#post-positivism

- Jane Freeland (December 21, 2020). "The Allure of the Archive: On Frustration and Comfort in the Historian’s Craft." German Historical Institute London Blog.

In an earlier post of some years ago I treated determinism from the perspective of why so many philosophers believe in determinism -- The Denial of Freedom as a Philosophical Problem -- so too I might frame the problem of naturalism purged of metaphysical fallacies as The Denial of Naturalism as a Philosophical Problem. And here I mean a strict naturalism, a rigorous naturalism, purged of all transcendent teleology, purpose, meaning, and value. This is not to deny that there is teleology, purpose, meaning and value in the world, only that transcendent teleology, purpose, meaning, and value are metaphysically incoherent.

The denial of naturalism as a philosophical problem is a failure to distinguish between philosophy purged of metaphysics (positivism, which in its post-positivist form converges upon naturalism) and naturalism purged of metaphysical fallacies. In other words, this is a conflation of bad philosophy with bad metaphysics, as once naturalism is purged of Metaphysical Fallacies it can be a perfectly respectable metaphysics -- but it is a metaphysical doctrine, and we ought not to dissimulate on that point. 

While I want to avoid metaphysical fallacies and pernicious metaphysics as much as anyone, I have no objection to metaphysics per se. If metaphysics can be formulated in a philosophically respectable way, then that is all to the good as far as I am concerned. Post-positivist thought that hews closely to the traditional positivist line (even if not the name) keeps the flame alive by acknowledging the legitimacy of metaphysics in principle, but rejecting every actual attempt to formulate a metaphysics, which is always found to be wanting.

The positivist project closely resembles the phenomenological project, in its attempt to put into practice a a sweeping, rationalistic program without regard to the underlying history of the thought that is to be transformed by the programmatic approach. For Husserl this was the dream of a philosophy as a rigorous science; for the positivists this was the dream of science rigorously purged of metaphysics. But late in his life Husserl wrote, "The dream is over." Positivistically-conceived science ought also to be brought face-to-face with the harsh fact that the dream is over. Post-positivist thought ought to be exactly this, but it is not.

Of course, we still have survivals of metaphysical fallacies, and we still need to purge our thought of all manner of pernicious metaphysics. Even rigorously conceived and practiced naturalistic thought is subject to a thousand metaphysical ills, and being aware of the danger is usually not sufficient to safeguard against it.

One of the great fallacies of our time has been born of assimilating evolutionary thought to the tradition of the great chain of being, so that evolution itself becomes the temporalization of the great chain of being (scala naturae). In scientific terms, we know that evolution is a mechanism that acts without looking ahead, that it is a branching bush and not a ladder of ascent. All metaphysical fallacies to the contrary have been pointed out countless times by many biologists. We need to go beyond the recounting of scientific fallacies, however, and engage with the metaphysical fallacies, and the metaphysical fallacy in conflating evolution with the great chain of being is that evolution is the mechanism by which all possibilities are eventually actualized, i.e., the principle of plenitude.

This is but one example among countless possible examples, but it is an instructive example. Even today, several hundred years beyond the scientific revolution, it is arguable that the idea of the great chain of being is more easily comprehensible than that of natural selection; our evolutionary psychology has been unaffected by the scientific revolution, so that the business of purging our metaphysical fallacies is stubbornly counter-intuitive. Evolution has produced a brain that is incredulous in the face of evolution. (This is probably the ultimate source of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism.)

Since unadorned naturalism is apparently too appalling to contemplate, instead we get naturalism with the accretion of human desires and wishes, which make it possible for naturalism to serve as a surrogate for more traditional beliefs -- beliefs that inherited considerable mystical and mythological baggage and so served a social function in mediating between the ordinary business of life and human experiences not easily assimilated to ordinary experience.

Metaphysical Methodology

Metaphysical Fallacies

Metaphysical Biases

Metaphysical Fallacies Again

Forms of Metaphysical Bias

Metaphysical Pathology

Addendum on Metaphysical Pathology

Revolutionary Metaphysics

Metaphysical Paradox

Addendum on Metaphysical Paradox

Naturalism Purged of Metaphysical Fallacies

Metaphysical Conflation

i think things are starting to form a circle for me now in my head.  i have talked about theory with heather one on one, in the classroom and by reading assigned readings and every time i think i understand what's going on, i read some more and have yet another 'ah ha!' moment.  so... we live in a positivist-dominated world of thought, according to how we think about IR. while there are many theories under the umbrella of IR (and therefore CFP), the three dominant ideas (realism, pluralism and structrualism) of IR  are "three versions of one world" (Smith, 1996: 11).  first of all, the main question here is simply - what is (canadian) foreign policy? well, as Nossal states quite simply, it is a "frustratingly undefined concept" (2011: 2). but Nossal further explains that (C)FP is, "concerned with the explanation of the behaviour of those who have the capacity to exercise supreme political authority over a given set of issue areas for a given people in a given territory" (2011: 3).  so how is this related to IR theory? to counter the positivist approach, some IR theorists have taken a "critical turn" (Black and Smith, 2014: 134) and are slowly taking the stage in IR theory. this critical turn includes (but are not limited to) alternative perspectives such as post-modernism, critical theory, feminist theory and post-structuralists. 

so to ask the question again: why does theory matter (and how does it relate to the positivist world that we live in) ? Steve Smith says it best arguing that, 

"theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us about what       possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they determine not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons" (1996: 13). so, if theory is therefore limited in nature and structure by the dominated reflections of positivism, then how does this impact CFP? 

well, first we have answered what is dominant in the field of IR and CFP (positivist approaches including but not limited to Kirton's list) which will lead us to the answer of who dominantes the field ---> those who offer a mainstream political view/agenda of IR.

to connect the dots between IR theory and (C)FP we need to look at the epistemology of theory and IR in academia. why? 1) because the limited number of individuals who determine CFP were, at some point, academics in the field of IR, political science or otherwise similar field of study. what they know constitutes and influences what they bring to the table in terms of policy.  2) other than the limited range of influences who determine CFP, dominant academic literature has a degree of impact as well, pending its influence.  this is when we can turn to Zalewski who sees theory as a tool, as a critique and as every day practise.  Zalewski says, "International politics is what we make it to be and the contents of the 'what' and the group that is 'we' are questions of vital theoretical and therefore political importance" (1996: 352) why is this problematic?  "asking what it mens to know, who may know, where knowers are located and what the differences among them mean for the knowledges that result" (Sylvester, 1996: 256/7)