Raw Notes ~ Case Study: Deepwater Horizon
Explosion, fire and spill - Mexico, November 18 2010
Offshore drilling - there is no control of the drop of the water head
A riser (section of the rig) provides no control at the top of the rig. Control is achieved by BOP (blow out preventer) however the distance between the BOP and the riser is around 5000ft. Hydrocarbons can enter the riser and through the rig (inflammable)
Dynamic positioning - uses propellers and motors to ensure the rig is fixed in the same position. Vessel must have power at all times
To shift crew rotations involved to operate - requires around 60 people to operate per shift
various contractors involved and coordinated
In the event of a power failure, the BOP and riser must separate. The rig allows this to occurs. There is also a saw in the middle of the rig to cut through the core pipe prior to the separation of the BOP and riser
Remote Operating Vehicles ROV used seal the well from the rest of the riser.
Long string rather than liner and tie-back (one degree of safety less than other mechanisms)
No lockdown sleeve at time of accident
single string over several formations of different pressure
Conducted soon after cementing
Confusing because of unusual spacer
Flows confusing due to offloading
Insufficient response to flow indications
Hydrocarbons entered the riser
Hydrocarbon flow through the MGS
Gas entry into engine room, intake not auto
Engine overspeed, power loss, fire
Crew shut BOP but failed to seal well
EDS pushed but link to BOP lost in fire
Automatic function (separation of the riser and BOP) did not work
ROV operation of BOP didn’t work
Note that if one thing did not occur, the entire catastrophe would not occur.
Cement job failed to seal off the producing reservoirs. Casing seal failed
Hydrocarbon inflow was not recognised, and hydrocarbon entered the riser
Gas ignited on the rig, causing fire and loss of power
The BOP failed to seal the well. Spill will not have happened
There was no uncertainty that the cement job failed
Float collar, uses pressure to enable the insertion of cement into a sealed casing
In the case of the accident, excessive pressure was applied (within the tube) and fractures can occur. Nitrofied cement was used to lower the density of the concrete core - this was so that there was a lower chance of fracturing the concrete
Well pressure must exceed pore pressure
Well pressure must not exceed fracture pressure
Casing protects shallower formations from deeper pressures
Flow Condition not Recognised
Two negative tests conducted and accepted by crew as successful. The test procedure is very uncertain
Lost circulation material and spacer (viscous material to separate mud and water) excessively used
Spacers can be discharged into water only if it has been used
The excessive use of the spacer affected the negative pressure tests
There was a high level of reliance upon manual/human intervention in the activation of DH safety systems.
Blind Shear Ram (BSR) could not shear through anything other than the core pipe during an emergency.
Another blind shear ram (BSR) in the case of the first failure. It seals the well
Real time modelling of fluids and pressures in tubulars (simulations)
Significance of Deep well drilling
One quarter of US oil production comes from deepwater oil fields