in science depend on input from the senses. But this input need not be experiential.

The acquisition of propositional knowledge can be facilitated by experience, but again it is no requirement.

However, experience stimulates our curiosity, so in this sense it is correct that experience stands at the 'beginning of philosophy'.

1. Inventio and doctrina For Andreas, new knowledge, inventio is ontologically prior to and more valuable than doctrina. It is ontologically prior, because a teacher must either have acquired the knowledge he teaches from another teacher, or he must have found it himself. The same is true, of course, for the teacher of the teacher. He may have learned all he has to teach without having found new knowledge on his own. At some point, however, this series must end in order to avoid an infinite regress. All knowledge taught must at some point of time have been discovered. Therefore, it is ontologically prior to knowledge that is taught.

The higher value of inventio compared to doctrina is explained by an analogy to the capability to heal: It is more valuable to have the capability to heal oneself without external assistance than to rely on the help of others in getting healed (fol. 11 r).

2. Knowledge of concepts

Both concepts used in principles (and the non-complex knowledge of such concepts, fol. 11 v) and concepts used in conclusions (and the non-complex knowledge of such concepts, fol. 12 r) must be based on input from the senses, because all these concepts must have been abstracted from what the senses convey of the world. Andreas gives a very lengthy and detailed account of the interplay of the 'internal and external senses', following Avicenna (fol. 11 r sq.). Experience, however, i. e., the repetition of sensations of the same (or similar) objects over time, is not required. In other words, in order to have non-complex knowledge of a concept that is used in a principle, it is sufficient to perceive an object referred to by this concept only once (fol. 11 v, fol. 12 r). 3. Propositional knowledge of principles

To grasp the content of a principle is an achievement of the intellect propria virtute, without interference of any other mental capability. Andreas concedes that sensations or experiences may be helpful, because they allow us to assent more quickly to a principle before us. But the decision whether concepts should be united in a principle, so that the principle is asserted, or whether they should be divided, so that the principle is negated is only up to the intellect and its lumen naturale. It may be helpful to perceive repeatedly that a whole is bigger than any of its parts. And the concepts involved in these perceptions are themselves based on input from the senses. But the question whether it is really an universal truth that the whole is bigger than any of its parts cannot be decided inductively. We know principles by knowing the concepts contained in them. The reason for that is that even perceptual error will not prevent the intellect from arriving at the truth of the principle in question. This fact can only be explained if the intellect need not rely on perceptual input for getting things right (fol. 12 r).

4. Propositional knowledge of conclusions

For knowledge of conclusions, again, experience may be helpful, but it is no precondition. The fact that a conclusion is a conclusion (and no principle) is cognised by the intellect (fol. 12 r). Without awareness of the cause(s) of what is stated in the conclusion, knowing its content is only knowledge quia – knowledge of the fact as fact without an awareness of where this fact comes from: We only know that there must be a cause, but we do not know what the cause is. This is precisely the situation at the beginning of philosophy: It is reponsible for the sense of wonder (admiratio) that brings people to reflect on causes of phenomena. Knowledge of causes, however, presupposes demonstration and does not in itself presuppose input from the senses. 

So we may state that for Andreas experience paves the way to knowledge, because it is a partial cause for it rather than a necessary condition. As such it is the beginning of philosophy, because it allows for cognition of facts that stimulates our sense of wonder. This sense of wonder is in turn the 'efficient cause' at the beginning of philosophy.

If this was all Aristotelians have to say on the role of experience in the development of (Aristotelian) science, we might safely assume that the "whiggish" account of Aristotelianism mentioned in the first post of this series is right and that Aristotelianism is indubitably the very antithesis of "experimental philosophy": The intellect knows principles without any direct input from the senses. Concepts can be known, even if an object falling under the concept is perceived only once. The only way to know conclusions is to deduce them from principles that have been cognised by the intellect propria virtute. Even the emphasis on finding new knowledge fails to relativise the apriorism inherent in this account, because such new knowledge can only consist in either finding new principles without experiential input or deducing conclusions from them, again without any direct connection to experience.

But as we will see, Andreas' claims have been put into question subsequently. Early modern criticism of his position focuses on Andreas' thesis that the intellect can cognise principles in its own right and without experiential input. Accordingly, the topic of the next post in this series will be Chrysostomus Javellus, a Dominican critic of Andreas' Scotist views.

Recent research on early modern conceptions of philosophy has focused on the role of the philosopher. I only mention The philosopher in early modern Europe: the nature of a contested identity, a volume edited by Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter. The importance of such reflections notwithstanding, it is nevertheless interesting to ask, what early modern texts themselves have to say about philosophy as a discipline.

At first sight, it may be a bit surprising that, to my knowledge, this question has not yet been adressed in a comprehensive fashion. There is a wealth of publications on how metaphysics, natural philosophy, or ethics have been defined in early modern thought. Yet, the question what holds them together to form a unified conceptual project has, to my knowledge, received scant attention. So this may form a worthy topic for discussion.

Most early modern thinkers seem not to have placed great emphasis on this question themselves. Nevertheless, an analysis of what we find on the topic in early modern writings on philosophy can be instructive. The example I want to discuss illustrates this quite clearly: the monumental Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti cursus integer by Mastrius and Belluto (the Cursus in EMTO).

I have chosen this work, because our perspective on early modern scholasticism tends to be distorted by the fact that the Scotists have received considerably less attention than Thomist and Jesuit authors of the period - due to the fact that scholastic authors of the latter persuasions have been more extensively reprinted. So putting a Scotist first may show at the same time how EMTO may help to question established routines of research on early modern thought - wich is one of the objectives of this project.

Only one of the 4000 columns (vol. 1, p. 60) in the five volumes of the Mastrius-Cursus discusses the question how to define philosophy as a whole (if we may trust the index). In this passage at the beginning of the quaestio prooemialis in universam Aristotelis logicam, Mastrius and Belluto skillfully relate the nominal definition of philosophy as love of wisdom to explanation of  philosophy as originating in wonder that is proposed by Plato (in the Theaitetos) and Aristotle (in Met.). Mastrius and Belluto follow Aristotle in assuming that this wonder at the beginning of philosophy stems from a lack of insight how things in the world come about. Philosophy begins because we only know effects without causes (as Aristotle states in Met. 982b12).

But this can only be a genetic argument for the definition preferred by Mastrius and Belluto. Such a genetic explanation is not very helpful when we try to find out more about the place of philosophy in the order of things.  Mastrius and Belluto again follow Aristotle (or, to be more precise, what they believe to be an important strand in Aristotle's thought on the matter), namely, that philosophy is to be defined as cognitio rerum, ut sunt, sive per suas causas: Knowledge of the way things are, that is, knowledge by their causes.

The reasoning for this definition, however, is distinctively anti-Aristotelian. Whatever exists in the world has been created by God. Therefore, everything that exists in the world has received its being from Him. Therefore, we can understand what things are, if we understand how they have been caused, because what they are stems from God as their first cause. Right now I am not so much bothered by the (legitimate) question, whether this argument is conclusive. For me, the problem whether this definition really applies to philosophy as a whole, is more pressing. For some insights into this problem we must turn to Mastrius' and Belluto's views on what they call  "natural philosophy". Their position is remarkable, insofar as they believe that philosophia naturalis comprises both metaphysics and physics. Even Pasqualigi's argument for an inclusion of logic under the head of natural philosophy is cited approvingly, because it allows to reconcile the tripartite division favored by Mastrius and Belluto with the more orthodox twofold division of philosophy into a theoretical and a practical part.

If metaphysics and physics - and maybe even logic! - are to be subsumed under the heading of philosophia naturalis, one cannot help to wonder how all these disciplines are related. But I would prefer now to consider another question, namely the status of practical philosophy. In the text, Augustine's thesis that philosophy must lead to the human good (felicitas) is wholeheartedly accepted. And moral philosophy receives (honorific?) mention as a legitimate part of philosophy. But even if we accept that insights into the secrets of nature (arcana naturae) provided by philosophia naturalis are as helpful in reaching this goal as the ability to conceive proofs and argumentations (philosophia rationalis), I cannot help to wonder whether there shouldn't be a prominent role for ethics in this endeavour.

I am not quite sure whether there is an easy answer to that question. Right now, I think the following two options are conceivable:

(1) The task of moral instruction is delegated to moral theology. Then, the fact that practical philosophy is mentioned as a a legitimate part of philosophy may be - more or less - explained away by the necessity to pay lip service to authorities (both Augustine and Aristotle accept it). Philosophy proper consists of metaphysics cum physics cum logic - sciences that tell us how things are by investigating their causes. The definition of philosophy in the text fits nicely with this interpretation: Moral philosophy does neither tell us how things are nor does it investigate causes. Therefore, it is no part of philosophy.

(2) Moral philosophy is a constitutive part of philosophy as a whole because it is indispensable for leading a good life. This view is attractive because it does not force us to believe that Aristotle and Augustine are irrelevant for Mastrius and Belluto. But what, then, should be the domain of practical philosophy? And how can it fall under the general definition of philosophy as an investigation of things and their causes?

The last question points to another difficulty with the general definition  of philosophy adopted by Mastrius and Belluto: What exactly is cognitio? Cognitio is no habitus, at least it is not mentioned as such in the Nicomachean Ethics. Therefore philosophy as a whole cannot be a habitus, even though some of its parts plainly are (because they are scientiae). Neither can it be synonymous with "notitia", the awareness of singulars that is what an artifex is aware of. The point is not merely verbal: If we accept the formula "cognitio rerum ut sunt sive per suas causas" as a real definition of philosophy the question of what genus it belongs to is at least as important as an understanding of its differentiae specificae. And of that, I confess, I do not have the faintest idea.