Recent research on early modern conceptions of philosophy has focused on the role of the philosopher. I only mention The philosopher in early modern Europe: the nature of a contested identity, a volume edited by Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter. The importance of such reflections notwithstanding, it is nevertheless interesting to ask, what early modern texts themselves have to say about philosophy as a discipline.

At first sight, it may be a bit surprising that, to my knowledge, this question has not yet been adressed in a comprehensive fashion. There is a wealth of publications on how metaphysics, natural philosophy, or ethics have been defined in early modern thought. Yet, the question what holds them together to form a unified conceptual project has, to my knowledge, received scant attention. So this may form a worthy topic for discussion.

Most early modern thinkers seem not to have placed great emphasis on this question themselves. Nevertheless, an analysis of what we find on the topic in early modern writings on philosophy can be instructive. The example I want to discuss illustrates this quite clearly: the monumental Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti cursus integer by Mastrius and Belluto (the Cursus in EMTO).

I have chosen this work, because our perspective on early modern scholasticism tends to be distorted by the fact that the Scotists have received considerably less attention than Thomist and Jesuit authors of the period - due to the fact that scholastic authors of the latter persuasions have been more extensively reprinted. So putting a Scotist first may show at the same time how EMTO may help to question established routines of research on early modern thought - wich is one of the objectives of this project.

Only one of the 4000 columns (vol. 1, p. 60) in the five volumes of the Mastrius-Cursus discusses the question how to define philosophy as a whole (if we may trust the index). In this passage at the beginning of the quaestio prooemialis in universam Aristotelis logicam, Mastrius and Belluto skillfully relate the nominal definition of philosophy as love of wisdom to explanation of  philosophy as originating in wonder that is proposed by Plato (in the Theaitetos) and Aristotle (in Met.). Mastrius and Belluto follow Aristotle in assuming that this wonder at the beginning of philosophy stems from a lack of insight how things in the world come about. Philosophy begins because we only know effects without causes (as Aristotle states in Met. 982b12).

But this can only be a genetic argument for the definition preferred by Mastrius and Belluto. Such a genetic explanation is not very helpful when we try to find out more about the place of philosophy in the order of things.  Mastrius and Belluto again follow Aristotle (or, to be more precise, what they believe to be an important strand in Aristotle's thought on the matter), namely, that philosophy is to be defined as cognitio rerum, ut sunt, sive per suas causas: Knowledge of the way things are, that is, knowledge by their causes.

The reasoning for this definition, however, is distinctively anti-Aristotelian. Whatever exists in the world has been created by God. Therefore, everything that exists in the world has received its being from Him. Therefore, we can understand what things are, if we understand how they have been caused, because what they are stems from God as their first cause. Right now I am not so much bothered by the (legitimate) question, whether this argument is conclusive. For me, the problem whether this definition really applies to philosophy as a whole, is more pressing. For some insights into this problem we must turn to Mastrius' and Belluto's views on what they call  "natural philosophy". Their position is remarkable, insofar as they believe that philosophia naturalis comprises both metaphysics and physics. Even Pasqualigi's argument for an inclusion of logic under the head of natural philosophy is cited approvingly, because it allows to reconcile the tripartite division favored by Mastrius and Belluto with the more orthodox twofold division of philosophy into a theoretical and a practical part.

If metaphysics and physics - and maybe even logic! - are to be subsumed under the heading of philosophia naturalis, one cannot help to wonder how all these disciplines are related. But I would prefer now to consider another question, namely the status of practical philosophy. In the text, Augustine's thesis that philosophy must lead to the human good (felicitas) is wholeheartedly accepted. And moral philosophy receives (honorific?) mention as a legitimate part of philosophy. But even if we accept that insights into the secrets of nature (arcana naturae) provided by philosophia naturalis are as helpful in reaching this goal as the ability to conceive proofs and argumentations (philosophia rationalis), I cannot help to wonder whether there shouldn't be a prominent role for ethics in this endeavour.

I am not quite sure whether there is an easy answer to that question. Right now, I think the following two options are conceivable:

(1) The task of moral instruction is delegated to moral theology. Then, the fact that practical philosophy is mentioned as a a legitimate part of philosophy may be - more or less - explained away by the necessity to pay lip service to authorities (both Augustine and Aristotle accept it). Philosophy proper consists of metaphysics cum physics cum logic - sciences that tell us how things are by investigating their causes. The definition of philosophy in the text fits nicely with this interpretation: Moral philosophy does neither tell us how things are nor does it investigate causes. Therefore, it is no part of philosophy.

(2) Moral philosophy is a constitutive part of philosophy as a whole because it is indispensable for leading a good life. This view is attractive because it does not force us to believe that Aristotle and Augustine are irrelevant for Mastrius and Belluto. But what, then, should be the domain of practical philosophy? And how can it fall under the general definition of philosophy as an investigation of things and their causes?

The last question points to another difficulty with the general definition  of philosophy adopted by Mastrius and Belluto: What exactly is cognitio? Cognitio is no habitus, at least it is not mentioned as such in the Nicomachean Ethics. Therefore philosophy as a whole cannot be a habitus, even though some of its parts plainly are (because they are scientiae). Neither can it be synonymous with "notitia", the awareness of singulars that is what an artifex is aware of. The point is not merely verbal: If we accept the formula "cognitio rerum ut sunt sive per suas causas" as a real definition of philosophy the question of what genus it belongs to is at least as important as an understanding of its differentiae specificae. And of that, I confess, I do not have the faintest idea.